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The law of medical negligence raises, an microcosm but
arguably acutely, many issues facing the law of delict and
tort. This is so because most issues confronting the wider
law - such as compensation - are at least equally relevant
to medical negligence. There are other, stronger, reasons.
These are that medical negligence is at once an unusual and
idiosyncratic field; something relatively rarely
appreciated. Why is this the case? The law regulates many
other professional activities, all of which are likely to
be more difficult to regulate than those of the ordinary
non-professional man simply because they are outwith the
normal experience of the non-specialist. The practice of
account~nts, of engineers, of ship-designers and of many
others may be classified partly or wholly into business and
applied scientific spheres of discourse. These examples,
like many reparation claims appearing before the courts,
may perhaps fall into one or other reasonably clearly
delimited category. By contrast, the practice of clinical
medicine involves science - but with a leavening of less-
quantifiable artistry. Whether that artistry truly has a
characteristic of not being based upon rigorously logical
scientific premises, or perhaps partly masks a subliminal
or subconscious application of logic and pattern-
recognition, is open to consideration. The science upon
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which it 1S based demonstrates a vigorous, hydra-headed
development. With the mapping of the human genome
presently being undertaken, a single example of "leading-
edge" research, many other areas are only slowly yielding
their mysteries. Combined with the "professional" element
and its splendidly variegated practice, the discipline of
medicine, it is submitted, is unusual if not unique in the
difficulties which it presents to regulation by the law. l
As Lord Bridge has put it:
"[L]itigation in the field of medical negligence
continues regrettably to grow in volume. The
growth is probably attributable to two principal
causes: first, the greater awareness of patients
of their legal rights and a greater willingness
to enforce them; secondly, the ever increasing
sophistication of medical procedures. It is
ironic but perhaps inevitable that the further
advances medical science makes in being able to
offer potential cures for conditions previously
incurable or fatal, the more the medical
profession lays itself open to attack in respect
of the mistakes which can occur in the highly
complex and delicate ~rocedures necessary to make
the cures effective.,,2
This eminent lawyer's concern over the incidence of medical
negligence finds an echo in a recent study of deaths
lThe aetiology of disease being a prime example which is
unlikely ever to disappear, and requiri~g a rational. legal
analysis of causation. Unfortunately there 1S anecdotal ev tdence
that these characteristics of medical practice and related
litigation can place barriers in the way of those who suffer
negligence: Brain Damage due to Blocked Tracheostomy Tube: A
12-year Saga, D. Brahams, 1989 Lancet 55.
2Foreword by Lord Bridge, in Medical Negligence, M.J. Powers
and N.H. Harris, Butterworths, 1990.
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following operative procedures;3 especially anaesthetic
complications. 4 Wider ethical and legal debates, for
I ' t' 5 6examp e cover i.nq gene 1C and embryo research, in-vitro
fertilisation
7
and other possibilities perhaps unimaginable
a few decades ago demonstrate the need for a system of law
not only able to analyse such developments in terms of
existing values and concepts, but also one which can
regulate and adapt to the fundamental and changing nature
of the discipline under scrutiny.8 It is submitted that it
3Report of the National Confidential Enquiry into
Perioperative Deaths, 1990, covering deaths within thirty days
following surgical procedures between January 1990 and December
1990, considered infra.
4"The difference is that, in general, surgeons don't kill
but incompetent anaesthetists can." Per Dr. John Lunn,
anaesthetic clinical co-ordinator of N.C.E.P.O.D. study (supra),
quoted in N. C. E. P.O. D. : Surgeons and Anaesthetists could do
better, L. Dilner, 1992 B.M.J. 1071, at p. 1071.
5 Se e generally Law and Medical Ethics, J.K. Mason and R.A.
McCall Smith, third edition, Butterworths, 1991, chapters 6 and
16.
6Discussed in Law and Medical Ethics, cit. sup., chapter 17.
Research utilising embryos is now regulated under the regime
introduced under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
(c. 37). To borrow a phrase, much ink has been spilt on this
subject, but The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990,
P.A. Wiewiorka, 1991 S.L.T. 65 gives a useful outline of the
provisions, and Rights, Restraints and Pragmatism: The Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, J. Montgomery, 1991 54
M.L.R. 524 a discursive analysis.
7 Se e Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (supra) and
inter alia the issues raised in, Assisted conception and clinical
freedom: whose freedom is it? D. Morgan, 1990 N.L.J. 600.
8 I n Scotland, it is arguable that the system of extensive
written pleadings gives parties fair notice, as ,does the pr~ct~ce
of Heal th Boards in making case notes ava i.LabLe to t.h i.rd
doctors" for assessment, perhaps reflecting some movement towa:-ds
greater openness: the Access to Medica~ Reports Act ~990 be1ng
an example. In England, this trend 1S reflected an formal
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1S these characteristics of the practice of medicine which
render it of especial interest to lawyers, and to the
architects of the law.
The law, it is thought, should provide a system of
analysis and substantive provision which must above all be
rational, ethical and just. This thesis therefore attempts
firstly to assess these qualities in the present system in
the main topics in the law of medical negligence, i.e. the
background to, and basis of, liabili ty, the standard of
care and causation.
It will be argued that the aims stated above are not
fully satisfied. 9 In attempting to establish this, it is
hoped that this thesis may fulfil a descriptive role in
summarising the appropriate substantive rules. This
provides a necessary foundation for the final goal of the
work, which is an attempt to devise a reformed general
approach which, it is submitted, may provide at least a
starting point to satisfy these general aims in addition to
those which emerge during the thesis and are summarised
below.
procedure in personal injury litigation. See, The impact o~ ~igh
Court/county court procedural changes on personal 1nJury
litigation, I. Goldrein and M. de Haas, 1991 N.L.J. 1699 and
[E]nding "forensic blind man's buff", C. Dyer, 1987 B.M.J. 1407.




The law of medical negligence occupies no special place in
the jurisprudence of this country. Despite this, or partly
because of it, difficulties exist both in the substantive
rules applied to such liability, constructed in the same
way as any other action in negligence, and also in the
delayslO and other obstacles which defenders must endure
and surmount as much as pursuers. l l Although Scotland has
tradi tionally emphasized fair notice in its system of
detailed written pleadings, the risks of delay and
obfuscation in complex litigation on medical negligence are
present. Mustill L.J., commenting in the Court of Appeal
on the (then) English procedure in Wilsher v. Essex Area
Health Authority, said:
" .. 1 cannot part from the appeal without saying
something about the history of the action. I do
so, not to criticise the practitioners who
conducted the case, but to draw attention to
certain features of medical negligence litigation
as currectly conducted in England and
Wales ... [T] he first feature speaks for itself:
it is delay. The events in question happened in
the first two months of Martin Wilsher's life.
He is now aged 7 1/2 years. Surely this will not
lOConsidered infra.
llFor example, the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and
Compensation for Personal Injury, publ. 1978, Cmnd. 7054 (the
"Pearson Report") found that although 85% - 90% of all claims in
tort were successful, only 30% - 40% of those brought for medical
negligence succeeded (paras. 78 and 1326) and that such cases
also took longer than the norm for personal injuries actions
generally (op. cit., para. 242 and Table 129, vol. II).
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do ..... [T]hey should not have to wait so long.
Secondly, the procedures adopted for the trial
were such as to make the trial quite
unnecessarily difficult to conduct, and to create
a real risk of injustice ... [N]o particulars were
ever given of the persons said to have been
negligent, or of when or how they were negligent.
The defence was served during May 1981. It said
nothing ... [N]o request for particulars notice to
a~mit or interrogatory was served 'by either
slde .... [A]s was stated before us, it was fought
"in the dark" ,,12
The general aims stated above beg the question of how such
a large and ambi tious task is to be approached.
Implicit in any argument for reform is the assumption that
the present approach is unsatisfactory. Accordingly, the
evidence and arguments ln support of this will be
considered. At the time of writing, there 1S remarkably
little evidence for the perceived increase ln claims for
medical negligence. 13 The available data are at present
minimal and have provided little assistance in detecting
trends, although . .an lncrease ln the sizes of settlements
and awards, and probably also of incidence, appears to be
generally perceived. 14 The writer has been able to discover
12 pe r Mustill L.J., Wilsher, [1986] 3 All E.R. at p. 829f -
830e. It should be noted that the procedure in the English
system of personal injury Li, tigation has been improved since
this: described in, The impact of High Court/county court
procedural changes on personal injury Ii tigation, I. Goldrein and
M. de Haas, 1991 N.L.J. 1699 et seg. In Scotland, the
Administration of Justice Act 1982 provides a mechanism for
investigating potential claims, and case notes are often released
by the Health Board (or Trust hospital) to an independent doctor
for assessment of claim potential.
13These trends are discussed infra, particularly in the
context of reform.
14niscussed infra, especially in the context of reform.
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very little useful information, but has been encouraged to
find this general paucity confirmed in these terms:
"[I]t is not presently possible to identify the
number of medical ~ccidents that occur each year
or the number WhlCh result from negligence
because this information is not collected. It i~
clear, however, th~t over the last 10 years or so
the number of clalms for medical negligence has
increased" . 15
Assuming that an increase in the incidence of claims does
exist, the present writer argues that, prior to any
consideration of reform, it is fundamental to look behind
the law to consider its aims and objectives. Only after
evaluating these, and concluding that they are in general
valid even though subject to al teration in the light of
principle and indeed practice, 16 will it be possible to
construct a suitable response to the lssues raised.
15Medical Negligence, M. A. Jones, Sweet and Maxwell, 1991,
at p. 3, citing inter alia Medical Negligence: Compensation and
Accountability, D. Harris et al., King's Fund Institute, 1988,
at p. 11. Jones also notes that the introduction of Crown
Indemnity in 1990 will also mark the start of recording of claims
made under its auspices. This, of course, will exclude claims
in respect of general practitioners and private hospitals. The
Central Legal Office of the Common Services Agency is understood
by the present writer to be embarking upon computerised record
keeping of negligence actions, although these would pertain only
to cases involving N.H.S. practitioners acting within the scope
of their employment and is presumably now overtaken in
completeness by Crown indemnity. The present author has been
unable to obtain any meaningful data from these and many other
sources. The data being collected currently are probably too
recent to display any trends, and remain incomplete in that non-
N. H. S. and general practi tioners remain outside the scheme.
Probably the most satisfactory (English) data are those published
by the King's Fund study, supra.
16Fo r example, as a resul t of the principle of "scarce
resources".
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Thereafter, the writer will put forward his proposals In
implement of these objectives.
Summary
Having considered the form of the work, let us now
summarise its content. 17 This focusses upon the case-law in
Scotland and also in England. 18 This approach excludes an
otherwise purely comparative study, although other systems
of jurisprudence will be considered in relation to reform.
Such a task is outwith the scope of the present work.
The topics in the law of medical negligence selected
for analysis have been so chosen because, it is submitted,
they represent the essential core of the subject and
therefore a suitable structure for the thesis. 19
Accordingly, it is submitted that this constitutes a
logical, systematic and well-established approach. The
thesis concentrates mainly upon the common law relating to
doctors working wi thin the National Heal th Service, and
17An examination of the entirety of the law of medical
negligence in the united Kingdom is beyond the scope of this
thesis. See generally, Medical Negligence, Michael A. Jones,
Sweet & Maxwell, 1991.
18 I n essence the English and Scots law is the same; the
cases appear td be freely cite~ in both ~urisdic~i~ns.
Similarly, the National Health Ser~lce, a~d medIcal traInIng,
seem to be very similar on a U.K.-WIde baSIS.
19Material published after the end of March 1992 has not
been included in this thesis.
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excludes pharmaceuticals, medical machines and strict
liability.
After considering the historical background to the
claim for damages for medical negligence and the present
bases of liability,20 the standard of care, and the fault
principle will be examined. The law relating to consent
will be included only insofar as relevant to the main
principles. This is because a comprehensive examination of
this topic requires a separate, major work. 21 The
principles of causation, and the writer's proposals for
reform will then be considered. Again because of
constraints of space, procedural aspects of the law such as
expert evidence, and prescription and limitation, are not
considered discretely but are introduced where appropriate
in the context of these major topics. The overall aim is
thus to consider the applicability and suitability of the
main principles of delict and tort to the law of medical
negligence. In turn, the rationality and ethics of the law
in this area, and how these might better be served by
reforms, will be discussed.
It will be argued that the test for the standard of
care, the fault principle generally and the rules of
20Th e draft Bill introduced by Rosie Barnes in an attempt to
establish a no-fault compensation scheme is not discussed, as it
is unlikely to be brought before Parliament again in the same
form.
21A Patient's Right to Know, Sheila~. M. Mc~ean,. Dartmouth
Publishing, 1989, contains a comprehe~slve ex~mlnatlon of the
law, practice and wider issues raised ln relatlon to consent.
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causation are unsatisfactory. The legal criterion of fault
precludes the recovery of damages for all non-negligent,
i.e. "non-fault", accidents both in general and in medical
negligence. Despite the allowance of a margin for error
(as opposed to negligence22), this approach is otherwise apt
to be rigid an application, admitting of no intrinsic
flexibility ln respect of training requirements,
inexperience or exhaustion in the medical practi tioner.
It may be contrasted with the concept of the non-delegable
duty, which has been described as a disguised form of
vicarious liability.23 Inasmuch as this implies a broader
view of tortious responsibility, it is likely to promote a
greater degree of supervision and responsibility on the
part of those ultimately liable. It is submitted that this
should be implemented in the law of medical negligence by
the increased liability of doctors of consultant rank, and
ln terms of training by the employing board or trust body.
It is envisaged that the former issue would be included
within the proposals for reform infra, in that such
practices would form part of the audit process and would be
amenable to scrutiny by the proposed new body, whether ex
22 Se e Lord Edmund-Davies' opinion in Whitehouse v. Jordan,
[1981] 1 All E. R. 267, at p. 276: " .. while. some .. errors m~y be
completely consistent wi th the due exerc i se of profess7o~al
skill other acts or omissions in the course of exer c i s i.nq
"clinical judgment" may be S? glari.ngly. below ,proper standards
as to make a finding of negllgence lnevltable.
23J. G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, The Law Book Company,
seventh edition, 1987, at p. 361.
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proprlo motu or raised by referral by a patient.
Whilst issues such as hours worked by junior doctors
and inexperience may play a part in giving rise to a claim
for damages in medical negligence, the wider considerations
which they represent generally have no part in the present
system of Li. tigation. 24 Some confirmation of undetected
negligent, or sub-negligent, defects in the standard of
care, may be inferred from the results of the N.C.E.P.O.D.
study referred to supra. It must be emphasized that this
study is restricted to peri-operative deaths, and therefore
excludes (a) non-death adverse outcomes and (b) non-
operative deaths. This suggests that those cases included
in the study represent a very small proportion of total
medical adverse outcomes, in which there presumably must be
a significant component of hidden negligence or sub-
negligence. In such cases, the recovery of damages is not
possible because of a lack of detection or admission.
Furthermore, if, as must be possible (and is arguably
likely) there is negligent treatment but, coincidentally,
no injury or harm occurs, 25 no legal remedy will be
24 Cf. Lord Justice Mustill's opinion in Wilsher v. Essex
Area Health Authority [1986] 3 All E.R. 801 at p. 812: " .. 1
accept that full allowance must be made for the fact that certain
aspects of treatment may have to be carried out in what one
witness ... called "battle conditions" ... [A]n emergency may
overburden the available resources, and, if an individual is
forced by circumstances to do too many things at,once, the fact
that he does one of them incorrectly should not llghtly be taken
as negligence."
25Questions as to the circumstances in which damages are
awarded have arisen: in Udale v. Bloomsbury Area Health
Authority [1983] All E.R. 522, Jupp J. enunciated a principle of
11
avai lable despi te the breach In th t d de s an ar of care.
Although it may be commented that such cases consequently
do not matter, it is submitted by the writer that such a
response 1S unsatisfactory and represents a serious
inconsistency in failing to discriminate against harm-free
episodes of negligence. In doing so, the effect exerted by
the law towards the improvement of standards of practice,
even if it be at a minimal level of deterrence against
negligence, must seriously be impaired as a result. The
approach to deterrence is therefore rendered haphazard to
the extent that it depends upon the coincidence of
negligence, detection, harm and the raising of an action by
the patient. Nor is the law likely to be effective r.n
deterring sub-threshhold negligence, i.e. practice which
verges upon the legally negligent.
The test for the standard of care, and substantial
reliance upon evidence of common practice, will also be
argued to be unsatisfactory. This is both in respect of
the criterion of comparison (common practice) and the way
in which the test operates in different medical settings.
This is despite the fact that it has been said that, "[I]n
practice, medical negligence is a failure to live up to
public policy that the bi:th of a ~ealthy ba~y.did.not generally
sound in damages follow1ng a f a i. l ed s t.er i l i se t i on , al though
expenses, and pain and suffering, would do so. How~ver, Thake
v. Maurice [1984] 2 All E.R. 513 and Emeh v. Kens1ngton Area
Health Authority [1984] 3 All E.R. 1044 disapproved Udale, Emeh
involving a congenitally abnormal child. See also McKay v. Essex
Area Health Authority 1982 2 W.L.R. 890.
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proper medical standards, and those standards are set, not
by lawyers, but by doctors". 26 Although it has been argued
above that the legal approach to medical negligence 1S
unsystematic, conversely the present legal test may brand
a doctor negligent when he or she makes a single error,
perhaps occas ioned by tiredness or inexperience. Even
where an ultimately unsuccessful or unfounded claim is
made, a doctor will have been subjected to a stressful
period of uncertainty and concern, a factor no doubt partly
responsible for the phenomenon of "physician countersuits"
against patients for libel or defamation in the Uni ted
states, where there appears to be considerable
dissatisfaction wi th the law relating to personal
. . . 27lnJur1es. The current approach risks punishing the
"innocent", as well as allowing some of the "guilty" to
escape unregulated.
Nor 1S the de facto responsibili ty of a National
Health Service hospital consultant in actual charge of the
patient sufficiently reflected legally, as may be seen in
reported cases dealing with the negligence of junior
doctors, who are sued individually, with their employing
d d ho r Lt.i 28health boar s an aut lt1es. It is submitted that the
26Medical Negligence, M.A. Jones, cit. sup., at p. 13.
27"The pleas for radical reform of personal injury law will
not be silenced": D. Harris, Tort Law Reform in the United
States, 1991 11 Oxford J. Leg. Studies 407, at p. 407.
28Unless in the seemingly rare case of a consul tant in
charge delegating, appointing or supervising a junior doctor
negligently, which would constitute a breach of the consultant's
13
non-imposition of liability upon those who are actually
responsible for junior N.H.S. hospital doctors from day to
day, 1. e. the senior medical staff, is to ascribe legal
responsibili ty in part wrongly. This may be contrasted
with comparable professional activities undertaken in
partnerships, whether medical, legal or other, which by
reason of their form rather than content, display a
different pattern in the ascription of liability and
responsibility.29
Furthermore, the use of insurance as well as vicarious
liability in respect of claims in medical negligence, and
the existence of claims which do not proceed to
litigation, 30 operate to reduce the effectiveness of the
fault, and deterrent, criteria. This effect is reduced
further where claims are settled out of court, as amongst
the conditions which may be attached may be an obligation
to keep the amount paid confidential.
In this context, it is postulated that there exists a
public expectation of a very high degree of success in
medical care, which is not always justified. It may be
that this, allied to what may be described as a consumer or
(direct) duty of care.
29Under the Partnership Act 1890, the firm (and partners)
are jointly and severally liable for the delicts of their fellow-
partners (section 10; cf. Mair v. Wood 1948 S.C. 83). A firm
is generally also vicariously liable for the negligent acts of
its employees.
30 The present author has been unable to determine the number
of such claims; this information does not appear to be available.
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claims-orientated mentality, may explain at least the
perception of an increase in such claims in the Uni ted
Kingdom in recent years, 31 al though the adverse consequences
of increasing litigation in this field have been strongly
felt in the United States. 32 It may also be suggested that
the introduction of Crown indemni ty33 will prove to have the
same fault as the preceding medical defence organisation
indemnity lnsurance arrangements that of being too
expensive. The resolution of such conflicting requirements
may ultimately call into question the ethos and balance of
present treatment and compensation issues.
The criterion of causation, it is submitted, 1S
unsatisfactory in its application to cases of increasing
technological and aetiological complexity. Its effect may
be to deny the pursuer or plaintiff a remedy, because of an
31Although the quantification of any increase in claims is
a matter of great difficulty, it seems accepted that the trend
is nevertheless increasing: Medical Negligence, M.A. Jones, cit.
sup., at p. 3.
32professional Liability, R.S. Emerson and R.M. Schwartz,
1983 (January) New York State Journal of Medicine 69 at pp. 71 -
74.
33nepartment of Heal th Circular HC (89) 34. This is not
intended to affect the substantive law (although arguably it may
exert an effect) but entails that the payment of damages in
respect of negligence by N.H.S. hospital doctors, dentists and
others whilst acting within their contracts of employment is by
the employing heal th authori ty. The impetus for this change
(from January 1990) was because of the substantial rise in the
cost of medical indemni ty insurance premiums, which is documented
elsewhere. From 1 April 1991, N.H.S. hospitals which have "opted
out" and assumed trust status also are held financially
responsible for meeting claims in respect of medical negligence
arising in the course of their employees' duties.
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inability to satisfy the relatively simple, but severe and
inflexible, standard required by the law. Indeed, it may
pose a conundrum an which even scientific and medical
opinion cannot state that a given episode of negligence
"caused" the harm in question. Nor, it will be argued,
would a reversal of the onus of proof be a satisfactory
solution. 34 Other than by excision of the causal criteria
by the adoption of a fully needs-based compensation scheme,
there appears to be no way of eliding the necessi ty for
some causal enquiry. However, the reform proposals of this
thesis seek to soften the strictness of the present regime
in both procedural and substantive ways, as considered
infra. A slightly wider scope for compensation,
administered substantially by doctors, will be suggested in
the final chapter, in an attempt to achieve this.
It 1S therefore thought that there should be a
consideration of the aims behind these analytical tools of
fault and causation. Principally these number three:
firstly, "common sense justice", secondly compensation, and
thirdly deterrence. It will be argued that these are in
general valid and desirable goals, albeit also requiring,
in the writer's view, a shift in emphasis from an entirely
reactive system to a partly preventive one.
34procedural difficulties pertaining to the action for
medical negligence, including the recovery of medical records and
expert reports, will also be considered where appropriate.
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Analysis of these objectives yields interesting
results. The content of the rather nebulous term "common
sense justice" need not be satisfied solely by the present
negligence-based action for medical negligence but may, it
1S submi tted, be better met by other means. The same
argument applies to deterrence. Nor, it will be argued,
should the present attempt to deliver compensation by the
same vehicle as deterrence be continued: separation of the
means of attaining these aims, and a re-considered approach
to compensation, are required. 35 Against this, however,
certain of the arguments advanced by Stapleton36 must be
taken into account. If the suggested reform constitutes a
preference in favour of medical negligence victims, it
would .pr1ma facie fall foul of the argument against
preferences in tort37 or delict. It will be argued that
this point is not fully substantiated either in principle
or on examination of her arguments and their application to
t.h i 381S area. stapleton concedes ultimately that preference
35 I n Holland there has for long (since 1967) been a generous
system of social security disability benefits which compensates
anyone who has lost in excess of 15% of income-earning capacity
irrespective of causation. However, in the debate at the time
of writing, it has been argued that doctors are insufficiently
scrupulous in their assessment of patients, and it seems that the
width of the system will require to be restricted: J. Verbeek,
1991 303 B.M.J. at p. 1495.
36Disease and the Compensation Debate, J. Stapleton, Oxford
University Press, 1986.
37stapleton, Ope cit., inter alia at pp. 1-3 and 145 et seg.
38 I b i d.
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1S unavoidable, glven the principle of scarce resources. 39
Further, in the present context, the point is of doubtful
applicability anyway: this is because victims of medical
alleviation of this.
negligence are currently disadvantaged and are therefore
analogous to victims of man-made disease in requiring
It would hardly constitute a
preference to attempt to restore presently disadvantaged
categories to the level of protection to which they are
purportedly entitled. Indeed, it is likely that potential
medical negligence claims may, as with man-made disease (to
which they are not dissimilar) go undetected, an aspect in
itself of the disadvantages of medical negligence claims
unidentified by the Pearson Commission. 4o Regarding
compensation, it will be argued that claimants in respect
of medical negligence should be removed from the purview of
the law of delict and placed entirely under the auspices of
the social securi ty system. stapleton has argued that
systems of compensation should compensate according to the
need of the recipient rather than the cause of the
. . h" 41disab1l1ty or ot er cr1ter1a. Whilst such a possibility
is desirable on grounds of consistency and rationality, it
raises two difficulties. One is that an ultimately
39stapleton, Ope cit., at p . 153: "[T]he most obvious
problem with a tort-derived concept of what is a "just" level of
benefit is that its costliness may preclude the ultimate
comprehensive goal." See also p. 177 et seg.
40 Se e stapleton, Ope cit., ch. 2.
41stapleton, Ope cit., inter alia at pp. 108 and 112-117.
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arbitrary dividing line is still required to distinguish
between compensatable and non-compensatable disabilities.
If not, there is a risk that compensation would be payable
in respect of any imaginable negative aspects of human
life, no matter how trivial. The second is that such a
widening of the scope of compensation would be likely to
constitute, in time if not immediately, an excessive burden
on the public purse and that this would necessitate
restrictions: "[I]n an ideal world, everyone injured in
any accident anywhere, whether caused by negligence or not,
would be fully compensated. However, that is not
possible. ,,42 An economically poor nation is highly unlikely
to be able to spend the sums on damages (or indeed on its
heal th service) which are paid even at present in the
Uni ted Kingdom, and it 1S harder still to imagine the
degree of national weal th required to support a mass i ve
needs-based scheme. Indeed, the most extensive no-fault
accident compensation scheme yet founded, in New Zealand,
has encountered difficulties in funding. 43
However, it is submitted that a compromise between the
theoretical appeal of needs-based compensation and the
practical constraints of scope and funding is possible.
Indeed, it has been recently suggested that reform should
42Should We Find Faul t? Stephen Irwin, "Counsel", The
Journal of the Bar of England and Wales, April 1991 at p. 18.
43Accident Compensation in New Zealand (2 The
Status), John Cumming, 1992 J.L.S.S. 24; New Zealand:




be directed towards eliminating the procedural costs of
administering compensation by the tort system whilst
recognising that not all injury or disability may be
compensated. 44 It will be argued that in view of the
present writer's necessarily inexact risk/benefit
calculation in relation to medical negligence claims and
N. H. S. heal thcare, compensation for harm resul ting from
medical mishap must unavoidably be minimised on grounds of
scarce resources, and in any event removed from the sphere
of damages, instead being disbursed by the more efficient
and less expensive social security mechanism.
contrast to the views of most commentators.
This is in
If it is
ultimately impossible rationally to exclude any category of
injury or disability from compensation, then logically this
requlres maximal compensation for all deviations below a
notional and global norm. 45 If so, and in the light of the
arguments below, it is hardly less logical or rational to
reduce compensation as far as possible. If this is
correct, it follows that no-fault compensation reforms,
usually built upon a delictual-type interpretation of the
44 Th e views of Professor O'Connell, University of Virginia,
speaking at a Conference on alternative means of compensating
medical accident victims, Oxford, England, April 1992, reported
in Reconsidering compensation for medical accidents, R. Smith,
1992 B.M.J. 1066, at p. 1066.
45An d perhaps requiring a system of fines or contributions
levied upon those possessing attributes of whatever sort
exceeding this notional norm. The task of identifying and
quantifying these seems to the wri ter to be unworkable and
arbitrary.
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same aims, are not supported in principle by this thesis.
However, the present author seeks to find a middle way
between these two polarised possibilities.
The form of compensation proposed would be through the
less expensive, quicker and more efficient conduit of the
existing social securi ty network. Following from the
principle of scarce resources, it is submi tted that the
amounts of compensation should be kept as low as reasonably
possible. For the same reason, an admittedly arbitrary
dividing line to exclude trivial injuries, and the early
period of disability, would be required. Compensation in
respect of medical negligence (and indeed all medical
mishap or simply failed treatment) would therefore be
outwith the law of negligence, and treated equally with
other disabili ties. An attempt to reduce public
expectation of compensation for adverse medical outcomes
might well also be advisable. The equally important non-
compensatory goals, including provision for explanations,
accountability and deterrence, would be achieved separately
and more efficiently by other mechanisms.
These proposals, it is thought, infringe minimally (if
at all) stapleton's caveat against preferences. They are
partly the result of a re-evaluation of the balance between
the value of the existing health-care delivery mechanism
and the role of compensation in relation to its benefits.
It is submitted that the aims underlying the law of
medical negligence are better met discretely than by the
21
unsatisfactory combined delivery mechanism. Hence, a shift
of emphasis in the law towards the assessment and even pro-
active control of the actual standard of care is required,
wholly discretely from the compensation issue. Greater
emphasis should be placed upon the concept of deterrence,
modified partly to reduce its pejorative connotations. In
the criminal law, for example, the law allows for the
regulation of conduct per se, not just where demonstrable
harm has occurred. This is shown by the modern law of
inchoate crimes, including conspiracy theories and
particularly the law of attempted crimes. Even if a
"strong" theory of criminal attempt is accepted, such as
the requirement for an overt act, no harm need accrue to
the victim before the perpetrator is liable to criminal
legal consequences. Attention should, it is submitted, be
devoted to the professional conduct of medical personnel,
ideally to minimise and indeed prevent negligent episodes
occurring irrespective of the incidence of harm. As is
evident in the present law, it is thought that the proposed
reforms would not inhibit medical innovation. In effect,
peer review as applied to publications, and systems of
quality control, would act as arbiter. It is submitted
that these suggestions would not be to re-combine the
criminal law and the law of delict, but merely to alter the
emphasis upon one specific area of the latter. This
differs from the approach of most commentators, who tend to
22
concentrate primarily upon the compensation-related aspects
of the law.
The question which remains is how the non-compensatory
goals of deterrence, common-sense justice and indeed
improvements in the standard of care are to be achieved.
It will be argued that various means are required. Amongst
these would be a system of reporting, instituted by
patients, to a panel analogous in some respects both to the
Scottish Mental Welfare Commission, an existing body with
a pro-active role in addition to its reactive one, and also
similar to the Medical Responsibili ty Boards in Sweden.
The primary reason for this 1S to ensure that medical
negligence, accidents and disappointed patient expectations
alike are all considered and an explanation provided; there
1S some evidence to the effect that this is what most
patients seek. 4 6 In addition it is submitted that such a
system would monitor and improve the standard of care,
probably at relatively low expense. This system would also
require to be supplemented with increased use of medical
audit and quality control mechanisms. 4 7 An enhanced role
for the existing General Medical Council in educating and
46A. S imanowi tz : No Faul t Compensation - Short Term Panacea
or Long Term Goal?, in No Fault Compensation in Medicine, ed.
R.D. Mann and J.D. Havard, Royal Society of Medicine, 1989, at
p. 151.
47 Se e chapter entitled "Accountability of Documents". in
Clinical Freedom, Sir Raymond Hoffenberg, publ. by The Nuff1eld
Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1987. This is discussed infra in the
context of reform.
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disciplining persistently negligent doctors 1S also
envisaged. At present it is only the most serious breaches
of professional duty which attract its intervention. The
emphasis upon an educative and positive reaction to
negligent episodes would be increased, instead of a
confrontational approach involving maximal stigma. This
would take into account the doctor who exercises a high
standard of care generally, an order to treat him more
justly, rather than to focus solely upon an isolated
incident. It is submitted that consideration of cases by
the proposed body would be largely inquisitorial in nature
rather than adversarial. This, and the separation of
compensation from professional accountability would, it lS
thought, improve communication between doctor and patient. 48
The test for the standard of care would, subject to an
appeal to the courts, be applied by the profession itself,
reflecting the emphasis presently glven to expert evidence,
a trend unlikely to change in v i ew of the increasing
technology of medical practice. The standard employed
would be that of "acceptable practice", tempered wi th an
allowance for greater or lesser experience or
I Of ' t i 49qua 1 lca lons. It would therefore be an objective test
tempered with a discretion as to subjective factors. The
standard would therefore be seen by doctors, patients and
48A. Simanowitz, ibid.
49niscussed infra in the context of reform.
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indeed other medical personnel as one which it would be
possible to satisfy without the artificial device of over-
emphasizing the junior doctor's need to consult his
superior. These ideas place greater emphasis upon the
benefits, rather than the disadvantages, of a health-care
system free of charge at the point of use.
These suggestions are not perceived as a panacea for
litigation in medical negligence. 5 0 It is hoped that they
may provide a starting-point for a more effective
implementation of essentially the current aims of
compensation, deterrence, and indeed prevention of
negligence, than 1S presently achieved. In a wider
context, this may be viewed as the next stage in a process
of development which has seen the criminal law and the law
of reparation separate from one another. To the extent
that specialisation, and further refinement of the
operation of the law of delict and tort generally, are
proposed, it is submitted that the ideas put forward in
this thesis may be seen as the next stage of development.
50 s e e , International Medical Malpractice Law, D. Giesen,
Mohr/Nijhoff, 1988, at p. 721 et seq., on the trust between the





,This introductory chapter provides a necessarily brief
outline of how the case law of medical negligence has
developed,l in its professional context where appropriate.
It 1S divided into two sections. The first covers
medicine. 2
principally the period from the early cases of medical
negligence, insofar as a starting point is discernible, to
the emergence of pre-National Health Service hospital
Whereas the development of the medical
profession itself has interacted with that of the law, the
establishment of the National Health Service, in Scotland
in 1947-48, has had a substantial effect particularly in
increasing the scope of vicarious liability and in the
duties and standard of care. 3 The second part is not
historical, but covers the present bases of liability of
lA full history of this topic is beyond the scope of the
present work. For accounts of the historical evolution of the
legal systems of Scotland and England, readers are referred
respectively inter alia to, A Legal History of Scotland, D. M.
Walker, vol. 1 (et seg.), W. Green & Son, 1988 and, A History of
English Law, Sir William Holdsworth, vol. 1, Methuen/Sweet and
Maxwell, seventh edition, revised 1956 and reprinted 1982.
2Th e transition from the various types of hospital which
existed before the establishment of the National Health Service
to that system, and the changes in the substantive law which are
associated with it, are considered infra in the section entitled
the Basis of Liability.
3 The law after the inception of the National Health Service
is essentially the modern law and as such is accorded appropriate
treatment infra.
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doctors for the delict of negligence. The overall aim of
this chapter is to elucidate the development of the common
law and to examine its working in the present context.
General Background
It was remarked in 1955 that "[I]t is a tribute to the high
standard in general of the medical profession ln Scotland
that there are practically no decisions on this question
[the standard of care] an the reported cases." 4 Indeed
Black, in his major historical treatise upon liability for
personal injury and death, S makes no reference to the
occurrence of medical or surgical cases. 6 However, he
traces the emergence and development of the remedy of
assythment from the prlor system, essentially one of
tabulated (or tariff) payments in respect of wrongful death
4 pe r Lord President Clyde in Hunter v. Hanley 1955 S.C. 200
at p. 205. Lord Sorn agreed: "[I]t is curious that there should
be no reported case in Scotland in which a decision has been
given as to the grounds on which a doctor can be made liable in
damages." (ibid., at p. 207).
sA Historical Survey of Delictual Liability in Scotland for
Personal Injuries and Death, R. Black: the first three pa~ts of
this work are published in 1975 VIII C.I.L.S.A. commenclng at
pages 47, 189 and 318. The final part is published in 1976 IX
C.I.L.S.A. at p. 57.
6A brief reference is made, albeit not of relevance for the
purposes of the present work; part I, ibid. at p. 49.
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and injury. 7 Regrettably, Walker's comment upon the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, that
"[H]arms and wrongs were no doubt common enough
in Scotland at this time but there was no law of
delict because there could be no enforcement of
reparation. Harms were for the most part
recognised only if criminally cognisable."s
must now be considered dubious ln the light of the
criticisms made by Sellar. 9 No mention of cases involving
medical negl igence appears to be made by Walker. 10 The
earliest use of the term "negligence" has been stated
elsewhere to refer to breach of duty by a public official. 11
Even at the later time of Stair there is little to
suggest that a case in medical negligence might be brought,
unless perhaps reflecting something of criminal
recklessness or intent. 12 Nevertheless, assythment
remained of importance until the late eighteenth or even
7Se e also, The Development of Reparation, D. M. Walker, 1952
64 Jur. Rev. 101, and A Legal History of Scotland, D. M. Walker,
W. Green and Sons, 1988, vol. I, at p. 344, entitled
"[O]bligations arising from harms and wrongs".
Swalker, A Legal History of Scotland, Ope cit., at p. 344.
9Review of Walker's A Legal History of Scotland, supra, by
W. D. H. Sellar, 1992 10 Law and History Review 188, at p. 193.
10walker, A Legal History of Scotland, Ope cit., at p. 344.
11Th i s was in the fifteenth century. Chapter 20, Delict and
Quasi-Delict, by Hector McKechnie, at p. 266, in An Introduction
to Scottish Legal History, Various Authors, publ. The Stair
Society, 1958.
12McKechnie identifies several tranches of cases concerning
professional negligence in the context of debt, and various
intentional delicts such as enticement and seduction. Ope cit.,
at p. 275.
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early nineteenth centuries, after which its use declined
more steeply, despi te continued mis-use of the name .13
Black considers that this remedy would have been
sufficiently flexible to provide compensation for injuries
sustained from a defender's "positive acts", perhaps even
where accidental. 14
However, as we have seen, it is doubtful whether the
remedy of assythment could have provided a remedy against
a medical man in respect of his negligence. 1s The general
remedy gave way steadily in favour of the well-documented
Roman actio legis Aguiliae16 and actio injuriarum,17 a
watershed apparently being the unreported case in 1795,
documented by McKechnie, of Gardner v. Ferguson. 18 This
marked the next stage of a continuing process of separating
the legal treatment of criminal matters, l.e. those
13Black, ibid., at pp. 53-54. The existence of this remedy
was only brought to an end in 1976, by the Damages (Scotland) Act
1976, c. 13, s . 8: "After the commencement of this Act no person
shall in any circumstances have a right to assythment, and
accordingly any action claiming the remedy shall (to the extent
that it does so) be incompetent."
14Black, Ope cit., part I, at p. 54.
1SAssythment would only allow a remedy if the negligence
were criminal: McKechnie, Ope cit., at p. 274.
16Se e inter alia Part I, Negligence in the Civil Law, F.H.
Lawson, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1950 (reprinted 1962).
17Se e inter alia, Delict and Quasi-Delict, H. McKechnie,
ibid.; Designation of Delictual Actions, T. B. Smith, 1972 S.L.T.
(News) 125, and Damn Injuria Again, T. B. Smith, 1984 S.L.T.
(News) 85.
18McKechnie, Ope cit. recounts and discusses this case at p.
276.
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involving some mental element characterisable as such, from
civil litigation, one of the prime functions of which today
lS to provide compensation. 19 It also marked the appearance
of another trend towards the action for damages for medical
negligence familiar today. The sum recoverable in the
system which ultimately emerged was, unsurprisingly, based
upon an assessment of the loss of the claimant. 2o It was a
" .. reasonable sum by trustworthy men of the court, paying
due regard to whether the deceased was bond or free, and
the defender shall be answerable for the sum so assessed
and shall find sufficient cautioners ... therefor. ,,21 The
profession of medicine experienced many changes since the
time of Hippocrates, who suggested some characteristics of
a good surgeon. 22 These included the following:
"[T]he finger nails neither to exceed nor to come
short of the finger tips. Good formation of the
fingers, thumb well opposed to forefinger.
Practice at all operations wi th each hand and
19Th i s is to over-simplify. The other alms of the law of
delict, such as enforcing moral responsibility and deterrence,
will be considered inter alia in the context of the moral basis
of fault.
20 Fo r an account of legal developments reflecting the change
from pastoral to arable farming and feudalism, see chapter VI,
Part III (The Age of Transition), J. W. Jeudwine, Tort, Crime and
Police in Mediaeval Britain, Williams and Norgate, London, 1917,
especially pp. 88-96.
21Black, ibid., at pp. 52-53.
22Hippocrates lived in the fifth century B.C. The
Hippocratic Oath is now taken by few, if any, doctors: Pathways
in Medical Ethics, Alan G. Johnson, Edward Arnold, 1990, at p.
12. In fact the practice of the Greek doctors of the Hippocratic
era appears not to have been all wi th this ideal in mind
(Johnson, Ope cit., at p. 16).
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with both together. Arrange the boiled
the light, the instruments, the position
as~istants. Promote ability,




Hamil ton has chronicled some of the development of the
Scottish profession thus:
"[D]uring James IV's peaceful reign, Scotland was
a leader in the early European renaissance and
under this enlightened King, the study of
medicine in Scotland was particularly favoured
and the growth of a separate secular profession
encouraged. Medical practice outside monasteries
developed, and the surgeons in Edinburgh were
first to appear as a corporate body.,,24
It appears that the partial antecedent of the present
medical profession, unlike the clergy, another ancient
profession, was the trade guild. 25 These have been seen as
the forerunners of the partly-regulatory bodies existing
today such as the General Medical Council. 26 It is likely
that these bodies played a significant role in the
maintenance of standards of practice, as well as other
alms:
23Recounted by Sir Charles Illingworth, in "The Sanguine
Mystery; This Bloody and Butcherly Department of the Healing
Art" The Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1970, at p. 11., .
These quali ties had perhaps partly been forgotten dur i nq the
early middle ages.
24 Th e Healers, A History of Medicine in Scotland, D.
Hamilton, Canongate, Edinburgh, 1987, at p. 7.
25An Introduction to the Law Relating to the Health Care
Professions, P. F. C. Bayliss, Ravenswood publications, 1987, at
p. 1. Bayliss states that the guilds for the city of London
appeared at the turn of the first millenium.
26Ba y liss, Ope cit., at p. 1.
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"The main privileges of each guild were to enjoy
a monopoly over its particular trade in the city,
t<;> h.ol~ property. and to exercise a power of
d1sc1pl1ne or pun1shment over its members, and
ov7r non-members who infringed its rights. The
gU1lds controlled entry to their trades by use of
apprenticeships, and they guarded their trade
secrets closely .... [M] any of the principles of
the guilds will be found in the modern day
legislation which controls the health care
professions. There is an attempt to delineate
each profession from another, to regulate
admission to it by means of a common standard of
training, to exercise a disciplinary power over
its members in their professional practice and to
punish unauthorised practice. ,,27
Such medical practice as existed from around the time of
the eleventh century was regulated by guilds of "medicine,
surgery and dentistry"; 28 the practice of medicine had
subdivided relatively early into these fundamental
divisions, still extant today.29 To describe surgery as
thus regulated 1S perhaps to endow it with an aura of
respectability not always justified. That there existed
considerable dubious practice seems likely, even judged by
the early standards then prevailing:
" [S] urgery was not
practice, and that
respectable; moreover its
of "practical" medicine in
27Bayliss, Ope cit., at pp. 1-2. The emphasis is added. No
doubt this analysis may equally be applied to other professions,
such as the legal profession.
28Ba y liss, Ope cit., at p. 2.
29Today's familiar subspecialties were much longer in their
gestation. The development of ophthalmology, for example, is
cognisable by the substantial numbers of specialist textbooks
published in England dur~ng ~he late eightee~th an~ e~rly
nineteenth centuries: A Br i.ef H1story of Ophthalm1c publ1cat1ons
in America, D. M. Albert, 1986 93 Ophthalmology 699 at p. 701.
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general, was largely an the hands of barber-
surgeons, leeches and other practitioners of
f~lk-remedies, ,and,similarly unlettered persons
w1th no ground1ng 1n the arts or any license to
practice from an established school of
medicine. ,,30
These barber-surgeons of the middle ages apparently tended
to practise
,
1n the towns, unlike their physician
counterparts, who practised in the country.3!
It 1S interesting to note the influence of guild-like
bodies in the development of English law during this
period, analogous to that, for example, of the common
serjeants, viz.: "[T]he order of the coif was a guild of
countors (sic) .... though it did not follow the craft guilds
by seeking incorporation or civic powers. ,,32 The guilds'
" .. responsibility included both the prototypes for ethical
practice and the gr1evance, mediation, and punishment
procedures against malpractices ... [M]edieval (sic) London's
medical guilds regulated professional conduct ranging from
30"The Mediaeval Traffic with Europe", by J. D. Galbraith,
in The Influence of Scottish Medicine, ed. D. Dow (The
Proceedings of the 11 th Bri tish Congress on the History of
Medicine, Edinburgh, 1986); Parthenon, 1988, at p. 11.
Galbraith, ibid., states that clerics were, in 1215, prohibited
by decree from the practice of surgery. (This was by decree of
Pope Innocent III: see "The Sanguine Mystery; This Bloody and
Butcherly Department of the Healing Art", by Sir Charles
Illingworth, The Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1970, at
p. 1.) However, non-surgical physicians, Galbraith says, were
more respected as an academic discipline, and taught during that
period at universities.
3!The Healers, A History of Medicine in Scotland, D.
Hamilton, supra, at p. 21.
32 The Order of Serjeants at Law, J. H. Baker, publ. Selden
Society, (Supplementary Series, vol. 5), London, 1984, at p. 20.
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treatment of wounds and diseases through minutiae of
behaviour at guild meetings. ,,33
In the practice of medicine, however, the clergy now
obtained the ascendancy rather than surgeons. Thus they
" ... so established the distinction between
priestly physicians and profane surgeons, between
a cultivated exercise and a crude craft, between
the sombre profession of medicine and the
sanguine mystery of surgery ... [B] ut al though thus
relegated to inferior status, surgery could at
least claim priority in date of origin, for long
before the dawn of history the surgical treatment
of wounds must have been undertaken; even earlier
than the psychiatric administrations of the witch
doctor and certainly many millenium (sic) before
the advent of rational medicine.,,34
However, it lS likely that this connection between the
practice of medicine and the Church35 continued until the
Renaissance and intellectual revolution originating in the
seventeenth century.36 During this period, advancement in
medicine seems scant by modern standards, but nevertheless
'd f' Li t; 37contalne a core 0 ratlona 1 y. This is demonstrated for
This Bloody and Butcherly
by Sir Charles Illingworth, ~
example by surgeon Tagliacozzi's understanding of the
33Medical Malpractice and Peer Review in Medieval (sic)
England, M. P. Cosman, 1975 80 Transactions of the American
Academy of Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology 293, at pp. 293 -
294.
34"The sanguine Mystery,
Department of the Healing Art",
cit., at p. 1.
35 Se e, The Healers, A History of Medicine in Scotland, D.
Hamilton, supra, at p. 21 et seq.
36Johnson, Ope cit., at pp. 15-16.
37Ba y liss, Ope cit., at p. 2.
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techniques of rhinoplasty, and the importance of beneficial
patient diet in recovery from surgery.38
By contrast, however, far greater, and more rapid,
development was evident from approximately 1600 onwards. 39
It 1S interesting to note that this formative period
coincides with the major legal scholarship of the Scottish
institutional writers, 1n particular the writing of
Viscount Stair's Insti tutions of the Law of Scotland,
published a.n 1681. In the 17th century in Scotland,
however, competition became evident between the emerging
groupings of physicians and apothecaries. 4 o
identifies and describes it thus:
Hamilton
"[T]his [the apothecaries' increasing importance]
was in spite of their lowly place in the town's
hierarchy: unlike the surgeons, they did not
have a craft guild. Relations between the
physicians and the apothecaries were not cordial
and the tension between the two groups became
important in medical politics in Edinburgh as it
did also in London. The reason was simple. The
physician's code did not allow them to make up
their own medicines or lower their considerable
fees. As the apothecary's skills and knowledge
increased as a result of the physicians (sic)
complex prescriptions, the patients started to
consul t directly wi th an apothecary and were
38Surgical Malpractice in the Renaissance and Today,
Madeleine Cosman, 1990 86 Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery 1017
at pp. 1020 - 1022.
39Bayliss, Ope cit., at p. 2. Johnson, Ope cit., referring
generally to the Reformation, comments at p. 16 that "[T]he
turmoil in the basis of ethics coincided with the founding of
modern medicine. For example, anaesthesia and antiseptics were
both discovered wi thin a few years of the publication of Darwin's
On the origin of Species (1859)."
40 Th e Healers, A History of Medicine in Scotland, D.
Hamilton, supra, at p. 57.
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treated by them. This was a constant source of
outrage to the physicians." 41
For the emergence of the structured and highly disciplined
profession of medicine today, we must look to the
nineteenth century and its advances in public health. 42 The
Medical Act of 1858 provides the basic structure of the
profession which is still in evidence today;43 the General
Medical Council, and a system of registration for doctors.
A primary function of this professional body was, and .lS,
to oversee and regulate doctors'
training. 44
qualification and
At the time of the inception of this body, another
trend was beginning to make itself felt - the emergence of
the medical defence bodies, one of the earliest to be
established being the Medical Defence Union, a registered
company limited by guarantee and founded in October 1885.
This was following professional concern generated inter
alia by a damages action for negligent treatment and a
criminal prosecution for assault, involving a different
41 Th e Healers, A History of Medicine ln Scotland, D.
Hamilton, supra, at p. 57.
42Bayliss, Ope cit., at p. 2.
43Currently the Medical Act of 1983.
44An account of the role of the General Medical Council, and
the statutory organisation of the profession, may be found in
Bayliss, Ope cit., part I and ~h. 7 of Part II .. FO~ an account
of the establishment of the Natlonal Health SerVlce ln Scotland,
see, The Healers, A History of Medicine in Scotland, D. Hamilton,
supra, at p. 258 et seq.
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practitioner, in the preceding few years. 45 However, the
Medical Defence Association, which sought to prosecute
unregistered doctors and to support those registered but in
medico-legal difficulty, pre-dated the Medical Defence
Union by roughly a decade but, after the latter's
establishment, ultimately became defunct. 46 Parallel
American recognition of the emerging trend of malpractice
claims is demonstrated by the appearance in New York of
journal articles in 1822, and of a conference speech ln
1872, commenting upon and covering the subject. 47
The medical defence societies now number three in the
Uni ted Kingdom,48 and their main function is to protect,
advise, defend and indemnify doctors against professional
1 , l' 49neg 1gence calms.
Although there was sufficient litigation, both
criminal and civil, to prompt the founding of a defence
45sixty Years of Medical Defence, Robert Forbes, publ. The
Medical Defence Union Ltd., 1948, at pp. 2-3.
46Forbes, Ope cit., at pp. 4-5.
47 The History of Medical Malpractice in New York state, S.
Cirincione, 1986 (July) New York state Journal of Medicine 361,
at p. 362.
48 Th e other two being the Medical Protection Society, based
in London, and the Medical and Dental Defence Union of Scotland,
whose headquarters at the time of writing is in Glasgow.
49At the time of wri ting, the Crown indemni ty scheme for
doctors had only recently been introduced, and the effects of it
upon the defence bodies still remain to be clarified, as does
the possibility that ~o~mercial,i?surance comp~nies might, if
they succeed in ob'ta i.n i nq auf f i c i ent; past c La i.ms data, also
compete in this area.
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union 1n 1885, remarkably little of this has found its way
into the law reports until this century and the last,
perhaps because "[O]mission and neglect are too intangible
for the mediaeval mind." so The earliest reference to the
law of medical malpractice which the author has been able
to trace 1S to the fourteenth century law in England:
"[T]he basic law of malpractice was largely complete by the
end of the fourteenth century; in effect, it required the
physician to be diligent to avoid negligence and to do all
he could for his patient. He was not required to effect a
cure or to possess extraordinary powers or skills."s1
It has been suggested that recognition that the
healing professions, including the veterinary profession
(which was of greater importance in pre-mechanised days)
could not be relied upon to provide a cure, followed the
outbreak of the plague during this period. In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, developments 1n
knowledge and the practice of medicine were accompanied by
an increase in the control over those who were permitted to
SOpotter's Historical Introduction to English Law and its
Institutions, fourth edition, by A K. R. Kiralfy, Sweet and
Maxwell, 1962, at p . 255. However, the surgeon's "common
calling" has been said to give rise to liability independent of
contract but based upon the proper exercise of the art. See, for
example, Medical Negligence, Lord Nathan, Butterworths, London,
1957, ch. 2, at p. 6.
s1professional Liability, R. S. Emerson and R. M. Schwartz,
1983 (January) New York state Journal of Medicine 69, at p. 69.
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hold themselves out as practitioners. 52
However, it was not until these, and later, centuries
that the development of the medical profession, and
attendant claims in respect of malpractice brought a
systematic consideration of the essential basis of the
action
53
and of the test for breach of the standard of
care.
54
One of the earliest of these cases is considered by
Nathan: Everard v. 1615 to the
effect that a negligently injured patient may sue a doctor
who is in contract with a third party. Reported cases were
sporadic after this,56 and it is generally the nineteenth
century which furnishes us with more material. 57
52professional Liability, R. S. Emerson and R. M. Schwartz,
Ope cit., at p. 70.
53Fo r example, where a husband employed a doctor to attend
to his wife. If she then suffered injury resulting from
negligent treatment and the husband sued, the doctor could seek
to argue that there was no title to sue, because of the doctrine
of privity of contract. This in fact happened in the Scottish
case of Edgar V. Lamont 1914 S.C. 277. (The doctor's argument
was rejected, with liability being based upon a duty owed to a
non-contracting patient. The wri ter is not aware of any
attempt's being made to found an action raised by wife in respect
of a jus guaesitum tertio.)
54Nathan states that the delictual (sic) remedy of assumpsit
came to be associated wi th some cases of medical negligence
brought under contract (op. cit., at p. 6). Confusion was thus
engendered as, at least in some of the early (English) cases,
there was a tendency to express tortious liability in contractual
language (Nathan, Ope cit., at pp. 6-7).
55cited as (1615) 2 BuIst. 332 by Nathan, Ope cit., at p. 9.
56E. g. Slater V. Baker and Stapleton (1767) 2 Wils. K. B.
359.
57Slater V. Baker and Stapleton, (1767) 2 Wils. K. B. 359,
is an English case tried, as were almost all, by jury. The
plaintiff was the patient. Primarily the report recounts the
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The writer submits that the substantive law of medical
negligence has changed less than one might expect since
this period. The difference is principally in the test for
the standard of care and in the use of juries. The English
case of Seare v. prentice,58 reported in 1807, provides some
support for this. No question of privity of contract was
raised, the plaintiff shoemaker also being the patient in
respect of a dislocated elbow and fractured arm which
prevented him from carrying on his trade. In issue was
whether the doctor had been negligent, a verdict an his
favour having been returned at the original trial. It may
be noted that, as this was prior to the passing of the
Medical Act 1858, the doctor had not only held himself out
as a surgeon, but was clearly also qualified and
experienced to a generally appropriate degree; no issue of
his being an impostor was raised. As is still the case,
the evidence of expert medical wi tnesses was of great
influence, Lord Ellenborough C.J. holding the general rule
to be that " .. an ordinary degree of skill is necessary for
a surgeon who undertakes to perform surgical
operations .... and al though I am ready to admi t that a
surgeon would be liable for crassa ignorantia, ... ,without
differing expert (and other) evidence upon the conduct of the
doctor and apothecary in question; very little discussion of the
legal standard is given. Two legal issues raised were a possible
contractual relationship between co-defendants, and of more
interest, a very brief reference to the question of consent and
trespass "vi et armis".
5818 0 7 8 East. 348.
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the ordinary qualification of skill ... ". 59 The meri ts were
dealt with unanimously, Lord Ellenborough C.J. continuing
" t... ye the [above] question did not arise upon the
evidence; for no want of skill was imputed to the
defendant; and therefore the opinion of the learned Judge
[Heath J. at first instance] upon the point does not affect
the meri ts of the verdict upon the evidence in the cause. ,,60
An immediate difference between this and the modern
standard of care 1S an the reference to "crassa
ignorantia". Today, as discussed infra, the standard is
one of the ordinary skilled doctor. 61 It is also clear that
there is only one standard to be applied, that of
negligence and not, as is perhaps implied in Seare, an
additional alternative one of gross negligence. The writer
further suggests that an the present law, ignorance and
want of skill, rather than involving forensic investigation
under a separate heading as in Seare, would s imply be
incorporated within the concept of negligence.
The question of whether a non-contracting patient
could sue a surgeon arose, by reason of infelicitous
pleadings, in the English case of Pippin v. Shepherd in
1822. 62 Counsel for the defendant (Bayly) summed up the
59Seare v. Prentice, ibid., at p. 352.
60Seare v. Prentice, ibid., also at p. 352.
61 Se e Farquhar v. Murray 1901 3 F. 859 and Hunter v. Hanley
1955 S.C. 200, discussed infra.
62 18 2 2 11 Price 400.
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rnat ter thus: "[T]he single question is, whether this
declaration, which is for a tort in form, but founded, in
substance, on a contract, can be considered sufficient,
when it does not state anyone of the terms of the
contract, which is the gist of the plaintiff's cause of
action.,,63 There was no averment of a contract, but bald
statements that the defendant was a surgeon and had been
employed to produce a cure, in which he had (negligently)
failed. The three judges present64 agreed that the patient
could bring an action, apparently based upon the tort
doctrine of assumpsi t, irrespective of the contracting
party.65 An interesting insight into the context of
Wood B.
treatment at that time and a related policy question may be
gleaned from the opinion of Garrow B.:
"[I]n the practice of surgery particularly, the
public are exposed to great risks from the number
of ignorant persons professing a knowledge of the
art without the least pretensions to the
necessary qualifications, and they often inflict
very serious injury on those who are so
unfortunate as to fall into their hands. To hold
63pippin v. Shepherd, supra, at p. 407.
64 Lo r d Richards C. B., Graham B. and Garrow B.;
being absent.
65suggesting that gratuitous treatment would, if negligent,
be afforded the same remedy. (See generally the opinion of Heath
J. in Shiells and Thorne v. Blackburne (1789) 1 Hy. BI. 158 and
Coggs v. Bernard (1703) Ld. Raym. 909. In relation to the former
case see also Nathan, Ope cit., at p. 8 (footnote), who suggests
that' following Lord Loughborough's opinion, the true position
is ,,'.. that where the services are rendered by one professing
special skill there exists a duty to exercise skill as well as
care.")
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the contrary would be to leave such persons ln a
remedyless state.,,66
Gladwell v. steggall,67 involving a declaration apparently
based upon tort, concerned an infant of ten years whose
father employed a clergyman who held himself out as having
medical skills, to cure a leg condition albeit with
unfortunate resul ts. It was held that the patient was
entitled to raise an action in respect of this through her
"next friend", the action being acknowledged by the judges
to be delictually based. 68 Whilst in 1835 the case of
Hancke v. Hooper69 gave authority for the proposition that
66Pippin v. Shepherd, supra, per Garrow B., at p. 409.
67 18 39 5 Bing. (N.C.) 734.
68Charlesworth and Percy (on Negligence, by R.A. Percy,
Sweet and Maxwell, seventh edition, 1983 at p. 542), discussing
consideration in contract, ci ting inter alia Gladwell v. Steggall
(supra) as authority, say that "[T]his consent, which may be
implied, amounts to an agreement on the part of the patient to
allow himself to be treated and is sufficient consideration for
an implied promise to exercise proper care and skill.". Whilst
this is highly probable, the writer confesses to puzzlement as
to the authority in Gladwell for this proposition; it is
respectfully submitted that the case exemplifies this analysis
by implication. See also Harmer v. Cornelius (1858) 5 C.B.
(N.S.) 236.
69 18 3 5 7 Car. & P. 81. Tindall C.J. in his summing up to
the jury, ibid. at p. 84, said " .. the question is, whether you
think the injury which the plaintiff has sustained is
attributable to a want of proper skill on the part of the young
man, or to some accident. A surgeon does not become an actual
insurer; he is only bound to display sufficient skill and
knowledge of his profession. If from some accident, or variation
in the frame of a particular individual, an injury happens, it
is not a fault in the medical man."
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a surgeon was (vicariously) liable70 for the negligent act
of his apprentice,71 the best known case of this period,
dealing with the standard of care, was Lanphier (and Wife)
v. Phl' POS . 72 M L h' 1 d t t' h_ rs anp ler, a arme a an encoun er Wlt a
cow in a field, tripped and apparently broke a bone in her
However, treatment by splint and bathing in warm
water did not prevent serious swelling and inflammation.
In charging the jury after reading out the pleadings, Lord
Chief Justice Tindal, in a classic statement, said,
"[W] hat you will have to say is this, whether you
are satisfied that the injury sustained is
attributable to the want of a reasonable and
proper degree of care and skill in the
defendant's treatment. Every person who enters
into a learned profession undertakes to bring to
it the exercise of it a reasonable degree of care
and skill. He does not undertake, if he is an
attorney, that at all events you shall gain your
case, nor does a surgeon undertake that he will
perform a cure; nor does he undertake to use the
highest possible degree of skill. There may be
persons who have higher education and greater
advantages than he has, but he undertakes to
bring a fair, reasonable and competent degree of
k ' l l ,,73s 1 ...
70Bu t a surgeon would not be liable for the carrying out of
something properly left to another person, such as a nurse
bathing a patient: Perionowsky v. Freeman (1866) 4 F. & F. 977.
71Ma ny of these cases disclose that the medical practice
concerned was, by modern standards, primitive. The treatment
sought by the patient in this case was bleeding for a head
ailment. However, since the patient specifically had requested
this treatment, having obtained relief from it on a previous
occasion, the surgeon could not be held liable for the carrying
out of the patient's wishes not providing a beneficial result.
72 18 38 8 Car. & P. 475.
73Lanphier v. Phipos 1838 8 Car. & P. 475, per Tindal C.J.
at p. 479.
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Dugdale and stanton comment that the framing of the test in
this manner was to emphasize to the Jury that the
professional man was not to be taken as warranting the
success of his WOrki74 the implications of this were fully
drawn out in Lord Donaldson's speech regarding the
possibility of non-negligent errors of medical judgment ln
the House of Lords in Whitehouse v. Jordan75 as recently as
1981. It is notable that, in relation to an attorney, it
was held in 1836 that a mistake would only ground an action
for damages for negligence if it also demonstrated want of
reasonable skill and care. 76 This approach was in essence
confirmed subsequently in Rich v. Pierpont,77 an obstetric
case in which ErIe C.J. said U[AJ medical man was certainly
not answerable merely because some other practitioner might
possibly have shown greater skill and knowledge; but he was
bound to have that degree of skill which could not be
defined but which, in the opinion of the jury, was a
74professional Negligence, A.M. Dugdale and K.M. stanton,
second edition Butterworths, 1989, at pp. 232-233. They also
comment (ibid.) that U[IJt is doubtful whether its use produced
decisions which would differ from modern law." The wri ter
respectfully agrees with this viewi discusssed infra.
75[1981J 1 W.L.R. 246.
76 pe r Alderson B., at pp. 292-293 in Shilcock v. Passman,
1836 7 Car. & P. 289.
77 18 62 3 F. & F. 35.
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competent degree of skill and knowledge.,,78 This test was
invoked by the defendant's holding himself out as a
doctor;79 this avoided difficulties, in those early days of
registration of qualified doctors, in rendering impostors
liable under the same system which also dealt with the
negligence of those who were duly qualified. Nor was the
possibility of criminal liability for negligence unknown.
Thus ln Reg. v. Chamberlain,80 a herbalist prescribed
arsenical ointment for a patient suffering from a tumour.
The patient, not advised of the potent and toxic nature of
the ointment, died. Although a verdict of not guilty of
manslaughter was returned, the terms of Blackburn J.' s
charge to the jury are notable for their expression of the
standard of care:
"[ I ] f the prisoner by culpable negligence had
caused the death of the deceased woman, he was
guilty of manslaughter; but the mere fact that
death had occurred through mistake or misfortune
would not be enough, or no medical man would be
safe. There must, however, be competent
knowledge and care in dealing with a dangerous
drug, and if the man either was ignorant of the
nature of the drug he used, or was guilty of
gross want of care in its use, there would be
criminal culpability. ,,81
78Ri c h v, Pierpont, supra, per ErIe C.J. at p. 40. The jury
found for the defendant doctor. One might observe that, if civil
trial by jury was presumably supposed t~ be by the defen?ant's
peers, there is an argument that the Jury should cons i s t of
doctors!
79Jones v. Fay 1865 4 F. & F. 525; Ruddock v. Lowe 1865 4 F.
& F. 519.
8°1864 10 Cox's Crim. C. 486.
81Re g. v. Chamberlain, ibid., per Blackburn J. at p. 487.
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Little explanation of the term "culpable negligence" is
glven. The word "culpable" presumably signifies a greater
degree of negligence than on the civil standard, and thus
seems to be more analogous to today's criminal
recklessness. The use of the words "gross want of care"
offers some support for this proposition. However, it is
possible that the prosecution was inspired by the serious
consequences of the malpractice rather than the
demonstrated ae r i.ousries s of the mental element. In a
similar case, Reg v. McLeod82 in 1874, Denman J. charged the
jury that,
" .. if the jury were satisfied that the death was
caused by morphia; and if it was administered
without proper care, skill and caution, and
wi thout a proper knowledge of morphia by the
prisoner ... in any other way that would be clear
negl igence - he would not use the term "gross
negligence", because it was liable to
misinterpretation and if that was so the
prisoner would be guilty of manslaughter.,,83
This also suggests that something similar to the civil
standard of negligence, in suspicious or tragic
circumstances, would have been in theory sufficient to
ground conviction for manslaughter. 84
82 18 74 12 Cox's Crim. C. 534.
It again suggests
83Re q. v. McLeod, ibid., per Denman J. at p. 538.
84Again a verdict of not guilty was returned.
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that there was an overlap ln the civil and criminal
approaches to medical negligence during this period r n
England.
The Scottish Approach
By contrast, it seems that in Scotland very few, if any,
cases of medical negligence had been reported during this
period,85 despite the increasing medical consultations
suggested by the founding of the Royal Medical Colleges of
Scotland.
86
Thus Guthrie Smith commented in 188987 that,
"[T]he cases in which damages have been claimed
for negligence from medical men are not very
numerous, and the few that have occurred have
chiefly arisen from hasty and inaccurate
expressions of opinion in medico-legal cases ....
[F]or illegal detention in a lunatic asylum
damages may be recovered from the person applying
for the warrant, the medical men who grant the
certificate, and the keepers of the asylum who
85Remarkably little reference to such cases, in law reports,
digests, Institutional writings and textbooks has been found by
the writer, in research in various University and the National
Libraries, etc.
86Th e Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, founded 1505;
The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow, founded
1599 and the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, founded
1681. Source: chapter 12: The Scottish Colleges - Teaching and
Examining Abroad, T. J. Thomson, p. 161, in The Influence of
Scottish Medicine, ed. D. Dow, Parthenon, 1988 (The Proceedings
of the 11th British Congress on the History of Medicine,
organised by the Scottish Society of the History of Medicine,
Edinburgh, August 1986.)
87The Law of Damages, J. Guthrie Smi th, second edition,
1889, T. & T. Clark, at pp. 54-55. See also first edition, 1864.
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joined in the conspiracy, but under our reformed
lunacy law such a case can hardly now occur .... ,,88
The learned author continues, following a subheading,
"[TJ he option of suing the delinquent in contract or
delict, which is competent against legal practitioners as
well as medical men ... ,,89 Al though this appears to be a
general statement, it is not clear whether the reference to
medical men is restricted to the context of certification
under the then-prevailing lunacy laws. 9o
A similar case is that of Urguhart v. Grigor91 in 1864,
albeit involving a doctor's making an incorrect statement
regarding the pursuer to a third party, a procurator
fiscal. 92 If given honestly, it was held, the doctor was
not held responsible for the statement's correctness. 93
However, Simpson v. Allan94 exemplifies the type of medical
88Guthrie Smith, Ope cit., at p. 54. Footnotes are omitted.
89Guthrie Smith, Ope cit., at p. 55. The emphasis is added.
90Given the dearth of authority on this subject to which
Guthrie Smith previously refers (ibid., at p. 54) it seems likely
that some such restriction upon its meaning, notwithstanding the
context, may not unreasonably be inferred.
91 18 64 3 M. 283.
92 Th e headnote refers to "[IJnjury affecting character" and
"[pJrivileged statement".
93 I n England, it was ultimately held that a doctor who
examined a patient pursuant to the Lunacy and Men~a~ Trea~ment
Acts 1890-1930 and negligently and wrongly cer t i.f Led h i.m as
insane owed the patient a duty of care; see inter alia Hall v.
semple'1862 3 F. & F. 337 and Harnett v. Fisher [1927J 1 K.B.
402.
94 18 9 3 1 S.L.T. 526.
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malpractice case of which the Scottish courts were seized
at that time. 95 Although very little detail is reported,
the essence of the dispute was that the fact of the
defender's employment as a "medical attendant" was in
lssue. The basis of liability, if duly established, would
thus have been in contract. The question of law, although
not its answer, is recorded as whether the defender
"through negligence or unskilfulness, failed to supply
proper medical and surgical treatment to the pursuer. ,,96 An
oft-cited early case is that of Farguhar v. Murray97 r.n
1901. The case provides notably little assistance in that
it concentrates upon the pleadings and the evidence at the
expense of considering the law itself, despi te the fact
that Lord Young stated that "[I]n my somewhat long
experience I cannot remember having seen a similar case
before.,,98 However, the standard of care envisaged by the
court was that of gross negligence:
"I understand the law to be this, that an action
of damages may be maintained against a medical
man, ... ,for crassa iqnorantia or crassa
negl igentia. But there must be ei ther gross
ignorance or gross negligence, and this action in
order to be relevant must present a case of gross
95 Se e also Smith v. McLachlan 1894 S.L.T. (Reps.) 526.
96 r b i d., at p. 527.
97 1 9 01 3 F. 859. The case of Pollok (sic) 1900 2 F. 354,
regarding an unauthorised post mortem examination, is unhelpful
to our purposes.
98Farguhar v. Murray, at p. 862.
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ignorance, gross want of professional knowledge,
or gross carelessness.,,99
Lord Moncreiff agreed both that the pursuer had a prima
facie case and as to the standard of care:
"I agree with the majority of your Lordships that
on the pursuer's statements there was a case for
inquiry. I do not doubt that in some
circumstances a medical man may render himself
liable in damages if through gross negligence or
remissness (sic) he induces or permits a patient
to continue under a course of treatment which,
though beneficial at first, becomes injurious and
dangerous if continued too long. ,,100
Despi te these expresslons as to the standard, and the
argument by the defender that the word "gross" should be
included in the question at issue, it was referred to the
jury without the amendment sought. 101 Nevertheless, it is
submitted that the case bespeaks a test of gross
negligence.
with this standard of care seemingly accepted, other
developments proceeded apace in the Scots law, some of
which reflected those in England. Thus, liabili ty may
likewise be based upon holding out. 102 The question of
whether a patient had title to sue, where her husband
99 pe r Lord Young, ibid., at p. 862. His Lordship would have
upheld the Lord Ordinary's judgment.
lOOFarguhar v. Murray, ibid., per Lord Moncrieff, at p. 864.
lOlFarguhar v. Murray, ibid., at p. 864.
102nickson v. Hygienic Institute 1910 S.C. 352.
51
contracted with the doctor to treat his wife,103 was also
answered in the affirmative. Lord Salvesen said:
" .. the clear ground of action is that a doctor
owes a duty to the patient, whoever has called
him in and whoever is liable for his bill, and it
is for breach of that duty that he is liable, in
other words, that it is for negligence arising in
the course of the employment, and not in respect
of the breach of contract wi th the employer. ,,104
Again as south of the border, the liability was recognised
as being based upon the holding out of the practi tioner
concerned. 105
An additional development ln medical practice became
reflected ln the case-law. Whereas hitherto most
litigation had been concerned with individual
practitioners, increases in the size of general practices,
and increases in the amount of hospi tal medical practice, 106
inevitably gave rise to claims. The introduction of
indemni ty insurance for doctors, and the passing of the
103Th i s arose in Edgar v. Lamont 1914 S.C. 277. The wife's
originally cut finger ultimately required amputation.
104Edgar v. Lamont, ibid., per Lord Salvesen at pp. 279-280.
105Dixon v. Hygienic Institute 1910 S.C. 352.
106Arguably also the advances in anaesthetics, away from
ether to curare-derived skeletal muscle-relaxant drugs, such as
succinylcholine, which allowed surgery to become much safer.
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N t.i 107a lonal Health Insurance Act 1911, have been advanced
as further factors affecting the accelerated development
and expansion of the services of the Medical Defence
Union. loa Perhaps the most obvious expression of this was
the establishment of reciprocal medical defence agreements,
recognising the doctrine of vicarious liability applying to
partnerships. These extended protection and indemnity for
doctors practising as principals in general practice, to
employed assistants or locum tenens, even if members of a
different medical protection organisation. l 09
The hospi tal facili ties that existed in England up
until approximately 1800 had consisted mainly of
(charitable) voluntary hospitals and workhousesjllO perhaps
low expectations, both generally and in respect of the
likely efficacy of treatment, together with lack of
resources with which to pursue a claim, militated against
many be ing brought. In Scotland, the Royal College of
l07Raising the question whether doctors were actually
employees, under a contract of service with the hospital or not:
see Scottish Insurance Commissioners v. Edinburgh Royal Infirmary
1913 S.C. 751.
loaSixty Years of Medical Defence, Robert Forbes, ibid., at
p. 59. One reason apparently put forward for the need for the
indemnity scheme was the " "greatly increased danger of
fictitious claims being made owing to the spirit fostered by the
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 among the wage-earning
classes." " (ibid., at p. 59.)
l09 Suc h as the then London and Counties Medical Protection
Society. See Forbes, Ope cit., at pp. 66-67.
llOThe Hospitals 1800-1948:
Administration in England and Wales,
Pinker, Heinemann, London, 1964, at
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p. 4.
Physicians of Edinburgh had in 1725 established an appeal
for the bUilding of an Infirmary.111 Indeed, pre-eminent
amongst the various types of pre-N. H. S. hospi tals were
voluntary (charitably or voluntarily endowed), and local or
public authori ty, hospi tals, 112 the transfer of most of
which to the health service took place in the 1940s. One
of the main legal issues which this process raised, or
expanded, was that of vicarious liability.
This, already known in Scots law,113 did not take long
to become as firmly established in the law of medical
negligence as elsewhere, even before the roles of medical
personnel and their status as employees or independent
contractors had been clarified,114 ultimately by absorption
111Th e Hospital Movement of the Eighteenth Century and its
Development, W. H. McMenemy, at p. 56, ch. 3 in The Evolution of
Hospitals in Britain, ed. F.N.L. Poynter, Pitman, London, 1964.
112La w Relating to Hospitals and Kindred Institutions, S. R.
Speller, third edition, 1956, Lewis & Co., at pp. 1-3, and
chapter 1, generally on the defini tion and classification of
hospitals.
113Se e Baird v. Hamilton (1826) 4 S. 790. A discussion of
the development of the principle is outwith the scope of this
work; much has been written on the subject. See, principally,
the discussions in D. M. Walker, The Development of Reparation,
1952 J. R. 101; Culpa Tenet Suos Auctores: The Application of
a Principle, G. MacCormack, 1974 J. R. 83.
114Se e inter alia Hillyer v. Governors of st. Bartholomew's
Hospital [1909] 2 K.B. 820, Gold v. Essex County Council [1942]
2 K.B. 293, Cassidy v. Ministry of Health [1951] 2 K.B. 343,
Reidford v. Magistrates of Aberdeen, 1933 S.C. 276, and McDonald
v. Board of Management of Glasgow and Western Hospitals 1954 S.C.
453 discussed infra. An account of the development of hospital
liability (in England) for professional staff is given by R. M.
Jackson and J. L. Powell, in Professional Negligence, third
edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1992, at p. 458 et seq.
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into the National Health Service. 11S In modern practice, it
lS based upon the employment of medical personnel, at least
so far as N.H.S. hospitals are concerned. In the private
health-care sector, many medical personnel, such as
radiologists and nurs i.nq staff, will be subject to a
contract of employment with the hospital or private
healthcare company, and as such, the normal principles of
vicarious liability will apply. Where doctors, of
consultant or lesser rank, use private hospital facilities,
this will often be as a contractor for the services the
hospital provides or as an independent consultant.
Liability would thus depend upon whether damage was caused
by the consultant's negligence, a procedure or product for
which the hospital would be responsible, either directly or
vicariously through other employees.
d d i d' f 116These and relate matters are lscusse ln ra,
although the standard of care, ln the absence of an agreed
contractual term for a particular outcome, seems to be very
similar in contract and delict. 117 It may be noted that
hospital practice has also given rise to recogni tion of
11SDiscussed infra.
116Under the heading of Basis of Liability. See generally
Hospitals and Trained Nurses, A. L. Goodhart, 1938 54 L.Q.R. 553
and section 10 (Hospitals), in Charlesworth and Percy on
Negligence, Ope cit., p. 550 et seq.
117stevenson v. Shafer 1953 S.L.T. (sn. Ct. , ) 107; Eyre v.
Measday [1986J 1 All E.R. 488; Thake v. Maurice, [1986J Q.B. 644.
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some direct delictual duties,llS inter alia in respect of
unsafe systemsl 19 or insufficiently experienced staff. 120
A judicial attitude indicating greater flexibility than one
might have expected may be apparent in a recent case in
this area which was originally and erroneously pled in
contract. It was allowed to proceed to proof after major
amendment of, and answers to, the closed record being made
to convert the fundamental basis of the case to delict. 121
These matters, however, are more properly the province
of the modern law, and it is to this which the thesis now
turns: the bases of liability.
118Recent suggestions for the extension of this ground,of
liability may be found in Wilsher v., Essex Area Health Authorlty
[1986] 3 All E.R. 801, C.A., per Glldewell L.J. at p. ~31g - h,
and per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C., at p. 833J - 834c.
119Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council and Another
[1947] 1 All E.R. 633.
120Jones v. Manchester Corporation [1952] 2 All E. R. 125.
121Jones v. Lanarkshire Health Board 1990 S.L.T. 19.
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The Bases of Liability
This thesis has already considered briefly the historical
development of the law of medical negligence in Scotland
and England. Al though a significant proportion of this
remains relevant today, it requires to be brought up to
date, including some consideration of recent changes to the
health service and to liability for negligence.
Accordingly, this part of the chapter seeks to outline the
legal bases of liability of a doctor sued in Scotland for
damages for medical negligence. It focusses mainly upon
the Scottish, National Health Service hospital doctor or
general practitioner acting within the scope of his
employment; private practice 1S also considered where
appropriate.
The basis of liability for medical negligence may be
analysed in essentially two ways. It may mean firstly
whether a claim is brought in contract or delict. This is
determined by whether the patient in question consults the
doctor privately or under the National Health Service,l an
organisation established 1n 1947-48 " .. to secure
improvement in the physical and mental health of the people
of Scotland and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of
lNO guarantee of treatment by any individual doctor is glven
under the National Health Service. Although the doctor could
agree to alter the usual standard of care without payment, the
essential randomness of allocation of doctor does imply that
whatever standard of care be imposed be in general, or objective,
terms.
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illness .. ".2 When consultation is sought privately, the
parties will be free to agree such terms as they wish.
These may include a term guaranteeing a particular result
or altering the standard of, or indeed the existence of the
duty of, care. However, such a term is unlikely to
preclude the co-existence of a duty in delict or tort. 3
Normally, however, the existence and content of a
contractual duty will be similar to that which applies in
delict or tort,4 and the courts have indicated that they
will be reluctant to imply terms departing from this into
such a contract, in the absence of express stipulation by
the parties. 5 Secondly, the basis of liabili ty in this
context may refer to whether the claim is brought against
a general practi tioner, against a heal th authori ty for
2National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1947, c. 27, s.
1 ( 1 ) .
3Edgar v. Lamont 1914 S.C. 277; Gladwell v. Steggal (1839)
5 Bing. (N. C.) 733 (clergyman also acting as medical man);
Edwards v. MalIan [1908] K.B. 1002 (dental negligence). In other
areas in the law of negligence, contractual and tortious duties
are owed simultaneously; Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Mardon [1976J
2 All E.R. 5 (Court of Appeal), supported by the House of Lords
in Pirelli General Cable Works v. Oscar Faber and Partners [1983J
1 All E.R. 65; cf. recent developments reducing the incidence of
duties of care and recovery of damages for defective buildings:
Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1990J 3 W.L.R. 414 (House
of Lords); also the case of Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu
Chong Hing Bank Ltd. and Others [1986] 1 A.C. 80 (P.C.).
4Thake and Another v. Maurice [1986] 1 All E.R. 479; also
Eyre v. Measday [1986J 1 All E.R. 488.
5Thake and Another v. Maurice, supra; Eyre v. Measday,
supra.
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direct liability,6 for vicarious liability 1n respect of
employed medical personnel, or contractually in respect of
private treatment. For a pursuer, it will be attractive to
sue an institution if the alternative were an individual ,
because of potential difficulties in identifying the doctor
or for financial reasons after the introduction of Crown
indemnity. These "structural" possibilities will be
considered after the substantive matters of actions raised
in contract and delict. In doing so, it 1S the purpose of
this section to expound the legal bases of the present
action for damages for medical negligence.
Contractual Aspects
Prior to the establishment of the National Health Service
in 1947-48, the law relating to the liability of a medical
practitioner in contract had developed substantially
because of cases brought in respect of private treatment. 7
The simplest example 1S where a patient consults his
6 Su c h as a failure to provide a proper system of healthcare,
or perhaps in the negligent appointment of an unqualified doctor.
Direct liability was canvassed by Mustill L.J. at p. 811b - 812b,
in whose opinion Glidewell L.J. generally concurred, in Wilsher
v. Essex Area Health Authority [1986] 3 All E.R. 801 (C.A.).
Al though the pleadings were not framed in terms of direct
liability (cf. Pain J. 's opinion at first instance, considered
by Mustill L.J., ibid.), it may not be too great an exaggeration
to consider this as a suggestion for future cases.
7E . g . Dickson v. Hygienic Institute
v. Winsbury-White [1937] 4 All E.R. 494.
claims were being allowed in delict in
consultation: Edgar v. Lamont 1914 S.C.
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1910 S.C. 352; Morris
However, even in 1914
respect of a private
277.
general practitioner privately in the latter's practice, or
the patient's home. As has been commented, the ambit of
the medical "retainer" is both narrow and readily
ascertainable, and is restricted to the patient's health,
usually in connection with a specific matter. 8 If the law
of contract forms the bedrock of the liability of private
medical practitioners, it is by no means irrelevant,
however, to heal th service general practi tioners. The
secretary of state for Scotland was charged wi th
responsibility under the National Health Service (Scotland)
Act 19789 to establish the Scottish Medical Practices
Committee, a body responsible for ensuring adequate numbers
of medical practi tioners undertaking to provide general
medical services wi thin the area of each Heal th Board,10 and
administering the list of these approved practi tioners.
The responsibili ty actually to provide such services is
placed by section 19 of that Act upon the local health
board:
"[I]t shall be the duty of every Health Board, in
accordance with regulations, to make as respects
their area arrangements with medical
practitioners for the provision by them of
personal medical services for all persons in the
8professional Negligence, A.M. Dugdale and K.M. Stanton,
Butterworths, second edition, 1989, at p. 38.
9C . 29, s . 3
lOS. 3 (1) . In England, the Medical Practices Committee
fulfils a similar function.
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area who wish to11arrangements ... "
take advantage of the
In England, a similar approach has been followed, save that
the statutory body concerned to provide the relevant
services is the Family Practitioner Committee. 12 It may be
seen from this that general practitioners are not actually
employed by the Health Board (or Family Practitioner
Committee), and are therefore independent contractors who
agree to provide the required services. These doctors
practice in partnerships, to which the common law of
partnership, and the Partnership Act 1890, apply. Such
practices may be "traditional" in outward appearance, or
alternatively a statutorily-empowered "Health Centre",
which may provide a multi-disciplinary practice with inter
alia general medical, dental, pharmaceutical, specialist
out-patient, health education and other services and
f ' l' t.i 13aCl 1 leSe In March 1987, 184 such centres were in
operation ln Scotland. 14 Although perhaps resembling
miniature hospitals, they nevertheless remain partnerships,
even if larger and more complex than the norm. It is
IlNational Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978, c. 29, s.
19(1).
12 I n 1984, these were transferred to regulation under the
Health and Social Security Act 1984.
13National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978, s. 15. The
Secretary of state was empowered by this provlslon to delegate
to provide staff for, and regulate the internal charges for
se~vices (for example dental services) in relation to heal th
centres.
14Health ln Scotland 1987, SHHD, HMSO 1988 at p. 37.
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generally accepted that there is no contract between N.H.S.
doctor and patient, whether a hospital consultant or
general practitioner. l S
Terms of Service, the provisions laid down relating to
patient-care and kept up to date by the relevant authority,
provide a basis for the contract between doctors whose
names are recorded on the Medical List and that body for
the treatment of patients in the practice locality.16
General medical practices are therefore independent
contractors to the health service; this is unaffected by
fundholding practices, which enjoy greater financial
autonomy but are not distanced from the health service.
Partners in a general medical practice usually employ
assistant doctors to assist them in carrying out these
obligations, as well as nurs i.nq , para-medical and other
staff. Thus, the patient's contact with a health service
ISE. g. Michael Jones, Medical Negligence, Sweet and
Maxwell, 1991, at p. 14-15. Cf. Walker on Delict, op. cit.,
second edition, 1981, at p. 1057 and Jackson and Powell,
Professional Negligence, third edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1992,
at p. 448 footnote 7, in which it is tentatively suggested that
the inclusion of the patient's name on the G.P. 's register,
thereby increasing the doctor's fee income, might consti tute
consideration for their contractual relationship. The present
writer respectfully disagrees with both these views so far as
Scots law is concerned, al though it seems likely that this
remuneration could constitute consideration in English law.
I6 I t is noteworthy that s. 19(3) of the National Health
Service (scotland) Act 1978 provides that the remuneration of
general practitioners shall not be "wholly or mainly" by way of
a fixed salary unrelated to the number of patients in the care
of that practitioner. In other words, the number of patients
registered on the doctor's list of those for whom he is
responsible will affect his income.
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general practitioner or other health professional is
affected by this matrix of contractual obligations.
I t has been argued that the acceptance by such a
doctor of a patient on to his practice list, i.e. those for
whom he 1S professionally responsible, 17 constitutes a
contract between the doctor and the patient, wi th the
additional fee which the doctor receives forming any
required consideration. 18 It may be observed that Scots
law, not requiring consideration, might perhaps more
readily accept such an analysis. However, in arguing
against the existence of a contractual relationship between
heal th service doctor and patient, Blackie states that
"[T]his is because the doctor is performing an obligation
an terms of the National Heal th Service Acts ... " .19
Al though this view does not explicitly refer to general
practitioners as opposed to hospital doctors, it is thought
sufficient to explain the legal basis of the relationship.
Thus, the Scottish patient is receiving a benefit analogous
to a jus guaesitum tertio, although the present writer is
17A general medical practitioner under the health service
treats those patients on his practice list, visitors to his area,
accident/emergency cases and those whom no other doctor will
accept on to his list, being allocated by the Health Board.
18 Se e Professional Negligence, R.M. Jackson and J.L. Powell,
Sweet and Maxwell, third edition, 1992, at p. 448 et seg.
19 Se e the chapter covering the medical law of Scotland, by
J.W.G.Blackie, in Medical Responsibility in Western Europe, ed.
E. Deutsch and H.-L. Schreiber (Research Study of the European
Science Foundation, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1985) at p. 572.
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unaware of any health service case which has been argued on
this basis.
More complex is the situation an which the patient
consults privately a specialist in hospital practice or
requires an operation in hospital. At this point, the
hospital's management body and other staff are involved:
in addi tion to the contract between patient and doctor,
there .lS likely to be a contract between hospital and
patient. Purely delictual duties will co-exist as well. 2 o
The courts will be slow to imply terms into contracts for
private medical care which guarantee results. 21
The effect of the relationship between doctor and
private hospital lS less clear, as the doctor may well be
an independent contractor, rather than an employee of the
separate persona of the body managing or operating the
hospital. Consultant and other doctors in the health
servlce who also practice privately, ln hospitals or
consulting rooms, are likely to be subject to a contract
for services with that hospital rather than a contract of
employment, thus raising difficulties for recovery of
damages by the patient vicariously against the hospital.
However, it is possible that liability might arise in
20 Si r John Donaldson, M.R., in Hotson v. East Berkshire Area
Health Authority [1987] 2 All E.R. 210 at p. 216, said that he
was unable to state a justification for any difference in the
content of duties of care owed by a doctor in contract and in
tort.
21 Ey r e v. Measday, supra, and Thake v. Maurice, supra.
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respect of either negligently allowing an unsuitable doctor
to practice in the hospital, or the negligent carrying out
of any function which that hospital contracted to do. Such
liability could arise under contract, if one existed, but
would be more likely to arise by breach of a direct duty
under the law of delict. Although the contents of duties
of care are analysed elsewhere,22 they appear to be similar
whether arising in contract or in delict. 23
Delict
This appears to be by far the most common basis of
liability for claims in medical negligence, and is to be
derived ultimately from the principles regarding liability
for personal injury in Donoghue v. stevenson,24 which has
been unscathed by the recent developments in negligence. 25
22Infra, ln the chapter on the standard of care.
23 Se e Edwards v. MalIan [1908] 1 K.B. 1002, in which the
patient averred want of reasonable care by a privately engaged
dentist, which was dealt with by the court as an action based
upon tort and not contract. Also Naylor v. Preston Area Health
Authority [1987] 1 W.L.R. 958 and Eyre v. Measday [1986] 1 all
E.R. 479.
24 [1932] A. C. 562. See, The Analysis of Negligence, in
Introductory Essays on Scots Law, W. A. Wilson, second edition,
W. Green and Son, 1984, at p. 138 et seg.
25E. g. Tai Hinq Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank
Ltd. and Others [1986] 1 A.C. 80 (P.C.), Murphy v. Brentwood
District Council [1990] 3 W.L.R. 414, Department of the
Environment v. Thomas Bates and Son Ltd. [1990] 3 W.L.R. 457,
Parkhead Housing Association v. Phoenix Preservation Ltd. 1990
S.L.T. 812.
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As Blackie comments, liability may arise either
vicariously, or directly from the acts or omissions of the
person concerned. 26 This may in appropriate circumstances
include joint contributions to delicts;27 it seems that, at
least ln England, cases involving the liability of
hospitals form the most common and increasing category.28
Issues of liability to third parties usually arise outwith
the health service context, as in the case allowing a proof
before answer in respect of the actings of a senior medical
officer to the Department of Transport in relation to the
employment of a driver of an omnibus. 29
The usual basis for liability is in turn predicated
upon the basis of the most common contact between doctor
and patient consultation under the National Health
Service, originally constituted by the National Health
Service Act 194730 and in Scotland governed primarily by the
National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978. 31 32
26 Se e the chapter covering the medical law of Scotland, by
J.W.G.Blackie, in Medical Responsibility in Western Europe, ed.
E. Deutsch and H.-L. Schreiber (Research Study of the European
Science Foundation, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1985) at p. 595.
27 Se e the chapter covering the medical law of Scotland, by
J.W.G.Blackie, in Medical Responsibility in Western Europe, ed.
E. Deutsch and H.-L. Schreiber (Research Study of the European
Science Foundation, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1985) at p. 595.
28Litigation for Medical Accidents, c. Dyer, 1988 B.M.J.
1058.
29Johnstone v. Traffic Commissioner 1990 S.L.T. 409 (Outer
House) .
30c. 27
31 C • 29
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As discussed above, it is submitted that there is no
contract between doctor and patient in contact under the
National Health Service33 and that the contents of
contractual and delictual duties of care are similar: the
relatively early case of Edgar v. Lamont,34 although
occurring before the establishment of the health service,
provides some Scottish support for the proposition that a
doctor's delictual duty 1S co-extensive with any 1n
contract. 35
Although recent developments in duties of care have
concentrated upon the provision of information,36 many
different aspects of the duty have already been identified.
Cameron discusses duties concerning consent, disclosure of
32" h . t.i.v i [ ]C anges an ac 1V1ty an the N. H. S. hospi tal sector
between 1986 and 1987 were generally in line with long-term
trends; more inpatients were treated in fewer beds and the number
of new outpatients also continued to increase." Heal th in
Scotland 1987, S.H.H.D., H.M.S.Q., 1988, at p. 23.
33 I t receives explicit recognition in the chapter covering
the law of Scotland, by J.W.G.Blackie, in Medical Responsibility
in Western Europe, ed. E. Deutsch and H.-L. Schreiber (Research
Study of the European Science Foundation, Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, 1985) at pp. 571-572.
34 1 914 S.C. 277
35Gladwell v. Steggal (1839) 5 Bing. (N. C.) 733. If this
was so before 1947, it is more likely to be the case after that
date. Cf. D.M. Walker, Delict, W. Green & Son, 1981 at p. 1057,
where the author suggests.that this relationship is based upon
contract. Cameron considers firmly that the standard basis for
such claims is in delict: Medical Negligence: An Introduction,
J . A. Cameron Q. C., Law Society of Scotland, 1983 at p. 9. See also
Stevenson v. Shafer 1953 S.L.T. (Sh. ct.) 107.
36E. g. Moyes v. Lothian Heal th Board 1990 S. L. T. 444,
Goorkani v. Tayside Health Board 1991 S.L.T. 94.
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mishap, communication, keeping up to date with developments
and acting wi thin the area of the doctor's competence. 37
Undertaking work beyond the doctor's competence, and
failure to take precautions, prevent illness or attend or
examine a patient have also been identified,38 and the duty
extends to liability for illegible handwriting on a
prescription form. 39
Hospitals and Health Authorities
"Vicarious liabili ty in the law of tort may be
defined as a liability imposed by the law upon
some person as a result of (1) a tortious act or
omission by another, (2) some relationship
between the actual tortfeasor and the defendant
whom it is sought to make liable, and (3) some
connection between the tortious act or omission
and that relationship. In the modern law there
are three and only three relationships which
satisfy the second requirement of vicarious
liabili ty, namely that of master and servant,
37Medical Negligence: An Introduction, J.A. Cameron, Q.C.,
Law Society of Scotland, 1983, ch.4.
38Fo r discussion, see Professional Negligence, R.M. Jackson
and J.L. Powell, third edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1992, ch. 6.
39prendergast v. Sam and Dee Ltd and Others, Times Law
Reports, 14 March 1989, in which a doctor was held 25% liable for
injury occurring following the incorrect interpretation of
illegible handwriting on the prescription. The pharmacist was
held 75% liable for misreading it, as he should have been on
inquiry that the drugs thus prescribed were an unlikely
combination. In Dwyer v. Roderick and Others, Times Law Reports,
12 November 1983, a negligent major over-prescription of a drug
resulting in serious necrosis gave rise to a liability ultimately
of 45% to the doctor mis-prescribing and 45% to the pharmacist
who had not noticed the apparently obvious error. See Writing
a Wrong, Kenneth Mullan, 1988 297 B.M.J. 470.
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that of principal and agent, and that of employer
and independent contractor.,,40
Consideration of the liability of hospitals and health
boards or authorities requires a distinction to be made, in
effect between the position before the establishment of the
National Health Service an 1947-48 and that obtaining
sUbsequently. Before this, it was thought that hospital
authorities were not vicariously responsible for the
negligence of their professional staff. 41 Thus, it could
be said that during the period in question
" .. the bulk of Scottish decisions supports the
view that hospitals and nursing homes are not
liable to patients for negligence on the part of
their professional staffs acting in their
professional capacity. Scots law, of course, has
its roots firmly embedded in civil law with its
distinction between locatio operarum and locatio. ,,42operls.
As this suggests, liability on the part of the hospital
body was accepted only in relation to administrative or
managerial delicts committed by such staff43 and excluded
vicarious liability for the professional activities of the
professional staff. The rationale for this was that the
hospital only held itself out as providing the institution
40Vicarious Liabili ty in the Law of Torts, P. S Atiyah,
Butterworths, 1967, at p. 3.
41niscussed in Professional Negligence, R.M. Jackson and
J.L. Powell, Sweet and Maxwell, third edition, 1992, at p. 490
et seq.
42Quoted from Hospi tals '
1949 S.L.T. (News) 1 at p. 1.
Liability for Negligence, Anon.,
The emphasis is added.
43 Se e Hillyer v. Governors of st. Bartholomew's Hospital,
[1909] 2 K.B. 820.
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at which patients could consul t the doctor, 44 and was a
variant on the theme of the "control" test used generally
in the law of employment to determine the legal status of
a glven person. The applicable legal principles were thus
partly governed by the structure of the hospital and the
profession at that time. Before the establishment of the
health service, on occasion some doctors gave their
services ei ther free of, or for a nominal, charge an
respect of sessions at voluntary hospitals for the poor, a
factor influencing the courts' reluctance to hold the
institution liable. 45 The analysis in Hillyer v. Governors
of st. Bartholomew's Hospi tal, 46 that hospi tal managers were
not legally responsible for the doctors working in the
hospital, was followed in subsequent Scottish cases, for
example, Scottish Insurance Commissioners v. Royal
f · 47In lrmary. The function of the hospital management was
44paraphrasing the view of Lord Dunedin in Scottish
Insurance Commissioners v. Edinburgh Royal Infirmary 1913 S.C.
751. This is quoted in Hospitals' Liability for Negligence,
Anon., 1949 S.L.T. (News) 1 at p. 1.
45" It is very difficul t to avoid the conclusion that most of
the earlier decisions regarding voluntary hospitals (or hospitals
that were assumed to be voluntary) were deeply influenced by the
desire to protect chari table funds from claims for damages,
though it is not easy to see why, in this view, a charitable
hospital should be liable for the negligence of its domestic
servants but not of its medical staff." Lord President Cooper,
in MacDonald v. Glasgow Western Hospitals 1954 S.C. 453, at pp.
476 - 477.
46[1909] 2 KB 820
47 1 9 1 3 SC 751. This case considered whether the doctors
were employed by the hospital for the purposes of a statute, the
National Insurance Act 1911, c. 55.
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thus regarded essentially as an administrative one,48 and
liability could therefore arlse only in respect of a
limi ted range of circumstances. These included direct
liability for the negligent performance of the restricted
functions undertaken by that management, vicarious
liability for servants acting under its direction, and
other forms of direct liabili ty such as lmproper
delegation. As far as liabili ty for the exercise of
professional skills was concerned, al~hough vicarious
liability for employees as such was recognised by Scots law
at the time, the difficulties concerned whether the doctor
was merely a (regular) independent contractor, was or was
not employed and whether a professional person who was not
directed as to the exercise of his skill but who was
nevertheless employed could be part of the doctrine of
vicarious liability. It was at the time well established
that the only liabili ty applicable to these doctors was
direct liability to the patient only in respect of their
own delicts or torts. They were not thought to be
employees.
In Scotland, the scope and basis of liability were
greatly expanded following upon the establishment of the
health service. This expansion was largely effected by the
48An alternative analysis might be made in terms of the law
of agency. This might raise the possibili ty of the agent's
liability for the doctor principal; so far as the present writer
is aware, no attempt to analyse matters in this way has been
presented.
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cases of MacDonald v. Board of Management for Glasgow
Western Hospitals,49 extending liability to house officers,
and Fox v. Glasgow South Western Hospitals50 in respect of
nurses. The previous leading decision, that of Reidford v.
Magistrates of Aberdeen,51 was effectively disapproved. 52
The question which had caused difficulties, that of
vicarious liability for the exercise of professional skills
by employees, was thus resolved. It may be observed that
the timing of these cases reflected the increase of
indisputable instances of medical employment in the health
service in all categories of medical staff. 53 A further
acknowledged factor in this change was the new statutory
basis of the hospitals. 54
49 1 9 54 S. C. 453
5°1955 S.L.T. 337
51 1 9 3 3 S.C. 276
520pinion of the Lord President (Cooper) in MacDonald v.
Glasgow Western Hospitals 1954 S.C. 453 at pp. 473-474. At p.
474 he states that "I part with Reidford with the observation
that I am unable to extract from the opinions any single and
clear ratio decidendi, except that the averments of the pursuer
in that case were irrelevant."
53previously, many doctors of consul tant grade would not
truly have been employed by the hospi tal authori ty but would have
been visiting specialists. Liability based upon agency (e.g. Roe
v. Minister of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, opinion of Lord Denning)
has also been canvassed, and it is thought that the doctrine of
pro hac vice employment would provide another route to the same
destination.
54MacDonald v. Glasgow and Western Hospitals Board 1954 S.C.
453 per Lord President Cooper at p. 473.
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However, without resorting to artificial concepts, the
(English) Court of Appeal had held .ln 1942 that a
radiographer was in fact employed by the hospi tal body,
thereby opening the way to recognition of vicarious
liability and reducing the narrower, Hillyer-type approach
which had previously obtained. It is noteworthy that Lord
Denning was instrumental in expanding the scope of
vicarious liability, considering that hospitals chose the
specialists from whom the patient would receive treatment,
the latter having little control over this process, and
including also the doctor's source of remuneration. 55 This
reflected the increasing technical complication of
medicine, in which the hospital could no longer be seen as
merely the place where doctor and patient met. 56 It may be
observed that these decisions are based upon the liability
of an employer and therefore are still likely to be
inapplicable to any person - most likely to be a doctor of
consultant rank - who may visit a hospital for one clinic
or operating session every week or fortnight, but who
cannot be regarded as being employed by that institution.
If he were employed elsewhere within the area of a given
heal th board, vicarious liability would cover this
possibility. otherwise, it is likely that the only other
55per Lord Denning, in Cassidy v. Ministry of Health [1951]
All E.R. 574, at p. 586d - 586h.
56Janet BettIe, suing Hospitals Direct: Whose Tort was it
Anyhow? 1987 137 N.L.J. at p. 573.
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method of rendering a hospi tal or heal th authori ty wi th
perpetual succession liable would be by direct liability.57
It is interesting to note that once a general practitioner
has referred a case to his hospital colleague, the latter
takes over entirely the de facto care of that patient,
until he or she is released from hospital. This has the
effect of removing the general practitioner largely or
entirely from the risk of an action for damages during this
period. This state of affairs may be contrasted with that
obtaining where a client engages a solicitor and counsel in
litigation. From the solicitor's point of view, the
possibili ty of a claim for negligence where counsel's
advice has been relied upon appears to be increasing. 58
Direct Liability and Recent Developments
( Although since the inception of the National Health Service
there has been greatly increased reliance upon vicarious
liability, there is a little evidence that direct liability
may be rlpe for increased emphasis. It has been
57Cons idered infra. Al though the detai Is are as yet
unclear, it may be that the optional new self-governing trust
status for health service hospitals may make this a more real
problem than of late. Even so, if a health authority continues
to be responsible for the provision of healthcare and damages
under crown indemni ty, L'i ttle change may in fact be evident. The
heal th service or authori ty is not vicariously liable for general
practices at present anyway, so self-g?verning status ~or.t~ese
is unlikely to bring about any change ln patterns of llablllty.
58Ar e Solicitors Liable for Counsel's Negligence? A.R.W.
Young, 1990 S.L.T. 177.
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Whose Tort is it Anyhow? 1987
persuasively argued by BettIe that there exists authority
for holding a hospital, or a health authority (in respect
of which the same arguments would seem to apply) directly
liable to the patient. 59 Two strands of this argument may
be identified, one much less extensive than the other. The
first is based upon relatively recent dicta in Wilsher v.
Essex Area Health Authority:60
" .. a health authority which so conducts its
hospi tal that it fails to provide doctors of
sufficient skill and experience to give the
treatment offered at the hospital may be directly
liable in negligence to the patient. Although we
were told in argument that no case has ever been
decided on this ground and that it is not the
practice to formulate claims in this way, 1 can
see no reason why, in principle, the health
authority should not be so liable if its
organisation is at faul t . 1161
By virtue of Glidewell L.J. 's (undernoted) concurrence,
this assumes the status of a majority view, albeit obiter:
" .. 1 agree with Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-
C. that there seems to be no reason in principle
why, in a suitable case different on its facts
from this, a hospital management committee should
not be held directly liable in negligence for




60 1n the Court of Appeal: [1986] 3 All E.R. 801. The House
of Lords dealt only with the causation issue.
61 p e r Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V. -C., Wilsher, ibid., at
p. 833h, j: quoted by BettIe, ibid., at p. 574.
62 p e r Glidewell L.J., Wilsher, ibid., at p. 831g-h.
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Indeed, there is some prior consideration63 by the Court of
Appeal of direct liability. This was in the case of Jones
v. Manchester Corporation,64 in which an inexperienced
doctor, five months' qualified, administered pentothal
general anaesthetic to a patient already partly
anaesthetised by ni trous oxide gas. The patient died
immediately. A majority (Singleton L.J. and,
unsurprisingly,65 Denning L.J. as he then was) held66 that
not only had the doctor been negligent but suggested that
direct liability was also involved. 67 The effect of this
63 Th e pleadings a n the case apparently did not contain
anything to support a case of direct liabili ty against the
employer. Thus the judicial dicta in support of this possibility
must be viewed as obiter.
64[1952] Q.B. 852
65 I n view of his opinion in Cassidy v. Ministry of Health
[1951] 2 K.B. 343, albeit involving res lpsa loguitur.
66 The full indemnity ordered at first instance, by the
Corporation in favour of the doctor, was varied by majority on
appeal to the extent that the doctor was to be 20% liable and the
responsible authori ty 80% liable. This was an apportionment
under the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935,
Denning L. J. opining that no issue of the indemni ty of the
employer by employee should arise. However, Hodson L.J. (as he
then was) dissented, holding that a term required to be implied
into the contract of employment between doctor and Corporation,
to the effect of exercise of the appropriate degree of skill and
care by the doctor. Breach of this in turn entailed full
indemnity from the doctor gua servant; the only liability arising
on the part of the employer was vicarious, as opposed to direct,
liability.
67 Th e opinion of Singleton L.J. does not make it clear what
the basis for his finding the Corporation directly liable was.
However, it seems that the lack of instruction of Dr Wilkes as
to anaesthesia in such a difficult case, and the negligence of
her more experienced colleague, Dr Sejrup, although the latter
was not a co-defendant in the case, influenced the decision.
Support for this is gleaned from the following passages: "Dr
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was to render the doctor liable for one fifth of the
damages, but the employer four fifths liable. In fact, as
joint tortfeasor under the provisions of section 6 of the
Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935, the
indemnity sought by the Corporation was precluded. The
substantial difference between the majority opinions and
the dissent by Hodson L.J. (as he then was) never fails to
surprise and intrigue the present writer. 6 8
As BettIe argues, the form of direct liability
somewhat enigmatically referred to by their Lordships seems
to be limited: if based upon the existing law, then
Sej rup was the senior, and he was a servant of the hospi tal
board. So far as we know, neither of these young doctors had
been given any instruction as to the danger of using pentothal
when a patient was still partly unconscious from the use of
nitrous oxide, or of the great need for careful watching in such
a case" (at p. 864); "[T]he employer cannot have a right of
indemnity if he himself has contributed to the damage, or if he
bears some of the responsibility therefor; and the same reasoning
applies if some other and senior employee's negligence has
contributed to the damage. II (at p. 865). Denning L.J. states in
forthright terms that " .. at common law even if the negligence is
only that of one doctor alone, nevertheless the hospital board
is a joint tortfeasor with him and cannot at common law claim
contribution or indemnity from him." (at p. 869).
68As a matter of legal analysis, the present wri ter 1S
inclined to sympathise with the view of Hodson L.J.; no doubt
there was a term in the contract between doctor and employer that
reasonable care and skill should be employed in the treatment of
patients. Breach of this would give rise to a right of damages
for any loss accruing; presumably such loss would include damages
for negligence and thereby imply the general indemnity of an
employer vicariously liable for an employee's negligence. The
application of the provisions of the 1935 Act would seem to
require holding ab initio that the employer was a joint
tortfeasor. So to hold suggests that all anaesthetic mishaps
occurring via junior doctors at that time would mean liability
and breach of a direct duty of care on the part of all employing
health authorities.
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clearly no radical innovation could be envisaged. BettIe
comments that it would presumably extend as far as the
efficient running and staffing of the hospital. 69 However,
the more extensive and interesting possibility
canvassed is that of the non-delegable duty of care. Other
than the more recent Canadian case of Yepremian et ale v.
Scarborough General Hospital,70 the English authority
advanced in support of this theory is largely prior to the
establishment of the health service and the changes in the
law which took place following it. 71 Modelled, as BettIe
says, upon the concept in employment law devised to avoid
the strictures of the doctrine of common employment, the
non-delegable duty under consideration would mean that the
authority would be liable even for the negligence of
doctors in its employ - because of the non-delegable duty
directly owed. BettIe identifies three possible analyses
of a hospital's or health authority's liability:72
(1) A non-delegable duty is owed by the hospital to the
patient. The content of this duty
,
1.S to take
reasonable care in the treatment and general
69 't t 574BettIe, Ope C1. ., a p. .
7°1985 110 D.L.R. (3d) 513.
71A more recent Australian case, Kondis v. State Transport
Authority [1984J 58 A.L.J.R. 531 is considered by BettIe, ~
cit., at p. 574.
72Bettle, ibid., at p. 576.
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management of that patient. Therefore any treatment
negligence, even perpetrated by professional medical
staff would constitute the hospital's tort, because
the obligation vested only in the authority.
(2) The second possibility is the less extreme version of
this, to the effect that the hospi tal or authori ty
concerned has a (direct) duty to provide and to
organise the appropriate medical and other staff.
Clearly, such a duty would only have meaning when
applied to the hospi tal or authori ty and could not
thus be delegated. It is observed in passing that the
dicta referred to by Bettle73 support this possibility
rather than (1) above, particularly that of the Vice-
Chancellor in Wilsher, which is worth setting out in
full:
" [C] laims against a heal th authori ty that it
has itself been directly negligent, as
opposed to vicariously liable for the
negligence of its doctors, will, of course,
raise awkward problems. To what extent
should the authority be held liable if (e.g.
in the use of junior housemen) it is only
adopting a practice hallowed by tradition?
Should the authority be liable if it
demonstrates that, due to the financial
stringency under which it operates, it
cannot afford to fill the posts with those
possessing the necessary experience? But,
in my judgment, the law should not be
distorted by making findings of personal
fault against doctors who are, in truth, not
at fault in order to avoid such questions.
73 I . e . those in the case of Wilsher, ibid.
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To do so would be to cloud the real Issues
h i h . ,t 74W lC arlse.
(3) The third possibili ty is confined to that which is
presently well-established: that the hospi tal's or
authority's liability to its patients is based upon
an employer's . .VIcarlOUS liability, wi thout any
necessity to rely upon any non-delegable duty ln
respect of the actual provision of treatment. Of
course such an approach would allow direct liability
for breach of other duties, such as one, for example,
to take reasonable care in making appointments of
professional staff.
Whilst anticipating difficulties with each of the
Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson in
Quoted in full by BettIe, ibid., at
possibilities identified, BettIe concludes that the direct,
non-delegable duty is at least a stateable possibility and
one to which plaintiffs' advisers should turn in addition
to more established heads of liability.
The non-delegable duty of care thus contended for has
been subjected to criticism by Montgomery. 75 A point
advanced is that the test for breach of the non-delegable
duty in respect of patient care by a doctor would involve
74 pe r Vice-Chancellor
Wilsher, ibid., at p. 833.
p. 576.
75Suing Hospitals Direct: What Tort? Jonathan Montgomery,
1987 137 N.L.J. 703.
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I · hIt t 76 d' .app ylng t e Bo am es an lmputlng any breach thereof
to the authority or hospital. To do so would be
artificial. Particularly since vicarious liabili ty has
been well-established since the 1950s, this would not lead
to any benefit for the plaintiff,77 or indeed the defendant.
Montgomery states
78
that the problem of breach was avoided
in the three cases upon which BettIe's argument relies. 79
Whilst this point applies ln the case of Cassidy v.
Ministry of Health,80 the other two cases relied upon which
he discusses do not seem to bear this out. In Gold,
however, "the judge at first instance had found that there
had been negligence on the part of the radiographer", 81 and
in respect of Wilsher it likewise is acknowledged that
there was a finding of faul t in respect of the senior
registrar, Dr Kawa, even if not the more junior colleague
who called him In. So before the issue of the liability,
and the test, were finally determined, fault had been
considered ln detail. It seems, therefore, that to
criticise the direct liability hypothesis because it would
760 r one very similar.
77Crown indemnity may be seen either as a form of quasi-
direct liability (or insurance) or, more properly, as reinforcing
conventional employer's vicarious liability.
78 I b i d. at p. 703.
79 Ca s sidy, ibid., Gold, ibid. and Wilsher, ibid.
80A case involving res ipsa loguitur.
81Montgomery, ibid., at p. 703.
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requ1re the application of a Bolam-type test for negligence
is unsatisfactory.
BettIe's thesis is also criticised on the grounds that
ft .. [S]he appears to suggest that there is strict liability
for any damage caused after there is a failure to provide
reasonable care. ft 82 It is respectfully suggested that this
was intended to mean that ft .. there is strict liability on
the part of the hospital for any damage caused after there
1S a failure to provide reasonable care by the doctor .. ft .
If this is correct, it is submitted that this does not
refer to strict liability in the usual sense of the term,
and furthermore that the de facto breach of the hospital's
duty by the doctor is not strict liability but breach of a
re-drawn duty of care. However, the points regarding
allocation of resources and questions of discretion are, it
is submitted, well made,83 as is that concerning patient-
selected doctors in a private context, which would exclude
the direct liability under consideration. Whilst argu1ng
that BettIe-type liability would add little to the present
system, Montgomery nevertheless argues in favour of the
greater accountability of the new health service managers. 84
He concludes that,
"[T]o treat health authorities as if their
control over their servants was absolute is
unrealistic. Doctors in particular retain a high
82Montgomery, ibid. , at p. 703.
83Montgomery, ibid. , at p. 704.
84Mo n tgomery , ibid. , at pp. 704-705.
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degree of professional autonomy within the
National Health Service. To hold the
organisation liable for professional errors would
be to introduce a legal fiction which would do
nothing to clarify the allocation of
responsibility in health care. What is needed is
an analysis which will hold individuals
accountable for their personal decisions but
which also allocates responsibility for en;uring
that the professionals operate as a team. This
is more likely to be achieved within the
framework of a limited direct liability combined
with vicarious liability than by imposing a broad
non-delegable duty of care.,,85
It is thought unlikely that there will be any increase 1n
the scope of liability of the directly-arising type; it
runs parallel to existing duties and heads of liability.
Furthermore, recent decisions on the incidence of duties of
care by the House of Lords, such as Murphy v. Brentwood
District Counci186 and Department of the Environment v.
Thomas Bates and Son Ltd.,87 albeit not involving personal
injury but liability for defective buildings and economic
10SS,88 strongly suggest a judicial reluctance to
countenance any expanslon of liability, although 1n
Scotland "the same trend of decisions has yet to manifest
85Montgomery, ibid., at p. 705.
86[1990] 3 W.L.R. 414. See also Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd.
v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. and Others [1986] 1 A.C. 80 (P.C.).
87[1990] 3 W.L.R. 457
88A further example in the field of economic loss, although
involving consideration of H~dley.Byrne-typ.e factors such as
reliance upon professional adv1ce, 1S Al Saud1 Bangue and Others
v. Clark pixley [1990] 1 Ch. 313, a decision of Millet.J. It was
held that the auditor of the accounts of a company d1d not owe
a duty of care to prospective commercial.creditors (banks) of a
company which subsequently was compulsor1ly wound up.
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itself".89 It has been argued, however, that there IS a
general trend in the United Kingdom's labour market away
from the traditional analysis of part-time and full-time
employees towards independent contractors. Although
vicarious liability would not prima facie be applicable in
such cases, it has been argued that for the purposes of
protecting plaintiffs, it should be. 9o If such a policy-
based argument may be presented in relation to the general
sphere of employment law, it is strongly arguable, it is
submitted, that the de facto responsibility of consultant
doctors should also be so reflected .
It .IS clear that direct liability, despite some
judicial references to it, has hitherto played a minimal
role In the regulation of liability for negligence.
However, following the introduction of N.H.S. indemnity in
89Th e Future of Liability for Defective Buildings, H. L.
MacQueen, 1990 S.L.T (News) 337 at p. 337. MacQueen also
discusses the Scottish cases of Parkhead Housing Association v.
Phoenix Preservation Ltd. 1990 S.L.T. 812 and Scott Lithgow v.
G.E.C. Electrical Projects Ltd. 1989 G.W.D. 38-1770. In the
former, it was held that the facts came within the Junior Books
formula, albeit involving physical damage, whereas in the latter
it was held that the facts were outwith Junior Books. These are
discussed by MacQueen, ibid., at pp. 339-340 (so far as
implications on tort/contract relationships are concerned, see
inter alia Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd.
and Others [1986] 1 A.C. 80 (P.C.)). However, it is thought that
(i) the persuasive effect upon Scottish legal advice of the
recent English House of Lords cases will be strong, and (ii) in
the event that an appropriate Scottish case were appealed to the
House of Lords that the opportunity would be taken by their
Lordships to make clear that the laws of the two countries should
be the same.
90Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors - A Re-
examination, E. McKendrick, 1990 53 M.L.R. 770.
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January 1991,91 all ranks of doctors, including consultants,
employed by the N. H. 5 are indemnified by the Crown for
damages awards in respect of negligence, rather than the
previous arrangement of sharing liability between the
appropriate medical defence organisation and the employing
authority. 92 This applies within the scope of the contract
of employment, and extends to medical supporting staff as
well. Where a hospital has "opted out" of health service
control,93 it becomes a self-governing institution and as
such is not covered by the indemnity.94 It may, however,
insure against negligence claims, which Crown bodies, such
as hospitals operating within the N.H.S. financial
framework, are barred from doing. 95 However, it may be
noted that Crown immuni ty, specifically from interdict,
does not apply to Scottish Health Boards constituted under
91rntroduced inter alia by Department of Heal th circulars HC
(89) 34 and HC (FP)(89) 22.
92Although where large settlements are involved, i.e.
exceeding £300, 000, or al ternatively exceeding a .15% of a Board's
revenue allocation, whichever is the lesser, the Health
Department may contribute towards such payment: N.H.S. Circular
1990 (P.C.S.) 3, paras. 1 - 3, and Annex A thereto.
93National Heal th Service and Communi ty Care Act 1990,
sections 5 - 12.
introducing N.H.S.the circularsof94paragraph 12
indemnity, cit. sup.
95Despi te this, paragraphs 31 and 32 of the. circ:=ulars
introducing Crown indemnity (cit. sup.) empower contlnuatlon of
the risk-pooling by health authorities to meet po~ential~y large
claims - a form of self-insurance. For substantlal clalms, the
Department of Health may contribute a proportion of the damages
awarded.
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the National Health Service Acts. 96 Private practice, and
N.H.S. general practice, are excluded from Crown indemnity,
although it is conceded by the scheme that a junior N.H.S.
hospital doctor who sees a private patient in an N.H.S.
hospital, effectively within the scope of his contract of
employment, will be included within it. 97
Funding of successful negligence claims against N.H.S.
hospi tals and communi ty care uni ts in the transi tional
period is partly by the medical defence organisations98 and,
in the cases of large settlements (over £300,000) also
partly by the Department of Health. 99 Most of the cost of
settlements, however, will continue to be borne solely by
the appropriate health board, authority or opted-out
hospital although there will continue to be relief from the
Department of Health for very large (amount unspecified)
cases. l OO There is no reason for the liability, or existing
indemnity insurance arrangements, of general practices to
96Br i tish Medical Association v. Greater Glasqow Heal th
Board 1989 S.L.T. 493; cf. Lord Advocate v. Strathclyde Regional
Council 1990 S.L.T. 158; discussed in, Crown Immunity from
Statute, 1.5. Dickinson, 1990 S.L.T. 61. Presumably the effect
of British Medical Association applies to N.H.S. Trust status
hospitals.
97paragraph 5 of the circulars (supra) specifically includes
private work performed by junior hospital doctors. Presumably
such treatment will in effect be on behalf of the consultant
concerned.
98N. H. S. Circular (PCS) 32, para. 12.
99 I b i d.
lOoAnnex to Circular (PCS) 32, para. 31.
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be changed by opting for fund-holding status. A monitoring
system for health service liability costs 1n negligence 1S
also established,IOI although at the time of writing it is
too early for any results or conclusions to be available
from this. A doctor sued for negligence where the
provisions of Crown indemnity are applicable may, provided
the pursuer, other defenders (principally the employer) and
the court agree, instruct an independent defence if he
wishes to, although the health board would remain liable
for the full amount of any damages awarded. I 02
IOICircular (PCS) 32, supra, para. 14.
I02Annex to circular (PCS) 32, para. 26.
87
Part II: Standard of Care
Chapter III
The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence Case Law
Introduction
The test for medical negligence is the criterion by which
a doctor may be adjudged legally at fault. Assuming the
duty of care to be established, the legal concept of
"fault" is the first test which a pursuer must satisfy 1n
order to render a doctor liable for negligence. This test
is not based upon the reasonable man but instead upon the
equivalent reasonable doc t.o r i ' and, it is submitted, 1S
objective. 2 In the law of medical negligence, the test for
breach of this duty of care compares the standard actually
exercised by the doctor during the episode in question with
an abstract standard, the definition of which is heavily
IHunter v. Hanley 1955 S.C. 200. More colourfully, " ... the
standard of care differs - although he might be prepared to give
it a try, the reasonable man will not make a very successful
attempt at brain surgery." An Introduction to the Law of Delict,
W.J.Stewart, w. Green & Son 1989'at p. 60.
2Se e inter alia Hunter v. Hanley supra, Wilsher v. Essex
Area Health Authority [1986J 3 All E.R.801 and Jackson and
Powell, Professional Negligence, third edition, Sweet and
Maxwell, 1992, at p. 38 et seg. A subjective approach to the
standard of care in a contractual context was firmly rejected in
Wimpey Construction (U.K.) Ltd. v. D. V. Poole, [1984J Lloyd's
Repts. 499 (considering Megarry J.'s argument in favour of a
subjectively-determined standard in relation to a particular
solicitor, at pp. 183-4 in Duchess of A~gyll v. Beus~linck [1972J
2 Lloyd's Repts. 172). Thi~ adds we1ght to the V1ew .t~at t~e
contractual and tortious/del1ctual standards are very Slffi1lar 1n
this area. See also inter alia Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu
Chong Hing Bank Ltd. and Others [1986] 1 A.C: 80 (P.C.) and Weir
v. Wyper 1992 S.L.T. 579 (O.H.; Lord Coulsf1eld).
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influenced by reliance upon evidence of what other doctors
do. This is despite the lat~Bt power of the court to hold
a common practice negligent.~; It is submitted that, as a
matter of practical reali ty, a court will be relatively
slow to displace strong or especially technical evidence
upon the practice of medicine, for the basic reason that
however sensible or ethical such evidence mayor may not
be, Uni ted Kingdom judges are not medically trained or
qualified. Their assessment of the evidence must therefore
be based upon their existing training, with factors such as
qualifications and experience of expert witnesses playing
a large role. 4 So far as obtaining the patient's consent
1S concerned, it is clear that the approach of the courts
1n England (and, it is submitted, Scotland5 ) is to reject
3Se e K. McK. Norrie, Medical Negligence:
and the Standard of Care, 1985 J.R. 193.
Common Practice
(/
4Th e role of the expert witness in the American courts has
recently been the subject of investigation. The study con~lu~ed
that for an adversarial system, there are strongly confl1ct1ng
pressures on such wi tnesses: An Empirical Examination of the Use
of Expert witnesses in American courts, A. Champagne, D. Shuman,
E. Whitaker, 1991 31 Jurimetrics 375 et seq.
5S J W G Blackie "Scotland", in Medical Responsibilityee . . ., h .
. W t Europe ed H -L Schreiber and E. Deutsc , Spr1nger-r.n es ern ,'"
Verlag, Berlin, 1985, at p. 578 et seq.
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a "reasonable patient" test6 such as that favoured in the
u.s. in Canterbury v. spence. 7
Some categories under which medical negligence may be
classified have developed from practice. These have
included deviation from common practice, genuine difference
of opinion as to type of treatment, and failure to carry
out a given procedure properly (this too could be figured
as a deviation case). In all of these the formal terms of
the test has been the same.
Ultimately, it is thought that short of abandoning the
attempt, there is no method of assessing a practitioner for
negligence on a given occasion other than by comparing his
conduct with a standard. What that standard is, however,
may not be as restricted as this basic methodology. The
obvious possibilities are, firstly, referring the doctor to
some abstract notion of an internal or subjective standard
- which is likely to be artificial and problematic. An
alternative is to compare the doctor with some external
reference standard, be this what his fellow professionals
6Se e Sidaway v. Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital,
[1985] AC 871, despite Lord Scarman's powerful dissent in favour
of a patient-driven approach where (arguably) non-medical aspects
of the doctor's practice are involved, such as information
disclosure.
7(1972) 464 F. (2d.) 772. In Canada, Reibl v. Hughes (1980)
114 D.L.R. (3d.) 1 (S.C.C.) adopted the "prudent patient" test.
Consent in medical matters has been the subject of discussion,
inter alia in chapters 6 and 7 of A Patient's Right to Know,
S.A.M. McLean, Dartmouth, 1989; chapter 9 of Law. and M7d~cal
Ethics, R.A.A. McCall Smith and J.K. Mason, t.h i rd edi t i on ,
Butterworths, 1991, and chapter 4 of Medicine, Patients and the
Law, M. Brazier, Penguin, 1987.
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actually do, or an absolute standard which may be higher
than that exercised 1n actual practice. Clearly,
difficulties arise a.n attempting to make allowance for
genuine differences of opinion.
However, it is submitted that the only standard which
ultimately should be applied, whether by a judge or by
self-regulation of the profession, is one based involving
an external, or absolute standard of practice. Otherwise,
the actual practice of a majority or even entirety of a
profession might reduce the standard of care, with the
assessing body unable to hold any actions in breach of the
standard. The extent to which this is assessed by means of
actual practice is problematic. At present, much turns
upon common practice even though the court probably has the
power to hold a common practice negligent. Blackie states
that it 1S standard practice an Scottish pleadings to
" .. include a specific averment to the effect that no doctor
in the position of the defender would have done what was
done. 118 It is submi tted that such a test of necessi ty
delivers a lower standard of care than is desirable 9 , and
therefore risks serious over-reliance upon common practice.
This approach applies throughout the range of medical
activities - in diagnosis, obtaining consent, advice and
treatment. It is still a test almost entirely based upon
8J . W. G. Blackie, Ope cit., at p. 575.
9Ev e n below a notional average standard.
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the doctor's view the "reasonable patient"-type
formulation has been rejected.
So far as the more complex situation arising in the
case of specialist hospital units 1S concerned, the test to
be applied retains this emphasis upon the individual
practi tioner performing the medical task. No unit or
"team" standard applies; nor does a standard based upon the
actual qualifications or experience of the practi tioner
concerned. 10 The test is thought to be an objective one,
based upon the task undertaken. 11
The actual formulation which we have been considering
merely provides the shell of the test. Its actual content
obviously depends upon the circumstances of each case - the
specialty (or generality) involved, the patient's symptoms,
diagnosis, treatment and all other aspects of the medical
encounter. In ascertaining the content of the test, the
court is only, in effect, told whom to ask rather than what
the substantive answer should be. To achieve this, the
court requires to act in a way dictated by the
fundamentally adversarial system of litigation. It must
listen to the testimony of both sides' expert witnesses,
take in and understand technical medical evidence, assess
and weigh up the different techniques and attitudes put
10wi l s h e r v. Essex Area Health Authority [1986] 3 All E.R.
801 (C.A.). The House of Lords did not consider issues of the
standard of care, but confined themselves to causation.
llwi l s h e r , supra; M. A. Jones, Medical Negligence, Sweet
and Maxwell, 1991, at p. 85 et seq.
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forward. Only then, having gleaned an idea of what both
good and/or usual practice is, will the court be able to
adjudicate upon the substantive merits.
It 1S arguable that as lawyers and judges are
intelligent, highly trained and systematic, they therefore
are well able to bring their own intellects to bear upon
the medical 1ssues. But because the test pertains to form
rather than substance then they must necessarily, and will
be, heavily influenced by the views of the experts from
which they must make a substantive medical judgment with
the benefit of hindsight. This is in a fundamentally alien
discipline to legal personnel, and is by definition
coloured by which side the expert appears upon. 12 It may
also be mentioned that the test for medical negligence only
applies in cases in which there has occurred harm. Thus,
if a doctor is negligent and perhaps by chance no harm
results from this, no triable issue of negligence arises. 13
Any deterrence sought by the law must be considered subject
to this factor, which, it 1S submitted, greatly hinders the
efficacy of the deterrent or hortatory function of the law.
Consideration of the duty,14 and standard, of care in
I2An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in
American Courts, A. Champagne, D. Shuman, E. Whitaker, Ope cit.
I3Unless perhaps disciplinary procedures before the General
Medical Council are invoked.
I4 I n this thesis, issues surrounding the duty of care are
not discussed in any detail. This is because an N.H.S. doctor's
duty of care rarely seems to give rise to dispute. However,
there is a wider debate on the relevance of the duty of care
analysis in Scots law. Since Donoghue V. Stevenson 1932
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cases of medical negligence has ln turn given rise to a
remarkable variety of issues. Who should be clinically
responsible, the test for the standard of care, the effect
of common practice, 15 and "team", "post" and junior doctors'
competence have all been raised ln this context. 16
Furthermore, as the law - and medical practice - have
continued to develop, additional questions have been
introduced . 17 Examples of these include effective
S.C.(H.L.) 31, this approach has in effect been by concession.
See inter alia, The Analysis of Negligence, in Introductory
Essays on Scots Law, W.A. Wilson, second edition, W. Green and
Son, 1984, at p. 138.
15Se e The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence, R. B.M.
Howie, 1983 J.R. 193; cf. Common Practice and the Standard o~
Care in Medical Negligence, K. McK. Norrie, 1985 J.R. 145 ~
16 Se e Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority, [1986] 3 All
E.R. 801 (C.A.) and [1988] 1 All E.R. 871 (H.L.).
17Hunter v. Hanley 1955 S.C. 200 is conventionally cited as
authority in case of deviation from common practice (inasmuch as
the needle used was too small). If this is to be the criterion
of "deviation", however, then it is submitted that it leaves no
place for incompetently-performed "conventional" treatment:
there is nothing unconventional about giving a patient an
injection. Thus, by defini tion almost, incompetent treatment may
be categorised as a deviation, as long as something no doctor of
ordinary skill would do. Whether, where this test is applied,
it makes any difference whether the treatment is "conventional"
or "deviational" is another question. It may be that the courts
will be more ready to hold the so-called deviation cases
negligent. Nor does this assist when considering the patient
whose doctor does not wish to operate, perhaps on the grounds
that operations (like litigation) are risky and should not be
lightly undertaken. This might consti tute deviation in a
specialty commonly undertaking "aggressive" management, or
invasive treatments. However, it now seems that this (or an
almost identical) test, will be applied to all areas of medical
practice, and the use of appropriate experts will counteract this
point. This is discussed infra. See also Sidaway v. Board of
Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital and
Others, [1985] A.C. 871.
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communication both with the patient18 and other doctors19,
and issues of duty and confidentiali ty, for example In
relation to patients with acquired Immune deficiency
syndrome. 2° The wri ter seeks to argue that the law's
approach, both in respect of the fault principle and indeed
the mechanics of the present standard of care, is
unsatisfactory. It does not inter alia reflect either the
reality of the doctor-patient relationship or the
responsibilities which should attach to medical personnel,
but which are distorted by the existing rules of vicarious
liabili ty and Crown indemni ty. It will ultimately be
argued that the fault principle is inappropriate in cases
of medical negligence. 21
In the wider law of negligence, development of the
concepts of the duty of care and foreseeability has
l8An early example involving failure to communicate
principally with a locum, but also with the patient, is Farguhar
v. Murray, 1901 3 F. 859.
19Examples are Chapman v. Rix, Times, 19 November 1959, 22
December 1960 and Coles v. Reading and District Hospital
Management Committee, (1963) 107 Solicitors' Journal 115, and
Fowler v. Greater Glasgow Health Board, 1990 S.L.T. 303. Also
in this context generally, see Tehrani v. Argyll and Clyde Heal th
Board (No.2), 1990 S.L.T. 118 (the consequences of difficulties
in communication between doctors, and the individual doctor's
redress on termination of contract of employment).
20 Th e delictual analysis will be concentrated upon, because
it is the most common form of medical encounter. Contractual
(i. e. private) treatment will be discussed where app::opriat~, but
wi th less emphasis than the above. As has been cons i.de r ed Infra,
the contents of contractual duties in any event are very similar
to their delictual counterparts.
2lReform is discussed infra.
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proceeded apace. 22 A marked retrenchment of recent
decisions from the broad principle enunciated by Lord
Wilberforce in Anns v. London Borough of Merton23 has taken
place.
24
The House of Lords has held that whether a duty of
care exists in a case of audi tors' negligence should be
determined by an application of adapted existing criteria
rather than by general principle. 25 Any narrowing trend,26
however, has been independent of developments27 in areas of
22 Se e the opinion of Lord Scarman (giving the opinion of the
court), in Tai Hing Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. and Others
[1986J 1 A.C. 80 (P.C.), at p. 101C et seg. See also discussion
including the tort/contractual duties debate, in ch. XI
(Contractual Duties Not Fixed by the Parties), An Introduction
to the Law of Contract, P. s. Atiyah, fourth edition, Clarendon
Press, 1989.
23[1978J A.C. 728, per Lord Wilberforce at pp. 751-752
24 Se e inter alia Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing
Bank Ltd. and Others [1986] 1 A.C. 80 (P.C.), Murphy v. Brentwood
District Council [1990] 3 W.L.R. 414, Governors of the Peabody
Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson and Co. Ltd., [1984] 3
W.L.R. 953, H.L. and also, The Modern Law of Negligence, R. A.
Buckley, Butterworths, 1988 at pp. 3-12; Clerk and Lindsell on
Torts, sixteenth edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1989, ch. 10
("Negligence", R. W. M. Dias and A. Tettenborn) at pp. 444-455,
discussing inter alia Anns (supra) and liability for economic
loss.
25caparo Industries pIc v. Dickman and others, [1990] 1 All
E.R. 568. For a comparison of the factors to be taken into
account, including contractual aspects, in a principal-
contractor/engineer-subcontractor relationship, see Pacific
Associates Inc. and Another v. Baxter and Others, [1989J 2 All
E.R. 159 (C.A.).
26Discussed generally in, Rethinking Negligence: The House
of Lords and the Duty of Care, J. G. Logie, 1988 S.L.T. (News)
185.
27 Fo r example as to what constitutes a Crown body and the
extent of its immunity from common law remedies (and indeed from
statutory intervention). The British Medical Association
succeeded in its appeal to the House of Lords on a narrow
question of an interdict against Greater Glasgow Health Board:
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negligence in which the existence2 8 and/or nature2 9 of the
duty of care is not in issue. By contrast, in the law of
medical negligence, liability has been extended to some
extent by the development of new facets of the duty of
care,30 although the existing test for the standard of care
British Medical Association v. Greater Glasgow Health Board 1989
S.L.T. 493. For an analysis of this case and inter alia the
similar case of Lord Advocate v. Strathclyde Regional Council
1990 S.L.T. 158, see Crown Immunity from Statute, I. S.
Dickinson, 1990 S.L.T. (News) 61.
28 Se e Johnstone v. Traffic Commissioner 1990 S.L.T. 409
dis~ussing the lia~il~ty of a senior medical officer in giving
adVlce to the Commlssloner. The case envisages that a duty of
care to third parties, however, might exist in suitable
circumstances. See also Weir v. J. M. Hodge & Son 1990 S.L.T.
266 (0. H.) in which the Outer House held, being bound by an
earlier House of Lords decision, that a solicitor did not owe a
duty of care to a beneficiary in respect of a will which he had
been instructed to prepare (another aspect of the duty owed by
solici tors is considered in: Are Solici tors Liable for Counsel's
Negligence? A.R.W. Young, 1990 S.L.T. (News) 177).
29 Se e Moyes v. Lothian Health Board 1990 S.L.T. 444 (O.H.).
Interestingly, the duties applicable to the Secretary of state
acting through the Scottish Home and Health Department in respect
of public health vaccination programmes have been reconsidered
in a similar case to Bonthrone v. Secretary of state for Scotland
1987 S.L.T. 34. In Ross v. Secretary of State for Scotland 1990
S.L.T. 13, Lord Milligan held that in the absence of averments
of bad fai th a case based on negligence in a policy-based
decision must fall. An associated question was raised in
Montgomery v. Lothian Health Board and Secretary of State for
Scotland, unreported, Outer House, 8 February 1989, in which it
was averred that a duty existed to warn the natural mother of an
adopted child not to have the child vaccinated where an adverse
resul t occurred allegedly as a resul t whooping cough vaccination.
A proof before answer was allowed by Lord Morton of Shuna (i.e.
confirming the competency and relevancy of the averments if
proven) on the question of the location and circumstances of the
vaccination.
30E. g. Gerber v. Pines, (1934) Solicitors' Journal 13. See
also Chapman v. Rix, Times, 19 November 1959 and 22 December
1960 and Coles v. Reading and District Hospi tal Management
Committee (1963) 107 solicitors' Journal 115. See also Fowler
v. Greate~ Glasgow Health Board 1990 S.L.T. 303, concerning ~he
provision of information by medical staff to parents followlng
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has not been altered. 31 32 Rather, it has continued to be
applied without relaxation. 33 It could be argued, perhaps
by economic analysts of law,34 that the fundamental nature
of the doctor/patient relationship is contractual,
postulating the absence of the National Health Service. On
this v i ew , the usual, delictually-governed relationship
resulting from the existence of the Service represents an
aberration. The present writer, however, seeks to discuss
brain damage sustained whilst in hospital and whether an
inference of negligence could be drawn.
31Se e Ingram v. Ritchie, unreported, Outer House, 28 July
1989 (failure to warn 35 year old smoker of risks inherent in
short-term use of low-dose contraceptive pill; patient
subsequently suffered thrombosis). In Brady v. Brown,
unreported, Outer House, 5 July 1988, the test for the standard
of care laid down in Hunter v. Hanley 1955 S.L.T. 213, 1955 S.C.
200 was applied, and the applicability of the test to different
clinical settings considered. It is disappointing that this case
has not, so far as the writer is aware, been reported.
32Johns v. Greater Glasgow Health Board 1990 S.L.T. (Notes)
459; Goorkani v. Tayside Health Board, 1991 S.L.T. 94 (failure
to advise on risk of infertili ty following unconnected eye
treatment); Gibson v. Grampian Health Board, unreported, Outer
House, 15 March 1985 (failure to remove cannula and associated
ducting postoperatively).
33Se e inter alia Moyes v. Lothian Health Board 1990 S.L.T.
444; also Devaney v. Greater Glasgow Health Board, unreported,
Outer House, 30 January 1987.
34Se e generally Calabresi, The Costs of Acci~ents, Yale
Universi ty Press 1970. However, Walker (on De Ldc t , second
edition 1981 at p. 1057) has commented that a contract "may" be
formed ~here a patient consul ts a National Heal th Service doctor.
With the greatest respect, it is doubted whether this is the
appropriate view. This is discussed elsewhere.
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the most commonly-presenting example, that of the National
Health Service patient. 35
It is axiomatic that the clinical context in which
medical negligence arises 1S highly relevant to a
consideration of the standard of care. Since 1948 most
medical consultations have been obtained under the National
Health Service. 36 37 Where a patient does consult a doctor
privately, the terms of that contract may expressly agree
(unusually) that treatment, for example, will be
see also National
successful,38 thus grounding an action for breach of
35Th i s thesis is an inappropriate place for a debate upon
the merits in terms of economic analysis of the health service,
a subject meriting separate and extensive treatment in itself,
e.g. in Medical Malpractice, Theory, Evidence and Public Policy,
P.M. Danzon, Harvard University Press, 1985, especially chapters
1 - 4 and Part II.
36National Health Service Act 1948;
Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978.
37Assuming that it provides a valid basis, figures for the
number of beds allows some comparison to be made. The private
sector provides relatively little in terms of long-stay as
opposed to acute services, for obvious reasons. Nevertheless,
it is still likely that the public sector is far bigger than the
private. See Health in Scotland, H.M.S.Q., Scottish Home and
Health Department, 1987 (the most recent available at the time
of writing) ch. 2, and Independent Hospitals Association Acute
Hospital Survey, Introduction, 1989 (from private communication
to the author): a growth in this part of the private sector since
1979 of a 37% increase in beds to 10,433 is reported for the U.K.
In Scotland alone, however, the increase reported is from 265 to
398 beds over the same period. This represents an increase of
50%. Health in Scotland records 55, 338 beds for the National
Health Service in 1987, at p. 23 (see caveat above).
38Implied terms are relatively little discussed in the case
law. It seems that the courts will be slow to imply terms
significantly more onerous than their tort/delict-based
counterparts. This is exemplified by Thake v. Maurice, [1986]
Q.B. 644 and Eyre v. Measday [1986] 1 All E.R. 488.
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contract where this is not fUlfilled. 3 9 However, as
considered above, it 1S submitted that the case law
suggests that the contents of the tests for medical
negligence contract and tort/delict are still
converging. 40 Partly, this is for the practical reason that
a private patient may sue concurrently in contract and in
tort or delict: the contractual terms which the (English)
courts have seen fit to imply have been similar in effect
to the tortious standard of care. 41 42
39 Se e Morris v. Winsbury-white [1937] 4 All E.R. 494. In
addition, contract terms may be affected by the Supply of Goods
and Services Act 1982 (now modified by the Consumer Protection
Act 1987) and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. For
discussion, see The Doctor and the Supply of Goods and Services
Act 1982, A.P. Bell, 1984 4 Legal Studies 175, and The Unfair
Contract Terms Act, A Revolution in the Law of Contract, M.G.
Clarke, 1978 S.L.T.(News) 26 and 33.
40Robertson v. Bannigan 1965 S.L.T. 66 supports this
proposition. It appears to be the case generally in the matter
of professional negligence. See Jackson and Powell, Professional
Negligence, third edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1992, at p. 7 et
seg. See also inter alia Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Mardon,
[1976] Q.B. 801 per Master of the Rolls (at p. 819); Midland Bank
v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch. 384. In Scots law, Edgar v.
Lamont 1914 S.C. 277 suggests that the two bases of liability co-
exist: "( I) t seems to me that the clear ground of action is that
a doctor owes a duty to the patient, whoever has called him in
and whoever is liable for his bill, and it is for breach of that
duty that he is liable, in other words, that it is for negligence
arising in the course of the employment, and not in respect of
the breach of contract wi th the employer", per Lord Salvesen,
1914 S.C. at pp. 279-280. In Edgar, a husband had called in the
doctor, who defended an action against himself by the patient
(wife) because of absence of title to sue in contract. This
defence failed.
41Morris v. Winsbury-White, [1937] 4 All E ..R. 494; Thake v.
Maurice [1986] Q.B. 644; Eyre v. Measday [1986] 1 All E.R. 488.
42There are other suggestions, mainly obiter, to this
effect. See also Stevenson v. Shafer, 1953 S.L.T. (Sh. ct.) 107.
"Even in contract ... the plaintiff must prove a loss of
substance ... "; Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Heal th Authori ty
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It is trite that the professional nature of medical
practice, and in turn forensic consideration of its
negligent exercise, entails that an ordinary man in the
Clapham omnibus is not appropriate to pronounce on matters
of medical treatment. This is well recognised by the law.
In the general case, the more appropriate test is that of
the "ordinary medical practi tioner on the Clapham
omnibus" . 43 If, however, that test were of wide
application, it is less so now: this is because of the
relentless march of specialisation. 44 It is now commonly
the case that, unless dealing with a general practitioner,
expert witnesses must be selected by the pursuer's
solicitor from the long list of hospital specialties. 45 In
complex cases, perhaps involving a condition which could
(Court of Appeal), per the Master of the Rolls, Donaldson M.R.,
[1987] 2 W.L.R. 287 at p. 295d; also Lord Dillon, ibid., at p.
298g; see also the (obiter) opinion of the Master of the Rolls
in Naylor v. Preston Area Health Authority, [1987] 1 W.L.R. 958
at p. 967g-967h: "[I]n my judgment ... it is but one aspect of the
general duty of care, arising out of the patient-medical
practitioner or hospital authority relationship and gives rise
to rights both in contract and tort".
43 The metaphor used by McNair J. in Bolam v. Friern Hospital
Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582.
44"Today the fund of medical knowledge is so vast, and
increasing at such a rate, that no one practitioner can master
all aspects of medical care." The Organization of Health Care:
A Critical View of the 1974 Reorganization of the National Health
Service, by P. Draper, G. Grenholm and G. Best, p. 254, ch. 8 in
An Introduction to Medical Sociology, ed. D. Tuckett, Tavistock,
1976.
45 Th i s may be more problematic than may appear. See pp.
139-142 of Preparation of Medical Evidence on Liability, A.
Winyard, ch. 8 in Medical Negligence, M. J. Powers and N. H.
Harris, Butterworths, 1990.
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arlse either from the anaesthetic or operative procedure,
even identifying and distinguishing the crucial issues to
be litigated may be difficult for the pursuer's advisers. 46
The body of professional knowledge, which arguably
distinguishes all p r ofe s s LonaLV from other liabili ty in
negligence,48 entails the shape of the present action's
emphasis upon expert testimony.49
comment that,
Jackson and Powell
"[T]he problem which the courts have faced an
devising a rational approach to professional
liability, is that they must provide proper
protection for the consumer, whilst allowing for
the factors mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Broadly speaking, the solution which has been
found is to require that professional men should
possess a certain minimum degree of competence
46 Th i s factor combines potently with another to enhance the
effect of the expert witness: judges are not medically trained,
al though they have expertise in assimilating and evaluating
expert testimony.
47mutatis mutandis
48Bu t what exactly is a profession? This is another
determinant of the standard to be applied. A test of "holding
out" was applied in relation to a dental practitioner in Dickson
v. Hygienic Institute, 1910 s.c. 352. This approach was broadly
followed in Kirkcaldy District Council v. Household Manufacturing
Ltd., 1987 S.L.T. 617: a solid fuel advisory service was held
not to be "holding themselves out to be acting as a member of
what the courts have as yet understood to be a "professional
class" of adviser" (per Lord Allanbridge, 1987 S.L.T. at p. 622).
This less-strict test implied for the non-profession tends to
follow the approach in Morrison's Associated Companies v. James
Rome & Sons Ltd. 1964 S.C. 160. For discussion of this point,
see p. 572, Responsibility for Negligence, J.W.G. Blackie:
chapter in Medical Responsibility in Western Europe, ed.s. E.
Deutsch and H. -L. Schreiber, Research Study of the European
Science Foundation, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1985.
49 Th i s is so irrespective of which of Howie's or Norrie's
views is preferred.
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and that they should exercise reasonable care 1n
the discharge of their duties.,,50
It 1S this common law duty that is central to this
discussion, representing the most common, and debated,
aspect of the standard of care. 51 The uncertainty with
which the test for the standard of care requires to deal
may be analysed into several components. Those of consumer
protection and individual judgment have already been
identified. Intermixed with these are variations in
doctors' abilities, values, and differing patient
expectations and outcomes. 52 Since at least 1838, it has
been recognised that " ... nor does a surgeon undertake that
he will perform a cure; nor does he undertake to use the
highest possible degree of skill".53
Hunter v. Hanley
It is reconciliation of these conflicting requirements that
has been attempted by the modern formulation of the test
50professional Negligence, R.M. Jackson and J.L. Powell,
third edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1992, p. 5.
51Th e statutory duties, such as those arising under the
Consumer Protection Act 1987, Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984
and Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979, merit a more substantial
treatment than is possible in a thesis dealing primarily with the
common law. Readers are therefore referred to the literature on
these subjects.
52 Su c h factors may well influence the likelihood of there
being litigation in the first place.
53Tindall C.J., 1n Lanphier v. Phipos (1838) 8 C. & P. 475
at p. 478.
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for the standard of care. The leading Scottish case,
Hunter v. Hanley,54 involved the negligent use of too small
a bore of needle for an intramuscular penicillin injection.
The needle broke and lodged in the pursuer, causing her
injury and distress. It was argued for the pursuer that
the doctor had fallen below the required degree of care.
At trial, it was held that the test was whether there was
such a departure from usual practice as could reasonably be
described as gross negligence. On appeal, however, the
dispute consequent upon reference to gross negligence was
largely resolved. 55 Following judicial consideration of the
appropriate standard, a new trial was ordered.
The leading opinion was delivered by Lord President
Clyde, and remains strong authority today. At the outset,
it may be mentioned that al though the precise type of
injection in Hunter may not be the most common, it is an
example of a minor procedure universal to medical practice.
Because of this, and the frequency of giving injections by
medical personnel, it is thought that there is relatively
little room for variation in technique consistent with non-
negligent practice.
54 1 9 5 5 S.C. 200
If this is so, a consequence is that
55Th e full resolution of this point, as it has subsequently
been argued outwith the courts, has been l~ft to ~.B.M. Ho~ie and
K. McK. Norrie, in The Standard of Care ln Medlcal Negllgence,
1983 J.R. 193, and Common Practice and the Standard of Care in
Medical Negligence, 1985 J .R. 145 respectively. :rhe present
writer takes the view that the test does not Lnvo Lve the
establishment of gross negligence. This is a point advocated by
Norrie.
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there is little scope for genuine difference of
professional opinion in performing such tasks, and hence
that the use of an undersized needle is hardly an example
of deviation from common practice. As a result, on the
facts of Hunter, either evidence of common practice would
exert a disproportionately strong effect, or it was a case
merely of incompetent performance of a standard technique.
The previous cases to which reference was made in the
opinions did raise the issue of gross negligence; it may be
that the arguably idiosyncratic aspects of the facts in
Hunter also impelled judicial consideration of this.
Resolution of the question was not, however, dealt with
wholly unequivocally by the Lord President. 56 He considered
both Gleqq on Reparation57 and the previous case-law. The
latter concerned mainly the liabili ty of solicitors a.n
negligence to their clients, discussing gross negligence. 58
His approach distinguished medical (in the context of
56 Se e The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence, R. B.M.
Howie, supra, and Common Practice, and The Standard of Care in
Medical Negligence, K. McK. Norrie, supra.
57Third edition, at p. 509: see opinion ln Hunter v. Hanley
1955 S.C. 200.
58 Se e the opinion of Lord President Clyde, Hunter v. Hanley,
1955 S.C. 200, discussing previous authorities at p. 205. He
mentions Farquhar v. Murray (1901) 3 F. 859, a medical negligence
case which turned wholly on its facts. He also referred to a
series of decisions concerning the negligence of law agents in
advising their clients. The cases to which he refers included
Hart v. Frame & Co., (1839) McL. and Rob. 595, Purves v. Landell,
(1845) 4 Bell's App. 46 and othe~s.. His LO;rdship summaris~s
their effect as being that errors ln lnterpretlng the law, or ln
knowledge of the law, do not per se constitute negligence.
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"professional") negligence from other forms of negligence.
This was because of the "ample scope for genuine difference
f
.. ,,59o 0plnlon. However, these authorities provided little
satisfactory guidance on the question of gross negligence.
The apparently most relevant case, Farquhar v. Murray, 60
turned entirely upon lssues of fact. Practically no
discussion of the law is reported. Nor did the edition of
Glegg referred to by his Lordship vouchsafe significant
support for a test of gross negligence in cases of medical
negligence.
However, negligence ln that degree was certainly
extant elsewhere in the law of delict. The cases involving
trustees concerned an "immunity" clause, and it may have
been this which partly impelled the development of the law
towards an additional standard of gross negligence in this
area. 6 1 If so, this special ty of the consti tution of
trustees' powers scarcely merited its transplantation into
the law of medical negl igence. Some degree of indirect
support for this suggestion may be gleaned from Menzies on
59 Pe r Lord President Clyde, Hunter v. Hanley, 1955 S.c. 200
at p. 204.
6°(1901) 3 F. 859
61 Th e cases referred to by Lord President Clyde, at 1955
S.C. 200 at p. 205 include Knox v. McKinnon (1888) 15 R. (H.L.)
83; Raes v. Meek, (1889) 16 R. (H.L.) 31; Carruthers v.
Carruthers, (1896) 23 R. (H.L.) 55 and Wyman v. Paterson (1900)
2 F. (H.L.) 37.
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Trustees,62 which reviewed the law of trustees' negligence
a few years after the cases which the Lord President cited
occurred. Menzies states that gross negligence is required
in order to render a trustee liable, but that "simple
negligence" is insufficient. 63 Wilson and Duncan on Trusts,
Trustees and Executors also refer to a two-tier analysis
of trustees' negligence, against which an immunity clause
only confers protection in the case of ordinary negligence,
or errors of judgment, al though much depends upon the
wording of the clause. 64
Regarding professional negligence, Lord President
Clyde said that he regarded the phrase, " "gross
negligence" only as indicating so marked a departure from
the normal standard of conduct of a professional man as to
infer a lack of that ordinary care which a man of ordinary
skill would display. So interpreted, the words aptly
describe what I consider the sound criterion in the matter,
although, strictly viewed, they might give the impression
62 Th e Law of Scotland affecting Trustees, A. J. P. Menzies,
second edition, W. Green, 1913, ch. 5 (The Execution of Trust),
para(s). (511 and) 512 et seq.
63"Where there is a want of exact diligence-the omission to
execute some trust modo et forma - such negligence will be
covered by the immuni ty. Where there is a want of simple
diligence-the omission ev~n ,to attempt to execut~ som~ trust-
such negligence is gross; 1t 1S culpa l~ta, and the 1mmun1ty does
not apply." Menzies on Trustees, Ope C1t., at para. 512, p. 279.
See also Menzies, Ope cit., footnote 1 at pp. 279-280.
64Trust, Trustees and Executors, W. A. Wilson and A. G. M.
Duncan, with W. A. Elliott, S.U.L.A./~. Green, 1975, at pp. 390-
391, considering several clauses Wh1Ch have come before the
courts.
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that there are degrees of negligence. ,,65 This suggests that
the Lord President equiparated the substance of the two
apparently discrete types of negligence, 66 which would
appear to reflect the contemporary approach to the standard
of care ln negligence generally.67 The standard of
"ordinary" skill and care, employed by the Lord President
has given rise to much debate within the context of medical
negligence:
"[ I] t follows from what I have said that in
regard to allegations of deviation from ordinary
professional practice - and this is the matter
with which the present note is concerned - such
a deviation is not necessarily evidence of
negligence. Indeed it would be disastrous if
this were so, for all inducement to progress in
medical science would then be destroyed ... [T]o
establish liability by a doctor where deviation
from normal practice is alleged, three facts
require to be established. First of all it must
be proved that there is a usual and normal
practice; secondly it must be proved that the
defender has not adopted that practice; and
thirdly (and this is of crucial importance) it
must be established that the course the doctor
65Hunter v. Hanley, cit. sup., per Lord President Clyde, at
p. 206.
66 s e e , The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence, R.B.M.
Howie, supra; per contra, Common Practice and the Standard of
Care in Medical Negligence, K. McK. Norrie, supra. However, in
the light of recent case-law, it has been argued that the English
law and Scots law approaches to the standard of care in medical
negligence are diverging: see Medical Negligence, Hunter v.
Hanley 35 Years On, anon., 1990 S.L.T. (News) 325.
67Walker states that, "[T]he distinction between culpa lata,
culpa levis and culpa levissima i~ no longe~ general~y.accepted
in Scotland, [he cites as authorlty for thls proposltlon Ersk.
III 1 21· S.S. Baron Vernon v. S.S. Metagama, 1927 S.C. 498 per, , ,
Lord Justice Clerk Alness at p. 509 and even Hunter v. Hanley,
cit. sup.] but the duty to take reasonable care is infinitely
variable according to the circumstances of the case." The Law
of Delict in Scotland, D. M. Walker, second edition, 1981, w.
Green, at p. 200-201.
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adopted is one which no professional man of
ordinary skill would have taken if he had been
acting wi th ordinary care. ,,68
The long-established standard of care at Scots common law
is based upon the "reasonable man". 69 Whether the Lord
President's formulation, using the word "ordinary" r n
preference to "reasonable" , represents a difference in
substance, has occasioned some debate.
that the two are similar:
Walker considers
" " "[R] easonable care" is therefore what is
reasonable for a qualified member of that trade
or profession, [he cites Lanphier v. Phipos
(1838) 8 C. & P. 475] such failure as no doctor
of ordinary skill would be guilty if acting with
ordinary care" [per Lord President Clyde in
Hunter v. Hanley, cit. sup., p. 205] .... [I]n such
cases [medical] deviation from usual and normal
practice is negligence only if the course of
action adopted is one "which no professional man
of ordinary skill would have taken if he had been
acting wi th ordinary care" [per Lord President
Clyde, Hunter v , Hanley, cit. sup., p. 205]." ,,70
Norrie argues that the two standards are different:
" ... [A] test of "reasonable care" necessarily
carries with it a connotation which allows the
court to say what ought to have been done in the
circumstances; which connotation is lacking on a
strict definition of "ordinary care", which
suggests reference only to average or usual
standards, and so binds the court to accept as
not being negligent that which is ordinarily done
. h' t f th " 71ln t e clrcums ances 0 e case.
68 pe r Lord President Clyde, Hunter v. Hanley 1955 S.C. at p.
206.
69 Fo r example, Muir v. Glasgow Corporation 1943 S.C. (H.L.)
3, and Walker on Delict, cit. sup., at pp. 199 - 206.
70Walker on Delict, cit. sup., at pp. 205-206.
71Common Practice and the standard of Care, K. McK. Norrie,
1985 J.R. 145, at p. 148.
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He comments further that evidence of similar practice by
other, average, doctors will therefore constitute an
absolute defence. 72 It therefore seems that the test for
negligence set out in Hunter was a departure from the more
traditional test of reasonable care used generally in the
law of delict. Returning to the test itself, if the extent
of the deviation is, as was said, immaterial,73 this might
appear to be inconsistent wi th the general disavowal of
differing degrees of negligence. 74 This appearance would
not be so, however; he argues that the existence of
deviation is the important factor, not its extent.
Norrie's point regarding the weight of evidence of common
practice - even by a single other practitioner - must also
b b ' i nd 75e orne ln mln . However, it has recently been argued
that the English approach to the test for medical
negligence, as expounded and subtly varied in cases such as
Sidaway v. Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital,76 has
72 Lb i d11.
73 pe r Lord President Clyde, Hunter v. Hanley, 1955 s.C. 200
at p. 206.
74 I b i d., at p. 206, although the Lord President does say
that "strictly viewed" his words might be taken to indicate
differing degrees.
75common Practice and the standard of Care an Medical
Negligence, K. McK. Norrie, supra.
76[1985] 1 All E. R. 643
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now diverged from that ln Scotland, to a less clear
standard. 77
Lord Russell ventured to add to Lord President Clyde's
opinion only in relation to the jury's construction of Lord
Patrick's charge at the trial. 78 However, he too canvassed
the question of a standard of "gross negligence". As far
as the cases dealing wi th the immuni ty of trustees, and
their use of the more serious standard, was concerned, he
drew attention to the fact that the trustees concerned were
non-professional, gratuitous trustees. By this means, he
at the very least implicitly distances his views from the
more stringent standard. 79
Lord Sorn referred firstly to Farguhar v. Murray80, as
the only case involving a doctor to which the court's
77Medical Negligence (Hunter v. Hanley 35 Years On), Anon.,
1990 S. L. T. News, 325. The present author respectfully disagrees
with this view, on the basis that the Scottish cases appear to
apply a test of the same substance as the English. The debate
in the pages of the Juridical Review between K.McK Norrie and
R.B.M. Howie, considered elsewhere, suggests that the substance
of the tests (in the mid-1980s) was similar. A rebuttal of this
argument has also been published by D. K. Feenan in Medical
Negligence: Hunter v. Hanley 35 years on: a reply, 1991 SLT
(News) 321, wi th which the present author would respectfully
agree.
78 I b i d., at pp. 206-207.
790pinion of Lord Russell, Hunter v. Hanley, 1955 S.C. 200
at pp. 206-207. However, D. M. Walker quotes without comment,
but wi th implici t approval, Lord Russell in Hunter when the
latter said: ""There is ... only one standard, viz., the absence
of reasonable care in the circumstances, or ordinary culpa" "
[Lord Russell, ibid., at pp. 206-207]. Quoted in The Law of
Delict in Scotland, D. M. Walker, second edition, W. Green, 1981,
at p. 200.
8°(1901) 3 F. 859.
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attention was drawn. He was clearly of the view that the
case was equivocal authority for any proposition regarding
the standard of care. 81
He commented that it was assumed generally that the
standard of gross negligence in the cases involving law
agents suggested, by analogy, that that standard should be
applied to cases of medical negligence.
"It may be said, however, that, until recent
times, the general impression has been that gross
negligence must be proved in order to render a
doctor liable. The impression has been derived
from decisions and dicta pronounced in cases
relating to solici tors. ,,82
However, his Lordship concluded that such an approach
should not necessarily apply to doctors. In the light of
the decisions inter alia in Stevenson v. Donoghue(sic)83 and
Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries,84 he
considered that there probably was not room for a test
involving gross negligence and in any event appeared to
doubt whether the authorities dealing with law agents
81" .. [A]11 that was decided was that the case was relevant
for enquiry, two of the Judges indicating that "gross negligence"
must be proved and the other two not committing themselves on the
matter." Lord Sorn, ibid., at p. 207.
820pinion of Lord Sorn, Hunter v. Hanley, 1955 S.C. at p.
207.
83 19 32 S.C.(H.L.) 31
84[1940] A.C. 152
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should be regarded as of automatic applicability to the
medical profession. 85 86
The test laid down ln Hunter is still that used in
modern Scots cases. 87 In England, a similar test was
applied in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee,88
although subsequent English cases have, it has been argued,
ignored Hunter on occasion and diverged from its formula. 89
However, it is submitted that the subsequent case-law has
continued to apply the same test.
85" I think that these and other cases have resul ted in a
development which makes it doubtful whether, in a question of
civil liability such as we have here, there remains any room for
the conception of "gross negligence" as distinct from
"negligence" ... Whether it is lack of skill that is alleged, or
lack of diligence, or both the defender must not be judged by too
high a standard and I endorse what your Lordship has said on this
matter." Opinion of Lord Sorn, Hunter v. Hanley, 1955 S.C. at
p. 208.
86 Lo r d Sorn does not consider
trustees' negligence, but perhaps he
that they might be distinguished upon
clause was the main issue in them.
the cases dealing with
may also be taken to agree
the ground that an immunity
87Indeed, a recent attempt in the Court of Session to argue
that inter alia the case of Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital
Governors [1985] A.C. 871 had changed the test set out in Hunter
was rejected by Lord Caplan, in Moyes v. Lothian Health Board
1990 S.L.T. 444 in which the Hunter test was affirmed, per his
Lordship at p. 449G - I. It has, however, been argued that the
Scottish and English tests for medical negligence are now
diverging: see Medical Negligence: Hunter v. Hanley 35 years
on, (Anon.), 1990 S.L.T. 325; cf. D.K. Feenan, supra.
88[1957] 2 All E. R. 118
89Medical Negligence: Hunter v. Hanley 35 years on, supra.
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Hunter v. Hanley: Discussion
The substance of the Hunter test may, it is submitted, be
divided into two analytical categories. The first 1S the
intrinsic nature of the test itself, and the second is the
legal context in which the test is applied - notably the
division of responsibility of medical personnel and
vicarious liability. The aim of the present section is to
attempt to identify the most important of these. Whether
these are indeed satisfactory, and the threshold question
of whether faul t 1S an appropriate or indeed workable
touchstone of liability, will be dealt with infra.
The principal intrinsic characteristic of the test in
Hunter is that only one other doctor of ordinary skill need
be prayed in aid of the defender in order to exculpate him
from a potential finding of negligent conduct. Although
this appears lenient to the defender, in that evidence of
the practice of only one other colleague need be led, it is
qualified by the requirement that he be of ordinary skill.
A substantial degree of emphasis 1S therefore placed upon
evidence of common practice.
A maverick or unethical practice indulged in even by
a minority of one doctor could be struck at by evidence
that such was not the practice of one of ordinary skill.
It should also be noted that the a doctor may practice at
a far higher level of skill or ethics than the "ordinary
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skill" yardstick. Although unlikely to be litigated,
technically such a doctor would be in breach of the test if
no other doctor of ordinary skill practised at his high
standard. No explici t mechanism inheres in the test to
deal with such a situation. As a practical matter, were
such a case to arise, no doubt an exceptionally high
standard would emerge - and be recognised as such - during
expert evidence. This leads to a further point: that the
test is set at the level of competence of the "ordinary"
practitioner, although in construing that adjective a court
could also incorporate a factor of "reasonableness".l
So far as the legal context of the test is concerned,
it is principally the doctor who had direct contact with
the patient in the "medical encount.er v/ who is liable.
Leaving aside cases ln which a "team" or "post" test has
been canvassed i ' this takes no account of the present
structure of Heal th Service medical personneL" and the
lSee The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence, R.B.M.
Howie, cit. sup. and Common Practice and the Standard of Care in
Medical Negligence, K. McK. Norrie, cit, sup.
2 I . e . whether diagnosis, treatment or consent etc.
3Ev e n in these cases, the test for medical negligence (and
causation connection) has been applied to the actual medical
practitioner who performs the treatment or who dealt with the
patient: Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority [1986] 3 All E.
R. 801 (C.A.) and [1988] 1 All E. R. 871 (H.L.).
4Edgar v. Rosen, 7 May 1986, 1986 293 B.M.J. 552. No doubt
part of the underlying rationale for this is as expressed by
Stair, in a somewhat theological vein at times: "[T]he
obligation of delinquence then, is that what whereunto injury or
malefice doth oblige, as the meritorious cause thereof ....
"In reference to man is the obligation of repairing his
damage, putting him in as good condition as he was before the
115
division of clinical responsibility. In such a context,
the one in which most reported cases arise, a consultant
medical practitioner is in charge and responsible in the
organisational hierarchy, although not usually and directly
r n law. S This 1S not reflected an the present law of
medical negligence. By contrast, by virtue of the current
organisation of practices into partnerships, principals in
private practice as solicitors (and indeed N.H.S. general
medical practitioners 1n partnerships) are legally
responsible for the delicts of their junior professional
colleagues, by the doctrine of vicarious liability inherent
in the employer/employee relationship and in the joint and
several liability of partners. So far as N.H.S hospital
doctors are concerned, employer's
. .V1car10US liability
applies, to the effect of rendering the employing health
board or authority liable for employees' delicts. 6 It may
be that this does not reflect the de facto responsibility
of those involved, especially in view of the effective
delegation of this responsibility for medical management to
injury; and this only is man's part for himself. For the
inflicting of punishment is for God, in so far as it is
authorized or allowed by him; but it is not for, or from, man
himself ...... : viscount Stair, The Institutions of the Law of
Scotland, ed. D. M. Walker, The University Presses of Edinburgh
and Glasgow 1981, I, 9, 2.
sUnless perhaps improper delegation has taken place, for
example.
6Discussed above in the context of the basis of liability:
N.H.S. Trust-status hospitals are themselves responsible for
payment of claims in respect of medical negligence.
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the consultant in charge of the case. 7 Research has shown
that al though the rate of deaths in surgical operations
generally is acceptably low, nevertheless this tends to
hide unsatisfactory practices, which may well not result ln
death or even any harm at all. One of these factors,
albei t not necessarily congruent wi th legal "faul t", has
been unsatisfactory supervision of, and by implication
over-delegation to, junior doctors by consultants. 8 The
weight to be ascribed to evidence of common practice has
been vigorously debated by Howie and Norrie. 9 In Howie's
discussion, this is prefaced by a consideration of the
standard of care in the Scots as well as the English law of
medical negligence. The former argues that the content of
the standard differs in the two jurisdictions. Whereas
Hunter bespeaks an "ordinary" standard, in which evidence
7Se e Edgar v. Rosen, supra. See also the reference to the
Report of a Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths,
infra.
8 Th e Report of a Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative
Deaths, N. Buck, H.B. Devlin and J.N. Lunn, The Nuffield
Provincial Hospitals Trust and The King's Fund, 1987: "[O]ur
assessors are similarly concerned that many operations were
undertaken by surgeons too junior and too inexperienced to do the
job. Assessors commented that mistakes were frequently made by
these surgeons .... [T]his lack of supervision in many cases has
led our assessors to recommend that no patient should undergo a
surgical operation without prior consultation being obtained by
the operating surgeon with the consultant on duty or his senior
registrar." (p. 38). The broad findings of this study have been
confirmed by the second report, considered infra in the context
of reform.
9Th e Standard of Care in Medical Negligence, R.B.M. Howie,
supra; Common Practice .and the Standard of Care in Medical
Negligence, K. McK. Norrle, supra.
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of common practice plays a largely determinative role, the
English case of Bolam1 0 apparently differed in that a higher
standard, of conformity with a responsible body of opinion,
must be established an order for the doctor to avoid
liability.
The English Approach
In Bolam, the patient had been admitted to hospital for
treatment by E.C.T., or electro-convulsive therapy.
Although he was suffering from a mental illness, he was
sufficiently capax as to be able to give consent by signing
a form. He did this in ignorance of the risks inherent in
the treatment, particularly that of fractures as a result
of muscular contractions. Evidence was led to the effect
that the probability of this event occurrlng was one in ten
thousand. Consequent upon the administration of this
treatment, Bolam suffered serious pelvic fractures. It
further emerged in evidence that there were two responsible
schools of opinion on the risks of administering this type
of treatment. They were opposed on the issue of whether
the patient should be given relaxant drugs or whether
manual control of the patient should be applied. The
action against the hospital's management committee was both
in respect of the lack of information given to the patient
lOBolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee, [1957] 2
All E. R. 118.
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r.n order to obtain his consent.t ' and that some form of
relaxant drug should have been administered. Broadly, it
was clear from McNair J.' s charge to the jury that the
doctor should not be held guilty of negligence merely
because he conforms wi th a responsible body of medical
op1n1on which takes a conflicting view to that of a
different but also respectable body of medical opinion.
The question at issue thus was somewhat different from
that r n Hunter, and it 1S as a resul t of this that
differing views of the test for medical negligence were
possible. Howie argues that because of the emphasis upon
a responsible body of medical
. .0p1n1on, doctors are
therefore able to "legislate themselves out of the law of
negligence by supporting each other's actions, however
unreasonable these might appear". 12 The absence of an
explicit ethical factor allowing the court to hold a common
practice to be unreasonable is thus said to be a flaw in
the test. However, Howie himself admits that the two early
cases13 upon which he starts his discussion provide limited
support for his argument: 14
" ... [T] hese cases
seem to be more
are balanced by others which
an tune wi th the principles
11presumably consent in cases of mental illness will be
particularly affected by the doctor's wish not to wor~y.or upset
a patient who perhaps already suffers from such cond1t1ons.
12Howie, op. cit., at p. 201.
13Lanphier v. Phipos (1838) 8 Car. and P. 475 and Rich v.
Pierpont (1862) 3 F. and F. 35.
14Howie, Ope cit., at p. 203.
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enunciated in Lanphier, Rich and Bateman. Since
the early 1950s there have been cases in which
the court has itself fixed the standard of care
to be attained, and fixed that standard on the
basis of what it conceives ought to have been
done in the circumstances of the case litigated.
The expert evidence as to medical practice has
not been treated as conclusive on the issue of
negl igence. ,,15
However, Howie considers the Scots law to differ from this.
This view is based substantially upon his analysis of the
Lord President's opinion in Hunter, which he argues omits
the so-called ethical or reasonable dimension allowing the
court to superimpose its own standards upon the profession
where required. He also views the Lord President's opinion
as supporting the proposi tion that the test for medical
negligence in Scots law is one of gross negligence. 1 6 The
essence of his argument appears to be that the Lord
President equates similar practice with common practice.
By contrast, the view put forward in Howie's article is to
the effect that a common practice is one carried on by a
reasonably large number of practitioners, whereas a similar
practice refers to one carried on by a few or even one or
. t.i 17two practl loners. The thrust of the argument against the
Lord President's test is that the two types of practice are
wrongly equated; the effect of common practice lS thus
devalued. It is argued from this that because evidence of
15Howi e , Ope ci t. , at p. 207.
16Howi e , Ope ci t. , at pp. 211-213· see also p. 215.,
17Howi e , Ope cit. , at pp. 213-216.
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only one other doctor's like practice suffices to prevent
a finding of negligence, that the standard of care is in
effect one of gross negligence: "[W]hile it may be correct
to say that gross negligence is now not a term used to
describe the standard, it does not follow that that
standard has been departed from. ,,18 The cases considered by
the Lord President and discussed supra are, it 1S
suggested, consistent with this view. Two further points
are advanced in order in support of this. Firstly, he
mentions the comment by the Lord President that gross
negligence 1S the "sound criterion in the matter", although
the latter did explain the test and his interpretation of
gross negligence in a close context. 19 Howie also draws
attention to certain textual similarities between tests
enunciated in inter alia Urquhart v. Grigor20 and that of
Lord President Clyde in Hunter. 21 Ultimately, the article
argues that Bolam attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable,
being one line of authority stressing evidence of similar
practice and his view of the English test stressing
reasonable care.
18Howie, Ope cit., p. 217.
19pe r Lord President Clyde, Hunter V. Hanley 1955 S.C. at p.
206. See Howie, Ope cit., p. 217 et seg.
2°(1857) 19 D. 853
21Howie, Ope cit., at p. 218.
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These v i ews have been considered by Norrie. 22 He
traces the adoption of the test set out in Hunter in Bolam,
in which McNair J. approved it. 23 Norrie argues that the
acceptance of the Bolam test r n Whi tehouse v. Jordan24
indicates that the substance of the Hunter test became part
of English law.
25
The standard of care is argued to be the
same in both jurisdictions. 26 This being so, he continues,
there is no reason for there to be a difference in the
court's view of common and similar practices north and
south of the border. 27 Norrie's view of inter alia Sidaway
is that a standard of care consistent with that in Hunter
22 K. McK. Norrie, Common Practice and the Standard of Care,
supra.
23McNair J. in Bolam strongly implies that the substance of
the test is the same in both jurisdictions when he says that
"[i]t is just a question of expression. I myself would prefer
to put it this way: A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he
has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a
responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art.
I do not think there is much difference in sense." (Bolam, [1957]
2 All E. R. 118 at p. 122).
24[1981] 1 All E. R. 267
25 Th i s point, Norrie says (op. cit., at p. 148) derives from
J . A. Cameron's view as expressed in Medical Negligence: An
Introduction, Law Society of Scotland, 1983.
26 Th i s is particularly because, as Norrie says, Ope cit., at
p. 149, the Hunter test was also approved in Maynard v. West
Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 W.L.R. 634 and
Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Royal Bethlem Hospi tal
[1985] 2 W.L.R. 480.
27Norrie, Ope cit., at p. 152. He argues that some.of the
cases cited by Howie, particularly Vancouver General Hospltal v.
McDaniel (1934) 152 L.T. 56 (P.C.) are of insufficient width to
support fully the propositions for which they are advanced as
authority by Howie.
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was stated by the majority,28 and in turn that the court is
able to impose its own view of what the standard of care
should be.
So far as the Scots law is concerned, Norrie refers to
the case of Kelly v. Edinburgh District Council,29 in which
an architect used glass in breach of a specification set
out in the appropriate British Standard Code. The Inner
House held that departure from the code, which was a guide
to good practice, was not conclusive of negligence. This
in turn r a i s e s the question as to whether a guide to
practice, and the issue of professional practice are the
same: it is thought, however, that they should not be
equiparated. Nevertheless, Norrie's argument to the effect
that the Scottish courts can and will depart from the
internally-set standard does receive some support from the
case. Similarly, he argues that common practice as such
will not be exhaustive of issues of negligence as far as
the courts are concerned. Nor, he argues, does departure
from common practice produce a shift in the onus of proof
f . I . t 30to the defender, in the manner 0 res lpsa OgUl ur. His
view of Clark v. McLennan3 1 is that it is merely an example
28Norrie, op. cit., at p. 154-155.
29 1 98 3 S.L.T. 593
30No r r i e , Ope cit., at p. 158-160, citing inter alia the
cases of Brown v. Rolls Royce Ltd 1960 S.L.T. 119 and Clark v.
McLennan [1983] 1 All E. R. 416.
31 c i t . sup.
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of criticism of the heavy burden on the pursuer in cases in
which the task of discharging the burden is onerous. Thus
Norrie considers that Clark is inconsistent with the Lord
President's test in Hunter.
In summary, Norrie seeks to demonstrate that the
English and Scots law are very similar, and furthermore
that both jurisdictions may hold a common practice
negligent. Thus he says that the standard of care is that
which the "court finds legally acceptable".32 Despite the
Lord President's use of the word "ordinary", he argues that
the Hunter test did include an element of reasonableness
and did not import a standard of gross negligence. This 1S
because "ordinary" means what a doctor would do who is by
implication reasonable - otherwise the word "any" would
have to qualify the description of the doctor in question
for the test to bear the meaning contended for by Howie.
Moreover, as he comments, Lord President Clyde himself
appeared to see no difference between ordinary and
reasonable. Perhaps the apparent differences are merely
ones of expression rather than sUbstance. 33
32No r rie, Ope cit., at p. 162.
33No r rie, Ope cit., at p. 163. See, Raising the Standard of
Care, J. Holyoak, 1990 Legal Studies 201.
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Discussion
Two differing views upon the import of the test set out in
Hunter have been canvassed. That case was based upon three
different strands. They comprised firstly textbooks, Glegg
on Reparation34 and Salmond on Torts· 35, secondly, the
prev r.ous professional negligence cases and thirdly, the
cases on trustees' negligence. A primary reason for these
differing views 1S that there was remarkably little
guidance from previous medical negligence cases. Farguhar
v. Murray36 in particular, although more recent than most,
was of little assistance to the court as one of the few
prev10us medical cases discussed. Undoubtedly, the
reference elsewhere in the law of delict to standards of
gross negligence provided potential for arguments by
analogy. This was reflected in Lord Patrick's charge to
the jury 1n Hunter, to the effect that there "must be such
a departure from the normal and usual practice of general
practitioners as can reasonably be described as gross
negligence" .37 However, although the rest of the charge
was unexceptionable, it was on this ground that the pursuer
34Third edi tion
35Eleventh edition
36 1 9 0 1 3 F. 859
37pe r Lord Patrick in Hunter, 1955 S.c. at p. 202.
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appealed; the response of the Inner House was unanimous, to
the effect that this consti tuted a misdirection. This
strongly supports the view that gross negligence was the
wrong standard to import into the case. Furthermore, Howie
places much emphasis upon the Lord President's opinion
alone, which Norrie suggests, correctly it .lS thought,
should be balanced by a reasonably-weighted consideration
of the other opinions. By virtue of the fact that his
judgment is the leading one, and is the most detailed and
perhaps systematic, then some additional weighting should
undoubtedly be accorded to it. But when the other opinions
are also cons idered fully, 38 the argument in support of
Norrie's Vlew lS, it lS thought, strengthened. Lord
the writer
Russell appears to disapprove a test of gross negligence,39
at the same time as approving the Lord President's opinion.
If there is not an inconsistency inherent in this, the
conclusion must be that Lord President Clyde did not
support a test based upon gross negligence. All the judges
disapproved Lord Patrick's charge to the jury, making as it
did express reference to gross negligence:
respectfully agrees with Norrie's view on this point.
So far as the difference between the two jurisdictions
is concerned, prima facie there is a difference in the two
tests in that McNair J. in Bolam makes express reference to
38Considered supra.
39Hunter, 1955 S.C. at p. 206.
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"reasonableness" In contrast to the "ordinary" test In
Hunter. Reasonableness does connote something of a higher
standard than ordinary, and perhaps with also a connotation
of an external or objective yardstick.
that,
McNair J. states
"I myself would prefer to put it this way: a
doctor is not guil ty of negligence if he has
acted in accordance with a practice accepted as
proper by a responsible body of medical men
skilled in that particular art. I do not think
there is much difference in sense. It is just a
different way of expressing the same thought.,,4o
Leaving aside McNair J. 's express approval for Lord
President Clyde's formulation, the issue becomes the
meaning, and subsequent interpretation of, "reasonable" and
"ordinary". Despi te the fact that varIOUS cases from
Lanphier v. Phipos41 onwards stressed the "reasonableness"
formulation, Howie tends to emphasize those apparently
giving greatest weight to common practice. Norrie42
comments, for example, that the statement relied upon by
Howie, In the opinion of Lord Alness in Vancouver General
. 1 43 b' tHospi tal v. McDanIe, was 0 I er. However, it may be
commented that that there is in effect no common ground
possible between a test in which the court may displace
40 pe r McNair J., in Bolam, cit. sup., at p. 122; quoted
supra and by Norrie, Ope cit., p. 148.
41(1838) 8 Car. and P. 475
42 Ibid.
43(1934) 152 L.T. 56
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common practice and one in which it may not. The former
clearly operates a test, ultimately, of reasonableness and
this must reduce evidence of common practice to the status
of an evidential factor to be taken into account.
Common Practice
So far as common practice itself is concerned, it is highly
desirable if not essential that the court be empowered to
hold a common practice negligent if appropriate. However,
there is perhaps a temptation for a court to consider that
what a majority does 1S likely to be right, or, more
accurately, at least "reasonable", and therefore that
deviation is likely to be "wrong", or negligent. However,
it is submitted that an unusual case may exist wherein a
majori ty practice is negligent and the practice of the
individual is not.
this possibility,
It is partly in order to accommodate
1n which the possible underlying
assumption of the majority being non-negligent is false,
that the court should, it is submitted, retain the
potential to hold common practice negligent. It is thought
that the Lord President in Hunter was aware of this when he
said that,
" ... such a deviation [from ordinary professional
practice] is not .necessarily E7vidence c;>f
negligence. Indeed 1t would be d i aas t rous Lf
this were so, for all inducement to progress in
medical science would then be destroyed. Even a
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substantial deviation from normal practice mal be
warranted by the particular circumstances.,,4
Clearly, his Lordship had in mind medical advances, rather
than the (mis)use of known techniques. It is submi tted,
though, that what he says 1S in principle capable of
application to the mode of performance, or choice of, an
existing treatment. Again, it may be that the facts of
Hunter glve rise to a distorting effect: there are
presumably very few if any ways in which the injection
could have been performed in non-negligent deviation from
the common and, 1n that case, non-negligent manner.
Nevertheless, it may well be that deviation from a common
practice would in fact raise a presumption, formal or
he rw i f l' 45ot 1se, 0 neg 1gence. Nor does the test consider what
the criterion for judgment should be if there is no
standard practice in a particular area of medical practice.
~he Standard in Differing Medical contexts
In this section, the applicability of the test to different
clinical settings will be considered in the light of
Wilsher v. Essex Area h ho r i 46Healt Aut r1ty. Thus far,
44 Lo r d President Clyde, Hunter, cit. sup., at p. 206.
45 s e e, for example, Clark v. McLennan, cit. sup.,
Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority, cit. sup.
46 c i t. sup.
129
and
consideration of the test has been in the context of the
actions of a single practitioner, be he a general
practitioner or hospital doctor. Where more complex
treatment is attempted in the context of a team of medical
personnel, variations on the test have been canvassed. 47
It may be commented that although the actual standard
rema1ns constant under the test, its content must of course
vary according to the specialty, treatment setting, rank of
doctor and all other circumstances of the medical
encounter. Equally, it 1S implici t that the standard
applicable to the general practitioner, as may be seen from
Hunter, is that of the fellow general practitioner
exercising ordinary skill, and not that of the general
hospital physician, for example. In appropriate areas,
this will in effect yield to a more absolute approach as
where a doctor's handwriting on a prescription is
illegible. 48 However, the guiding principle appears to be
that of comparing like with like: an incarnation of peer
review.
Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority
In this case, three doctors were involved in treating a
neonate . They compr i sed the consu I tant in charge, the
47Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority, cit. sup.
48Wr i ting a Wrong, K. Mullan, 1988 B.M.J. 470.
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house officer and senlor registrar. Accordingly, the court
required to consider the ascription of responsibili ty,
which was limited to those having direct contact with the
patient, rather than the consultant, in the absence of any
argument of improper delegation or similar.
The infant plaintiff was born prematurely and placed
r n a special baby-care N. H. S. hospi tal uni t. A junior
hospital doctor inserted a blood oxygen tension monitoring
catheter into his umbilical vein. It should have been into
his umbilical artery, and therefore gave a false reading,
which led to an excess of oxygen being administered. This
resulted inter alia ln near-blindness (retrolental
fibroplasia, or R.L.F.) r n the plaintiff. The junior
doctor had asked a more experienced senlor registrar
colleague to check the insertion; neither doctor realised
that the monitoring catheter was wrongly placed, with the
attendant consequences.
At trial, Pain J. held that the Health Authority had
been negligent, that the causal link had been established
and awarded damages in the sum of £116,199. On appeal by
the Heal th Authori ty, two main isues were raised. The
first was whether the doctors concerned had fallen below
the appropriate standard of care. It was contended that
the standard exigible from the actual doctors was merely
that to be reasonably expected of any doctor possessing the
same formal qualifications and practical experience. In
other words, allowance should be made for any lack of
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experience of a doctor, which might a.n turn suggest a
broadening of consultants'legal responsibility.
The second major point raised by the appeal was
whether the excess oxygen administered could be said to
have caused the effective blindness. It was one of various
"risk factors" for the condi tion which were present in
relation to the plaintiff. 4 9 Lords Justice Mustill and
Glidewell (Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. dissenting)
/'
held .r n essence in the Court of Appeal that inexperience
was no defence to a case of medical negligence. A
different, and perhaps more easily satisfied, test applying
to junior doctors was therefore ruled out. 5 0 Several other
possibilities were also canvassed, however. The most
prominent of these is the suggestion by the dissenting
Vice-Chancellor to the effect that the Health Authority
might be directly liable in negligence for failure to
provide staff of adequate skill. Some indirect variation
of the standard applicable for the inexperienced might
therefore be available, although it 1S doubtful how far
this would afford a remedy as it 1S thought that
establishing such a case under the present law would be
difficult. However, Lord Justice Mustill was of the view
that inexperience would not justify a lowering of the
49 Th i s point is an issue relating to causation and as such
is dealt with elsewhere.
50 Se e references to the N. C. E. P.o. D. Reports, supra and
infra.
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standard of care. That was to be defined in relation to
/
the post actually held,51 rather than the experience and
characteristics of the individual doctor employed within
that post. This approach is therefore objective rather
than subjective. Furthermore, the test applied in Wilsher
yielded as a result a post not merely as "houseman" but as
doctor filling such a post in a specialist premature baby-
care unit. The standard thus was tailored as closely as
possible to the post in which the allegedly negligent
doctor found himself.
Mustill L.J. considered three basic possibilities
regarding the standard of care. 52 Before doing so, he
stated that the issue of direct liability by the health
authority had not been used as a basis for the plaintiff's
argument. The point at issue was therefore the liability
of doctors for whom the health authority was vicariously
responsible.
The first possibili ty considered was the so-called
"team" standard of care. As its name implies, it would
involve "each of the persons who formed the staff of the
unit [holding] themselves out as capable of undertaking the
specialised procedures which that unit set out to
51 The actual post held by a doctor is likely to be
determined partly by what post,is available, in which area and
specialty. It must thus contaln an element of chance - hardly
a suitable criterion to incorporate in the computation of the
standard of care, but a consequence of this approach.




perform".53 This v i.ew was rejected by his Lordship. It
would entail that a student nurse be judged on the same
standard as a consultant surgeon on the overall result of
the team's performance. His Lordship also appeared to
consider that the imposition of a uniform standard for the
unit would in effect54 lead back to direct liability by the
health authority, a line of argument disclaimed by counsel
for the plaintiff.
A different approach was put forward by the
defendants. The standard sought by them would adjudge the
doctor on the basis of his actual qualifications and
expe r i.enoe . This, too, was rejected. The first stated
reason was that the standard of care received by the
patient would as a result become a lottery, depending upon
whether a novice or experienced doctor had treated him.
This is open to doubt ini tially on the grounds that its
underlying assumption that it is better to be treated by an
experienced doctor lS not perhaps automatically true.
However, the second stated reason was that there was no
justification for making junior doctors a special case when
that did not happen in other comparable professions, In
which "learning by doing" was unavoidable. It must be
commented that, at least in the case of solicitors, it lS
possible for the trainee to learn in this way, whilst the
530pinion of Lord Justice Mustill, Wilsher, cit. sup., p.
54Although by means which are unclear from his opinion.
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principal, i.e. partner, expressly takes responsibility for
the transaction and that the two are not necessarily
incompatible, as this implies. The third formulation of
the standard cons idered , that according to "pos t", was
canvassed by his Lordship. This apparently meant the task
or specialty which the doctor held himself out as
performing, and not the "rank" of the individual filling
that post. This standard, in Lord Justice Mustill's Vlew,
was not that of the " .. averagely competent and well-
informed junior houseman .. ", 55 but of the doctor " .. who
fills a post a.n a unit offering a highly specialised
service".56 Within this inheres the necessary flexibility
to distinguish between consultant surgeons and nurses, for
example, working in the same unit. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the test also takes into account the holding out
of that doctor as a member of a specialist unit and
therefore providing specialist care.
Glidewell L. J. also considered the appropriate
standard of care, generally agreeing with Mustill L.J. He,
too, considered that no allowance should be made for
55Mu s till L.J., Wilsher, supra, p. 813h.
56Mu s till L.J., ibid.; see Jones, Medical Negligence,
supra, at pp. 85-90.
135
/'
inexperience of the practitioner concerned. But he admits
that this test is harsh. He suggests that the junior's
duty will be complied with if he consults his superior (in
fact the houseman in Wilsher consulted the unit's senior
registrar and was ultimately held not to be negligent). It
has been argued by Mason and McCall Smith5 7 that a junior
doctor may well be insufficiently experienced so as not to
know when matters are at risk of going wrong and thus when
a superior should be called in. But, unless that doctor
consults his aupe r i o r s in each case, he 1S effectively
thrown back upon a standard of care based upon the
qualified doctor. 5 8 They also comment that negligent
delegation of responsibility by a consultant to a junior
doctor could amount to direct negligence on the part of the
former. 59
Glidewell L.J. also rejected the "team" standard of
care, and held the junior doctor not negligent in calling
in the senior registrar, but did hold the latter negligent
for his failure to notice and remedy the mistake of his
junior colleague. Interestingly, his Lordship also
commented that6 0 he saw no reason why the health authority
57 Law and Medical Ethics, J. K. Mason and R. A. A. McCall
Smith, third edition, 1991, Butterworths, at p. 216.
58 I b i d .
59 I b i d .
60 0p i n i o n of Glidewell L.J., Wilsher, cit. sup., at p . 831d-
g.
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should not be adjudged negligent in appropriate cases for
a failure to provide adequately skilled staff in sufficient
number. 61
Inexperience and the Duty of Care
The Vice-Chancellor in Wilsher differed from his brethren. 62
Whereas in the normal case a doctor was under a duty to
pass to another doctor a patient whose treatment was beyond
his capacity, that did not apply to the training of
housemen an treating patients. A subjective view was
therefore required by the Vice-Chancellor's test: "[I]n my
judgement, such doctors cannot in fairness be said to be at
fault if, at the start of their time, they lack the very
skills which they are seeking to acquire". 63
In saying this, his Lordship clearly adverts to the
underlying factual situation, and is to be commended for a
common-sense approach. It was precisely this feature of
the case which led Lord Justice Glidewell to mitigate his
test wi th the suggestion that the junior doctor might
discharge his burden by seeking the assistance of his
61 Th i s is approaching perilously close to the public law
based actions on allocation of resources. Clearly such a case
would require to be framed wi th the utmost care in order to
succeed on the basis of negligence.
62 0p i n i o n of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, V.-C., Wilsher,
cit. sup., at p. 832 et seq.
63 0p i n i o n of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, V.-C., Wilsher,
cit. sup., at p. 833d.
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senior colleagues. The test set out by the Vice-Chancellor
was one in which liability would follow acts or omissions
which a "careful doctor with his qualifications and
exper ience" 64 would not have allowed or committed
respectively.65 He added that a health authority should not
be liable vicariously for negligence solely attributable to
. .1nexper1ence. One difficulty which he anticipated is that
his proposed test would depend upon the seniority of the
doctor who treated the patient - very possibly a matter of
chance. He comments that this 1S not the law, 66 and
proposes a solution along the lines of direct liability.
If the health authority has failed to provide a doctor of
sufficient skill and experience to undertake the clinical
work, and that doctor has been negligent, then the
authority may be directly liable. Although his Lordship
describes this as direct liability, it also bears
similarities to an extended doctrine of vicarious liability
inasmuch as it visits liability upon another party to the
one who has de facto been negligent. Despite these and
other problems, however, his Lordship considers that its
benefits outweigh its disadvantages, principally that of
making unwarranted findings of negligence against junior
640pinion of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, V.-C., Wilsher,
cit. sup., p. 833f.
650pinion of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, V.-C., Wilsher,
cit. sup., p. 833f.
66 0p i nion of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, V.-C., Wilsher,
cit. sup., p. 833g.
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doctors. Although his approach to the test differed from
that of his brethren, he agreed that the junior doctor had
discharged the standard of care upon him, but that his
senior registrar colleague had not. In summary, the "team"
standard of care and a defence of inexperience were both
rejected by majority, and only the more senior doctor was
unanimously found negligent. 67
Whilst in cases of medical negligence the Scottish
courts have continued to apply tradi tional rules more
strictly, this has accompanied a strong retrenchment on the
wider horizon of the law of tort and delict. 68 It IS
thought that Wilsher, as a recent and authoritative English
case, consistent with the strict approach In Kay v.
Ayrshire and Arran Health Board,69 is likely to be followed
In appropriate Scottish cases. There is little authority
of a similar nature in Scots law. In Junor v. McNicol 70, a
house officer was held not to be negligent in failing to
67 Th e appeal in this case to the House of Lords was on the
ground of causation; the House agreed with the Vice-Chancellor
that causation was not established on the balance of
probabilities. See Lord Bridge's opinion, [1988] 1 All E. R. 871
at p. 874g.
68 Se e inter alia Junior Books v. The veitchi Co. Ltd, Tai
Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. and Others and
Murphy v. Brentwood District Council, all cited supra: see also,
The Future of Liability for Defective Buildings, H.L. MacQueen,
1990 S.L.T. 337.
69 198 7 S.L.T. 577
70"Times", 26 March 1959; see Medical Negligence: An
Introduction, J. A. Cameron, Q.C., Law Society of Scotland, 1983
for an account of the case.
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administer penicillin injections: the junior doctor was
following the instructions of the consultant responsible
-:
for the case. 71 This case q i.ves some support to the
argument that the consultant in charge should himself be
held legally responsible for the actions of his junior
colleagues, by a variation of the existing principle of
vicarious liability.
Novices have been considered elsewhere in the law of
delict and tort. In Nettleship v. weston,72 a learner
driver was held to have satisfied the standard applicable
to those drivers of reasonable or ordinary skill. Thus no
allowance was made for inexperience, nor, as 1S strongly
argued this thesis,73 for ascription of legal
respons ibi 1 i ty to those doctors charged wi th day-to-day
responsibility for patient-care and clinical training.
Jones v. Manchester corporation74 involved a hospital board
and a doctor being sued jointly for negligence. The
majority (Lord Denning and Lord Singleton) did not envisage
any allowance for the relative inexperience of a co-
71As has been noted already, this responsibility will only
rarely co-exist with legal responsibility in the typical N.H.S.
hospital medicine case.
72[1971] 2 Q.B. 691
73And is incorporated as part of the writer's proposals for
reform in the last two chapters of this thesis.
74[1952] 2 Q.B. 852
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defendant upon whose actions the case was partly based. 75
There is, however, some authori ty for a raising of the
standard of care where an individual's professional
experience and qualifications make this appropriate:
Wimpey Construction (U.K.) Ltd v. Poole. 76 This is at
variance with the approach set out by the Court of Appeal
in Wilsher. 77 It is argued by them that application of the
Wimpey principle would resul t only in a raising of the
standard of care where the experience of the individual
professional meri ted it, rather than a reduction. The
case, however, was not considered by the Court of Appeal ln
Wilsher and dealt with the ambit of an insurance clause, ln
75 The rest of the case is taken up with a consideration of
an indemnity between the defendant and the hospital authority,
the effect of which is superseded. However, the board was
ultimately found liable to the extent ~f eighty per c~n~um for
damages, in respect that there was lna?-equate prov.lslon of
adequately skilled medical staff. In the llght of the dlfferent,
statutory framework under which the National Heal th Service
functions, doubts must be expressed over the weight as authority
of this case in that context.
76[1984J 2 Lloyd's Reports 499
77wi l sher, cit. sup.; see Mason and McCall Smith, cit. sup.,
at p. 205.
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a contractual context. 78 However, in Wimpey, Webster J.
Variation of the Duty of Care
The Australian case of Cook v. Cook,80 an appeal to the High
Court of Australia, 1S an interesting development of the
concept of the duty of care, and its modification 1n the
light of the relationship of the parties. This indicates
78Although the test for professional negligence set out in
Bolam was considered. It was thought not to rule out a test
incorporating a subjective element of the individual doctor's
qualifications and abilities. However, an issue canvassed but
not decided in Duchess of Argyll v. Beuselinck [1972] 2 Lloyd's
Reports 172, discussed by Webster J. in Wimpey, was whether
someone wi th a higher than normal degree of skill retained
contractually would be subject to a different (i.e. higher)
standard of care as a result. This question is clearly influenced
by the element of delectus personae involved in selecting someone
under a contract. The case did not envisage any allowance being
made for the inexperience of a junior solicitor.
790pinion of Webster J. in Wimpey, cit. sup., at p. 506 et
seq. Donoghue v. stevenson, Opinion of Lord Atkin, [1932] A.C.
562, at p~ 580.
8°[1986] 162 C.L.R. 376
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the potential flexibility of the common law to adapt the
standard of care, even within the exisitng law, to the
circumstances of the case. In the light of the findings of
the first and second N. C. E . P . 0 . D. Reports81, this
strengthens the argument that the de facto responsibility
of consultant doctors in particular should be reflected in
the law to a greater extent than is the case.
Cook also concerned the position of the novice and did
not follow the English case of Nettleship v. Weston,82 which
was authority to the effect that no adjustment to the
standard of care was indicated ln a case where the
tortfeasor was a novice. In Cook, an unlicensed and
inexperienced driver was invited - and indeed encouraged -
to drive a car for practice, the person giving the
encouragement being the passenger and subsequently the
plaintiff. In attempting unsuccessfully to avoid hitting
a parked car, the driver lost control of the car and
crashed, thus occasioning injury to the passenger. The
issue for the court was put briefly by the majority, and
was
" .. whether the duty of care owed by such a driver
to a passenger under the common law of negligence
invariably requires that the driver exercise the
degree of skill which could reasonably be
expected of an experienced and competent driver
in the circumstances notwithstanding that a basic
ingredient of the relationship between the
particular driver and the particular passenger
81Discussed supra and infra.
82[1971] 2 Q.B. 691
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is their mutual knowledge that the driver 1S
unqualified and lacks that skill". 83
It may be mentioned initially that the point under
consideration by the court was not that of volenti non fit
. . .
1nlur1a. This is, of course, because the plaintiff could
not be said to have consented to the injuries which were
received. Thus the court in this case concentrated upon
the issue of inexperience an the context of the special
knowledge of this level of experience by the plaintiff.
Furthermore, actual knowledge and not merely imputed or
constructive knowledge was involved. For the law of
medical negligence, it may be seen that the Cook-type
special knowledge of a doctor's experience and competence
could only arise where the patient has the requisite
knowledge - it is thought very rarely.
At trial, Lewis J. had found that the accident had
been caused not by carelessness but by inexperience.
Applying a test based upon the reasonable novice, the case
was dismissed. On the initial appeal, the Supreme Court of
South Australia was divided upon the issue of the standard
of care. 84 King C.J. agreed with the trial judge regarding
the standard of care. Matheson and Johnston JJ. agreed
that the Nettleship v. weston8 5 standard, i.e. that of a
83 Co o k v. Cook, cit. sup., per majority, at pp. 378-379.
See also Weir v. Wyper 1992 S.L.T. 579 (O.H.).
84[1986] 162 D.L.R. 376
85 c i t . sup.
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reasonably competent driver, should apply. However, King
C.J. rejected a defence of volenti non fit injuria but
found there to be contributory negligence, whereas the
latter accepted the plea of volenti. On ultimate appeal to
the High Court, it was considered that Johnston J. had
applied a test in effect of the standard of the novice or
inexperienced driver. He found the driver negligent on
this standard. However, the High Court held that the
issues of volenti and of contributory negligence did not
preclude consideration of the effect of special knowledge
and the relationship of the parties upon the standard of
care. 8 6 Although the High Court accepted that the normal
standard of care would not be affected, beyond being
brought into existence by it, by any relationship of
proximity between the driver and passenger, they considered
that this relationship could not and indeed should not
become standardized by the law after this threshold
requirement had been met. 8 7 It was therefore possible that
the content of the duty of care could be affected by
important factors ln that relationship. Further, the court
thought that the facts of Cook were sufficiently special
and exceptional as to transform this normal relationship
between tortfeasor and victim and therefore to be capable
of affecting the content of the applicable standard of
86 Cook v. Cook, cit. sup., at p. 381.
87 Cook v. Cook, cit. sup., at p. 382 et seq.
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care. 8 8 The questions of proximity and of the standard of
care were therefore I inked. The "reasonable man" test,
whilst remaining essentially an objective one, would be
confined to the compartment of the individual tortfeasor
and victim, as dictated by the exigencies of the specific
relationship of proximity. Some authori ty, inter alia
Nettleship v. weston8 9 , was adduced in support of this.
Whether this reasoning could successfully be applied
to the case of medical negligence is unclear. It .1S
thought that, apart from the holding out of a medical
practitioner as such and relative lack of knowledge on the
part of most patients, by contrast driving skills, or their
lack, are much more readily perceived than the rather more
abstract and arcane skills of the medical practi tioner.
The man in the Clapham omnibus may well feel confident of
his ability to assess drivers even if he does not himself
hold a driving licence, but he is less likely to be able to
do the equivalent in medical practice. He may not even be
able to detect that anything has gone wrong - particularly
if he is under anaesthetic at the time. It might also be
383.
argued that in any event, the doctrines of volenti and of
contributory negligence are adequate to deal with cases 1n
which there is some knowledge of and assent to the ultimate
88 Co o k v. Cook, opinion of the majority, cit. sup., at p.
89 c i t . sup.
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harm. 9o The majority in Cook stressed two aspects of the
case. The first was the special, exceptional circumstances
of the case, and the second was the specific aspect that
the driver's lack of ability was known and accepted by the
passenger. Further, a distinction was sought to be drawn
between errors caused by inexperience per se, and by
superimposed carelessness. 91 They identified on one hand
the possibility that an inexperienced driver could make a
mistake consonant with his lack of experience but without
negligence92 and on the other that an inexperienced driver
could be negligent in the exercise of his lower standard of
ability. The duty of care should be modified in the light
of proximity and of exceptional circumstances, both of
which the court thought were present. However, it held
that the driver had in fact been careless additionally to
the standard to be expected in deliberately accelerating in
order to avoid hi tting the vehicle in her path, thereby
causing the actual although different accident. The
acceleration was a cause of the accident and greatly
90 I t must of course be borne ln mind that these two
doctrines say nothing about modifying the standard of care or the
existence of the duty. Thus the Cook approach is novel inasmuch
as it is qualitatively different from these apparently similar
doctrines.
91 Coo k v. Cook, cit. sup., opinion of the majority, at p.
389.
92Although it might reasonably be supposed that his lack,of
experience might render suc~ a mls~ake and .probable ~e~ultlng




lower standard of care.
There had been a breach of the
The High Court agreed with the
majority in the court below to the extent that negligence
was present, but on the test to be applied, it agreed with
the dissenting King C.J. It was observed93 that the
question of volenti could not be considered because it
could not exonerate the driver from a " .. failure to observe
the standard of care which might reasonably be expected of
an unqualified and inexperienced driver". 94 However, it may
be commented that the operation of the doctrine of valenti
is to absolve the defender95 of the "consequences arising
from that negligence,,96 rather than to affect the duty
itself. volenti 97 and indeed contributory negligence are
rarely if ever considered in the reported cases, even those
concerning liability for suicide attempts whilst the victim
is in hospital. The question of varying the standard of
care is therefore unlikely to arise in the context of the
relationship of proximi ty of the parties, or of special
93 Co o k v. Cook, cit. sup., at p. 389.
94 Co o k v. Cook, cit. sup., at p. 389.
950 r defendant, depending upon jurisdiction.
96 pe r Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley in Winnik v. Dick, 1984
S.L.T. 185 at p. 188.
97Al though there is nothing in principle to prevent this
doctrine being employed, the ,patient's lack of knowl.edqe ,?f
medicine - or possible unconSClousness at the relevant tlme lf
anaesthetised - probably militates against it in practice.
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knowledge or acceptance of a lower standard of care. 98
However, a varied standard of care has been considered in
relation to the level of experience and knowledge of the
doctor.
99
It was, however, rejected in favour of a uniform
standard based upon the doctor holding that post in the
specialist unit,
inexperience. 100
with no allowance being made for
It 1S the application of the test to
specialist medical units which, it is thought, causes the
greatest complexity. There is some authority showing that
the Scottish courts have considered an aspect of this,
where the existence of a duty of care has been negatived by
a common criminal purpose. 101 Even where a common criminal
purpose has been established, it appears that a duty of
care will not necessarily be wholly negated. Although
. 1 . 102 d . . k D' k103 d i d t .W1 son v. Pr1ce an W1nn1 v. 1C 1 no requ1re to
consider this, Weir v. wyper104 demonstrates that the facts
and circumstances of the case should be assessed. In Weir,
98AI though arguably this might be of application where a
patient knows that he or she is being treated by a junior or
training-grade doctor. This might carry the disadvantage
recognised by the Court of Appea~ in Wilsher that ~ t~o- or
multi-tier system of healthcare m1ght result from th1S 1n the
longer term.
99Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority, cit. sup.
100Se e infra.
101Lindsay v. Poole 1984 S.L.T. 269.
102 1 98 9 S.L.T. 484
103 1 98 4 S.L.T. 185
1041 9 9 2 S.L.T. 579 (O.H. )
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a proof before answer was allowed on the question as to
whether a criminal course of conduct had been engaged in.
The pursuer, who had been aged sixteen at the time of the
car accident, had asked a driver holding a provisional
driving licence to drive her home unsupervised by a
qualified driver. Lord Coulsfield doubted whether, r n
these circumstances, the pursuer's actions amounted to
participation 1n a common criminal activity. It is
submitted that such an approach is but a short step from
that in Cook, and in turn from tempering the duty of care
to the actor rather than the act elected to be performed. 105
At the time of wri ting, however, there is no indication
that this more flexible approach 1S likely to be
incorporated into the law of medical negligence. Inasmuch
as there 1S such a substantial difference in knowledge
between doctor and patient, the writer argues that a
variable standard of care has rightly been rejected by the
courts in the context of medical negligence claims. The
rejection of this is consistent with the emphasis placed by
the present writer upon an absolute standard of practice.
In conclusion, the standard of care 1n medical
negligence claims, as one of the main junctions between the
medical and legal facets of a claim, is an important part
of this area of the law. It is submitted that the balance
of the law in the standard of care (and causation) 1S
l05Especially in the light of a comparable English decision
in Pitts v. Hunt (1990) 3 W.L.R. 542.
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presently weighted in favour of the doctor, and that this
1S likely to continue 1n the ambience of the recent
"backlash" identified in the law of tort1 0 6 (and delict1 0 7 ) .
This chapter has also sought to criticise the test employed
to determine that standard: its strong emphas is upon
common practice, despite the courts' power to hold such to
be negligent, the reliance upon and limitations of
vicarious, and consultants', liability and the weight
necessarily q i.veri to expert testimony although this 1S
unavoidable. These serious criticisms, it is submitted, 1n
turn raise the deeper question of the justification for the
embodiment of the fault principle in this test, and it is
this issue to which the thesis now turns.
l06Ra i s i n g the standard of Care, J. Holyoak, 1990 Legal
Studies 201 at p. 201.




The Moral Basis of Fault
Introduction
In this section, a brief consideration of aspects of the
faul t principle an the law of delict and tort, and the
nature of its relationship to morality, will be offered.
The aim is to explore the existence and application of any
moral basis of fault in the law of medical negligence. l In
order to achieve this, three intertwined discussions will
be undertaken. The first is represented by legal writers. 2
Thereafter, recent discussions of the moral basis of fault,
principally by American commentators, will be considered,3
incorporating where appropriate (and thirdly) reference to
the general formulae for assessing faul t in the law of
medical negligence. The approach 1S therefore both
theoretical and practical. The writer seeks to argue that
the notion of moral fault is not sufficiently reflected 1n
the law of medical negligence as to explain or justify it
lIn doing so it is of course necessary to consider some
arguments framed generally for tort and delict. Full
consideration of this debate is inappropriate, however, for the
more specialised aims of the present work.
2No attempt will be made to resolve such issues as the
provenance of culpa in Scots law; such aims are outwith the scope
of the present work.
3Fault liability in this debate will principally be
considered, although in the literature much attention is also
devoted to strict liability. The former is more relevant for
this work, given the present basis for actions of medical
negligence. Dictates of space prevent full consideration of the
topic of strict liability.
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consistently and satisfactorily, 4 nor that principles of
corrective justice are satisfactorily reflected in the law.
In turn, this means that to the extent desirable those
characteristics or qualities claimed for "the fault
principle" which are to be valued may be as well, or
better, attained by alternative means. 5 Such means are
discussed later in the appropriate context of reform.
Theoretical Approaches
Before consideration of the recent discussion on the fault
principle, it 1S appropriate to begin by attempting to
elucidate what 1S meant by the term.
I n common usage, the word "fau 1t" seems inseparabLe
from some connotation of imperfection, if not moral
blameworthiness as well. It has been defined recently as
"an imperfection or defect, ... ,a mistake or
error, ... ,something wrongly done; offence, ... ,the
responsibility for wrongdoing or failure" and derived
4Readers are referred to the six heads in the "indictment
of the fault principle" in Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and
the Law, by Peter Cane, fourth edition, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1987, in ch. 19.
SIndeed, some moral content in the law is probably both
vital and desirable, and the present writer would not gainsay
this. A much more limited aim is that espoused in the present
chapter. It will emerge that it does not not necessarily follow
that the only, or best, way to achieve some such moral content
is by the fault-based negligence system. This idea has recently
been put forward strongly by more than one scholar in this field.
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ul timately from the old French word, "faute". 6 This has
been the case for a considerable period of time. 7 Although
a definition wholly avoiding tautology may be impossible,
the theme appears, unsurprisingly, to be rooted in ideas of
right and wrong. Let us first consider the approach to
morality in delict or tort in general, in relation to the
law of negligence.
Stair, under the ti t.Le heading of "reparation"S, refers
to obligations which arlse by "delinquence". Such
obligations arise "without any convention, consent, or
contract, either particularly, or only by virtue of any
positive law·, and therefore, they must needs have their
original from the authority and will of God, and of our
obedience thereto".9 Although Stair's categories of
obediential obligations are not necessarily congruent with
what is presently meant by fault, the underpinning of his
v i ew is that a dereliction or failure to perform these
6Wordmaster Dictionary, Penguin, M. H. Manser and N. D.
Turton, Penguin, 1987, at p. 255.
7Fo r example, in 1944 the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
listed "failing", "defect", "imperfection" and "responsibility
for an untoward occurrence": Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, Third Edition (1944) at pp. 681-682;
it is interesting to note that the revised version of 1955 also
encompassed the same meanings, but including at one point a
reference to "sin"!
SThe Institutions of the Law of Scotland, Stair, 1693, ed.
by D. M. Walker, The University Presses of Edinburgh and Glasgow,
1981, Book 1, Title 9, at pp. 168-169.
9Stair, Ope cit., at Book I, title 9, at pp. 168-169.
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duties has taken place.
l O
This probably represents ln part
the consanguini ty of the early criminal law and law of
delict.
Walker states that,
"[t]he second precept, enjoining forbearance from
inflicting harm, has as its corollary that
reparation should be made by one who does harm
to his neighbour. The province of the law of
delict, stated most generally, is therefore the
legal duties of forbearance from inflicting harm
on others and the consequential duty of making
reparation if and when harm has been done."ll
Whereas this does Li ttle to emphasize ei ther faul t or
morality, the author continues by quoting from Erskine: l 2
" " (a) I terum non laedere is one of the three
general precepts laid down by Justinian,l3 which
it has been the chief purpose of all civil
enacments (sic) to enforce. In consequence of
this rule, everyone who has the exercise of
reason, and so can distinguish between right and
wrong, is naturally obliged to make up the damage
befalling his neighbour from a wrong committed by
himself. Wherefore every fraudulent contrivance,
or unwarrantable act, by which another suffers
lOSee for example the eighteenth edi tion of Erskine (by
Rankine, Bell and Bradfute, 1890). The author comments at Book
III, title 1, para. 4: " [o]bligations, when considered with
regard to their cause, were divided by the Romans into those
arising from contract, quasi-contract, delict, and quasi-delict.
But there are certain obligations, even full and proper ones,
which cannot be derived from any of these sources, and to which
Lord Stair gives the name of obediential. Such is, among others,
the obligation of parents to aliment or maintain their
children ... ".
llDelict, D. M. Walker, second edition, W. Green and Son,
1981, at p. 3.
l2An Insti tute of the Law of Scotland, by John Erskine,
eighth edition, 1870, by Badenach Nicholson.
l3Walker, Ope cit., at p.3, cites Justinian's Institutes
(Corpus Juris Civilis) Book I, title 1, para. 3 and Digest, Book
I, title 1, para. 10.
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damage, or runs the hazard of it, subjects the
delinquent to reparation." ,,14
By contrast, this gives an indication that some notion of
moral fault underlies the legal concept of fault, although
Walker primarily stresses the adjustment of losses rather
than ascription of fault. 1S 16 The present writer seeks at
this stage only to try to demonstrate that moral notions of
fault are present in some of the Institutional writings,
and not the discrete issue that any particular idea of
morality or Roman legal concept underlies the modern law.
It has been argued that,
"[t]he material collected and analysed ... does not
support the proposi tion that the Scots law of
reparation derived a principle or doctrine of
culpa from Roman law in general or from the lex
Aqui I ia in particular ..... But the sporadic
reliance on texts from the Digest or Institutes
which use the term culpa does not prove that
Scots law extracted from the Roman sources and
applied a principle of culpa ..... The more
frequent occurrence in the cases of the word
culpa itself without a specific reference to the
14walker, Ope cit., at p. 3, quoting from Erskine's
Institutes (cit. sup.), Book III, title 1, para. 13.
Iswalker, op. ci t., at p , 5. However, the author does
advert to the moral implications: "[m]oreover a moral flavour
has been imparted by the language of the courts in inquiring
whether the defender was in "fault", or did "wrong"." Walker,
Ope cit., at p. 5. This implies that the ascription of"moral"
fault takes place after the analysis of legal fault, and that the
former is not dependent upon the latter.
16De s pite the fact that Walker, Ope cit., at p. 42, quotes
Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 S.c. (H.L.) 31 at p.
44 to the effect that a general sense of moral wrongdoing may
underpin some of the law of delict, it is clear that both Lord
Atkin and Walker consider that this cannot be the basis for all
legal remedies in delict. Walker comments: (at p. 42) "What is
fault? It is clearly not synonymous with moral fault .. ", and
"[f]ault may be regarded as coextensive with absence of legal
excuse or justification."
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Roman law shows merely that some advocates and
judges preferred to reason wi th the help of a
word derived from Roman law. It does not show
that the rules or principles which they expressed
in terms of culpa were derived from Roman law.,,17
Whether the modern Scots law of reparation has any
connection wi th morality has been doubted, rather
emphasizing the importance of the allocation of losses
consequent upon harm. This is the view urged by Gow, who
stresses "reasonableness" in his argument based upon the
law of nuisance: 18
"The words "right" and "wrong", hallowed as they
are by long usage, cannot now be got rid of, but
their use should not obscure the fact that a law
of reparation concerns itself with harms, and in
particular unjustifiable harms. When, then, is
a harm unjustifiable? The answer is when the
actor has made unreasonable use of his rights or
liberty. ,,19
This has been strongly countered by Elliott, who has argued
that a moral basis of fault exists in culpa, and that this
is desirable. 20 21 Although the present writer considers
17Culpa in the Scots Law of Reparation, G. MacCormack, 1974
J.R. 13, at p. 26.
18 1Gow, Is Culpa Amora ?, 1953 J.R. 17.
19GOW, Ope cit., at p. 35.
20 Se e, What is Culpa?, 1954 J.R. 6. To the extent that this
debate is predicated on the law of nuisance, and the case of
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, it is now superseded
by the case of R.H.M. Bakeries v. Strathclyde Regional Council,
1985 S.L.T. 214. It appears that liability for nuisance in Scots
law as a result of R.H.M. Bakeries, is based on fault. This,, .
to some degree, strengthens the argument advanced by Elll0tt,
supra.
21 Th e related debate on the terminology of the lex
aguilia/actio injuriarum is outw~th t?e scope ?f the present
discussion. See, for example, Deslgnatlon of Dellctual Actions:
Damn Injuria Damn, T. B. Smith, 1972 S.L.T. (News) 125, and Damn
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that the modern law does reflect a move away from the so-
called moral basis, it is not disputed that a finding of
negligence may, though not necessarily, coincide wi th a
moral defect. 22 23
At this point, it 1S interesting to consider the
attitude to moral fault evinced by textbook writers on the
modern English law.
Relatively little discussion 1S offered on fault and
its relationship to morality. street emphasizes the
allocation of loss model of tort and the pervasive
influence of insurance. 24 Salmond and Heuston refer to the
original author's support of liability's being based upon
fault,25 and comment that "[f]ault has never been, and is
not today, an essential element in tortious liabili ty. ,,26
More illuminating 1S a subsequent comment on the
Injuria Again, T. B. Smith, 1984 S.L.T. (News) 85.
22 Th i s 1S of course in the context of a negligent act,
rather than an intentional civil wrong.
23 To concentrate on this aspect of the debate is not, it is
submitted, to deny that moral fault, or indeed a non-moral, legal
conception of fault, has no part to play in the law.
Particularly in the context of the law of medical negligence, the
influence and utility of the moral and economic deterrence which
some claim for the law of tort or delict, will be considered.
24Street, The Law of Torts, by Brazier, eighth edi tion,
Butterworths, 1988 at p. 10.
25Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, by Heuston and
Buckley nineteenth edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1987, at p. 24,
referri~g to the most recent edition written by Salmond (Salmond
on the Law of Torts, sixth edition, 1924), at pp. 12-13.
26Salmond and Heuston, Ope cit., at p. 25.
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relationship of moral defect to legal fault:
"[I]t is clear that to Salmond, with his emphasis
on mens rea, fault was a matter of personal
shortcoming. But the "faul t" upon which
liability may rest is social fault, which may,
but does not necessarily, coincide with personal
immorality. The law finds "fault" in a failure
to live up to an ideal standard of conduct which
may be beyond the knowledge or capacity of the
individual. ,,27
Whilst acknowledging that the legal principle of fault had
an "affinity,,28 with the criminal law, Winfield and Jolowicz
argue implicitly that morality has a loose connection with
the legal "fault principle", in its deterrent effect and
regulation of individual responsibility.29 Nevertheless,
their view appears to be that in practice this effect 1S
difficult to quantify, and is of limited extent. 30
In conclusion, it is submitted that these authorities
demonstrate some serious reservations as to whether the
legal principle of "fault" in the general law of tort or
27Salmond and Heuston, Ope cit., at p. 26. The authors of
this work point out (at p. 27) that it followed from the original
Salmond view that the award of damages was substantially punitive
in nature. Although they comment (at p. 27) that such a view has
never formed part of the substance of the law, some would argue
that the related concept of deterrence, and regulation of
individual responsibili ty, fulfil the formal requirements of
morality, even if the content differs from Salmond's view. See,
for example, Salmond and Heuston, Ope cit. at p. 28, and New
Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: A Tort Lawyer's
Perspective, L. N. Klar, (1983) 22 Univ. Toronto L. J. 80
(discussed infra in the context of reform).
28Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, by Rogers, thirteenth
edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1989, at p. 24.
29Winfield and Jolowicz, Ope cit., at pp. 24-27.
30Winfield and Jolowicz, Ope cit., discuss this at pp. 27-
30.
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delict bears a necessary or automatic relationship to
actual moral fault. It has been said that,
II [p] aradoxically, the faul t concept itself in
origin contemplating only interpersonal justice,
eventually opened itself to a consideration also
of social needs, distributive justice and
stricter liability. This transformation has been
rapidly gaining pace since the individualistic
fault dogma began to yield to the mid-20th
century quest for social security, and the
function of the law of torts came to be seen less
in its admonitory value than in ensuring
compensation of accident victims and distributing
the cost among those who can best bear it." 31
Where negligence, rather than other areas of the law of
delict or tort, is concerned, the extent to which a
perceived moral shortcoming may coincide with the legal
test of faul t is thought to be much greater. 32 This is
because that area more closely resembles the earlier
criterion of wrongdoing, rather than harm. An objection
may be raised that unintentional conduct may be more
difficult to stigmatise as a moral failure than an
intentional civil wrong. 33 Before consideration of the
American analyses, we may note that recent concerns in this
area have been aptly summarised in the following terms:
" ... by far the greatest attention and criticism
is focused (sic) upon compensation through the
tort of negligence for personal injury. It is
indeed beyond question that the operation of the
law in this area is vulnerable to powerful
criticism. While the various objections overlap,
31Th e Law of Torts, J. G. Fleming, seventh edition, The Law
Book Company Limited, 1987, at p. 94.
32 Cf . The Advantages of Fault, W.W. McBryde, 1975 20 J.R.
32.
33Wi n f i e l d and Jolowicz, Ope cit., at p. 25.
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they can nevertheless be conveniently grouped
under three main heads. The first is that tort
is an extremely inefficient and wasteful system
for compensating victims of personal injury. The
~econd is that its operation, both in theory and
1n practice, is arbitrary and capricious. The
third is that the spread of liability insurance,
which shields tortfeasors in many situations from
the financial consequences of their actions, has
effectively deprived the tort of negligence of
any moral basis which it might once have had.,,34
American Approaches
Inasmuch as American tort law seeks to resolve the similar
potentially conflicting requirements, and indeed criticism,
of the tort system, it 1S instructive to consider the
essence of this debate. At the outset it must be
emphasized that the discussion to which reference will be
made encompasses the law of tort and therefore by
implication the law of delict an its entirety. To
attempt to conclude this substantial issue is outwith the
scope of this work. The aim of this section is to discuss
the main arguments and ultimately to assess their relevance
to the law of medical negligence. However, it is pertinent
to inquire as to the reason for considering these issues.
In response, it is contended that one of the major tasks
of this thesis is to analyse the theoretical and practical
34The Modern Law of Negl igence, R. A. Buckley, London,
Butterworths, 1988, at p. 378. In fact, insurance must dilute
the effect of a finding of fault. It is arguable that the fact
that negligence is capable of be~n~ ins~red against means.th~t
it loses some of its moral culpab1l1ty, 1f any; after all, 1t 1S
not possible to insure oneself against committing crimes!
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aspects of the faul t principle in the law of medical
negligence. Accordingly, although the literature discusses
the law of tort35 generally, a cri tique of the aims and
objectives of the fault principle in general is likely to
contain implications for our purpose. The risk that
medical treatment, however expert its provider, might be
unsuccessful is a factor which arguably differentiates all
"professional" activities from the usual example of a case
in negligence. There is a clear margin for non-negligent
error 1n medical negligence cases, reflecting this
intrinsic inability of the discipline to guarantee
outcomes. 36 Thus,
"[CJentral to decisions in cases of medical
negligence is the undisputed fact that in all
medical practice there is a risk. Even the most
prudent or technically brilliant physician cannot
guarantee absolute safety or success in the
medical transaction. Thus, his liability has to
be 1 imi ted to those cases where the resul tant
harm was demonstrably due to his falling below
the accepted level of care. This level, which
is at the root of the negligence action, is set
by the courts on the evidence of medical
practitioners themselves.,,37
35Again, by implication also the law of delict.
36"The true position is that an error of judgment may, or
may not, be negligent; it depends on the nature of the error.
If it is one which would not have been made by a reasonably
competent professional man professing to have the standard and
type of skill that the defendant.he~d hims~lf ou~ as ~aving, and
acting with ordinary care, then 1t 1S negl1gent. Wh1tehouse v.
Jordan [1981J 1 W.L.R. 246, per Lord Fraser at p. 263.
37Medicine, Morals and the Law, S. McLean and G. Maher,
Gower, 1983, chapter eight (Negligence), at p. 156.
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Two principal stages may be discerned in the literature. 3 8
The aims and objectives of the law are discussed, and then
the extent to which these are realised. One of the sources
of energy which underlies this debate was the American
economic analysis of law, the principal exponent of which
is Calabresi.
3 9
The essence of his theory is that both the
cost of accidents and accident avoidance should be
minimised so far as consonant with fairness; the unmodified
fault principle is argued not to achieve this. It must,
however, be observed that a substantial apparent reason for
the gestation of such theories was the increase in motor
vehicle accidents in the United States in the late 1960s. 40
Hence, it must be borne in mind that economic analyses
based on this must be viewed with caution. The reasons for
this are twofold. Firstly, it may be that motor vehicle
claims are frequent and so readily detectable, the
insurance of associated risks and processing of claims so
efficient and streamlined, that this model provides a
peculiarly apt vehicle41 for economic analysis. Secondly,
38Bo t h as regards the law of tort (delict) and the law of
negligence. At present, we shall concentrate on the "fault
principle" ; causation and other issues will be deal t wi th
separately (infra).
39 Th e Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis, G.
Calabresi, Yale University Press, 1970.
40Calabresi, Ope cit., at p. 3.
41 Th e converse is that a discipline which 1S not readily
visible or understandable to the ordinary man in the street, such
as the practice of ~edicine,. may therefore be a peculiarly inapt
vehicle for econom1C analys1s.
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the underlying law of tort may be sufficiently
differentiated from that obtaining ln particular in
Scotland and to medical negligence as to imperil reasoning
by analogy between the two.
As regards the fault principle, though, Calabresi's
prlmary aim is not to consider its merits or otherwise per
se - rather it is to examine whether or not the principle
meets the economic criteria of efficiency which he has
previously set out. It is not therefore unreasonable to
argue that his analysis lS less concerned with the
substantive content of the rules and more with their
general reconciliation with his theory.42 This suggests in
turn the most fundamental criticism which may be made of
such analyses. It lS, of course, that the elusive
influence of the concept of justice can neither be
accounted for entirely an economic terms, nor can the
substantive requirements of justice (or "fairness") be
predicted in these terms. It is also argued that, once an
unquantifiable element of "fairness" is introduced into the
judicial equation, this renders similarly unquantifiable
the extent and influence of the economic analysis. So
argues Epstein, who advocates a "common-sense" approach:
"A knowledge of the economic consequences of
alternative legal arrangements can be of great
importance, but even among those who analyse tort
in economic terms there is acknowledgment of
certain questions of "justice" or "fairness"
rooted in common sense beliefs that cannot be
explicated in terms of economic theory. Even if
42 Se e Calabresi, Ope cit., at pp. 239-243.
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they cannot provide satisfactory answers to
fairness questions, the advocates of economic
analysis in the law still insist that their work
is of primary importance because it reduces the
~rea in which fairness arguments must be judged
r n order to reach a decision in a particular
case. But once it is admi tted that there are
questions of fairness as between the parties that
are not answerable in economic terms, the exact
role of economic argument in the solution of
legal question becomes impossible to determine. ,,43
This criticism may also be made of other important economic
theories, such as those of Posner44 and to some extent the
counter-movement, exemplified by Epstein's argument ln
favour of causally-determined strict liability.45 Whereas
these consider the moral basis of fault (and causation
questions) incidentally to tort law in general, other
wri ters have specifically deal t wi th the several models
43A Theory of strict Liability, R. Epstein, 1973 2
(University of Chicago) Journal of Legal Studies 151 at pp. 151-
152. [In this quote, Epstein refers to an article by G.
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed: Property Rules, Liabili ty
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 1972 85
Harv. Law Rev. 1089 at pp. 1102-1105, and also to R. A. Posner,
A Theory of Negligence, 1972 1 Journal of Legal Studies 29.
There is, however, nothing to suggest that Epstein's criticisms
of economic analyses are not applicable to the latter in
general.]
44Economic Analysis of Law, R. A. Posner, second edition,
1977; Little, Brown and Company (Boston and Toronto)
45A Theory of Strict Liability, R. A. Epstein, 1973 2
(University of Chicago) Journal of Legal Studies 151. See also
Epstein's Theory of Strict Tort Liability, N.E. Simmonds, 1992
Cambridge L. J. 113 and The Structure of Tort Law, J.L. Coleman,
1988 97 Yale L. J. 1234.
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underlying fault in negligence. The work of Coleman is an
important example of this. 46
From the foregoing, a sui table starting point for
discussing the basis of the fault principle47 is Epstein's
comment that "(t)he task is to develop a normative theory
of torts that takes into account common sense notions of
individual responsibility". 48 One of the major reasons
advanced for the faul t principle 1S its regulation of
individual responsibility. Others are the goals of
elementary justice (presumably a large component of which
is individual responsibility), deterrence, educating the
public as to reasonable and unreasonable conduct, appeasing
victims and allowing confrontation. 49 Let us examine the
propositions which underly this.
46Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part I,
Jules L. Coleman, 1982 1 Law and Philosophy 371, and Moral
Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II, Jules L.
Coleman, 1983 2 Law and Philosophy 5.
47As we have seen, there seems to be no necessary or
automatic congruence between this principle and moral notions,
to the extent that this is discernible from the textbooks.
48A Theory of Strict Liability, Epstein, cit. sup., at p.
151. The present writer makes no comment on the substantive
merits of this statement. Rather, the quote is intended to show
a common reason advanced in support of the fault principle.
49These points are made in the course of a discussion of New
Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, and the Woodhouse Report
(which led to its being established), in an article by L. N.
Klar New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: A Tort Lawyer's
pers~ective, 1983 33 Univ. Toronto Law J. 80 at pp. 92-93.
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Underlying Assumptions
The first point which arises is why we are considering
"fault", either legally or morally, at all?5o
Each individual human being has no choice about his or
her coming into existence. As life progresses, it is
evident that most humans experience hardship and happiness
in reasonable proportion, although it has been said that
" [B] u t in this wor ld nothing can be said to be certain,
except death and taxes". 51 These trite observations are
made as a reminder that the individual's fortunes wax and
wane, until they cease to sound in creation. Therefore, by
our very existence, we must be deemed to accept that bad
fortune is in some degree inseparable from life. One of
varlOus possible expressions of this argument lS, of
course, the death of the individual. If society cannot, or
50 Th i s is of course a wide debate in its own right. In
recen t years, concern over the "tort remedy" per se has broadened
to include compensation in general. See generally, Compensation
and Support for Illness and Injury, D. Harris et al., Oxford
Socio-Legal Studies, Clarendon Press, 1984, ch . 1; Atiyah' s
Accidents, Compensation and the Law, by Peter Cane, fourth
edition, 1987, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Part 1; Disease and the
Compensation Debate, Jane Stapleton, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1986 (discussed infra; cf. Principle and Pragmatism in the
Compensation Debate, K. S. Abraham, 1987 7 Oxford J. Legal
Studies 302).
51Written by Benjamin Franklin (Letter to Jean Baptiste Le
Roy, 13 November 1789, wri tings, vol. X): reference and
quotation from The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations,
published by The Reprint Society (by arrangement with Oxford
University Press), 1966, at p. 88.
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will not, seek to attenuate hardship of every kind, it
follows that nei ther will legal provision for doing so
exist. There may be many different reasons for this.
Amongst these, even those who advocate the wider
attenuation of hardship, as an incarnation of an ideal,
perhaps, must concede that the resource implications of so
doing constitute an obstacle to its realisation. 52
Alternatively, others would argue that the individual must
accept responsibility for him- or her-self, and for a large
degree of the risks inherent in existence. 5 3 It is between
these two extremes that society, and the law, attempt to
achieve a balance.
However, any civilized society, to a varying extent,
prides itself upon its care for the less fortunate members
of that society. This may be manifested in many different
ways. One example of it may be the development of the
legal system itself, as a means of regulating disputes and
ordering society.
society is enormous.
The difficulty which faces such a
Whereas some categories of the less
fortunate are readily identifiable on a society-wide
52 I t may be observed that in many cases the law provides
only a minimum standard of conduct with which the individual must
comply, rather than providing a higher, or ideal, standard upon
which aspirations could be placed. No doubt to do so would be
impracticable!
53To the extent that these contain political implications,
it must be stressed that the present writer does not seek to
support, or argue from, any political affiliation whatsoever.
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scale,54 the provision which should be made for such groups,
and whether others should be "re-advantaged", are matters
likely to provoke serious disagreement. In addition, the
unspoken assumption underlying these priori ties is that
there will be insufficient resources available to
compensate everyone wi th some claim to alleviation of
hardship. Such compensation need not be direct and
financial; it may be rehabilitation,55 direct care, re-
training or a variety of other possibilities. 56
It is this unspoken assumption which fuels the debate
over the alleviation of hardship. Were the latter the only
goal, and resources unlimited, no disagreement would arise.
Thus the first complicating factor which we may identify is
this scarcity of resources in the face of competing claims.
The second complicating factor lS, of course, the other
families,byinformally54 1 d i . . dExc u a nq p r ov i s i on rna e
individuals and support groups.
55See, for example, Rehabilitation of Personal Injury
Claimants, P. Cornes, 1989 S.L.T.(News) 129.
56Clearly, the hardship involved may involve the loss of
something or someone, or something else irreplaceable. In this
case, monetary compensation is given. Whereas the starting point
for such compensation is arbitrary, it is possible after this has
been fixed, to introduce an element of "comparative" logic into
the award precedents. See, for example, Damages for Personal
Injuries and Death, J. Munkman, eighth edition, Butterworths,
1989, at pp. 1-2: "Damages are simply a sum of money given as
compensation for loss or harm of any kind" " .. it must be
recognised that the primary rule is compensation. The rule that
compensation is measured by the cost of repair, or restoring the
original position - restitutio in integrum - is a derivative or
secondary rule, which applies only if and so far as the original
position can be restored. If it cannot, the law must endeavour
to give a fair equivalent in money, so far as money can be an
equivalent, and in that way "make good" the damage."
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functions of the law in addition to alleviating hardship.
Here the law has concurrent aims: tort law especially, it
is argued, fulfils more than one purpose. 57
An alternative approach where an individual has
suffered hardship, rather than simply determining whether
society can afford to alleviate it by any means, is to
consider (in conjunction with the harm) its nature, and the
circumstances in which it came into existence, 1. e. a
causally-based enquiry. This is what the Scottish and
English legal systems have tended to do. In doing so, they
have evolved criteria for choosing which forms of hardship,
and the ways in which it may come into existence, should
determine the question of recompense. 58
with these conflicting requirements in mind, let us
turn to the recent analysis of tort, principally by
American writers, in considering the extent to which it 1S
based upon moral factors. These analytical and
philosophical discussions display a wide variety of
different approaches. As Fletcher comments, "order and
coherence" in tort 1S an ideal which is difficul t to
57 Se e New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: A Tort
Lawyer's p~rspective, L. N. K~ar, cit. sup.; Accidents,.costs and
Legal Responsibility, s. stolJar, 1973 36 ~.L.R. 233; D1sease ~nd
the Compensation Debate, Jane Stapleton, C1t. sup.; Compensat1on
and support for Illness and Injury, D. Harris et al., cit. sup.
58Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, by Peter
Cane, Ope cit., ch. 1.
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attain;59 it may well reflect the underlying nature of the
subject under consideration.
Theorizing in tort or delict may take one or more of
several different approaches. A theory may seek to analyse
the existing law, i.e. be descriptive, or it may propound
a normative approach, a version of what the law should be
like, or principles by which the law may be measured and
re-fashioned if necessary. Thus the general60 and
celebrated theory of Calabresi says that the law of tort
should minimise costs both of accident compensation and of
accident prevention consonant with fairness. In turn, he
criticises the law of tort, and puts forward an
alternative, based upon so-called "mixed" systems of fault
and legislative controls for the efficient realisation of
h . I' 61t e economlc ana YS1S.
The present wri ter agrees wi th the arguments put
forward to the effect that the tort system is not wholly
justified by reference to moral principles, and that this
applies in turn to the law of medical negligence which for
present purposes is a microcosm of the law of negligence
59synthesis in Tort Theory, George P. Fletcher, 1983 II Law
and Philosophy at p. 64.
60 I. e. not concerning the moral basis of tort as such.
61Calabresi, Ope cit., Pt. VI (Towards a New System of
Accident Law).
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generally.62 It is further suggested that Coleman's
distinction between grounds of rectification and modes of
rectification also applies to medical negligence. This
means that the precepts of "justice" do not necessarily
require the existence of the present remedy a.n tort or
delict for the recompense of negligently-caused adverse
effects. Fletcher comments that,
"[F]or nearly two decades diverse schools of tort
theory have attempted to reduce liabili ty for
personal injuries to a few basic principles.
Calabresi advocates the principle of minimizing
the total costs of accidents and accident
avoidance; Posner advocates the principle of
encouraging those activities whose benefits
outweigh their costs. Epstein endorses a system
of tort law in which causing harm is a
sufficient condition of liability. My own
[Fletcher's] work is read as advocacy of "non-
reciprocal risk-taking" as a standard of
1 · b' 1 . t " 63la 1 1 Y .
Relatively little argument in favour of a consistent and
coherent moral basis for the law of tort is presented. The
arguments ln favour of this approach64 have been
George P.
(footnotes
systematically reviewed in the work of Coleman, to whom
this thesis now turns.
62 Th i s is because, as merely an area of professional
activity to which the usual precepts apply, the same questions
and issues are necessarily raised in connection with it.
63 The Search for Synthesis in Tort Liabili ty,
Fletcher, 1983 II Law and Philosophy at p. 63
omitted) .
64Towards a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, Ernest J.
Weinrib, 1983 II Law and Philosophy 37; to a lesser degree in
Tort Liability for Breach of Statute: A Natural Rights
Perspective, J. Robert S. Prichard, Alan Brudner, 1983 II Law and
Philosophy 89.
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Coleman identifies the methods with which philosophy
has sought to give tort law a moral basis, a process which
he describes as one of providing a "rational
reconstruction" of the law under one or other principles of
justice. 65 His methodology is instructive in that it
incorporates the var i.ous possibili ties utilised in the
effort to establish a moral basis of fault (and also strict
liabili ty, which need not concern us). Al though other
principles have been discerned,66 those identified by
Coleman are, it is submitted, the most important and will
therefore be concentrated upon. They comprise:
(1) retributive justice;
(2) responsibility theory;
(3) reciprocity theory, and
(4) principles of corrective justice. 67
These principles include the arguments of those, such as
weinrib,68 who seek to argue that there is a moral basis
for tort. The conclusion reached by Coleman, and with
65Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part I,
Jules L. Coleman, 1982 I Law and Philosophy 371 at p. 371.
66Those identified by williams include appeasement, justice,
deterrence and compensation. See The Aims of the Law of Tort,
Glanville Williams, 1951 Current Legal Problems 137 at pp. 138-
150.
67Coleman, Ope cit., at pp. 371-372.
680p . cit.
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which the writer respectfully concurs, 1S that no one of
these principles of justice can provide a basis for tort
law, and al though morali ty may be discernible an some
proposi tions of the law "i t cannot explain why we have
adopted a tort system as the approach to vindicating these
claims. ,,69 It will be noted that deterrence 1S not
explicitly mentioned, as it is not considered a discrete
"principle of justice" sufficient on its own to support
unassisted the weight of the negligence and tort edifices. 70
It may nevertheless be a factor tending to support the
existence of the tort and negligence system, and will be
considered where appropriate in this context. 71 The writer
is bolstered in this view by the excellent analysis of this
subject put forward by Williams in 1951. 72
69Coleman, Ope cit., Abstract, p. 371.
70 I t is nevertheless an important factor, and is considered
1n this thesis principally under the heading of reform.
71Somewhat similar remarks apply to compensation. See
Theories of Compensation, Robert E. Goodin, 1989 9 Oxford J.
Legal studies 56.
72 Th e Aims of the Law of Tort, Glanville Williams, 1951
Current Legal Problems 137, at p. 172: "[O]ur attempt to find
a coherent purpose in the present law of tort cannot be said to
have met with striking success .... [W]here possible the law seems
to like to ride two or three horses at once; but occasionally a
si tuation occurs where one must be selected." (ibid., at p. 172).
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Retributive Theory
Leaving aside his views upon strict liabili ty, 73 we may
consider firstly Coleman's view of retributive theories.
Such theories are perhaps those with the most obvious claim
to providing the moral basis ln question. The statement of
this theory set out in this article is circular:
" .. [F] aul t in torts marks a moral defect in an actor for
his conduct ... [L]iability is justly imposed upon a faulty
actor in order to penalize, punish or nullify his moral
fault".74 I t wi 11 immediate ly be noticed that this is
merely a statement of the alms of the theory, which when
stated in this form does not provide justification for
itself. Nor, as is pointed out, can it serve to justify
strict liability, because "fault" is not then part of the
legal calculus of liability.75
An important argument which lS presented against a
retributive basis of tort is the fundamental one that an
individual may be found liable in tort in the absence of
moral fault. 76 This, it is said, lS because the standard of
73Necessitated by considerations of space, and additionally
because the focus of this thesis is medical negligence, i. e.
restricted to fault-based liability for unintentional injury.
74Coleman, Ope cit. , at p. 374.
75Coleman, Ope ci t. , at p. 374-375.
76Coleman, Ope ci t. , at p. 375.
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care is essentially objective rather than subjective:
"[A]ccording to the objective test, a defendant is at fault
whenever he fails to exercise the care of a reasonable man
of ordinary prudence - whether or not the defendant himself
lS capable of compliance.,,77
It 1S submitted that in Scotland the standard of care
an the law of negligence is significantly, and probably
substantially, objective. It is that of the reasonable
man, as laid down in the Scottish case of Muir v. Glasgow
t · 78Corpora lon . The opinion of Lord MacMillan in the case
was that,
"[L]egal liability is limited to those
consequences of our acts which a reasonable man
of ordinary intelligence and experience so acting
would have in contemplation ..... The standard of
foresight of the reasonable man is, in one sense,
an impersonal test. It eliminates the personal
equation and is independent of the idiosyncracies
of the particular person whose conduct is in
question .... The reasonable man is presumed to be
free from both over-apprehension and from over-
confidence, but there is a sense in which the
standard of care of the reasonable man involves
in its application a subjective element.,,79
(He cites, ibid., the case




of Vaughan v. Menlove 3
objective standard.)
78 194 3 S.C.(H.L.) 3. It is interesting to speculate as to
what proportion of the general population would constitute
"reasonable men"; presumably, for example, convicted criminals
would by definition require to be excluded from this category.
How many of the rest would be suitable to be included, and by
whose arbitration?
79 1 94 3 S.C.(H.L.) at p. 10.
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The English law of tort adopts a similarly objective
standard: for example, Buckley80 cites Nettleship v.
Weston81 as an example of such a standard, and the inability
of the learner driver to meet it, being incapable of so
doing through inexperience, i.e. incapacity.
It is submitted that, if indeed it is the case that an
individual may be found liable in the absence of moral
fault, then the claims of this sub-theory to provide any
moral underpinning must be therefore be flawed. The
likelihood of this being the case 1S increased by the
objective nature of the Scottish test for breach of the
appropriate standard of care. Were the test entirely or
largely subjective, then this argument would relinquish
some of its force 82 because the test would be tailored more
to the individual actor. As it is, however, we may note
Atiyah's critique inter alia that the compensation payable
bears no relation to the degree of fault nor to the means
of the defendant. 83
The question now becomes one of whether the same
reasoning may also be applied to the law of medical
80The Modern Law of Negligence, R. A. Buckley, London,
Butterworths, 1988, at p. 24.
81[1971] 2 Q.B. 691.
82niscussed in Glanville Williams, op . cit., at p .159 et
seg.
83Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Peter Cane,
fourth edition, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987, at pp. 415 and 416
(Counts 1 and 2 in the indictment of the fault principle).
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negligence. Some factors appear which may serve to render
the test for the standard of care an medical negligence
morally apposite. As we have seen, it was stated that an
objection to the retributive theory of tort was that the
individual defendant (or defender) might not have the
capacity to comply with the duty, which in effect is a form
of strict liability. In the medical context,84 a qualified
and duly registered doctor has sufficient qualifications,
training and intelligence that we may be reasonably certain
that he is intrinsically capable of satisfying the present
standard of care. An additional factor is the element of
"holding out" of professional medical skills, absent in
many examples of common, non-professional liabili ty for
negligence, and which may serve to justify an informal
presumption that this argument might not be open.
been commented generally that,
It has
"[p] racti tioners are usually committed, or
expected to be committed, to certain moral
principles, which go beyond the general duty of
honesty. They are expected to provide a high
84And indeed perhaps all the contexts of liabili ty for
professional negligence.
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standard of serV1ce for its own sake.,,8S
The standard of care applicable to medical negligence 1S
higher than the normal standard, but only inasmuch as it 1S
based upon reasonable but comparable medical practice.
This is because the ordinary man on the Glasgow omnibus
would presumably make a poor general practi tioner, for
example. The legal test, and standard, it is suggested,
are very similar but simply translated to the discipline of
medicine. Any higher aspirations or idealism are likely to
be the product of the professional training and calling
than the substance of this legal test.
However, to leave the enquiry at this point would, it
is submi tted, be to leave it incomplete. As one might
expect, the case law gives very little overt reference to,
or explicit consideration of, any retributive or generally
moral basis for the law of medical negligence. The
essence of the leading Scottish test for medical negligence
1S that,
" .. it must be proved that there is a usual and
normal practice; secondly it must be proved that
the defender has not adopted that practice; and
thirdly (and this is of crucial importance) it
8sprofessional Negligence, R.M. Jackson and J. L. Powell,
second edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1987, at p. 1. This does not
of course imply anything of necessity for the content of the duty
of care, although perhaps it renders the moral basis of it a
little more likely. It should be noted that the third edition
of Jackson and Powell, Sweet and Maxwell, 1992, does not repeat
the above but instead analyses the apparent formal distinguishing
characteristics of a profession, no doubt in deference to the
increasing number of callings seeking identification as such.
Despite this, the present writer included the quotation from the
second edition as aptly encapsulating the traditional
professional ethos.
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must be established that the course the doctor
adopted is one which no professional man of
ordinary skill would have taken if he had been
acting with ordinary care.,,86
Ultimately,8? this too is a reasonably objective test88 and
therefore provides the basic potential for Coleman's
objection to the retributive theory to apply to the law of
medical negligence. The special difficulties, and moral
connotations, of the attribution of legal fault to doctors
were summarised in an English case in 1983:
"[T] his claim reveals a disgraceful state of
affairs. ~ere an injury is caused which never
should have been caused. Common sense and
natural justice indicate that some degree of
compensation ought to be paid by someone. As the
law stands, in order to obtain compensation an
injured person is compelled to allege negligence
against a surgeon who may, as in this case, be a
careful, dedicated person of the highest skill
and reputation. If ever there was a case in
which some reasonable compromise was called
for ... and avoid the pillorying of a distinguished
surgeon, this was such a case.,,89
Perhaps this was suggested by the comment in Atiyah' s
Accidents, Compensation and the Law90 that,
86 pe r Lord President Clyde, Hunter v. Hanley, 1955 s.C. 200,
at p. 206. The question as to whether all cases of medical
negligence are to be analysed as deviations from a notional norm
is dealt with elsewhere.
8?See also the more recent case of Moyes v. Lothian Health
Board 1990 S.L.T. 444, an Outer House decision in which Lord
Caplan approves Lord President Clyde's test in Hunter.
88A more objective version of it would involve raising the
applicable standard to that of the highest-skilled professional
in that field.
89 pe r Kilner-Brown J., in Ashcroft v. Mersey Regional Heal th
Authority, (1983) 2 All E.R. 245, at p. 246a - 246b.
900p . cit.
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"[N] ei ther in law nor in morali ty is faul t the
only ground on which a person may be required to
compensate another, although in the sphere with
which we are mainly dealing the law at least
generally recognizes no other.,,91
However, the case of Wilsher v. Essex Area Health
Authori ty92 must be considered a.n this context. 93 In
Wilsher, one of the principal issues between the parties
was whether the standard of care should be varied towards
the subjective part of the spectrum in order, in effect to
allow a junior doctor's inexperience to be a defence to an
allegation of negligence. The Court of Appeal held the
junior doctor not to have been negligent. This was despite
his inexperience, which the court clearly said in general
would not afford a defence to an allegation of negligence.
In calling upon a more senior colleague, a registrar (who
also did not notice the incorrect treatment of the
91Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, by Peter
Cane, fourth edition, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987, at p. 427.
92[1986] 3 All E.R. 801 (C.A.): we are not concerned with
the appeal to the House of Lords at this stage, as that dealt
only with the issue of causation rather than the standard of
care.
93As indeed might the case of Payne v. st. Helier Hospital
Management Committee [1952] Current Law Year Book 2442, in which
a casual ty doctor wrongly diagnosed internal injuries in a
patient kicked by a horse, negligently failing to call in a
consultant as the former doctor was not capable of making the
appropriate diagnostic examination.
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Pa t i e n t ) 94 the ]'Unl' d t hor oc or was t us held to have
discharged his duty of care. Two points should be noted.
Firstly, the defendant in the case was the Area Heal th
Authori ty as employer. It is difficult to see how the
ascription of liabili ty vicariously to the employer can
comply wi th the requirements of the retributive theory.
This is because, assuming that the Authority had discharged
its duty to appoint suitably qualified and skilled medical
staff, it has thereafter Li, ttle direct control over the
actual medical practice of such staff. 95 Therefore to make
the defendant vicariously liable in such circumstances
cannot satisfy the central requirement of a retributive
basis for medical negligence. 96 Secondly, Wilsher laid down
that inexperience was not a defence: as already
considered, the test was primarily objective. Mustill L.J.
in the Court of Appeal in the case of Wilsher v. Essex Area
Health Authority stated as follows:
94 Th i s was consti tuted by incorrect placing of a blood
oxygen tension monitor which gave false readings and therefore
induced the doctors to increase the level of oxygen applied to
the infant plaintiff beyond that which was safe. However, the
issue appealed to the House of Lords was solely that of
causation, dealt with elsewhere in this thesis.
950 nc e appointments had been properly made, and assuming
that systems were in place to regulate, monitor and perhaps keep
employed doctors up-to-date with Department of Health circulars,
direct liability would be very unlikely to arise.
96Unless perhaps the health authority sought indemnity from
the doctor which is unlikely. In any event, the professional
indemnity insuranc~ ~ar~ied by, doctors, an~ th~ introduction of
Crown indemnity, mllltates agalnst the retrlbutlve theory as the
retribution is exacted partly or wholly against one who cannot
be held morally responsible for the conduct in question.
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"[T]o my mind, this notion of a duty tailored to
the actor, rather than to the act which he elects
to perform, has no place in the law of tort.
Indeed, the defendants did not contend that it
could be justified by any reported authority on
the general law of tort. Instead, it was
suggested that the medical profession is a
special case ..... lf the hospitals abstained from
using inexperienced people, they could not staff
their wards and theatres, and the junior staff
could never learn .... To my mind, it would be a
false step to subordinate the legitimate
expectation of the patient that he will receive
from each person concerned with his care a degree
of skill appropriate to the task which he
undertakes to an understandable wish to minimise
the psychological and financial pressures on
hard-pressed young doctors .... For my part, I
prefer the third of the propositions which have
been canvassed. This relates the duty of care,
not to the individual, but to the post which he
occupies. I would differentiate "post" from
"rank" or "status". In a case such as the
present, the standard is not just that of the
averagely competent and well-informed junior
houseman (or whatever the position of the doctor)
but of such a person who fills a post in a unit
offering a highly specialised service ... ,,97
Essentially, it 1S submitted that this reinforces the
primarily objective nature of the test for medical
negligence and indeed strengthens this characteristic
inasmuch as a junior doctor, who may de facto be unable to
comply with the demands of the duty, will nevertheless be
held to be in breach of it. It may thus be seen that any
claim of the retributive theory to provide a moral basis
for the law of medical negligence
97wi l s h e r , [1986] 3 All E. R. at p. 813d - 813h; see Jones,
Ope cit., at pp. 85-90.
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cannot be sustained, for it 1S open to the same criticism
made generally by Coleman.
It 1S interesting to note that in modern scientific
method, an important criterion of the validity of a theory
1S its falsifiability.98 If an explanation is susceptible
of testing in this manner, it is important to note that
only one counter-example is required in order to falsify,
or refute, the theory. With this in mind, let us proceed
to consider the next potential moral basis for this
part of the law of delict. 99 Before leaving retributivism,
it is worth noting that even if its claims were sustained,
Coleman states that,
" ... [W]e can penalize an individual's fault -
moral or other - without the penalty taking the
form of his being held liable for the costs of
harms his fault occasions. In other words, even
if the notions of moral fault and fault in torts
converge so that every person who is at fault in
torts is morally culpable, the retributive
argument could not adequately explain why it is
that the victim is compensated by his injurer.
Indeed the retributive argument suggests a very
different sort of means for allocating costs:
namely, the "at fault" pool." ,,100
This raises a point to which the thesis will return r.n
considering reform, namely that of general "severability",
or as Coleman subsequently analyses it, the distinction
98 Se e, for example, Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and
Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963.
99 Se e, for example, Karl Popper, Poverty of Historicism,
Routledge, Keegan and Paul Ltd, 1957, at pp. 132-134.
100Coleman, Ope cit., at p. 375.
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between grounds of rectification and modes of
rectification. 101
Responsibility Theory
R i.b i Li h 102esponsl 1 lty t eory, as evaluated as a moral basis for
tort liability, is predicated principally upon the work of
Epstein.
103
This theory accepts that the claim to moral
justification of the fault principle, considered supra in
the context of retributive theories, does not provide a
moral basis for the faul t principle. 104 The theory takes as
its starting point that tort theory must be based upon
" .. common sense notions of individual responsibili ty". 105
Quite simply, as Coleman neatly encapsulates it,
"[T]he moral weight which was to have been
carried by the fault principle in the ill-fated
Retributive Argument is to be borne instead by
the causal condition. Not only would Epstein's
approach .... reduce, if not eliminate entirely,
the role of fault in a just theory of liability;
101Se e Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and
Limits: Part II, 1983 II Law and Philosophy 5, at p. 11 et seg.
102niscussed in Coleman, Ope cit., p. 378 et seg.
103s e e, for example, A Theory of Strict Liability, Richard
A. Epstein, 1973 (University of Chicago) Journal of Legal Studies
151.
104Th e difficulties raised in the general legal context by
the concept of responsibili ty a:-e ~iscussed in Voluntary Acts and
Responsible Agents, Bernard Wllllams, 1990 10 Oxford J. Legal
Studies 1.
105Epstein, Ope cit., at p. 151.
185
it would provide a moral foundation for the much
maligned rule of strict liability as well. ,,106
At once, we may observe that this theory allows very little
scope in attempting to discern a moral basis for the
current law of medical negligence, for it seeks,
prescriptively, to abolish a fundamental part of the
present legal analysis of such cases, the fault principle.
At the outset, therefore, this theory is severely fettered
ln its ability to explain or justify the existing law. The
moral quality of the tortfeasor's act is irrelevant; it is
the simple fact that he caused the damage or injury which
justifies liability. This would, it is submitted, tend to
produce even greater complications of policy in the
definition and ascription of causal responsibility; Hart
and Honore conclude that,
"[W]hat we are really concerned to stress,
therefore, is that there exist in the law of tort
two radically different techniques for limiting
responsibility, causal and non-causal, and that
both of these should have a place in any workable
107system of law."
However, let us consider the theory a little further. The
essence of Epstein's thesis is that the causal consequences
of a person's intentional action are those for which he
b . bl 108should e responsl e. Notwithstanding the criticisms
106Coleman, Ope cit., at pp. 378-379.
107Causation in the Law, H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honore, second
edition, Oxford, 1985, at p. 307.
108Fo r a discussion of causation and responsibility sparked
by the Californian market-,share product liability case. of Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories (clted as 1980 607 P. 2d. 924 lnfra), see
Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?
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levelled at this by Coleman109 and others 110, severe
difficulties in applying this to medical negligence are to
be anticipated, precisely because the causal chain may not
be clear, especially in a scientific and technical
discipline such as the practice of medicine. Recent
examples of this phenomenon include Wilsher,lll Hotson v.
East Berkshire Area Health Authorityl12 and Clark v.
MacLennan. 113 We may note, as does Coleman,114 that the two
theories considered above require the tortfeasor to make
recompense to the victim. The penultimate approach which
has been propounded as giving negligence a moral underlay
lS the reciproci ty of risk theory, which includes pre-
Larry A. Alexander, 1987 6 Law and Philosophy 1.
109Coleman argues that to make a defendant liable in this
way allows the potential to render him liable inappropriately,
i.e. inflexibly (his "strong" criticism); his "weak" criticism
is that the theory may not ascribe liability where the defendant
may not have caused the harm but nevertheless either is or ought
to be held liable. It is also argued that causal responsibility
and personal responsibili ty do not coincide, further reducing the
viability of the theory in providing a moral basis for
negligence. Coleman, Ope cit. at pp. 379-381. An example of one
of Coleman's criticisms is that examined above in the context of
the retributive theory: vicarious liability.
110"The simple causation formula fails, for it disregards a
significant requirement of fairness. Individuals should be held
accountable only for unexcused actions. Any approach that
disregards excuses hardly warrants approval as a just basis for
shifting losses." George P. Fletcher, Synthesis in Tort Theory,
1983 II Law and Philosophy 63, at p. 72.
111supra
112[1987] A.C. 240 (H.L.)
113[1983] 1 All E.R. 416
114coleman, op. cit., at p. 383.
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conditions for the imposition of liability under this head.
The leading proponent of this approach is Fletcher;115 once
again the potential for it to justify or indeed even to
explain the basis for the law of medical negligence is
limi ted by the possibili ty of regarding it partly as
normative rather than descriptive. 116
Reciprocity of Risk
This analysis ini tially applies two tests. As its name
suggests, firstly the tortfeasor must have imposed a risk
upon the defendant which he did not, or would not, lmpose
upon or accept himself: this lS the idea of non-
reciproci ty and perhaps ul timately lS traceable to the
similar biblical injunction. II? It is the basic test for
the imposi tion of liabili ty. An element of fairness is
also emphasized at this point: the tortfeasor must have no
acceptable excuse for having acted as he did. Should an
excuse be absent, then the tortfeasor may justly be held
115Se e, Fairness and utility in Tort Theory, George P.
Fletcher, 1972 Harvard Law Review 537, and The Search for
Synthesis in Tort Theory, George P. Fletcher, 1983 II Law and
Philosophy 63.
116 . t t 385Coleman, Ope Cl ., a p. .
117"Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should
do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the
prophets." Holy Bible, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd. (no date
of publication quoted); The Gospel According to st. Matthew,
chapter 7, verse 12.
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liablel 18 (it being implicit that the tortfeasor must have
"caused" b t bl . t ., y accep a e c r i e r i a , the damage, loss or
injury) . As regards the moral dimension in which we are
principally interested, Coleman, arguing that the theory
cannot account either for fault or strict liability,
comments that:
" ... while the Reciprocity View makes the absence
of an excuse a condi tion for liabili ty to be
imposed justly under both the fault or strict
liabili ty principles, in nei ther case is
liability in fact defeasible by a showing by the
defendant of a lack of defective motivation on
his part. ,,119
It has also been commented that,
" "Even if a person admits that he occasionally
makes a negligent mistake, how in the nature of
things, can punishment for inadvertence serve to
deter?" But if this question is meant as an
argument, it rests on the old, mistaken
identification of the "subjective element"
invo 1ved in negligence with "a b lank mind",
whereas it is in fact a failure to exercise the
capaci ty to advert to, and to think about and
control, conduct and its risks. Surely we have
plenty of empirical evidence to show that, as
Professor Wechsler has said, "punishment supplies
men with an additional motive to take care before
acting, to use their faculties, and to draw upon
their experience." Again there is no difficulty
here peculiar to negligence, though of course we
can doubt the efficac~ of any punishment to deter
any kind of offence"l °
118Se e Fairness and utility in Tort Theory, George P.
Fletcher, 1972 Harvard Law Review 537, at pp. 537 - 540.
119Coleman, op. cit., at p. 384.
120punishment and Responsibility, H.L.A. Hart, op. cit., ch.
VI (Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility), at pp.
156-157 (footnotes omitted).
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It 1S submitted that this factor is crucial to the validity
of a moral theory purporting to justify or explain the
nature of tort. If the conduct of the tortfeasor is to be
assessed irrespective of his moral or other motivation or
capacity, then such an analysis is flawed. For, if the
over-arching purpose of the law of tort is moral, how can
it simultaneously omit this axiomatic and fundamental
factor in the person whose conduct is being considered and
evaluated? Again, the tortfeasor might be acting outwith
his capacity, and therefore being judged against an
impossible standard which again resembles strict liability
and 1S open to cri ticism. 121 Coleman continues by
demonstrating that in fact the reciprocity thesis is based
upon a distributive justice model rather than a corrective
justice one. 122 Thus, he says of the reciprocity view that,
" .. everyone has a right not to be harmed without
being compensated. If we take Fletcher at his
word, it is the fact that one has suffered harm
that enti t.Le s one to recompense, not the fact
that one's harm results from another's non-
reciprocal risk taking. The principal that is
supposed to impart moral significance on the
criterion of non-reciprocity of risk actually has
the effect of eliminating it. With non-
reciprocity as a condition of liability out of
121Se e inter alia, strict Liability 1n Scotland, D.M.
Walker, (1954) 66 J.R. 72; Punishment and Responsibility, .H:L.A
Hart, Ope cit., ch . VI (Negligence, Mens. Rea, and Cr1m1nal
Responsibility); Jules Coleman, Moral Theor1es of To~ts, Part I
(op. cit.) principally at pp. 374-383; Part II (op. c1t.) at pp.
14-15 and 26-29; cf. inter alia Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of
strict Liability, 1973 (University of Chicago) Journal of Legal
Studies 152.





The present writer respectfully agrees with this criticism
of the theory, to the effect that its claim to a moral
content is ultimately not sufficiently sustainable. 124 So
far as the law of medical negligence is concerned, it 1.S
further submitted that the reciprocity of risk analysis 1.S
satisfactory nei ther as a descriptive theory nor as a
normative theory. In both cases, this is because the
underlying nature of the transaction is not susceptible of
translation to these terms. Whereas reciproci ty has an
immediate plausibility in the examples considered by
Coleman, for example that of motor-car drivers accepting a
background risk and then superimposing upon that an
unacceptably high risk by careless driving,125 the clinical
situation 1.n which the doctor is consulted by the patient
is not an activity in which there is the basic parity of
risk imposition before the transaction or event in question
which 1.S by implication required by the theory. The
patient imposes no risk upon the doctor, al though the
doctor may well impose varying degrees of treatment or
investigative risk upon the patient, to which the latter
123Coleman, Ope cit., part I, at p. 389.
124A detailed critical analysis of the harm aspect of the
theory is made by M. Margaret Falls, at pp. 27-38 of an article
entitled Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons, 1987
6 Law and Philosophy 25.
125coleman, Ope cit., part I, at pp. 387-388.
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consents, ln the normal case. This furnishes little basis
for the operation of the theory, unless perhaps a formula
is employed which permits the doctor to impose risks up to
a certain level and no more. This, of course, starts to
resemble the current test for medical negligence and more
fundamentally has moved away from the central concept of
reciprocity. Thus in Hunter v. Hanley,126 the forensic
enquiry centred upon the actual conduct of the doctor at
the time; there was little or no scope for the patient to
impose risks upon the doctor reciprocally. The nature of
the transaction was unilateral to the extent that the
patient consulted the doctor and presumably expected the
latter's reasonable endeavours to be used. 127
Corrective Justice
The fourth and final general category under which it has
been sought to provide a moral basis for negligence in the
the law of tort is that of corrective justice. Such an
. 1 db" b 128 happroach has been most persuaslve y urge y Welnrl, w 0
proposes an Aristotelian corrective justice structure
1261 9 5 5 S.C. 200
127Th i s might furnish a basis for a reciprocity formula,
but, it is thought a somewhat artificial and unsatisfactory one.
128Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, E. J. Weinrib,
1983 II Law and Philosophy 37.
192
infused by Kantian content. 129 It 1S this theory which
prima facie carries the strongest claim to provide a moral
b . f th 1 fl· 130aS1s or e aw 0 neg 1gence.
The general corrective justice model first
distinguishes between corrective, and distributive,
justice. The latter is described as existing " .. where a
glven resource 1S distributed among competing claimants in
accordance with a ratio that states a criterion of
merit".131 Corrective justice is said to be based upon the
assumption of the parties as equal before the occurrence of
the allegedly negligent episode (so-called "antecedent
equality") and, after this event, in restoring this prior
state of affairs "by transferring resources from defendant
to plaintiff so that the gain realized by the former is
used to make up the loss realized by the latter". 132
However, even at the start of his argument Weinrib
acknowledges the limi tat ions of theories of corrective
justice:
"[T]he status of corrective justice as a form and
not a principle of justice points to its
limitations as a solvent of tort controversy. A
corrective justice conception of negligence will
not in itself justify preferring the current
system of 1 iabil i ty based on faul t to a more
129weinrib, Ope cit., Abstract, at p. 37.
130Se e also, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort
Law Make Sense? Larry A. Alexander, 1987 6 Law and Philosophy
1 .
131weinrib, Ope cit., at p. 38.
132Weinrib, Ope cit., at p. 38.
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comprehensive no-fault compensation scheme.!33
Inasmuch as compensation schemes implicate values
of distributive justice, the decision between
them and a corrective justice system must be made
on the basis of considerations extrinsic to the
forms of justice which they respectively embody.
Moreover, since corrective justice is a matter of
structure not substance, there may be no tort
regime which uniquely satisfies its
requirements .... Corrective justice in itself is
devoid of a specific content
1
which accordingly,
must be sought elsewhere ... " 34
Coleman, in his excellent analysis of corrective justice
th . 135 . h b dar i .eor1es summar1ses t ese oun ar1es 1n this way:
" ... corrective or rectificatory justice 1S
concerned with wrongful gains and losses.
Rectification is ... a matter of justice when it is
necessary to protect a distribution of holdings
(or entitlements) from distortions which arise
from unjust enrichments or wrongful losses. The
principle of corrective justice requires the
annulment of both wrongful gains and losses.,,136
This clear statement is, however, only the first step in
our discussion.
comment that,
We must also bear in mind Coleman's
"[O]ne important claim that corrective justice
cannot ground is that a faulty injurer who has
secured no gain through his faul t ought to be
held liable in damages to his victim. The reason
for that is quite simple. The concern of
corrective justice is wrongful gains and losses.
The faulty injurer we are imagining secures no
gain: no gain, no liability as a matter of
133Th i s hardly justifies or explains, morally or otherwise,
the fault principle in negligence. The present writer submits
that the criticism of Coleman which is put forward by Weinrib
(op. ci t., at p. 39) , in that the l.atter' s conception of
corrective justice allows wrongful qa i ns and losses to be
separated from the parties, is relevant.
134weinrib, Ope ci t. , at p. 40. The emphasis 1S added.
135Coleman, Ope ci t. , part I I .
136Coleman, Ope ci t. , part II, at p. 6.
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corrective justice. To find the source of
liabili ty we must look elsewhere. ,,137
It 1S thought that this variant has been correctly
analysed; it is that which most closely resembles medical
negligence. Thus far, however, we are not enti t.l.ed to
conclude that weinrib's theory is unable to provide a moral
basis either for negligence generally or medical negligence
specifically. This 1S for two reasons. The first 1S
whether Weinrib's model of corrective justice 1S
sufficiently similar to that of Coleman as to bring the
former's argument within the ambit of the latter's
criticism. The second relates, of course, to the content
of Weinrib's theory, and is considered below.
It is submitted that weinrib's general
characterisation of corrective justice 1S sufficiently
similar to that discussed by Coleman that the same
criticism applies to both. Coleman's working definition
has already been set out; that of Weinrib 1S slightly
different. He draws a distinction between Aristotelian
corrective justice, in which the same gains and losses are
required, but the crucial point is that there is always a
nexus r.n the transaction between the plaintiff and the
defendant. In other words, the payment of damages must be
137Coleman, Ope cit., part II, at p. 11. Weinrib states,
Ope cit., at p. 39 that " .. the term "corrective" applies to the
types of reasons for an arrangement rather than to an arrangement
itself." (footnote omitted).
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by the latter to the former,138 assum1ng no complications
such as contributory negligence. This 1S to be contrasted
with what is described as the more modern version of
corrective justice in which the gains and losses are no
longer "anchored,,139 to their respective plaintiff and
defendant140 but can "float free,,141 of what previously were
these attachments. The question raised 1S whether the
objection by Coleman still holds good - but a logically
subsequent 1ssue 1S also raised. This, as has been
adverted to briefly, refers to the structure of the medical
negligence claim, in which it is difficult to identify any
gain from his negligence accruing to the doctor. 142 This is
in contrast, for example, to some of the examples discussed
which concern unjust enrichment or other possibili ties
demonstrating a clear and tangible gain to the tortfeasor.
Returning to the former, however, Weinrib describes his
version of Aristotelian corrective justice as considering
138Weinrib, Ope cit. , at p. 38.
139weinrib, Ope ci t. , at p. 39.
140weinrib, Ope ci t. , at p. 39.
141weinrib, Ope cit. , at p. 39.
1420ther than the benefit of non-compliance with the duty of
care. it is thought that on balance this gain should be of, .
insufficient weight to allow this theory to be appl1ed to such
cases. In any event, compared with the potential loss accruing
to the victim in medical cases, and indeed the tangible gains
often cited in example, e.g. of wrongful acquisition of
property, it is argued that this ~ay be disr:egarded. Cf.
Weinrib Ope cit. at p. 54: "[B]oth 1nterpretat10ns locate the
defenda~t's wrongful gain in the foregone burden of precautions."
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" .. the position of the parties anterior to the
transaction as equal, and it restores this
antecedent equality by transferring resources
from defendant to plaintiff so that the gain
realized by the former is used to make up the
loss suffered by the latter. ,,143
The version of corrective justice discussed by Coleman
differs only in this quality of the "detachability" of the
gains and losses arising in the transaction under
consideration. We may now attempt to determine the
applicability of the analysis and criticism by Coleman to
the work of Weinrib. It is submitted that the general
criticism of corrective justice as allowing a moral
analysis of negligence again fails. Coleman's distinction
between grounds and modes of rectification,144 and the
criticism it contains, must apply to both these forms of
corrective justice equally. Further, Weinrib states that
" .. for Aristotle corrective justice is a form of justice
and not a principle of justice. It does not state a
normative requirement which must be followed or pursued. ,,145
It is also contended that the analysis of corresponding
gains and losses, present an both types of corrective
justice, would require an artificial analysis of a galn to
be made in the normal case of medical negligence. It is
submitted that the functioning of the law seriously
undermines claims that corrective justice provides a moral
143Weinrib, op. cit., at p. 38.
144Coleman, op. cit., at p. 11.
145Weinrib, op. cit., at p. 39;
says that "[c]orrective justice
content .. "; op. cit., at p. 40.
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footnotes omitted.
is devoid of a
He also
specific
basis for medical negligence law and even fault liability
generally.
Despite these arguments, it is thought that the
Kantian content advocated by Weinrib comes closest to
providing a satisfactory moral basis for negligence. 146 As
Weinrib puts it,
"This is not to say that the content is a matter
~f e~e~esis from Kant's own writings, or is to be
Justlfled by the precise forms of
universalisation which characterize the various
forms of the Categorical Imperative. But it must
refer to some notion of equal membership in the
kingdom of ends and the consequent
impermissibili ty of arbi trary self-preference.
It must also eschew reference to the aggregation
of individual utilities which is the hallmark of
utilitarian justification. ,,147
The descriptive analysis presented of the objective element
in the test for breach of the standard of care is
persuasive. 148 It demonstrates how a subjective standard
would amount to a contravention of the Kantian principle of
146 I t is beyond the scope of the present work to review in
detail the content of Weinrib's theory, which utilises
Kantian ideas to provide the requisite substantive content of the
theory. Modern variants on Kantian theories of punishment are
discussed in Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons,
M. Margaret Falls, 1987 6 Law and Philosophy 25.
147Th e theory is explicative as well as normative: "[N]ow
there are two features of negligence which a Kantian theory must
explain .. " Weinrib, Ope cit., atp. 50. He refers also (ibid.)
to the intrinsic difficul ties of a utili tarian system of justice:
by defini tion that in concentrating upon the two individual
parties to the dispute, the wider overall utilitarian goal is
likely to be lost or diluted. However, the theory puts forward
a Kantian approach which differs from utilitarianism and is less
ambitious in its goals.




self-preference 1n conception, thus opening the way to a
partly objective standard. 149 This view, that of the
annulment of wrongful gains and losses, does fit in to the
general structure of corrective justice, although that
remains merely a structure and 1S easily able to
accommodate such a proposition. 150 More specifically,
Weinrib's interpretation of Kant is to the effect that the
defendant should place himself an the posi tion of the
plaintiff, or the person likely to be affected by the
prospective action. This bears a similarity to the general
legal test of reasonable foreseeability of harm. At the
point at which this "hypothetical" arises, the Kantian
calculus is applied "and provides a means for assessing the
propriety of the defendant's harm-causing action. ,,151 This
is by considering whether " .. the maxim of one's action
becomes a universal law of nature, the individual imposes
no law upon others which he would not impose upon himself
and arrogates to himself no privilege which he would not
allow to others."IS2 Weinrib argues that it is this which
simultaneously provides the moral content of the theory and
the link between the plaintiff and defendant;lS3
149weinrib, Ope cit., at p. 52.
Isoweinrib, Ope cit., at pp. 53-57, distinguishing Weinrib's
application of Kantian philosophy from utilitarianism.
ISlweinrib, Ope ci t.. , at p. 57.
IS2weinrib, Ope ci t. , at p. 50.
IS3weinrib, Ope ci t. , at p. 60.
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" .. it provides a posi tive reason for shifting
losses in accordance with it ... [T]he wrongfulness
of the action, consisting here of the defendant's
self-preferential violation of the equality he
ought to have accorded to the plaintiff, supplies
a ground for the restoration of the antecedent
equality which was wrongly disturbed. ,,154
We must now determine whether this theory is able to
provide a moral basis for the faul t principle presently
ex i sting in the law of negI igence , and spec if ically in
medical negligence.
The first point 1S that the cri ticism made of the
morally-based analysis 1n the context of retributive
theories appears also to apply here. "[T]he fault in the
doing need not exemplify a faul t in the doer. ,,155: the
legal fault principle need not necessarily correspond with
the existence of moral fault. It is also submitted that
the analysis of the case of Wilsher v. Essex Area Health
Authority156 also suggests that the Kantian content theory
does not provide a moral basis for the law of medical
negligence.
An important aspect of whether this theory can provide
a moral basis for negligence, and in particular medical
neg1 igence, is whether it 1S capable of explaining and
justifying the principles involved in the law. We may
consider the four oft-overlooked categories of tort, which
154weinrib, Ope ci t. , at p. 60.
155Coleman, Ope ci t. , part II, at p. 9.
156[1986] 3 All E.R. 801
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a morally based theory must support 1n this way. It is
submi tted that a moral theory, in order to explain or
justify the current calculus of liabili ty, must support
each one, otherwise it does not require the tort/negligence
system, but would equally support some other means of
satisfying the claims involved. 1 S 7 They comprise, following
Coleman's analysis,
(1) the foundation of the claim;
(2) the mode of rectification;
(3) the character of
rectification; and
(4) the ext e n t o f
rectif ication. 158
These are stated 1n broad terms to cover tort law
generally, but it is thought that they are also by
definition applicable to the subcategory of negligence (and
to medical negligence). Coleman explains 1 S 9 that the mode
of rectification 1S the manner in which the unjust gains
and losses are to be eliminated and the character of
157Al though not a question of the moral content of the
theory, it may be observed in passing that to argue that
Aristotelian corrective justice is required by a moral basis of
tort, is, it is submitted, to pre-suppose that which requires to
be established.
158Co1 eman , op. cit., at p , 12.
IS9 I b i d .
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rectification is whether a particular type of award is
appropriate in all cases. Note that again there lS a pre-
supposition that a quantifiable gain has accrued to the
tortfeasor. It is submitted that in medical negligence,
the only qa i n so accruing a s the benefi t of ignoring
reasonable precautions. Such a qa i n a s disputable on
grounds, it is suggested, (a) of triviality, certainly by
comparison with the loss sustained by the patient, (b) of
extreme difficulty of quantification and (c) of public
policy, in that the admittedly slight implicit legitimation
of failing to exercise due care should not be allowed to be
included.
However, the two of Coleman's categories which merit
particular consideration for our purposes are the first
two. If in fact it is the criterion of assessment actually
adopted, it is thought that weinrib's application of the
Categorical Imperative to negligence would provide a
foundation of the claim that a compensable (sic) loss had
160been suffered. Likewise, the tortfeasor, by his self-
preference and its non-universalisable nature, caused a
loss to the plaintiff. Although this analysis does
establish liability on the part of the tortfeasor, again it
does not, it is submitted, establish a necessary link
between tortfeasor and victim in the payment of damages.
160 Fo r a different approach to fault-based liability, see
George P. Fletcher, Synthesis in Tort Theory, op. cit., at pp.74-
81, employing a quasi-economic, quasi-utilitarian analysis.
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As previously discussed, the entitlement and liability thus
created might be satisfied by the use of a Calabresi-type
"risk-pool" or a no-fault compensation scheme.
The further question, even assuming that these
reservations about the general applicability of this theory
did not exist, is whether it can explain the existing
principles in the law of medical negligence. 161
The Scottish test for medical negligence, laid down ln
Hunter v. Hanley,162 has been set out already and is
considered elsewhere. For present purposes, it lS
submi tted that it does not correspond sufficiently to
Weinrib's theory as to support the fault principle ln the
law of medical negligence. Firstly, the "universe"
relevant to the application of the test would require to be
restricted to comparable medical practitioners, in order to
compare like with like. Another difficulty with applying
weinrib's theory to the medical sphere is that the law is
framed to allow genulne differences of professional
opinion. This might constitute a barrier to the criterion
of universalisability. Further, the terms of the Scottish
test (which it is submitted is similar to that applied in
England) do not correspond with Weinrib's application of
161 I t may be noted that in fact various different tests
would meet the central requirement of universalisabili ty in
Weinrib's theory, but that the converse is not necessarily true,
1.e. that the adoption of universalisability as the main
cri terion does not lead to the adoption of any particular
formulation of the test.
162 1 9 5 5 S.C. 200
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the Categorical Imperative, concerning essentially that
which no doctor of ordinary skill would do. Merely because
this test may not necessarily be inconsistent with such a
broad general principle as the Categorical Imperative does
not mean either that it corresponds to it, or indeed that
it automatically validates or supports it. The standard
employed is that of ordinary care, which ln itself might
not intrinsically be of a high enough standard to be
universalised. Nor, aqa i.n , is it easy to reconc i Le the
vicarious liabili ty of a heal th board wi th this theory.
Application of this criterion thus might not lead to the
correct or appropriate standard of care, and might even
discourage the challenging of dubious but common medical
practices by the courts. In more complex cases involving
specialist units and hospitals, for example that of
Wilsher, its adoption might also ul timately imperil the
object of the exercise, if it were adjudged satisfactory
that all levels of medical personnel were able to call in
their next senior colleague in order to avoid a finding of
I
, 163neg 1gence. This would rapidly tailor the test to the
efficiency of upward delegation by medical staff, and the
degree of skill ultimately exercised by the harassed senior
doctor at the apex of the hierarchy!
163The atti tude of the Court of Appeal to this would no
doubt alter quickly were this commonplace, or in order to avoid
a finding of negligence.
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Conclusion
The writer finds Weinrib's application of the Categorical
Imperative attractive; it appears to offer many useful
descriptive and normative insights into the law. 164 Indeed,
it is thought that this approach comes the closest of the
varlous possibilities considered to providing a
satisfactory moral basis underpinning the fault principle.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that ultimately, reservations
exist about its abili ty to justify or explain the faul t
principle consistently and morally, and that there are
further difficul ties an its application to the law of
medical negligence. 165 In arguing that this debate
discloses no acceptably satisfactory moral basis for the
fault principle in medical negligence, the writer does not
dispute that moral considerations are relevant 166, and
tort
The
164A morally-based argument r n favour of widening
duties to include a duty to rescue is advanced by Weinrib in
Case for a Duty to rescue, 1980-81 90 Yale Law Journal 247.
165Idiosyncratic factors in medical negligence cases also
include the apparent enthusiasm by the European Communi ty for the
introduction of a reversed burden of proof in medical negligence
actions, reported recently in the British Medical Journal. The
fear is also recorded there of health authorities (and boards)
settling post-Crown indemnity litigation claims for reasons of
economy, rather than fighting them. Both possibilities would,
it is submitted, wreak havoc with a purported moral basis for the
fault principle. See 1991 B.M.J. at p. 129.
166Little reference to morality is evident in the case-law
of negligence. A possible example is the motive to injure in the
intentional tort of conspiracy to injure; see inter alia Lonrho
v. Shell Petroleum Ltd. [1982] A.C. 173. An example of a similar
Scottish intentional delict is British Motor Trade Association
v. Gray 1951 S.L.T. 247.
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indeed important, generally in the law of tort and delict.
One of the claims of morality to be concerned in this area
of the law is the apparent perception that because of
someone's responsibility for, or fault in, an accident,
they should be held liable. 167 Indeed the view has been
considered that any moral basis for the fault principle may
in fact rest upon psychological mis-perceptions of the law
and its role rather than a congruence of moral fault and
legal fault. 168 Further, those moral characteristics which
the fault principle may display, even if less than the full
basis sought by the varlOUS general theories already
considered, may be squandered by the harsh practical
realities of litigation, both in procedural terms as well
. b t t' I 169as ln su s an lve aWe
In conclusion, therefore, it appears that no clear or
consistent moral basis for the faul t principle may be
demonstrated without reservation. Such moral
considerations as undoubtedly do exist do not necessarily
appear to require the construction of the present analysis
167perceptions of liability may be determined by the
availabili ty of a legal remedy. See ch . 4 (by Sally Lloyd-
Bostock) in compensation and Support for Illness and Injury,
D. Harri~ et al., Oxford Socio-Legal Studies, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1984.
168Se e Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Ope cit., (ch. 4) at pp. 140-
161.
169Se e generally, Hard Bargaining:
in Personal Injury Actions, Hazel Genn,
1987, especially chs. 6 and 7.
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Out of Court Settlements
Clarendon Press, Oxford,
and calculus of liability. 170 If this broad proposition
must be stated with a certain tentativeness, we may be a
little more confident of its applicability to the law of
medical negligence. It is hoped that it has been shown
that the professional nature of this liability, the
underlying test and discipline involved in practice
generally seriously undermine the claims for fault's having
a truly moral basis .171 Nor, however, would the writer
assent to the broad proposition that morality is, or even
should be, irrelevant to a discipline such as law, which
must by definition be concerned with justice and
perceptions of moral right and wrong, however they are
clothed in the legal process.
The aims of the system, and the best means of
achieving them for the law of medical negligence, in the
argued absence of a satisfactory tie to the existing fault
principle, will be considered infra in this thesis in the
context of reform.
170Analogous reasoning is evident in Liability for Failing
to Rescue, Theodore M. Benditt, 1982 I Law and Philosophy 391.
171Se e Jones Medical Negligence, cit. supra, para. 3.77 (at
pp. 86-87; footn~te omi tted): "[AJ finding of negligence. · · does
not necessarily mean that the defend~nt ~as morally blameworthy,
since negligence is treated a~ an.obJectlve measure of a s~andard
of conduct without any inqulry lnto why a defendant falled to






Application of the faul t principle to cases of medical
negligence is, it is submitted, relatively intelligible to
the judge, lawyer or other (non-medical) layman. This, it
1S conceived, is partly because the reasoning and patterns
of logic which the doctor considers and evaluates 1n
reaching a clinical decision are relatively easily
understood, reconstructed and analysed subsequently, either
by doctors or others. The conduct of a fellow
professional, even in a scientific discipline, 1S perhaps
more amenable to this forensic assessment than the content
of the discipline itself. By contrast, it is suggested
that the issue of causation is different. l This is partly
because a causative process may not 1n itself be
scientifically understood, 2 and partly because consideration
of the causal issues raised by the seguelae of negligence
are unlikely to form part of the doctor's clinical
calculus; the consequences of such a lapse might not,
scientifically, even be possible to anticipate. Both of
lSee generally A.M. Dugdale and K. M. stanton, Professional
Negligence, Ope cit., at pp. 306 - 308.
2Se e Compensating Victims of Diseases, J. Stapleton, 1985
5 Oxford J. Legal stud. 248.
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these may render the court's examination of causal issues
problematic, although the general rules as to
foreseeability and remoteness apply to these cases as much
as to non-medical ones. Legal doctrines of causation,
particularly in relation to medical and scientific matters,
have been subjected to fundamental and systematic extended
criticism,3 and causal difficulties in the law appear to
arise most frequently in relation to scientific matters. 4
The development of the fault principle, and its
extension to new areas such as specialist hospital teams,
3An extended American-based critique which finds the present
underpinnings unsatisfactory is made by S.N. Pincus, in Progress
on the Causal Chain Gang: Some Approaches to Causation in Tort
Law and Steps toward a Linguistic Analysis, 1986 24 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 961. The main other materials in this large area are: Jane
Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence, 1988 104 L.Q.R. 213 and 389,
Law, Causation and Common Sense, 1988 8 Oxford J. Legal Studies
111 and Disease and the Compensation Debate, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1986 (chapter 3 deals with cause in fact, but references
to causation in the book are too numerous to detail); generally
H. L . A. Hart and Tony Honore, Causation in the Law, second
edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985; Atiyah's Accidents,
Compensation and the Law, Peter Cane, second edi tion, 1987,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson (especially chapter 4, on causation and
remoteness); A step Forward in Factual Causation, E. J. Weinrib,
[1975] 38 M.L.R. 518; Proof of Causation in Medical Negligence
Cases, J. G. Logie, 1988 S.L.T. (News) 25 and Further Reflections
on Medical Causation, A. F. Phillips, 1988 S.L.T. (News) 325 and
generally, Radiation: proving the causal link with cancer, D.
Brahams, 1988 N.L.J. 570.
4Causation in Toxic Torts: Burden of Proof, Standards of
Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, S. Gold, 1986 96 Yale L.J.
376, at pp. 376-377; the use of statistical evidence and its
consequences are critically examined in the context of the so-
called toxic torts. The adaptation and response of U. S . law
generally to the rehabilitation of ~oxic waste sites ~s ~i~cussed
in The Gorilla in the Closet: JOlnt and Several Llabll1ty and
the Cleanup of Toxic Waste Sites, W.R. Wilkerson, T.W. Church,
1989 11 Law and Policy 425. See also Toxic Torts, C. Pugh, M.
Day, 1991 N.L.J. 1549.
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has been relatively straightforward and has retained almost
entirely uninfringed those principles set out in Hunter v.
Hanley.5 It is submitted that this is not the case
regarding causal principles, which have been subject at
times to far greater challenge. 6
This chapter seeks to argue that the causal principles
embodied in medical negligence cases are unsatisfactory.
They do not take into account any deficiencies in
scientific knowledge, which, in view of the recently-
emphasised strictness of the law, tend to work injustice
against the pursuer. However, it is also suggested that
any reform redressing the balance in favour of the pursuer,
but within the scope of the present action, would tend to
be equally unsatisfactory. It might still have the effect
of holding as established a dubious, or untrue, causal fact
which was not capable of being ascertained. This would be
equally unsatisfactory whether working an injustice to a
defender or a pursuer. This argument, together with the
preceding chapters on the standard of care, it 1S hoped
.
1SItexplain sufficiently the need for the reform.
followed by proposals which are submitted to assist a.n
overcoming these inherent difficulties. The chapter
5supra.
6 Se e p. 102 et seq., Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and
the Law fourth edition, Peter Cane, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
London '1987 Proof of Causation in Medical Negligence Cases,
J.G. L~gie, ;upra, and Further Reflections on Medical Causation,
A.F. Phillips, supra.
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therefore commences with a brief exposition and
consideration of the relevant authorities. 7
Causal Principles
The general principle of causation in the law of delict and
tort may, conveniently, be illustrated by reference to a
case of medical negligence, that of Barnett v. Chelsea and
Kensington Hospital Management Committee. 8 Three workmen
had arrived at a hospital casualty unit for which the
defendants were responsible, complaining of vomiting and
feeling ill. They had been drinking tea. The casual ty
doctor, who was only informed of the men's condition by
telephone and did not examine them, advised them to go home
and call ln their own doctors, i.e. their general
practitioners. The men went home, one of them subsequently
dying of poisoning by arsenic which had been present in the
tea. The significance of the case is not that the casualty
doctor had in fact not exercised the skill and care which
the hospital's unit held itself out as providing, although
this was the case. Rather it was because the patient would
have died anyway, even if he had been treated timeously and
properly: no harm was therefore causally attributable to
7Fo r an excellent introductory discussion of general
causation issues in tort, see ch. 3 (Remoteness of Damage) in The
Modern Law of Negligence, R. Buckley, Butterworths, 1988.
8[1968J 1 All E.R. 1068
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the negligence.
We may sum this up "deceptively simply,,9 by saying
that a pursuer or a plaintiff must prove, on the balance of
probabili ties, that the breach of duty caused the loss
concerned in the action. 10 The concept is apparently based
upon notions of responsibility for one's actions. 11 More
specifically, causation is often analysed into two
questions, both of which must be satisfied if the pursuer
is to recover damages. The first is the threshold test of
"but for", or sine gua non. In the case of Barnett, the
doctor's conduct could not be said to have been a factor
without which the harm would not have occurred. Employing
the standard analysis ln delictual cases, thus the
plaintiff would not even have surmounted successfully the
preliminary causal hurdle.
The second question is that of the causa causans .12
This is the "legal" or perhaps "proximate,,13 cause - that
9Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Peter Cane,
fourth edition, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1987, at p. 94.
10Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence, seventh edition, R.
Percy, Sweet and Maxwell, 1983, at pp. 318-319.
Ilprofessional Negligence, A.M. Dugdale and K.M. Stanton,
second edition, 1989, Butterworths, at p. 295. Clearly,
vicarious liability would be an exception to this principle.
12Always assuming that the head of damage is recoverable:
Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] A.C. 750,
considered infra.
13Se e discussion at p. 263 et seg., (chapter 7, Proximate
Cause) in Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, ed. W. P.
Keeton, fifth edition, 1984, West Publishing Co., Minnesota.
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which the law ascribes as the actual, legal14 or common-
sense cause of the harm, again assessed according to the
likely v i ew of the " .. man a.n the street .. " .15 Its
description in these terms suggests, correctly, that its
analysis 1S not always a matter of certainty or indeed
clari ty! 16 Nor are all cases necessarily susceptible of
analysis in this way,17 and medical cases are likely to be
more difficult than most owing to the limitations of
knowledge and the attribution of symptoms and conditions
from which the pursuer would be likely already to be
suffering. 18 I t may be objected that some of the cases
mentioned in this analysis are not specifically ones of
medical negligence. Whilst this 1S undeniable, those
discussed nevertheless do deal wi th issues of medical
14perhaps with a degree of circularity.
l5 pe r Lord Wright in Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co. Ltd. v.
Minister of War Transport ere The Coxwold) [1942] A.C. 691 at p.
706.
l6H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honore refer to a "cloud of causal
metaphors" in Causation in the Law, second edi tion, Clarendon
Press, 1985, at p. 88; their sometimes atomistic analysis of the
case-law may be considered in the light of Lord Diplock's dictum
in Lambert v. Lewis [1981] 1 All E.R. 1185 at p. 1189, that such
an approach "presents the danger of so blinding the court with
case-law that it has difficulty seeing the wood of legal
principle for the trees of paraphrase". Atiyah' s Accidents,
Compensation and the Law, Ope cit. (see p. 102 et seq.) adopts
the bipartite analysis employed here, and criticises the Hart and
Honore approach ibid.
l7E. g. Fitzgerald v. Lane [1987] 2 All E.R. 455; Baker v.
Willoughby [1969] 3 All E.R. 1528; Jobling v. Associated Dairies
[1981] 2 All E.R. 752.
l8 E. g. the case of Barnett, supra.
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causation, even though arising for example in reparation
claims against industrial employers. In rebuttal of this
point, it is argued firstly that similar issues do arise in
medical cases, some of which might be conceptually almost
identical, and secondly that the courts will be likely to
decide causal issues an medical negligence cases in a
similarly strict fashion. If this is correct, such cases
are therefore thought to be relevant.
In considering the cases and p r i.nc i.p l es t ' applicable to
causation in this area, we may divide them into categories
according to the underlying nature of the causal issues
involved. 2 o It is submitted that the recent House of Lords
cases ln particular demonstrate a consistently strict
approach to the tradi tional burden of causal proof upon
plaintiff and pursuer irrespective of category. The first
and most straightforward class is what we may term "simple"
or "linear" causation, perhaps suggesting the common
h f h 1 ha i 21metap or 0 t e causa c ln. This category is so-called
because the causal enquiry lS straightforward, l.e.
Culpability and Compensation, D.M.19 Se e Remoteness:
Walker, 1976 J.R. 245.
20 I t may be noted that cases of medical negligence raising
causal questions tend not to involve questions of foreseeability
and remoteness, although these matters are in principle no less
relevant in these cases.
21 Cf . Hart and Honore, Ope cit., at p. 72: "[I]t is
easy ... to be misled by the natural metaphor of a causal "chain",
which may lead us to think that the causal process consists of
a series of single events each of which is dependent upon (would
not have occurred without) its predecessor in the "chain" and so
is dependent upon the initiating action or event."
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uncomplicated by multiple causes of any description. The
second category concerns cumulative multiple causes, and
the third, mutually exclusive multiple causes. 22 A related
issue which ei ther r equ i r e s a discrete category or fi ts
uneasily into the first one as a threshold question
therein, is whether the loss of a chance of recovery should
sound ln damages; it is proposed, as a matter of
practicality, to deal wi th this separately as a final
category. It also raises fundamental questions such as the
"all or nothing" nature of causation which in turn affect
all these categories.
22Despi te the discussion in H?-rt and Honore o~ Causation
(op. cit.), this analysis and termlnology have prev:ously been
used by Jane stapleton (Disease and the compensat i.on Debate,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 37 et seq.) and W. J. stewart
(A Casebook on Delict, W. Green/Sweet & Maxw~ll, 1991, at p.154).
See also Multiple Causes, at pp. 176-177, ln The Law of Torts,
J. Fleming, seventh edition, Law Book Company Ltd.
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Simple Causation23
A difficulty inherent in the concept of simple causation24
is ln satisfactorily distinguishing it from multiple
causation cases ln which there are two identifiable
possible causes of the harm. 25 For, if the harm complained
of
26
cannot be shown to be the legal cause, then some other
cause, be it merely an "accident", must underly the harm.
Thus, all cases involve multiple, ln the sense of at least
two, possible causes. 27 However, it is suggested that the
cases advanced under this heading give a beneficial
indication of some of the reasoning in, and attitude of,
23Consent cases, in which it must be shown that the pursuer
would not have consented to treatment had he/she been warned of
the risks, are thought to come under this category. They are not
therefore discussed separately. They include the following:
Chatterton v. Gerson [1981] 1 All E.R. 257 and Goorkani v.
Tayside Health Board (1990 G.W.D. 6-331; Lord Cameron.) It seems
that patients need not be warned of remote or unreasonable risks,
in the opinion of the doctor: Moyes v. Lothian Heal th Board 1990
S.L.T. 444. For discussion of Chatterton, see inter alia p. 95
(ch. 5, Consent) et seq. in Medicine, Morals and the Law, S.
McLean and G. Maher, Gower, 1983.
240 r "monocausali ty" .
25Causal analyses may be also be couched an terms of
potentially tortious risk and background risk. See J. Stapleton,
The Gist of Negligence, (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 389 at p. 390 et seg.
26 I f there is no harm, then by definition there can be no
claim for damages in tort or delict.
27 Se e for example, Loveday v. Renton and Another, Times Law, .
Report, 31 March 1988, regar?ing the c~usal effect.of pertussls
vaccine in relation to br-a i.n damage an young ch i Ldren , The
plaintiff was unable to satisfy the burden of proof.
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the courts ln relation to such questions. Inasmuch as the
"but for" t t f .es 0 causet.ion cannot be satisfied by the
pursuer or plaintiff, these cases are less-inaccurately
termed simple causation than those a.n which the actual
existence of two competing causal pathways may be
identified wi th certainty. 28 As has been commented, the
accumulation of aetiological knowledge tends to be slow and
haphazard, adding another layer to the difficul ties of
plaintiff or pursuer. 2 9
One illustration of simple causation already
considered is that of Barnett, supra. Another is the well-
known case of Kay's Tutor v. Ayrshire and Arran Heal th
Board. 30 Here, the pursuer was held ultimately unable to
surmount the primary causal hurdle of sine qua non;31 nor
28 Se e the analysis of the balance of probabilities test, in
relation to causation, in Disease and the Compensation Debate,
J. Stapleton, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, at p. 38 et seq.
The difficulties identified by her in relation to statistical
evidence and proof of occupational disease arguably also apply
to the disentangling of complications arising from negligent and
non-negligent medical treatment.
29 J . Stapleton, Ope cit., at p. 42.
301987 S.L.T. 577
310 f spatial and indeed temporal necessi ty, the causal
concepts extant will be discussed primarily in terms of the "but
for" test and the legal cause. It is submitted that applying the
type of analysis propounded by H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honore in
Causation and the Law, second edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1985 (i. e. that these concepts are inapposite and should be
substi tuted by consideration of when, and in what categories, the
courts allow recovery) in fact adds little to a discussion of the
effect of scientific knowledge upon the causal rules often
formulated in terms of this traditional two-stage test. (See,
for example, Hart and Honore, op. ci t., at p , 109 et seq.
(Chapter V: Causation and Sine Qua Non».
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did the expert evidence support the pursuer's contention
that the negligent, gross overdose of penicillin could have
partially caused the harm to the pursuer's son. 32 A known
seguela of the meningitis from which the pursuer's son was
already suffering, this harm (profound bilateral deafness)
was ln effect held by default to be caused by the
meningi tis which existed prior to the negligent treatment. 33
It was the absence of evidence showing that the overdose
could have materially contributed to the harm which
distinguished the case from McGhee v. National Coal Board. 34
For the present, it may be noted that all the courts
involved, apart from the Lord Ordinary (Davidson) in the
Court of Session, took a strict view of the issue. 3 5 No
judicial relaxation of the burden of proof upon the pursuer
was countenanced, and the strong influence of expert
32 A more recent case to similar effect is Ingram v. Ritchie
1989 G.W.D. 27-1217 (Lord Prosser), involving the causal effect
of a low-dose contraceptive pill on a cigarette smoker aged 35
who suffered a stroke shortly thereafter.
33 Th i s was partly because of the medical evidence, which
showed that deafness could be caused by meningitis, but it is
submitted that a very material contribution was made by the
operation of the legal onus of proof.
34 I n which a material increase in risk was held sufficient;
1973 S.C. (H.L.) 37.
35Lo r d President Emslie gives a full, critical account of
the Lord Ordinary's approach, which used the latter's own
idiosyncratic and partially unsupported analysis of ;he eVi~e~ce
at pp. 436C - 440L in the report of the defenders reclalmlng
motion to the First Division (Kay, 1986 S.L.T., at p. 435). The
House of Lords agreed unanimously wi th the Court of Session
([1987J 2 All E.R. 417).
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evidence in medical negligence cases was bolstered. 36
Furthermore, there appeared to be little if any evidence to
support the pursuer's argument that the overdose might have
caused or contributed to neurological damage37 manifesting
itself as deafness. The court's v i ew was not one of
scientific causal agnosticism, therefore, but that there
was negligible evidence ln favour of the pursuer's
argument. Although the evidence ultimately was
insufficient to support the pursuer's case, the approach
taken by the Court of Session may be contrasted with that
in the Scottish criminal cases of Khalig v. H.M.A. 38 and
39Ulhag v. H.M.A. , in which the pre-existing causal rules
regarding supply and administration of dangerous substances
were arguably relaxed significantly in order to convict the
accused. 40
The House of Lords' consideration of the appeal in Kay
turned largely upon the expert evidence, save for the
36pe r Lord MacKay of Clashfern in Kay, [1987] 2 All E.R. at
p. 422b.
37compare Loveday v. Renton and Another, Q.B.D., Times Law
Report, March 31, 1988, on the issue of whether pertussis vaccine
could cause brain damage in children. The balance of
probabilities test was not sa~isfied b~ the p~aintiffs in this
case. See Whooping Cough VaCClne on Trlal Agaln, C. Dyer, 1987
295 B.M.J. 1053.
38 1 98 4 S.L.T. 137
391 99 1 S.L.T. 614
40 Se e inter alia Scots Criminal Law and Aids, L. Farmer et
al., 1987 S.L.T. 389 and also A Critique of Criminal Causation,
~Norrie, 1991 54 M.L.R. 685.
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occasional distinguishing of McGhee on the grounds that the
negligent conduct was not scientifically known as a
poss ible cause of the harm. 41 Nevertheless, it 1S clear
that no relaxation of the interpretation of the evidence
was countenanced. This was despite certain ambiguities and
difficulties in the opinions. 42 The writer would only seek
to add that he agrees with Logie that the apparently
retrospective reasoning regarding the patient's cerebro-
spinal fluid sugar level was unsatisfactory if not
unwarranted. 43 Since this crucial evidence was
unascertainable one way or the other, it is respectfully
submitted that their Lordships should either have proceeded
solely upon an explicitly statistical basis 44, or have
declared some degree of agnosticism as a resul t. The
writer submits that, notwithstanding the strength of the
defenders' evidence as to the incidence of deafness an
meningi tis, their Lordships' analyses are significantly
41E . g . per Lord Keith, Kay, supra, at p. 421b - 421c.
42 Se e Proof of Causation 1n Medical Negligence Cases, J. G.
Logie, 1988 S.L.T. (News) 25 at pp. 25 - 27.
43 Ka y , supra, opinion of Lord Keith at p. 420gi the
inference mentioned by his Lordship is presumably that the
witness would have recalled the C.S.F. sugar level had it been
(at or) above the normal level. It is submitted that this is a
somewhat slender balance of probabili ties upon which to base such
an important supposition. See Logie's discussion of this, ~
cit., at p. 26.
44 I . e . expanding and explaining the expert's statement that
meningitis was very likely to have caused deafn,es,s and that
penicillin-induced deafness was unknown. (See op1n1on of Lord
Ackner, Kay, supra, at pp. 426b - 427d).
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based upon the onus of proof, wi th less emphasis being
placed upon the inadequacy of the pursuer's expert
evidence. Nonetheless, it is thought that the correctness
of this decision, according to the law as it stood, must be
conceded. This correctness may be unfortunate in terms of
its public (mis-)perception, and the writer seeks to
demonstrate in the light of other cases that the law's
approach to scientific causation is unsatisfactory.
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Mutually Exclusive MUltiple Causes45
Multiple causation
46
includes cases in which there are two
or more well-recognised possible causes, but scientific or
other difficulty supervenes in attempting to evaluate their
respective contributions to the harm. 47 The causes may be
discrete or by a single causal agent of concurrently
delictual and innocent provenance. The onus of proof 1S
likely to become crucial in these cases. This category is
discussed prao r to that of cumulative mul tiple causes
because, it is thought, the latter constitute more involved
questions for which the present discussion may form a
useful basis. 48 Where scientific or medical evidence cannot
paint a full or clear picture, the courts seem generally to
have considered this as an "evidential gap" which " .. was
the product of an imperfect state of medical knowledge and
45A novus actus interveniens would be considered under this
heading, as a defender might well seek to argue that it was a
separate cause excluding his or her alleged causal
responsibility.
46 Se e generally, The Law of Torts, J. G. Fleming, seventh
edition, Law Book Company, 1987 at pp. 176 - 177; The Law of
Torts, Prosser and Keeton, fifth edition, West Publ. Co., 1984
at p. 263 et seg., and Disease and the Compensation Debate, J.
Stapleton, Clarendon Press, 1986 at p. 37 et seg.
47 Cf. Kay, supra.
48Dividing multiple causes in this way may pre-suppose that
enough is known about a cause as to justify its classification.
It is submitted that a degree of common-sense is unavoidable in
employing the proposed taxonomy.
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the V1ew now taken by the courts is that such a gap can
only be bridged where the available evidence .1S
sufficiently strong to allow causation to be inferred. ,,49
However, it is submitted that one of the principal cases to
be considered is wilsher itself. 50 Th d .. . Cl ke eC1s1on 1n ar v.
McLennan,51 which allowed a shift in the onus of proof to
the defender, must be read subject to Wilsher, although it
has been argued that the narrowing effect of the latter
upon it is less than might be thought. 52
However, the case of Wilsher 1S more recent, more
authoritative and a more extreme example of mutually
exclusive multiple causation. For all these reasons it is
more instructive than Clark.
The infant plaintiff Martin Wilsher was born very
prematurely, with all the associated serious risks to his
49A. M. Dugdale and K. M. stanton, Professional Negligence,
Ope cit., at p. 307. An excellent account of the application of
MCGhee-type reasoning to Fitzgerald v. Lane [1987] 2 All E.R. 455
is given ibid., pp. 307 - 308 (the causation issue was not
discussed by their Lordships when the case was subsequently
appealed). As the learned authors comment, it is difficult to
be confident that the same approach could now be applied after
Wilsher.
5°[1988] 1 All E.R. 871 (H.L.). It seems that the case
involved mutually exclusive, or alternative, causes. Despite the
fact that McGhee involved cumulative causes, it was still
considered in Wilsher. As cases involving different modes of
causation are not in practice subdivided, perhaps the common law
of causation should ultimately be considered a many-dimensional
whole.
51[1983] 1 All E.R. 416
52Further Reflections on Medical Causation, A. F. Phillips,
1988 S.L.T. (News) 325.
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h 53ealth and development. He required additional oxygen,
but to do this it was necessary to measure and to monitor
his blood oxygen tension. An electronic measuring sensor
incorporated .ln a catheter was thus inserted.
unfortunately, this was into a vein rather than an artery.
As a result of the misleading information thereby
generated, an excessive amount of oxygen was administered. 54
It was this, the plaintiff alleged, which caused his
retrolental fibroplasia ("R.L.F.") - a condition which left
him practically blind.
The first causal argument surfacing in Wilsher was the
effect of the prior authorities. Inasmuch as the judge at
first instance in Wilsher, Peter Pain J., had combined or
eased the separate establishment by the pursuer of the
breach of duty and causation, the Court of Appeal held that
this could not be accepted. 5 5 Nevertheless, it was held by
majority that he had satisfied the test. 5 6 Thus the
53 11 Hi s prospects of survival were very poor: according to
one estimate they were as low as one chance in five. II Per
Mustill L.J. in Wilsher [1986] 3 All E.R. (C.A.) at p. 803.
54A full account and explanation of the medical management
of the plaintiff's case may be found in the opinion of Mustill
L.J. in the Court of Appeal (ibid.).
55 p e r Mustill L.J. ibid. at p. 815e - g; by implication from
the opinion of Glidewell L. J. at p. 832c - g. Sir Nicolas
Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. disagreed on the causation issue, holding
that to accept that the plaintiff had established this point
entailed an unwarrantable extension of the previous law. See pp.
834f - 835j ibid.
56 1 . e. based upon the existing case-law, in this context
referring to McGhee. See Mustill L.J. ibid. ~t p. 828g and 829b;
he draws a distinction between McGhee and Wllsher at p. 828h -
829d but considers the evidence sufficient to bring the,
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causation issue was decided the same way as in the court of
first instance, but inter alia upon a differing
interpretation of the prior case-law. 57 However, the most
significant issue which emerged in the evidence was that
several different causal pathways existed, anyone of which
might have caused the R. L. F. ,58 and it is this which is
central to our present enqulry. Sir Nicolas Browne-
Wilkinson V.-C. explained it with admirable clarity:
"[B]ut no one can tell in this case whether
excess oxygen did or did not cause or contribute
to the RLF suffered by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff's RLF may have been caused by some
completely different agent or agents, e.g.
hypercarbia, intraventricular haemhorrhage,
apnoea or patent ductus arteriosus. In addition
to oxygen, each of these condi tions has been
implicated as a possible cause of RLF. This baby
suffered from each of those conditions at various
times during the first two months of his life.
There is no satisfactory evidence that excess
oxygen is more likely than any of those other
four candidates to have caused RLF in this baby.
To my mind, the occurrence of RLF following a
failure to take a necessary precaution to prevent
excess oxygen causing RLF provides no evidence
and raises no presumption that it was excess
oxygen rather than one or more of the four other
plaintiff within the rule. Glidewell L.J. said that " .. 1 am in
the end in agreement with Mustill L.J. that the plaintiff has
proved sufficient facts to come within the principle of
McGhee, ... ,and thus to succeed." (p. 831h). The Vice-Chancellor
dissented, considering the facts of McGhee to rule out the use
of analogical argument (pp. 834f - 835j).
57McGhee will be dealt with infra; for present purposes it
is not yet necessary to consider it in detail. Describing the
Court of Appeal's judgment as "Ending "forensic blind man's buff"
" was premature. (in C. Dyer, Medicolegal, 1987 294 B.M.J.
1407.)
58 pe r Mustill L.J. ibid. at p. 828j.
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possible agents which caused or contributed to
RLF in this case. ,,59
We may now consider the appeal in Wilsher to the House of
Lords, solely upon the question of causation. As is well-
known, the majori ty v i ew of the Court of Appeal was
reversed, the dissenting opinion of the Vice-Chancellor
being approved. It was held unanimously that the burden of
proof upon the plaintiff could not be relaxed in the face
of what was not so much an evidential gap60 as a conflict of
expert evidence. Some doubt was expressed as to the
abili ty of the court to determine such an issue. 61 The
effect was that the plaintiff had been unable to establish,
as was required, which of the five possible differing
factors had actually caused the R.L.F. One debatable cause
out of five was held not to constitute a material
contribution (or a material increase in risk).62
Counsel for the plaintiff had also sought to rely upon
the case of McGhee, to the effect that the negligent
causlng of a material increase ln risk of harm was
sufficient to discharge the onus. This did not succeed,
and its reasoning was distinguished: it involved a single
causative agent, brick dust.
59 I b i d . , at pp. 834h - 835a.
Its (pre-existing) presence
H.
60As appeared to be the case in McGhee, infra.
61 pe r Lord Bridge of Harwich, [1988] 2 W.L.R. at p. 570G -
62 Se e infra.
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on the pursuer's skin was lengthened by reason of the
defenders' breach of duty. No other causative agent was
implicated. The case has been the subject of criticism,
Wilson commenting as follows: "[ I] t is no doubt easy to
pass from saying that X increased the risk of Y happening
to saYlng that it is probable that X caused Y, but
nevertheless it is a step and, as Lord Wilberforce pointed
out in McGhee, it is the step which the witnesses refused
to take in that case." 63
In Wilsher, however, four other possible agents were
also present, and there was a conflict of expert testimony
over whether that in question was indeed capable of causing
the harm. Although McGhee was not disapproved (it being
inappropriate to overrule it) it was described as laying
down no new principle of law and thereby in effect confined
to its own facts: 6 4
"[O]n the contrary, it affirmed the principle
that the onus of proving causation lies on the
pursuer or plaintiff. Adopting a robust and
pragmatic approach to the undisputed primary
facts of the case, the majority concluded that it
was a legitimate inference of fact that the
defenders' negligence had materially contributed
to the pursuer's injury. The decision, in my
opinion, is of no greater significance than that
and to attempt to extract from it some esoteric
principle which in some way modifies, as a matter
of law, the nature of the burden of proof of
causation which a pursuer or plaintiff must
63 A Note on Causation, W.A. Wilson, 1976 S.L.T. 193 at p.
195.
64 pe r Lord Bridge, at p. 569F et seq.:





discharge once he has established a relevant
breach of duty is a fruitless one.,,65
It lS submitted that this clearly and authoritatively
indicates the courts' attitudes to proof of causation in
cases of mutually exclusive multiple causes. It is also
consistent with the approach in the case of Kay, supra. We
may summarise it to the effect that the pursuer or
plaintiff must still establish on the balance of
probabilities which of the multiple possibilities caused,
or materially contributed to,66 the harm auf f e r ed , Although
any reduction in, or reversal of, the burden of proof based
upon McGhee or Clark has been short-lived, it may be
possible to make a "bridging" inference - but only in cases
which admi t evidentially of L'i ttle doubt and in which
perhaps it is the detail rather than the substance of
scientific explanation which lS absent. Al though one
cannot but admire the adept rationalisation of McGhee and
Clark, it is hard to conceive of a bridge as narrow, or one
useable in fewer circumstances. The consequences of any
shortfall in scientific or medical knowledge are, because
of the hallowed legal doctrine of the burden of proof,
visi ted r.n their full rigour against the plaintiff or
pursuer. The effect of this is exactly as if either the
65 pe r Lord Bridge, ibid. His Lordship goes on to approve in
terms Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V. -C. 's analysis of the import
of McGhee. See A. F. Phillips, Ope cit.
66Which possibility, in cases of
appear to be closed off by Wilsher.
Ope cit.
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suitable evidence, does not
Again, see A. F. Phillips,
plaintiff's evidence was rejected on credibility, or his
opponent's evidence was preferred for other reasons. In a
legal system which 1S arguably the pride of Western
democratic intellectual thought, it seems discordant to
equate the conclusions of agnosticism with atheism.
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Cumulative Multiple Causes
It is submitted that these have posed perhaps the greatest
challenge to rational legal analysis. It will be shown
that the law has already made a major concession in its
strict causal principles by allowing a material
contribution or material increase in risk to suffice.
Vyner v. Waldenburg Bros. 67 perhaps started the
process. The plaintiff was able to establish breach of
statutory duty on the part of the defendants, and of course
his own injury. However, the type of injury was a possible
result of the defendant's breach, but was not proved as
such. Nevertheless, this was held sufficient to transfer
the burden of proof to the defendant, to show that the
neglected precaution would not have averted the injury.68
The Vyner approach lasted until 1956, when overtaken by
Wardlaw v. Bonnington Castings Ltd. 69
In Bonnington, the plaintiff was employed by the
defendants. He inhaled microscopic particles of silica
whilst at work. These came from two different sources, one
67[1946] K.B. 50
68 Cf. the modern example of McWilliams v. Sir William Arrol
& Co. Ltd. [1962] 1 W.L.R. 295, a common law case of negligence
in which it was inferred that, had the safety precaution (belt)
been available, the deceased would not have worn it. This is an
example of considering hypothetical past conduct, and also
illustrates the "but for" test.
69[1956] A.C. 613.
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of which was "innocent"; the other was associated with a
breach of statutory duty. Both sets of partie les were
inhaled simultaneously and not sequentially. The plaintiff
subsequently contracted pneumoconiosis, and sued for
damages in respect of the breach. It became clear that the
onus of proof in respect of causation was to remain upon
the plaintiff, unless there was specific statutory warrant
for departing from this. This left the House of Lords
Li ttle room for manoeuvre if they were to find for the
plaintiff, and the burden of proof was effectively the same
as it would have been ln an equivalent common law
reparation case. The crux of the matter was that the
"guilty" dust alone could not have caused his
pneumoconiosis. The plaintiff was therefore unable to lead
evidence tending to show that the breach of duty only had,
on the correct test of the balance of probabilities, caused
his illness. It lS submitted that today this would
probably resul t in the onus not being satisfied and the
be i d i . d 70case lng lsmlsse. Lord Reid resolved it thus:
"[TJ he disease is caused by the whole of the
noxious material inhaled and, if that material
comes from two sources, it cannot be wholly
attributed to material from one source or the
other ... and the real question is whether the dust
from the swing grinders [the "guilty" sourceJ
materially contributed to the disease ...
"A contribution which comes within the exception
de minimis non curat lex is not material, but I
70Although, of course, evidential inferences may be. drawn in
suitable cases, for example Gardiner v. Motherwell Machlnery Co.
[1961J 1 W.L.R. 1424.
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think that any contribution which does not fall
within that exception must be material.,,71
It 1S submitted that the acceptance of a "material
contribution" represents a significant reduction in the
strictness of the standard for the plaintiff. Prior to
Wardlaw, and on the unrelaxed civil standard of proof, the
breach would have had wholly to have caused the harm. But,
as we have seen, causation of the harm could wholly be
attributed neither to the "innocent" nor to the "guilty"
dust. It was impossible to state that the "innocent" dust
would not have caused the harm but for the "guilty";
equally, the "innocent" component could not be exonerated
either. Contrast this with the "normal" case 1n which it
must be shown 51% (or more) likely that cause A produced
effect B. Had all the silica dust been produced by a
"guilty" method, the plaintiff would then have had to prove
it at least 51% likely that this was the cause of the harm.
This likelihood would then be accepted by the court as a
certainty for legal purposes. Two propositions may
therefore be distinguished; it is important to note that
they are separate. The first relates to the degree of
likelihood of the event's occurrence. This is the "balance
of probabilities". It represents the minimum degree of
probabili ty beyond which the event or causal connection
71 I b i d., at p. 621. The emph~sis is add~d. Considerati~n
was of course given to statutory 1nterpretat10n, although th1S
need not detain us: see Lord Reid's opinion, ibid. at pp. 619-
620. The case was followed in Nicholson v. Atlas Steel Foundry
and Engineering Co. Ltd. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 613.
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must be shown to be likely. The second proposition is the
one which was changed in Wardlaw. Normally, the entire
harm must be shown to be wholly caused by the breach. In
Wardlaw, the major concession was that partial, rather than
total, causation of the whole harm was accepted as
sufficient. This, it is submitted, 1S a remarkable
development. If no "discount", or causal apportionment, is
given to reflect the uncertain degree of cumulative causal
contribution of the "innocent" dust,72 the effect is that an
acknowledged partial cause is therefore deemed equivalent
to a total cause. 73 The plaintiff's burden is being eased
at the expense of rendering the defendant wholly liable for
a partially74 non-tortious injury. 75 Further, this
"material contribution", which must by definition be less
than half the cumulative total cause,76 but more than "de
72 I t is thought that this would be the rational solution.
To the objection that the discount would be arbitrary in size,
it could be replied that to do so is less unsatisfactory than to
impute liability for the whole harm in the face of the
limitations of knowledge.
73 I t should be noted that this partial causation must, of
course, still be proved upon the balance of probabilities. The
"partial" aspect of it refers to the causal contribution, and not
to its establishment as proved to the satisfaction of the court.
74 I t may be potentially partial - or even total, but again
there is no way of determining this.
75 Cf. J. Stapleton, in Law, Causation and Common Sense, 1988
8 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 111 at p. 127.
760therwise the plaintiff could adopt a different approach
and show that the breach had wholly and exclusively caused all
the harm, on the balance of probabilities, i.e the simplest form
of conventional causal enquiry.
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minimis",77 is ultimately treated as the whole cause. 78 To
do this would only be just if the evidence could show, or
support an inference, that the "guilty" dust was a sine gua
non of the harm - which comes full circle to conventional
"total" causation. Whilst it .1S conceivable that this
might be desired, it is submitted that such an important
question of policy should be fully and openly debated. In
the absence of this, it is suggested that Wardlaw masked a
fundamental change 1n the head of damage which 1S
recoverable.
A subsequent common-law case in which this principle
was considered and indeed extended by the House of Lords
was McGhee v. Nat iona I Coa I Board. 79 As we have seen,
McGhee was considered in Wilsher80 to the effect that it
simply represented a legitimate evidential inference and
77Whatever proportion that represents; perhaps under 5%?
78Stapleton comments in relation to multiple possible causes
(op. cit. at p. 43) that "[T]here is a problem, ... ,because the
disease may have been triggered by conditions which are
"innocent" .... Here the plaintiff must show that it was exposure
to the faulty conditions which was the more probable cause of
triggering. So even in cases where the only possible source of
this disease was under the defendant's control, the vagaries of
the all-or-nothing balance of probability test ...will still be
involved."
79 19 73 S.L.T. 14; 1973 1 W.L.R. 1. See generally
Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence, seventh edi tion, R. A.
Percy, Sweet and Maxwell, 1983, at p. 316 et seg. Remarkably
little is said about the case in Causation and the Law, Ope cit.,
by Hart and Honore. See p. 410; it is merely summarised as an
example of material contribution and not as material increase in
risk.
80 pe r Lord Bridge in Wilsher, supra, at p. 569F - G.
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not any new principle of law. 8 ! It 1S submitted that this
is disingenuous.
The pursuer's employment entailed that he worked in
very dusty conditions in the defenders' brickworks. He was
unable to wash off the brick-dust with which he was thus
coated during the working day, because of the defenders'
negligent failure to provide showers or other sui table
washing facilities. He then cycled home still caked in
dust, and ultimately contracted dermatitis arising from the
contact with it.
It is immediately evident that if the defenders' only
breach of duty was in failing to provide showers or similar
for use at the end of the working day, then the pursuer's
exposure to the dust during the day was not delictual and
could not therefore found any claim as such for damages, if
the harm caused was solely attributable to the exposure
during the hours of work. This of course suggests,
correctly, that the central issue was the causal impact of
the continuing dust which exerted its effect and became
delictual after the end of the working day, potentiated by
81 Lo r d Wilberforce's expressions to the contrary (that some
relaxation of the onus was allowable (1973 1 W.L.R. at p. 7»
were considered by Lord Bridge in Wilsher ([1988J 2 W.L.R. at p.
567) to be a minori ty view, unsupported by authori ty
(particularly Wardlaw). This certainly appears to restrict the
scope for relying upon or widening McGhee in future. It would
be unlikely to expect Wardlaw to support such a relaxation,
because the alternative relaxation devised to avoid the
unpalatable consequences of precisely that onus was the "material
contribution" formula instead of conventional total causation.
This type of approach was later utilised in McGhee.
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the pursuer's exertions on his bicycle.
At the outset, it may be remarked that some
differences between this and Wardlaw do exist and indeed
q i.v e some basis for arguing that McGhee is not a case
involving cumulative multiple causes.
ln Wilsher that,
Lord Bridge stated
"[A] distinction is ... apparent between the facts
of Bonnington Castings Ltd .... , where the
"innocent" and "guilty" silica dust particles
which together caused the pursuer's lung disease
were inhaled concurrently and the facts of
McGhee ....where the" innocent" and "guil ty" brick
dust was present on the pursuer's body for
consecutive periods. In the one case the
concurrent inhalation of "innocent" and "guilty"
dust must both have contributed to the cause of
the disease. In the other case the consecutive
periods when "innocent" and "guilty" brick dust
was present on the pursuer's body may both have
contributed to the cause of the disease or,
theoretically at least, one or other may have
been the so Le cause." 82
On the relevance of Wardlaw to McGhee, Stapleton has stated
that,
"[W]hat is remarkable is the misplaced reliance
placed on the case by the House of Lords in
McGhee ... , a case not of mul tiple cumulative
sources of damage but of multiple possible
sources ...
"But the evidence was that the disease may
have resul ted from a "triggering" incident of
exposure and there was no way of showing that it
was more likely than not to have been triggered
by the guilty source of risk. There was no way,
therefore, for the pursuer to prove on the
balance of probabilities that the guilty source
had caused the damage - i.e. that is was a sine
gua non of it - and therefore on the basis of
82 pe r Lord Bridge in Wilsher, at p. 567C - D.
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Bonnington Castings itself, he could not win.,,83
Some illumination upon this point may be obtained from the
opinions in McGhee itself. Lord Reid said, reflecting
generally their Lordships' views on how the matter was to
be approached:
"[T]he respondents seek to distinguish Wardlaw's
case .... by arguing that then it was proved that
every particle of dust inhaled played its part in
causing the onset of the disease, whereas in this
case it is not proved that every minor abrasion
played its part ...
"In the present case the evidence does not
show - perhaps no one knows - just how dermatitis
of this type begins. [His Lordship then
expounded possible causal pathways which we need
not consider in detail.]
"But I think that in cases like this we must
take a broader view of causation. The medical
evidence is to the effect that the fact that the
man had to cycle home caked with grime and sweat
added materially to the risk that this disease
might develop. It does not and could not explain
just why that is so. But experience shows that
it is so. Plainly that must be because what
happens while the man remains unwashed can have
a causative effect, though just how the cause
operates is uncertain.
"There may be some logical ground for such
a distinction where our knowledge of all the
material factors is complete. But it has often
been said that the legal concept of causation is
not based on logic or philosophy. It is based on
the practical way in which the ordinary man's
mind works in the every-day affairs of life.,,84
83J . Stapleton: Law, Causation and Common Sense, Ope cit. at
p. 127. The footnotes are omitted and the emphasis is added.
840pinion of Lord Reid, wilsher, 1973 S.L.T.(Reports) at p.
22. Their Lordships appeared to consider the matter one of
cumulative causation and that consecutive or simultaneous
exposure to the causal agent was immaterial. See th~ ~pinions
of Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Salmon. At p. 27 (lbld.) the
latter states strongly that causal enquiry should not become too
recondite a field.
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The v i ew of the House of Lords gives at best equivocal
support for the theory of "mutual exclusivity", although it
cannot be ruled out. It is submitted that their Lordships
deal t wi th the case as one of cumulative causation, and
that it may be considered as an authority in that context.
It is further suggested that although reliance was placed
upon Wardlaw, McGhee itself deal t wi th the issue r.n a
different manner - that of material increase in risk,85 and
to that extent McGhee did extend the previous law. It 1S
proposed therefore to consider the case as one of
cumulative causation.
The starting point 1n their Lordships' analysis was
that a material contribution, i.e. partial causation, of
the result would suffice. 86 If a defender had produced one
of two causes, for example, that would be sufficient. It
1S here that the idiosyncracies in the evidence and
terminology emerge. Because of the incomplete medical
knowledge of the aetiology of the condi tion, at first
instance Dr Hannay's " .. evidence was that he could not say
that the provision of showers would probably have prevented
the disease. He said that it would have reduced the risk
h ld t further than that.
,,87
materially but e wou no go
Another expert, Dr Ferguson, said " .. that washing reduces
85Discussed infra.
86McGhee, 1973 S.L.T. per Lord Reid at p. 21.
870p i nion of the Lord Ordinary (Kissen), summarising the
evidence led at first instance, 1973 S.L.T. at p. 17.
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the risk.,,88 The Lord Ordinary held that the distinction
drawn by Dr Hannay, to the effect that an increase in risk
did not necessarily equate to a material contribution. He
continued:
"[A] material lncrease ln risk may refer only to
possibilities and may not make a possibility into
a probability. It may strengthen the possibility
but that cannot mean that in all such cases the
possibility has become a probability. What the
pursuer has to show is that, as he avers, he
would not have contracted the disease but for the
defenders' breach of duty. He has to show that
this was probable and the degrees of risk have no
relevance unless they make a contraction of the
disease more probable than not contracting the
disease. ,,89
It is this terminology, the ultimate product of scientific
caution based upon incomplete medical knowledge, which, it
is submitted, accounts for the difference in expression of
the Wardlaw test in this case. It is submitted that the
explanation of the equiparation of the two formulae by the
House of Lords (i.e. material increase in risk and material
contribution) may be as follows.
9o
Before the pursuer contracted dermatitis, the dust
constituted a risk, and as with other "risk factors", it
could have been identified or described as such. In this
case such factors were only the "guil ty" and "innocent"
880pinion of the Lord Ordinary (Kissen), summarising the
evidence led at first instance, ibid., at p. 17.
890pinion of the Lord Ordinary (Kissen), 1973 S.L.T. at p.
17.
90 TO the limited extent that this is inconsistent with the
reasoning of the Lord Ordinary, it is with the greatest respect
submitted that that presently expressed is the better view.
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dust particles. After the point at which these risks
materialised and the disease supervened, the language of
risk therefore became inappropriate. For example, when one
has tossed a coin in order to discover which way up it
lands, a statement referring to risk evaluates only the
chances before the event. Once the event occurs, a
fundamental change has taken place in that the tangible
event must have been caused by something. After the
occurrence, on the limited information available all that
could be done was to translate the language of risk
directly into causal terms explaining the actual
occurrence. 91 It is submitted that this was the correct
approach, given the evidence, the wording of the Lord
Ordinary's judgment and the law. 92 It is unfortunate that,
in the absence of analysis of the provenance of the "risk"
expression, there came to be an over-emphasis upon language
perhaps at the expense of the underlying concepts. Thus it
was in Wilsher that McGhee came to be used, and perhaps
understood, as eroding the substantive law further than
Wardlaw. However, their Lordships were aware of the
policy-based nature of McGhee and its consequences. These
factors have been summed up by Stapleton, who considers
that this decision
91 Se e the discussion ln, A Note on Causation, W.A. Wilson,
supra.
92Indeed, Lord Reid states that the distinction may be
appropriate in cases wherein more is known of the aetiology of
the condition (1973 S.L.T. at p. 22).
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" .. constitutes a remarkable rejection of the
traditional preponderance of probabilities
concept as inadequate when dealing with the
classic multiple causation problem in disease 93
cases: proving that a negligent omission was the
medical cause of the disease where estimates of
relative risks are unavailable ...where other
possible sources of risk are outside the
defendant's control, considerations of deterrence
and fairness to the defendant arise more
strongly. This is where the reasoning in McGhee
is inadequate. In economic deterrence terms the
Lords' "solution" to the victim's causation
dilemma overinternalizes losses to the defendant
to an even greater degree than the tradi tional
regime of an all-or-nothing balance of
probability test .... There is little, if anything,
in the McGhee reasoning to prevent it being used
by a person who can show that his unreasonably
(that is, negligently) stressful work conditions
materially increased his risk of heart attack or
disease. ,,~4
The aspects of Wilsher of relevance to this discussion have
already been considered, and it is mentioned here only ln
order to recap, briefly, upon its guidance on the case of
McGhee. This, it lS submitted, should be accepted as
having authoritative implications as to future decisions
d i It· 95upon me lca causa lon.
of evidential inference.
The case may be regarded as one
If so, a decision on this basis
must be perceived as closely associated with its particular
93And , it is submitted, other cases in which similar
difficulties may arise - such as those of medical negligence.
94 J . Stapleton,
cit., at pp. 46-47.
Disease and the Compensation Debate, ~
Footnotes omitted.
95 I t is illuminating that the Vice-Chancellor (Sir Nicolas
Browne-Wilkinson) commented on McGhee that" .. Lord Reid and Lord
Wilberforce .. accepted that the decision was based not on logic
but on common sense or public policy. The difficulty is to know
whether ... it is right to extend further an illogical decision
taken on grounds of policy to cover the present case .. " (Wilsher,
[1986] 3 All E.R. at p. 835c).
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facts and not therefore likely to be developed or
propagated. 96 This is sufficiently important as to warrant
emphasis:
"[TJhe conclusion I draw ... is that McGhee ... laid
down no new principle of law whatever ...
"On the contrary, it affirmed the principle
that the onus of proving causation lies on the
pursuer or plaintiff. Adopting a robust and
pragmatic approach to the undisputed primary
facts of the case, the majority concluded that it
was a legi timate inference of fact that the
defenders' negligence had materially contributed
to the pursuer's injury. The decision, in my
opinion, is of no greater significance than that
and to attempt to extract from it some esoteric
principle which in some way modifies, as a matter
of law, the nature of the burden of proof of
causation which a pursuer or plaintiff must
discharge once he has established a relevant
breach of duty is a fruitless one.,,97
This 1S a further clear signal that the existing causal
principles are to be applied strictly. In effect, it
retains the Wardlaw concession as to material contribution,
but no more. In general, it is therefore consistent with
the other recent cases which we have considered. It 1S
also open to the same criticism that the consequences of
lack of scientific knowledge are visited upon the pursuer,
as a result of the onus of proof. It may be observed that
an ideal solution would be to visi t these consequences
96 Th i s approach is confirmed by Rhesa Shipping Co. S.A. v.
Edmunds and Another, The Popi M [1985J 2 All E.R. 712 in the
context of satisfying the burden of proof where two separate and
highly unlikely causal possibilities, neither of which could be
substantiated, existed.
97 pe r Lord Bridge, at p. 569F et seq., ibid.. His
Lordship's opinion was agreed unanimously by the House of Lords.
See also A. F. Phillips, Ope cit ..
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equally - perhaps upon neither. Before considering this,
we may consider the case of Hotson v. East Berkshire Area
Health Authority.98 It may be considered both as
exemplifying the strict approach to causation which we have
hitherto considered, but also as purveying an inflexible
and mechanistic reaction to an important question of only
slightly greater sophistication than those considered
supra.
Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority
The plaintiff r.n this case, aged 13, fell from a rope
several feet to the ground, suffering a fracture of his
left femoral epiphysis. He was thereafter examined by a
hospi tal's casual ty uni t medical staff, who failed to
diagnose this injury. After five days of pain at home, he
was again taken to hospi tal, x-rayed, and the correct
diagnosis was made. The appropriate treatment, an
operation to free the damaged joint and to insert a metal
p i.n into it, was performed. Unfortunately, avascular
necrosis of the epiphysis set in. As its name implies,
this is effectively the "death" of the circulation of the
blood supply to the area. Hence, the availabili ty of
oxygen and all the other support processes required for the
98At first instance, this is reported at [1985J 3 All E.R.
167 (Hotson v. Fi tzgerald, Simon Brown J.); in the Court of
Appeal at [1987] 1 All E.R. 210 and finally, in the House of
Lords, at [1987] 2 All E.R. 909.
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joint ceased. Serious disabili ty, and early onset of
osteo-arthritis, resulted from this. The dispute centred
around the consequences of this failure to diagnose the
condition on the plaintiff's first admission to hospital.
It was admitted that this had been negligent. Simon Brown
J. 's salient findings were as follows.
"Even had the defendants correctly diagnosed and
treated the plaintiff ... [on his initial
admission] ... there is a high probability, which
I assess as a 75% risk, that the plaintiff's
injury would have followed the same course as it
in fact has, ie he would have developed avascular
necrosis of the whole femoral head with all the
same adverse consequences as have already ensued
and with all the same adverse future
prospects ....
"That 75% risk was translated by the
defendants' admitted breach of duty into
inevitabili ty. Putting it the other way, the
defendants' delay in diagnosis denied the
plaintiff the 25% chance that, given immediate
treatment, avascular necrosis would not have
developed ...
"Had [it] not developed, the plaintiff would
have made a very nearly full recovery ... The
reason why the delay sealed the plaintiff's fate
was because it followed the pressure caused by
haemarthrosis (the bleeding of ruptured blood
vessels into the joint) to compress and thus
block the intact but distorted remaining vessels
wi th the resul t that even had the fall left
intact sufficient vessels to keep the epiphysis
alive (which, as finding no. 1 makes plain, I
think possible but improbable) such vessels would
have become occluded and ineffective for this
purpose. ,,99
It was held at first instance that the plaintiff had been
wrongfully denied a 25% chance of recovery. The proportion
of a quarter of the full amount of damages in respect of
the avascular necrosis was then awarded. This figure meant,
99 pe r Simon Brown J., ibid., at p. 171.
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ln effect, that the health authority was responsible for
causing a quarter of the plaitiff's disability, instead of
viewing the 25% and 75% chances respectively as mutually
exclusive single causes, the materialisation of either of
which would have caused the whole condition. It should
perhaps also be noted that this was not just a question of
analysing an increase or decrease in risk of a certain
percentage. The chance of recovery also declined to zero _
in other words then rendering the outcome statistically
certain. The question in issue was ln fact either one of
causation or alternatively one of the classification and
quantification of damages. The award of damages was
approved by the Court of Appeal, but the House of Lords
unanimously allowed the further appeal, reversing the court
below.
l OO
Essentially, their Lordships' decision was that
the harm was the avascular necrosis and not the plaintiff's
ingenious formulation of the loss of the chance of
101recovery. This being so, it was then unnecessary to
consider whether or not such a loss could sound in
damages. l 02 The remarks concerning this possibili ty were of
lOOCf. Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 K.B. 786.
lOlBy analogy wi th authori ties elsewhere, for example r n
actions for loss of a chance based ultimately upon contract. See
Kitchen v. Royal Air Forces Association [1958] 1 W.L.R. 563; cf.
Kenyon v. Bell 1953 S.C. 125.
l02 I n Takaro Properties v. Rowlinq [1988] 2 W.L.R. 418
(Privy Council) the causal issue of whether an unprofitable
company might ever have become profitable was undecided, as no
negligence was held to have taken place.
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course obiter, but Lord MacKay was the least discouraging
on the pOl· n t . 103 G' th t th hlven a e arm was to be considered
as the condition itself, it was clear that the plaintiff
was unable to surmount the hurdle of proof of causation
upon the balance of probabilities. To do so, he would have
had to show that the risk attributable to the negligence
was the one which actually materialised, proved likely to
a level of 51% probability or more. The findings in fact
could not support this. 104 It might be argued that Wardlaw-
type reasoning would help the plaintiff at this point,
leav ing as ide the (in effect) weakened case of McGhee.
Such an argument would state that in Wardlaw a contribution
greater than de minimis but less than the required 51% was
a sufficient causal component as to infer liability.
Indeed, such a proportion might well encompass the present
figure of 25%. The reason why this type of argument would
not work in Hotson was simply because the starting point
for enquiry, unfortunately for the plaintiff, was a 75%
103"1 consider that it would be unwise ... to lay it
down ... that a plaintiff could never succeed by proving loss of
a chance in a medical negligence case." Per Lord MacKay, [1987]
2 All E.R. at p. 916d.
104Compare Mitchell v. Hounslow and Spelthorne Health
Authority 1984 The Lancet 579, in which a 60% chance of avoiding
the harm (brain damage (subsequent to deprivation of a child's
oxygen through the umbilical cord because of .negligent
compression of it by a nurse)) had there been no negllgence was
held sufficient to establish causation. This was presumably on
the basis that the damage was 60% likely as a resul t of the
negligence, thus avoiding the potential post hoc ergo propter hoc
fallacy.
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chance of developing the disputed condition. lOS With only
the avascular necrosis classified as the loss, application
of the standard balance of probabilities test thus yielded
the clear result that the plaintiff was to be held, in law,
the sole author of his misfortune. We may conclude from
this that causation 1S to be considered not merely
strictly, but also narrowly and very much as an "all or
nothing" 106 test. In addition to its actual ratio, then,
the case heralds an even greater restriction of what 1S
arguably already a difficult rule for a plaintiff or
pursuer to satisfy. 107 Hotson occasioned much debate. loa
stapleton has argued that the loss was correctly
characterised as loss of a chance of recovery, which could
10SLo r d MacKay's statement (Hotson, [1987] 2 W.L.R. at p.
915g et seg.) to the effect that it was not correct to say the
plaintiff had a 25% chance of recovery on initial arrival at the
hospital is doubted. As his opinion makes clear, whatever the
reality of the situation the information directly relevant to
determining this was unavailable and the basis adopted by Simon
Brown J. appeared to be a reasonable one in the circumstances.
106 Se e Proof of Causation in Medical Negligence Cases, J. G.
Logie, Ope cit., at p. 28 et seg., including the analysis of the
"all or nothing" nature and Lord Reid's speech on the burden of
proof in Davies v. Taylor [1974] A.C. 207.
107 s e e , A Lost Chance for Compensation in the Tort of
Negligence by the House of Lords, T. Hill, 1991 54 M.L.R. 511;
cf. paper by Dr W. Scott contrasting this with a medical and
scientific approach to causation (personal communication).
loa Fo r example, The Gist of Negligence, J. Stapleton, (1988)
104 L.Q.R. 386; Law, Causation and Common Sense, J. Stapleton,
Ope cit.; Proof of Causation in Medical Negligence Cases, J. G.
Logie, Ope cit.; Further Reflections on Medical Causation, A. F.
Phillips, Ope cit.; Causation - The Lords' Lost Chance?, ~.
Price, (1989) 38 I.C.L.Q. 735; Damages for Loss of a Chance 1n
Tort?, F. Cownie 1989 5 P.N. 194 and Causation and the Increase
of Risk, A. Boon (1988) 51 M.L.R. 508.
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be established on the balance of probabili ties. Their
Lordships therefore applied their minds to the wrong test,
as the quantification of damages could not be raised prior
to proof of causation. She also argues that the
formulation of the claim defines the sUbsequent causal
enquiry, and that the former issue was not considered at
all.
109
Acceptance of loss of chance as a head of damage 1S
further argued to give a more coherent connection with the
wrong, thus reducing the scope for duties effectively
unenforceable because of causal idiosyncracies. 110 In the
context of tort generally, it has been argued persuasively
and strongly that the law should admit of reparation for
wrongful loss of a chance and that the system of negligence
perhaps pre-disposes to an unfortunate melding of the
concepts of valuation and causation. 111 There seems no
reason why this should not apply to cases of medical
negligence 1n d 1 · t 112e 1C , particularly when the law of
l09J . Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence, Ope cit., at pp.
392-393. Cf. D. Price, The Lords' Lost Chance, Ope cit., at pp.
746 et seq.
110See, J. Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence, Ope cit.;
ibid. and p. 394 et seq. Cf. Cook V. Lewis [1952] D.L.R. 1
(S.C.C.), in which two persons negligently discharged guns in the
plaintiff's direction. It was impossible to decide whose bullet
had struck him. Both, according to the Supreme Court, could be
held liable.
lllsee, for example, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in
Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future
Consequences, J. King, 1980/81 90 Yale L. J. 1353, especially
Part II, at p. 1363 et seq.
l12Se e Kyle V. P. & J. Stormonth Darling, W.S., 1992 S.L.T.
264 (0. H. ), in which a client averred los~ of a. :r:easonable
prospect of success in an appeal which h1S SOllC1tors had
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contract already admits of characterisation, and recovery
ln respect of, such loss.
The "all or nothing" (or " "yes or no" ,,113) nature of
the test for causation has also been subjected to trenchant
criticism,114 principally because its mechanistic and
inflexible nature tends to under- or over-compensate.
Therefore, arguably, it provides an inflexible and unfair
means of distinguishing between meritorious and non-
conducted negligently. Loss of this legal right (i. e. to
continue his appeal) was held to be a wrong capable of
independent valuation; proof before answer was allowed. See Lord
Prosser's opinion in Kyle, ibid., at p. 266K et seq. Arguably,





Gerecke, Risk Exposure as Injury: Alleviating the
of Tort Causation Rules, 1990 35 McGill L. J. 797 at
114Se e the discussion in Proof of Causation in Medical
Negligence Cases, J. Logie, Ope cit. at p. 28 et seg., and J.
King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, ibid.
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meri torious claims; 115 nor 1S it able to cope rationally
with scientific uncertainty. It is also unfortunate that,
in cases of loss of chance, much now turns upon whether a
plaintiff can formulate his claim in contract or not. 116 It
has been commented that " .. McGhee l 1 7 was in its modest way
a useful decision, showing a welcome flexibility with
respect to entrenched doctrine. One can only hope that the
decision .... was a harbinger of things to come and not an
evanescent incident. ,,118 Ul timately, it seems that the
flickering recognition in McGhee of the difficulties posed
by the limitations of scientific knowledge has now gone.
115J . Logie quotes (ibid., at p. 29) Lord Reid's rejection
of the balance of probabilities test in Davies v. Taylor [1974]
A.C. 207 at p. 213 [the case involved a claim by a widow in
respect of her husband's death; she had left him five weeks prior
to the accident]: "[I] can see no ground at all for saying that
the 40 per cent case fails altogether but the 60 per cent case
gets 100% [damages]. But it would be almost absurd to say that
the 40% case gets nothing while the 60 per cent award is scaled
down to that proportion of what the award would have been ... " ".
Cf. Hotson, [1987] 2 All E.R. at p. 915j - 916a, where Lord
MacKay of Clashfern quotes the principle enunciated by Lord
Diplock in Mallett v. McMonagle [1970] A.C. 166, at p. 176: "
"[I]n determining what did happen in the past a court decides on
the balance of probabilities. Anything that is more probable
than not it treats as certain." ". See also E. J. Weinrib, A
step Forward in Factual Causation, Ope cit., at p. 523 et seg.,
considering McGhee and its implications. J. Stapleton, in
Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., also gives a full
account of the test, at p. 38 et seg.
116Th i s and other aspects are considered in Chance and the
Burden of Proof in Contract and Tort, B. Coote, 1988 62 A.L.J.
761 at p. 770 et seg.
117And also Clark v. McLennan, supra (see A. F. Phillips,
Ope cit.), in the writer's submission.
118A Step Forward in Factual Causation, E.J. Weinrib, ~
cit., at p. 534.
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The Case Law: Discussion
The cases in each of these categories demonstrate a
consistent theme, that the traditional burden of proof upon
the pursuer or plaintiff is not to be relaxed. Where the
direct connection cannot be demonstrated as such, the
inference of causation may only be drawn where the evidence
1S strong enough to permit this upon the balance of
probabilities. Neither the substantive nor procedural law
may be changed in order to ease this task. The result may
be to deny a pursuer a remedy, to deem certain duties
unenforceable or to make a decision which does not
correspond with scientific knowledge. Such a rule has been
legally unexceptionable for many years. Various reasons
may, speculatively, be advanced for this. Those which
commend themselves to the writer are that the expectations
of the public have been increased (perhaps beyond the
ability of medicine to achieve, on occasion), and the
increasing technology applied in medicine. When tragedies
occur, more technical medicine may have the effect of
rendering adverse consequences more severe, particularly
where neonates or children are involved.
It is submitted that the cases which have occasioned
the greatest difficulty are likely to be those in which the
causal issues occupy a penumbra of incomplete scientific
knowledge. In Wilsher, if it had been possible to
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determine which of the five possible causes had
materialised, or the exact causal efficacy of the
"innocent" and "guilty" dust in Wardlaw or McGhee, cases
involving many years' stress and expense for both sides
would not have been required. 119 That of Wilsher ul timately
required re-trial on the causal issue. Kay and Hotson do
not fit this pattern, although they may be criticised upon
other grounds. The former, conventionally analysed, 1S
simply a case in which there was negligible evidence a.n
support of the pursuer's case even though the facts may
perhaps appear upon first blush to approach res ipsa
loquitur. Nevertheless, it 1S suggested that the
adversarial philosophy perhaps made the original claim and
appeals more likely. Tactical considerations on the part
of the defenders, such as their better knowledge of the
causal issue and of the difficul ties in discharging the
burden of proof,120 are likely to have militated against the
pursuer's settlement of the case. In any event, although
it could not be established legally, 1n the writer's
understanding it is not certain that the deafness could not
be said to have been caused by the overdose. It is
therefore at least possible that the harm could have been
119Se e also Thompson v. Smiths Ship-repairers (North
Shields) Ltd. [1984] 1 All E.R. 881, a case involving industrial
deafness through exposure to high noise levels.
120Se e The Civil Standard of Proof, R. Eggleston, ch. 10 in
Evidence, Proof and Probability, second edition, 1983, Weidenfeld
and Nicolson.
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delictually caused. 1 2 1 Hotson may be cri ticised on the
grounds that the classification of the issue by the House
of Lords was erroneous, and that its result may give rise
to unenforceable duties, as indeed may other cases arising
1n medical causation. If, as is suggested, these decisions
are referable to the existence of a "gap" between
scientific knowledge and that which 1S partially, or not
known, the difficulties are likely to be perpetuated. This
is because even as new knOWledge is discovered, the
boundaries of what is not understood will also recede _
leaving the "gap" intact. The judicial attempts, in
recognising this burden, to reduce it1 2 2 have been notably
short-lived.
approach that,
A doctor has commented upon the existing
"[TJhe "all or none" approach is reasonably fair
to patients who, statistically, would have had
chances somewhere near 0% or 100% of the
predicted outcome, but tends to be unfair to
those patients whose statistical chances were
nearer the 50% borderline ... ,,123
Many of the difficulties identified by Stapleton 1n
relation to man-made disease1 2 4 may also bedevil causal
121The writer is aware of the nature of the evidence led and
the unlikeliness of sustaining such an argument, bolstered by
Rhesa Shipping Co. S . A. v. Edmunds and Another, The Popi M,
[1985J 2 All E.R. 712.
122 Lo r d Davidson in the Outer House in Kay (supra), Clark v.
McLennan ( supra) and Hotson (supra, apart from the House of Lords)
serve to illustrate this.
123Dr w. Scott, personal communication, 2 March 1992.
124J . Stapleton, Disease and the Compensation Debate, ~
cit., at p. 33 et seq.
253
enquiry 1n medical negligence cases. These include
symptoms which are too difficult to detect or to associate
with negligence, or where a very long time-lapse, perhaps
even a generation, exists between the biological expression
of the harm and the negligent episode. These may be added
to the difficulties of multiple causation and the onus of
proof which have already been considered. 125
Conclusion
What lessons or conclusions, if any, may be drawn from the
foregoing? It 1S submi tted that the so-called "simple
causation" examples may in fact be regarded as a variant on
the theme of multiple mutually exclusive causes. In these,
background risk is the corollary of the pursuer's inability
to prove causation by the allegedly delictual source.
A traditional justification advanced for the existence
of causal enquiry 1n cases of negligence 1S that it
enforces responsibility for one's own actions. 126 Some of
the underlying reasoning is that normally there 1S a close
connection between a person's actions and their result, be
125 I n relation to the last-mentioned of these, readers are
referred to the detailed consideration and criticism of this in
Stapleton, Ope cit. at p. 38 et seg.
126McBryde does not mention this specifically: The
Advantages of Fault, 1975 J.R. 32, although it may well be
subsumed under "[M]orality", at p.40 et seg. The concepts of
voluntariness and responsibility are discussed in Voluntary Acts
and Responsible Agents, B. Williams, 1990 10 Oxford J. Legal
Stud. 1.
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it harmful or otherwise. This is held to be a matter of
common-sensei thus, pushing a cup over the edge of a table
causes it to fall and probably to break, depending upon the
nature of the surface upon which it lands.
The next component 1S that those who act are
cons idered both to be aware of the resul ts, as an the
example of the cup, and also to have intended those
results.
127
If, on this view, we wish as a matter of policy
to hold people generally responsible for their own
actions,128 then in any practical enquiry causation must
figure strongly.
Against this must be considered the view expressed by
critics
129
such as Ison, sUfficiently exasperated by
analysis of causal issues as to comment that
"[I]n practice, the difficulties of adhering to
any coherent rules for establishing causation are
insoluble, and the truth of the matter is that
purely intuitive moral judgments playa crucial
127Th i s argument, admittedly an extreme one, is advanced by
R. A. Epstein in support of his equiparation of causation and
legal liability without the notion of fault (see A Theory of
Strict Liability, 1973 2 (University of Chicago) Journal of Legal
Studies 151 at p , 168 et seq. Such an analysis is open to
various objections, but it is submitted that the reasoning
underpinning it is present, in much less extreme form, in the
current tort and delict system of liability for negligence.
128An d not succumb wholly to the doctrines of Freud!
129Se e also Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law,
op. ci t., especially chapter 4, Causation and Remoteness of
Damage, and Medical Negl igence - The Burden of Proof, M. A.
Jones, 1984 (6 January) N.L.J. 7.
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role. 11130
Following analysis, Stapleton concludes that
" .. the approach of the Law Lords in McGhee to the
typical multiple possible causation problem in a
disease case shows how extreme the departures
from conventional theory must be before any
attempt can be made to accommodate these cases.
The resul t is the creation of anomalies and a
distortion of legal rules which, in any case
ultimately seems to prove a dead end. ... '
"A final implication
from ... [McGhee][is] ... the Law Lords, faced with
the typical causation barrier to disease
compensation, abandoning a traditional element of
the one-to-one corrective justice model, namely
that the defendant be proved to be more probably
than not the party who caused the plaintiff's
damage, and allowing recovery against a defendant
who had merely been shown to have negligently
added one of a number of possible sources of
risk. 1 3 1 If this is the best solution to the
problem which the common law can provide, it
suggests that an accommodation of disease issues
would weaken the traditional basis of tort
liability. As Calabresi has noted, once it is
accepted that justice does not require an
individual wrongdoer to compensate his actual
victim it becomes more difficult to surport the
fault system in terms of justice .... ,,13
It may be noted that since the publication in 1986 of
stapleton's book, Disease and the Compensation Debate, from
which this passage is quoted, the law on multiple causes
130Th e Forensic Lottery, T. Ison, Staples Press, London,
1967, ch. 2 (section 5: causation), at p. 18. (This refers to
the Hart and Honore analysis of causation in common-sense terms.)
13lThe present writer submits that any reversal of the onus
of proof in respect of causation would have the same effect and
be subject to the same criticism.
132J . Stapleton, Disease and the Compensation Debate, ~
cit., at p. 49. Footnote omitted. In calabre~ian terms, McGhee
over-internalises liability, and Hotson and wllsher would over-
externalise it. See, The Costs of Accidents, G. Calabresi, New
Haven/Yale D.P., 1970, chapters 7 and 8. Cf. Accidents, Costs
and Legal Responsibility, S. Stoljar, 1973 36 M.L.R. 233.
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generally has been clarified, albei t that its "all or
nothing" nature remains unrelaxed. 133 Al though McGhee was
not overruled, as we have seen it was effectively confined
to its own factual circumstances. Thus a pursuer or
plaintiff will have to support the drawing of any
favourable inference as to causation with strong evidence.
It therefore appears that there are two equally unpalatable
alternatives, depending upon whether McGhee is regarded as
likely to be decided the same way should the occasion
arlse. The first is Stapleton's view that the logic behind
the policy-based decision ln McGhee undermines the
rationale of the negligence system, and that no other
solution has yet been proffered by the common law of
negligence. Indeed, the decision may be argued to be one
of distributive rather than corrective justice .134 The
second is that the law subsequently appears to be set upon
a course in which there is little or no relaxation of the
requirements of proof of causation. Whilst this might at
least reflect traditional tort preoccupations consistently,
it must also be judged unsatisfactory because the pursuer
might be refused a just remedy. 135 Al though Stapleton's
central concept of man-made disease is unlikely to arise in
133Chance and the Burden of Proof ln Contract and Tort, B.
Coote, 1988 62 Austr. L. J. 761.
134J . Stapleton, Disease and the Compensation Debate, ~
cit. at p. 49.
135 I t is thought that the law is equally unsatisfactory if
it works injustice either to pursuer or defender.
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medical negligence, it is thought that many similar
difficulties do exist; after all, both areas are concerned
with questions of medical causation. Indeed, there may be
even greater difficulties in respect of this type of case.
These may take various forms, not the least being the
average person's lack of knowledge of medical science and
practice, or a reluctance of medical witnesses to condemn
their fellow professionals. 1 3 6 Distinguishing the
negligently-caused exacerbation of a disease from its pre-
existing state, and the detection of some of the sequelae
of negligent clinical interaction, are further difficulties
of similar form as those identified by Stapleton ln
relation to man-made disease, but arising in the context of
medical negligence. As Gerecke has commented, "[T]he flaws
of the all or nothing approach are exposed in the increased
risk cases. In practical terms, the approach's most
glaring weakness is its denial of recovery to almost all
increased risk plaintiffs. ,,137 Further, it has been
coherently and strongly argued that the causal element in
136 Some of these risk factors and difficulties are discussed
in a practical context by J. Phillips and K. Hawkins, in Some
Economic Aspects of the Settlement Process: A Study of Personal




Gerecke Risk Exposure as Injury: Alleviating the
of Tort 'causation Rules, 1990 35 McGill L. J. 797 at
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the ascription of liabili ty may not be the best way to
achieve the responsibility element in the law. 1 38
However, it is sufficient to fulfil the purpose of
this chapter to submit that McGhee, Wilsher and Hotson
demonstrate the difficulty inherent in the common law of
medical negligence to provide a satisfactory answer to
causation questions, both those actually encountered and
those likely to be encountered in future. 13 9 For clarity,
however, it is worth placing this conclusion in slightly
broader perspective.
If, as seems likely, this disparity between scientific
or medical and legal causation cannot satisfactorily be
bridged, then we must take into account the aims of the law
at a more fundamental level. A main justification for
causal enquiry is the ascription and enforcement of
Lb i.Li.t; 140responsl 1 1 y. If this is accepted as a satisfactory
working aim, and further that the McGhee debate shows that
conventional one-to-one corrective justice cannot
accommodate this, we must look beyond the narrow confines
138 L . Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does
Tort Law Make Sense? 1987 6 Law and Philosophy 1. See also J.
Coleman Moral Theories of Torts, Part I, 1982 1 Law and
Philoso~hy 371, e.g. at p. 378 et seg.; cf. E. wei~rib, Toward
a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 1983 2 Law and Phllosophy 37,
at p. 47 et seg.
139 Se e , Radiation: Proving the Causal Link with Cancer, D.
Brahams, 1988 (August 12) N.L.J. 570.
140Th i s is only considered in the context of medical
negligence and not in the full scope of tort law, which is
outwith the present work.
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f th h .. 141o e present aut or1t1es.
following.
Possible avenues include the
( 1 ) Reversal of the onus of proof. 142 It 1S
thought that this would be open to similar
objections as McGhee.
(2) No-fault or other compensation schemes. The
former are generically open to the argument that
only the fault criterion 1S eliminated, the
troub lesome causa1 e lement be ing perpetuated.
However, to some degree such objections may be
countered by providing a "schedule" of condi tions
within the scope of the scheme,143 i.e. a partial
removal of this element. Unfortunately, it is
likely that the variety of conditions and
consequences to be expected 1n any such reform of
the law of medical negligence would render this
impracticable. This is discussed infra in the
context of reform.
141Se e A step Forward in Factual Causation, E.J. Weinrib,
cit. sup. at p. 533-534.
142 Fo r example Cook v. Lewis [1952] 1 D.L.R. 1.
143Discussed by J. stapleton, Disease and the Compensation
Debate, Ope cit., at p.49 et seq.
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( 3 ) Causation and the "enforcement of
responsibility" alm might both be retained in a
modified form, with liability allocated or
discounted according to causal responsibili ty.
An example of this type of approach is in the
American so-called "market share" doctrine. 144
This has some attractions, but loses its gloss
somewhat on closer examination. It has been
principally applied ln the u.s in product
liabili ty cases; such cases may be peculiarly
appropriate for this theory. There will be a
finite number of manufacturers, each of whom will
have kept records of the numbers and date of
production of the drug involved. Extensive data
will already be available from clinical trials as
to dose-response effects and this will probably
ease the subsequent aetiological enquiry even
where unforeseen consequences result. Many
epidemiological studies are done before the
launch of a new drug; data are therefore more
readily and generally available. 145 In medical
144A recent and compendious paper which explains fully, and
strongly advocates, this theory is: Risk Exposure as Injury:
Alleviating the Injustice of Tort Causation Rules, D. Gerecke,
cit. sup. See generally also, Developments in Victim
Compensation: A Look beyond the Superfund Act of 1980, anon.,
1985 10 Columbia J. Environmental L. 271.
145The new product liability regime in the E.C. is based
upon strict liability. See Product Liability, A.M. Clark, Sweet
and Maxwell, 1989. Vaccine damage has again been a matter of
concern: see" [W] hooping cough vaccine on trial again", C. Dyer,
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negligence cases, vastly varied individuals,
physiological processes, diseases and seguelae
are involved. Little of the aetiology of anyone
condi tion may be known even for the general
population, and this may be compounded by the
idiosyncracies of the individual negligently
treated patient. As has been pointed out, again
by Stapleton, it is particularly a.n cases r n
which some discount for causal non-responsibili ty
1S needed that precisely these data are unlikely
to be available. 146 Thus, any attempt to achieve
causal apportionment is likely to be crude,
although even this may be preferable to the "all
or nothing" test considered above. 147 However, it
1S possible that quanti tative and statistical
methods may be applicable, if reliable data are
1987 295 B.M.J. 1053 and Loveday v. Renton and Another Times Law
Report, March 31, 1988.
146J. Stapleton, Disease and the Compensation Debate, ~
cit., at p. 48.
147Discounts to reflect approximate degrees of causal
responsibility may be reasonably easily proposed. Leaving aside
the Kay case (because on the conventional view there was no
causal input to the deafness by the defender), in McGhee a 50%
figure, in Hotson either the 25% figure at first instance or
simply an arbitrary sum to reflect loss of chance, and in Wilsher
a 20% figure might be suggested. Of course, it may be argued
that this is little or no advance upon the status guo. Thus in
McGhee the condition may have been triggered by "innocent" dust,
in Wilsher that the R.L.F. might have been caused (say) by patent
ductus arteriosus and that in Hotson the boy had a high, 75%,
chance of avascular necrosis before the negligence supervened.
This, of course, brings full circle the original difficulties.
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available,148 al though such tools must be used
with great caution:
"[T]he causation issues dealt with in
civil actions and by medical scientists
are not the same. In a civil action
the causation issue is typically
whether the plaintiff's injuries were
caused by agent X. Population-based
studies by medical experts cannot
answer the question of individual
causation; they merely show whether an
individual is at an increased risk if
he or she is a member of a certain
group. ,,149
(4) Finally, a reassessment of an even more
fundamental nature is possible: reconsidering
the two broad themes of the law in this area,
viz. compensation and responsibility. It might
be argued that the causal enquiry be elided
totally, and these alms of the law be met,
without sacrificing the responsibility goal,
which might be satisfied by other means. In
medical negligence, this might, for example, be
by enhanced accountability. This dichotomy lS
accentuated where adverse medical outcomes such
148Major contributions to this burgeoning literature include
inter alia, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process, L.H. Tribe, 1971 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (a critical
assessment); The Probable and the Provable, L.J. Cohen, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1977; Probability Theory and the Law of Evidence,
A.L. Tyree, 1984 8 Crim. L.J. 224; What is Bayesianism? A Guide
for the Perplexed, D.H. Kaye, 1988 (Winter) Jurimetrics 161.
149Letter to the Edi tor, The Lancet, enti t.l.ed "Proof of
Causation", T.E. Kapshandy, 1992 339 The Lancet 876.
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as peri-operative patient infection are involved.
The immediate infection is caused by the agency
of the bacterium or virus, but considering the
aetiology of its source would be likely to prove
very difficult indeed. ISO These broader matters
are considered infra in the context of reform.
IS0There appears to have been little written on this subject
where it concerns negligence and compensation. However, this is
included to some extent in the discussion in, Avenues of
Compensation for Genetic Engineering Accidents, Y. Cripps, 1980
9 N.Z.D.L.R. 150 at pp. 150-157 and p. 161, although the author's
primary concern is the New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme.
A further difficulty which would affect cases of medical
negligence is that the agents liable to cause infection might
be those which are sometimes normally harmless and found in
hospitals. Genetically-engineered strains presumably are more
readily distinguishable and identifiable and therefore would be






Thus far, this thesis has considered the main principles of
the present law and its development. It has also attempted
to demonstrate the ways in which it is unsatisfactory in
its regulation of medical negligence. However, a further
alm is to propose a systematic means of alleviating these
difficulties. This part of the thesis therefore considers
the question of reform. It must be emphasized that
discussion is restricted to the law of medical negligence.
The many broader r.s s ues an the so-called "compensation
debate" are not considered, both by reason of the focus of
this work and by dictates of space. Readers who wish to
pursue these questions are referred to those works dealing
specifically wi th them, r n particular the excellent and
comprehensive discussions to be found r.n Atiyah' s
Accidents, Compensation and the Law. l
This section outlines the approach adopted;
thereafter, ln the following chapter, the wri ter' s
proposals for reform are put forward. Firstly, however,
the aims of delict and tort law are considered; these are
essentially similar in Scots and English law. 2 In doing
lFourth edition, by Peter Cane, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1987, particularly chapters 18, 19, 21, 22 and 25.
2Readers are referred to the previous chapters on the
substantive law.
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this, the underlying goals which the proposed new system
strives to meet are elucidated. Potential reforms, varying
from some of the limited changes considered by the Pearson
Commission3, to extensive no-fault, or even needs-based,
compensation schemes will then be discussed insofar as
appropriate. It is argued that none of these possibilities
would implement those desirable underlying aims of the law
without serious reservations. It is submi tted that the
writer's proposals, in attempting to address individually
the aims and principles involved, would go much further
toward providing a satisfactory system than is at present
the case.
We may summarise the var i ous shortcomings which we
have considered a n the existing negligence scheme for
dealing wi th medical malpractice wi thin two categories.
These comprise, firstly, the legal principles upon which
this thesis focusses and, secondly, matters essentially of
practice which have not been systematically analysed
because of constraints of space. The former comprised the
standard of care, the broader issues of the fault
principle, and proof of causation. Criticisms of these
were inter alia that the standard of care reflected
adequately neither moral fault, nor the ascription of
3Despi te supporting the retention of tort generally, ~he
Pearson Commission did, however, recommend more f ar e r eaohLnq
reform for areas other than medical negligence, for example in
road traffic reparation cases (Pearson Report, 1978, Cmnd 7054-
1, vol. 1, ch. 18), vaccine damage (Report, ibid., vol. 1, at p.
370) and handicapped children (Report, ibid., vol. 1 at p. 370).
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liability consonant with actual clinical responsibility and
practice. The flaws in the corrective justice model become
magnified in the context of medical negligence: not only
do the general criticisms manifest themselves in this area
of delict or tort, but the effect of indemnity insurance,
vicarious liabili ty4 of heal th boards and authori ties,S
difficulties of detection6 and proof and the operation of
the substantive law itself all add to this, and are
reflected ln the relatively small number of patients7
4Cf. the liability of a servant to indemnify his employer
in respect of damages paid by way of vicarious liability (para.
10-90, Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence, R.A. Percy, eighth
edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1990).
SRather than, for example, recognising the de facto
responsibility of the consultant in charge. In other areas of
professional activity in which the partnership is used,
recognition of the de facto responsibility by the law is more
readily achieved (e.g. firms of solicitors, in which the
principal is liable for the acts of his fellow partners and his
employees - it is in his interest to exercise sufficiently close
supervision) .
6By its nature, there appear to be no data on this.
However, "[I]t has been estimated that some 5 1/2 million in-
patients and 17 million new out-patients and accident and
emergency department patients use our hospitals every year. It
is also believed that there are some 200 million consultations
wi th general practi tioners every year. An average of some 15,000
formal complaints are made by in-patients every year whereas a
much smaller number of formal complaints are made by patients of
general practi tioners . " Medical Complaints Procedures, A. C.
Taylor, at p. 8, in Medical Negligence, M.J. Powers, N.H. Harris,
Butterworths, 1990. An example which may involve negligence
relates to the death of a patient in hospital, where in Scotland
a Fatal Accident Inquiry follows: e.g. Medicine and the Law:
Hairline Fracture and Meningitis, D. Brahams, 1991 The Lancet
605.
7Th e Pearson Commission, Ope cit., noted that whereas some
payment was made in 86% of all personal injury claims (Report,
vo l , 2, para., 66) only ~pproximately 30%-:-40~ of, medic~l
negligence c La i.ms resul ted an some compenaat i on s be i nq pa i.d
(Report, vol. 2 Table 11; see also vol. 1, p. 284, para. 1326).
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compensated, on occas1on highly8 (especially in the U.S.,9
where it has been argued that there is a litigation crisis
in the professions10). Furthermore, there is now strong
evidence that U. K. obstetric and gynaecological medical
practice 1S influenced by medico-legal considerations, 11
i.e. that there exists significant practice of "defensive
medic ine" . 12
It may be that the medical negligence claims analysed were simply
less meritorious than the general personal injury average. See
also Medical Negligence: Compensation and Accountabili ty, C. Ham
et al., King's Fund Institute/Centre for Socio-Legal Studies,
Oxford, 1988, which substantially endorses these various
criticisms, particularly Table 1, at p. 8, and Figure 5 (page
12), showing an apparent increase in claim rates per unit head
of population. These data do not, however, appear to be
correlated with the population's actual contact with the medical
profession and show widely differing rates between the two
regions studied. This tends to confirm the near-impossibility of
obtaining clear data upon trends in this field.
8Fo r example Tombs v. Merton and Sutton Health Authority,
1991 (11 December) "The scotsman" 2, in which a patient was
administered carbon dioxide during anaesthesia, resul ting in
severe brain damage. The damages awarded amounted to £1.65
million; the operation had taken place four years previously.
9Se e "Diethylstilboestrol daughter" claim settled for $4
million, D. Brahams, 1991 The Lancet 1137.
10"It is only in the litigious u.s. that the astronomical
premiums and awards threaten business and the professions. It
is the liberalization of our legal system, which has not occurred
in any other country in the western world, that has evoked this
litigation crisis." Professional Liability, R.S. Emerson, R.M.
Schwarz, 1983 New York state Journal of Medicine 69, at p. 71.
11Medicine and the Law: Worried Obstetricians, D. Brahams,
1991 The Lancet 1597.
12change in obstetric practice in response to fear of
litigation in the British Isles, M. Ennis, A. Clark and J.G.
Grudzinskas, 1991 The Lancet 616. In Medical Malpractice,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985, P. Danzon ha~ put
forward the view that in the U.S. there has been r e Let.Lve Ly
little or negligible, defensive medicine and concomitant waste
of re;ources; in fact, addi tional investigations would have
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In addition, trenchant criticisms have been made ln
respect of non-substantive factors. Thus the King's Fund
study concludes that the legal procedures involved are
lengthy and expensive for all parties; that patients may
well experience difficulty 1n obtaining a suitably
experienced solici tor or expert wi tnesses, and that the
adversarial system tends to inhibit explanation and
consideration, promoting instead obstructiveness, hostility
and . 13enm1ty. The study concludes not only that
substantial, long-term reform is required, but even that
short-term measures are needed, primarily to ease access to
justice. However, it has been argued that prognostications
of a rnas s i.v e financial burden upon health authorities
following Crown indemnity are unlikely to be realised:
"the National Heal th Service ... management
executive ... suggest that the media attention
given to high settlements is unrepresentative of
the true picture. Up to 1988, the total annual
cost to the hospital service of paying part of
defence organisation subscriptions was about £30
million. With transfer of indemni ty in 1990,
this £30 million was added to a combined fund of
£50 million from defence organisations for
payment of claims. The 1990/91 cost to the
N.H.S. of medical negligence was around £40-45m
in England. These figures are lower than those
forecast. During 1990/91 only 30 applications
were made to the Department of Health for help
with claims above £300,000; expenditure on claims
remains below 0.5% of total NHS revenue, and the
NHS management executive emphasize that no money
1S drawn from funds allocated to patient
improved patient care. Despite the now-conflicting evidence, it
is speculated by the present wri ter that the ir:surance-ba~ed
private medicine practiced in the U.S. would be 17kely,.des~lte
the so-called malpractice crisis, to lead to under-dnves t i.qet i.on .
13 Ki ng,S Fund study, op. cit., at p. 5.
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. 14 A . I 1serVlces. From prl ,1991, opted-out
hospital trusts became directly responsible for
all negligence costs incurred after that date.
If settlements exceed 0.5% of their income, then
trusts can borrow from either the Government or
commercial lenders to meet the excess. The
period of repayment would be set according to the
size of the loan - e.g., 1 year for advances of
below £100,000, but 10 years for loans over
£900,000 - and costs arising from such borrowing
should be borne by the relevant clinical
department. ,,15
Principally, the reforms suggested by the King's Fund study
comprise greater availabili ty of legal aid, balanced by
improvements in the self-regulation and quality control of
medical . 16servlces. Similarly, a report of the Royal
College of Physicians has recommended the establishment of
a no-fault scheme of compensation for medical negligence. 17
But before considering the spectrum of possible reforms,
it is important to consider the aims of the law. Some
consideration of these, it is suggested, provides the
foundation
available.
necessary to evaluate the
.varlOUS options
14Despite this, it is presumably possible that the original
budgetary allocations reflect the perceived increase in costs of
settling claims and thereby exerts a strong but concealed effect
upon patient-care funds.
ls"Noticeboard" , "Exaggerated claims?", 1991 The Lancet
1340. Cf. The true cost of compensation, S.A. McLean, 1991 (17
December) "The scotsman" 9.
16Ki n g,S Fund study, Ope cit., at p. 5.
17compensation for Adverse Consequences
Intervention, A Report of the Royal College of
London, 1990, at p. 22.
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of Medical
Phys ic ians of
The Aims of the Law
Various alms of the law of tort and delict have already
been identified and discussed. As has been remarked,
though, the quantity of analysis of these in the case-law
is negligible,18 and it is therefore to the literature that
we must turn for assistance. Even here, there is minimal
discussion of the law of medical negligence. 19
The most commonly-described goals are "justice", 20
compensation,2l deterrence,22 retribution and the need for
an inquest (or equivalent) .23 Others include appeasement of
l8 The Advantages of Fault, W. McBryde, ibid. at p. 34:
"[A] search through reported delict cases reveals very Lr ttle
that is said to justify basing liability upon fault."
19Th i s discussion is restricted to those aims occurring in
relation to liability for unintentional harm. Although these may
incidentally be appropriate to analyses of the wider law of
delict or tort, they are not necessarily applicable to such areas
as intentional harms and quasi-delicts etc.
20 Th i s is a general term which includes notions of common-
sense justice or morality, individual responsibility, and the
moral basis which has at times been claimed for the faul t
principle (discussed supra); it is equivalent to "corrective
justice".
21 I n this context the principle of scarce resources lS
inescapable.
22These three are considered in Atiyah's Accidents,
Compensation and the Law, fourth edition, at p. 560, to be the
principal aims.
23 Th e last two are mentioned by D. Harris et ale ln
Compensation and support for Illnes and Injury, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1984, at p. 21. Pages 17 - 25 list and discuss the
objectives of all the compensation mechanisms available.
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the v i.c t i.m/" and education. 25 In addi tion, McBryde has
suggested the interests of the defender in justice,
flexibili ty and the avoidance of categories, 26 al though
these, it 1S thought, need not exclusively be
characteristic of or define a fault-based system of
delict/tort27 but may also apply elsewhere. 28
However, most if not all of the various goals
identified may be classified within one of the three major,
over-arching aims: justice, deterrence and compensation.
Thus, appeasement of the victim and the need for an inquest
may be considered simply as limbs of the justice objective,
and education as a partial re-description of the deterrent
function. The defender's interest in justice, flexibility
and the avoidance of categories are, it is thought,
24 Th e Aims of the Law of Tort, G. Williams, 1951 4 Current
Legal Problems 137 at p. 138. This is closely related to
retribution.
25Ne w Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, L. N. Klar,
(1983) 33 Univ. Toronto L.J. 80, at p. 92. This objective is
similar to deterrence.
26 Se e The Advantages of Fault, W. McBryde, 1975 20 J.R. 32,
at p. 42 et seg.
27"Delictual liability is generally based upon fault. There
is no warrant, however, for excluding instances of no-faul t
liability from its ambit, for the essential character of the law
of delict is that it compensates for unlawfully inflicted injury,
not that it usually requires fault for doing so." The Law of
Delict, P.Q.R. Boberg, Juta & Co. Ltd., vol. 1 (Aquilian
Liability), 1984, at p. 16.
28 Th e y are also of less relevance t? me:dica~ r:egligence,
cases of which may be discretely and read1ly 1dent1f1able, even
if the aetiology of the condition concerned is not.
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desirable goals, but which need not be specific to the
delict process.
.almsThe for the delict or tort system do not
necessarily support its continuation unchanged, though.
Goals may be modified or even abandoned; they may be poorly
realised in medical negligence law, and better attained by
alternative means. 2 9 Such an approach has been urged on a
wider scale than merely the law of medical negligence, in
respect of which it has been said that
"[T]he fact that the objectives of the tort
system might be thought desirable does not
justify retention of a system which achieves
those goals so inefficiently, and ln many
respects not at all. ,,30
It lS argued that the objectives of compensation,
deterrence and corrective justice or individual
responsibili ty nevertheless represent generally laudable
aims for the law of medical negligence. 31 Indeed, expressed
at such a high level of generality and abstraction, it is
29 Se e , inter alia, New Zealand's Accident Compensation
Scheme: A Tort Lawyer's Perspective, L. N. Klar, [1983]
University of Toronto L. J. 80, and generally, Some Kiwi Kite-
Flying, M. Vennell, 1975 N.Z.L.J. 254, recognising the benefits
of the traditional tort approach.
30Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, fourth
edition, Ope cit., at p. 552.
31And the delict or tort system. See, inter alia,
Accidents, Costs and Legal Responsibility, S. Stoljar, 1973 36
M.L.R. 233.
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almost impossible to dissent from them. They are retained
as alms in the proposed reforms. 32
It is, however, thought that those aspects of the law
of medical negligence which have been considered
demonstrate unsatisfactory results. The law has thus far
attempted to satisfy the differing goals primarily by
providing only one mechanism: 33 the action for damages for
medical negligence. 34 This, it lS suggested, has
contributed sUbstantially to the difficulties experienced
under the current system. The philosophy of the law would
be better achieved by discrete, independent mechanisms for
the major objectives. Some indication of support for such
a less adversarial approach may be gleaned from the
following:
"[S]olicitors undertaking work on behalf of
plaintiffs are aware that many claimants (in my
experlence at least half) would not have
consulted them had they been handled
sympathetically by the doctors concerned once an
adverse event had occurred. In the early stages,
patients or their families are often not
motivated by the thought of damages but rather
by a wish to receive an explanation of what has
happened together wi th expressions of sympathy
32Although modified where appropriate: they are discussed
infra.
330mitting social security, which plays a negligible role in
compensating directly for medical negligence.
340thers have been suggested, for example no-fault schemes
and strict liability. See Compensating for medical mishaps - a
model "no fault" scheme, D. Bolt, 1989 N.L.J. 109; A Theory of
Strict Liability, R. Epstein, 1973 (University of Chicago)
Journal of Legal Studies 151; for a general discussion of
economic theories of deterrence, see, inter alia, ch. 4, Atiyah's
Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Peter Cane, fourth edition,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987.
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and regret as appropriate. The absence of these
ingredients can cause bitterness in the patient
which, if not cured at an early stage, may create
an overwhelming desire to pursue a case to trial
even if the expert evidence is against negligence
hav ing occurred." 35
Before considering other legal aims, a question arises as
to the provision of compensation. It seems that the tort
or delict action generally 1S an expensive method of
providing this. 36 The Pearson Report disclosed in 1978 that
actions for medical negligence had taken longer on average,
and resu1ted in a re lat i ve 1y lower leve1 of recovery of
damages, than was generally the case in tort litigation. 37
It has been suggested that the rate of claims in cases of
medical negligence has increased,38 although the evidence
for this seems somewhat anecdotal and inconclusive. 39 It
35preliminary Legal steps for the Patient, R. Vallance, at
p. 102, in Medical Negligence, cit. sup.
36compensation and Support for Illness and Injury, D. Harris
et al., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, at p. 327 et seq.; see
chapter 12 (Review and Prospect) generally.
37Th e Pearson Report, op. cit., stated that" .. at all stages
medical negligence cases took longer than other personal injury
cases. The average interval between the date of injury and the
date when the claim was disposed of was nearly five years .. ".
This was contrasted with a period of three or four years for
other personal injury claims. (ibid., vol. 2, para. 242 at p.
67). Whereas "some payment is made in respect of about 86% of
all personal injury claims" (ibid., vol. 2, para. 66 at p. 20),
a much lower proportion of claims in respect of medical
negligence succeeded, 30%-40% (ibid., vol. 2, table 11, at p.
19). The King's Fund study (op. cit. at p. 9 et seq.) tends to
support and indeed bolster the cri ticisms of the action in
respect of medical negligence.




King's Fund study ci tes
increase in the cost of
premiums, which has now
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primarily the large and
medical defence society
been affected by the
may also be pointed out per contra that the substantive law
applicable has not changed fundamentally, tending to
suggest that a conclusion on the evidence of an underlying
1ncrease may not entirely be warranted. 4o
If, as 1S argued in this thesis, there is no longer a
requirement to retain a combined mechanism for legal goal-
attainment, the compensation function in medical negligence
need not continue to be performed by this expensive and
slow means. It is therefore submitted that a new conduit
for the distribution of compensation 1S required. 41
Research has demonstrated that it is more efficient, and
less expensive, to compensate administratively than via the
introduction of Crown indemni ty. This increase substantiates the
increasing cost of awards and settlements, but does not of itself
establish that there is a rising underlying trend per head of
medically-involved patients. The writer sympathises with the
difficulties of gathering and analysing data in this notoriously
difficult field.
40Although there have been matters of serious concern in the
inception of the Crown indemnity scheme, such as its effect upon
the health-care budgets of opted-out N.H.S. hospitals, at the
time of writing, it is too early to determine this with clarity
(al though the fear must be that continued inflationary escalation
in settlements may ul timately lead to a "cap" being put on
liability in the individual case. Cf. the letter to The Lancet
(quoted supra».
41 Se e generally Theories of Compensation, R. Goodin, 1989 9
Oxford J. Legal studies 56.
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courts 42, and accordingly such a means of providing
compensation is proposed. 43 Indeed, the Government has
canvassed the idea of an arbi tration scheme for medical
negligence claims which would apply the same sUbstantive
law, including the Bolam test, and would reduce the costs
of meeting the approximately 7,000 claims amounting to an
average of £6,500 each which are made at present. 44 It has,
however, been argued by a leading medical commentator that
95% of cases are settled out of court and that
"[W] hat we need is not cosmesis but a cost
effective no fault system combined with a
strategy for reducing medical accidents. Britain
could have a system like the Swedish one for
about £50m, almost exactly the same as the amount
paid out by the NHS for medical negligence in
1990. And a Swedish style system would mean that
many more people were compensated with far less
42compensation and Support for Illness and Injury, D. Harris
et al., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, at p. 327. (See chapter
12 (Review and Prospect)) See also Pearson Report, Ope cit.,
vol. 1, para. 83, at p. 26, to the effect that the operating
costs of the tort system amount to approximately 85% of the value
of the damages awarded, a very high proportion exceeding that of
social security distribution (approximately 11%); and generally
the King's Fund study (ibid.).
43Discussed infra. The "compensation debate" has recently
been the focus of a major research study, which concluded inter
alia that "[W]e believe, in the light of the data presented in
this volume, that the future policy maker should plan to phase
out all existing compensation systems which favour accident
victims (or any category of them) over illness victims."
Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury, D. Harris et
al., supra, at p. 327.
44Ar b i tration for medical negligence claims, anon., 1991
B.M.J. 1156.
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of the money ending up in lawyers' pockets.,,45
It is, however, the non-compensatory aspects of the
wri ter' s proposal which distinguish it from most other
suggestions for reform, be they no-faul t or needs-based
approaches.
46
These 1ssues are often overshadowed by the
emphasis placed upon the conundrums of rational, realistic
reform of the general compensation function.
Corrective Justice
Al though it has been commented that " .. the tort system
focusses primarily on the obligation of the defendant to
pay, rather than the enti tlement of the plaintiff to be
paid, compensation. Thus the fundamental goal of the tort
system is corrective justice or fairness ... ", 47 we have seen
that corrective justice provides a basis of doubtful
validity for the fault principle. For the reasons
considered supra, it 1S likely that these reservations
apply more strongly in the case of medical negligence. A
recent empirical study by Genn supports the view that 1n
45Fiddling with medical negligence, R. Smith, 1992 B.M.J.
198 at p. 199. A footnote has been omitted in quotation, which
refers generally to the King's Fund study (supra) for the
estimated cost of £50m for the cost of such a scheme.
46 Some commentators have also indicated a need to strengthen
medical professional accountabili ty. See particularly the King's
Fund study, Ope cit., at pp. 33-34, and also Medical Negligence
and No-Fault Liability, C. Clothier, 1989 The Lancet 603.
47Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, by Peter
Cane, fourth edition, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987, at p. 560.
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reparation claims r n which an lnsurer (or arguably any
similarly-experienced defending organisation) is involved,
" .. the parties to personal injury actions do not
meet on equal terms and their objectives are
diametrically opposed. It has been
argued .... that there are both structural and
situational inequalities between the parties in
personal injury litigation and that the effect of
these inequalities is evident throughout
negotiations and the final out of court
settlement of a claim .... [T]he plaintiff is in a
disadvantaged position from the outset.,,48
Nevertheless, the present writer considers that the alm of
emphasizing individual responsibility, if detached from
joint implementation with the fault principle, exhibits
merit and is thus retained in the proposed scheme. This
perhaps elusive goal is, however, modified in the light of
the cri ticisms of it, and of the closely-related faul t
. . 1 49 h i h hId b . d d 50prlnclp e, w lC ave a rea y een conSl ere . It is
thus sought to be attained in the proposed scheme only
partly on the traditional, l.e. "individual", basis.
Rather, in the sense of promoting individual responsibility
the professional medical context, it may be
two are to a degree co-extensive, as corrective
one of the main virtues claimed in favour of the fault
satisfactorily achieved by a combination of strengthened





50 Se e the introductory section supra, and chapter IV, supra,
on the faul t principle, incorporating discussion on the principle
of corrective justice as a possible justification for a moral
basis for the fault principle.
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professional accountability and a partly patient-driven
quality audit.
This departure from the conventional view is thought
to be supported in part by the individual doctor's (as well
as his profession's) commitment to high professional
standards and probably also to self-improvement and keeping
up to date. These are perhaps most suitable for
"ordinary", i. e. non-medical, 51 cases of negligence in which
no medical or indeed professional ethic, which may suggest





Whereas there 1S almost universal agreement in principle
that some means of providing compensation is essential, and
even though deterrence is also a recognised goal, the need
for it is less clearly demonstrated. 52 Some commentators
have doubted the ability of the delict or tort action to
provide effective, consistent deterrence, especially an
negligent, as opposed to intentional, delicts and torts: 5 3
"[A] second important objective of the tort of
negligence is to deter people from acting
negligently: many accept, as a matter of
intuition, that the knowledge that the law will
52 Th i s work is of course restricted to medical negligence.
Thus the intentional delicts, which, being "conscious", are much
more amenable to deterrence, are excluded, as is the deterrence
of "ordinary", or non-professional, delicts and torts. Occurring
potentially in any aspect of the tortfeasor's activities, they
are therefore much less amenable to prediction and prevention
than is the case with a professional activity.
53 Fo r example, Compensation and Support for Illness and
Injury, D. Harris et al., Oxford Socio-Legal Studies, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1984, ch. 12.; Deterrence and Accident
Compensation Schemes, C. Brown, 1978 17 Univ. Western Ontario L.
Rev. 111; Common Sense Morality and Accident Compensation, S.
Lloyd-Bostock, 1980 Insurance L. J. 331. However, H.L.A. Hart
has commented that, " " [E] ven if a person admi ts that he
occasionally makes a negligent mistake, how in the nature of
things, can punishment for inadvertence serve to deter?" But if
this question is meant as an argument, it rests on the old,
mistaken identification of the "subjective element" involved in
negligence with "a blank mind", whereas it is in fact a failure
to exercise the capacity to advert to, and to think about and
control, conduct and its risks. Surely we have plenty of
empirical evidence to show that, ... "punishment supplies men with
an additional motive to take care before acting, to use their
facul ties, and to draw upon their experience."" (Punishment and
Responsibility, Ope cit., ch . VI (Negligence, Mens Rea and
Criminal Responsibility) at pp. 156-157 (references and footnotes
omitted); see chapter IV on the moral basis of fault, supra).
281
compel the negligent actor to pay for the harmful
consequences of his negligence will have some
general deterrent effect. However, the deterrent
function of the law is blunted by various
factors. First, it operates only if the
carelessness actually causes harmful
consequences, and even then, the amount of
damages depends on the relative severity of the
injury, not on the degree of blame attaching to
the conduct which caused it: a trivial mistake
can cause serious injury, while flagrant
carelessness may cause only a minor injury, or
none at all. Secondly, the law operates only if
the victim can produce adequate proof of the
actor's carelessness. Thirdly, the damages are
normally paid, not by the careless person, but by
his insurance company or his employer (under the
legal doctrine of vicarious liability)."S4
But even if deterrence is accorded substantial theoretical
importance, the tort and delict system would still be
subject to criticism:
" .... there are strong reasons to doubt that the
tort system is very effective as a deterrent or
accident prevention mechanism, and while modern
economic analysts of law see deterrence as the
main function and rationale of the tort system,
the practical barriers to the fulfilment of the
theoretical deterrence function of tort law are
so substantial that it is unsatisfactory to
attempt to justify the tort system in terms of
55the goal of deterrence."
It has been argued that the barriers to the achieving of
deterrence ln medical negligence litigation are more
substantial than elsewhere in the law of tort or delict.
This is despite the professional medical duty and ethic to
place the patient's interests above the doctor's and to
54compensation and Support for Illness and Injury, D. Harris
et al., supra, at p. 20.
55Emphasis added. Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the
Law, Ope cit., at p. 560.
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Recent
provide a high and improving standard of care, both of
which should lessen the need for deterrence.
medical research, demonstrating the existence of
"defensive" obstetric practice 1n the United Kingdom, tends
to suggest that the operation of tort, and by implication
its deterrent effect, is counter-productive and does not
therefore necessarily benefit the standard of medical
care.
56
Other commentators, who focus on specific areas,57
consider that such niches are in principle of intrinsically
and necessarily low susceptibility to deterrence. 58 It 1S
left to the so-called "tort lawyers" to argue in favour of
the retention of the old-fashioned, but in their view real
and valuable, virtues of deterrence in delict and tort. 59
These arguments re-emphasize the possibility, and common-
sense morality, of deterring negligent conduct as being of
sufficient importance to justify, in effect, the "accident
56 Se e Change in obstetric practice in response to fear of
litigation in the British Isles, M. Ennis, A. Clark and J.G.
Grudzinskas, supra: "[HJ owever, the anxiety of doctors about
Li tigation and the increased cost of carrying out more and
perhaps unnecessary tests may become an intolerable burden on the
National Health Service" (ibid., at p. 618).
57 Fo r example, so-called long-latency man-made disease. See
Disease and the Compensation Debate, J. Stapleton, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1986, ch. 2.
58Notwi thstanding the views of H. L.A. Hart, supra. See
inter alia Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, C.
Brown 1978 17 Univ. Western Ontario L. Rev. 111; and ch. 12 in, .
Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury, D. HarrlS et
al., supra.
59 Se e The Advantages of Fault, W.W. McBryde, op cit., and
New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: A Tort Lawyer's
Perspective, L. N. Klar, [1983J 22 Univ. Toronto L. J. 80.
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preference" in tort damages, and most of the other
vicissitudes alleged by reformers. It is interesting to
note that elements of economic theories of tort may be
appearlng in the law of medical negligence. The Medical
Insurance Agency has offered to doctors an insurance-type
contract of indemnity which requires to be in force at the
time of a claim for indemnification to follow, unlike
tradi tional medical defence body cover. However, risk-
related premiums, originally announced by the Medical
Protection Society, have been followed by the Medical
Insurance Agency, which has reportedly offered a discount
to members and fellows of the Royal College of General
Practitioners, who are thought to be at lower risk of a
La i 60calm.
course,
The present form of Crown indemnity does not, of
affect the arrangements for general practitioners.
In addition to these substantive matters, it lS
submitted that the deterrent effect lS not treated
systematically and consistently even within the category of
medical negligence. This is because it is only where harm
actually occurs, coincident with proof of fault and
causation, that liability is visited upon the defender or
tortfeasor. The coincidence of these factors must
seriously restrict the actual effect of the tort and delict
system. Although determining the numbers of cases in these
categories is practically impossible, it is submitted that
60Letter to the The Lancet, enti tIed "Qualifications and
quality of care", by W. McN. Styles, 1991 The Lancet 1352.
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some must exist in which negligence per se goes undetected
and therefore unregulated.
The result of this must be that the deterrent effect
is either weakened, or non-existent, in those cases where
no harm occurs. By implication it also weakens the
A further
thought that fortuitousness is an
upon which to base a decision whether
deterrent effect exerted by the whole law of medical
negligence. Even if this is disputed, perhaps on the view
that it may be fortuitous whether harm occurs or not and
that this is the important matter,61 the law still does not
deal consistently with negligent conduct. It is submitted
that this is unsatisfactory.
Arguments may be advanced per contra. For example, it
might be said that if no loss or damage occurs, then there
is no need for anything further to be done; by definition,
no-one has come to any harm. The present writer disagrees
with this. By not taking steps beyond the minimum to deter
negligent conduct, some implicit condonation by the law of
a certain level of negligence occurs, and the likelihood of
future negligent conduct is thereby also increased. 62 Even
if this argument is not accepted, the law is still not
dealing consistently wi th negligent conduct, and it is
thought that this, again, is unsatisfactory.
argument is that, as a practical matter, a compromise must
61Although it is
unsatisfactory criterion
or not to award damages.
62And, incidentally, the risk of harmful negligence - which
it is the law's present policy to reduce by deterrence.
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be found between a reasonable level of deterrence and the
disproportionate effort, or even impossibility, of
deterring all negligent conduct.
At first blush, this seems eminently reasonable. It
lS, however, not beyond dispute. This is partly because it
is predicated upon the delict or tort law model, which ln
its present form has an intrinsic limit to the amount of
negligence it lS capable of deterring, as we have seen. 63
However, if the unfulfilled underlying negligence-
prevention philosophy is accepted, and another way can be
found to deter more or all negligence,64 then it is thought
that this goal should be pursued. However, the wri ter
acknowledges that ultimately, the deterrence of all
negligent conduct is likely to be impracticable. It a s ,
nevertheless, contended that a greater degree of prevention
can, and should, be achieved in principle and in practice.
It is submitted that it is helpful at this point to draw a
distinction between professional activities, especially
medical, and "ordinary" negligence. The former generally
demonstrate unintentional, l.e. negligent, wrongs. Non-
medical or non-professional "ordinary" negligence includes
var i.ous other types of wrong, be they statutory, strict
liability or intentional. A further factor is relevant:
doctors are commi tted to provide improving and ethical
63 Th i s is because of the requirement for fault and causation
to be established in addition to the harm.
640 r to deter more consistently.
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attempted crimes can be punished. 65 One rationalization of
so doing is that society has been harmed, by the intention
and the steps taken towards commission of the crime by the
individual and that this is harmful to society and to that
individual. Although this may not constitute a full
justification for the prosecution of attempted crimes, it
does condemn the attitude of mind as well as the actions
taken. It is likewise important to note that no actual
harm has occurred, other than the possibilities adverted to
above. 6 6
It 1S submi tted that it 1S possible to draw some
conceptual parallels between non-harm causing negligence
and criminal attempts. Although there 1S nothing
appropriate in the civil law of negligence corresponding to
"preparation", there 1S nevertheless 1n an "inchoate
delict" an absence of positive harm, and a presence of a
mental element, in a loose sense including negligence. It
is thought that, although negligence is perhaps less
harmful to society than criminal attempts, in principle the
same reasons should apply to deterring negligence. 6 7 This
65 Se e , The Criminal Law of Scotland, G. Gordon, second
edition (and Second Cumulative Supplement, 1992), Greens, 1978,
ch. 6, part I.
66 Fo r a detailed discussion of theories of attempted crimes,
see The Criminal Law of Scotland, G. Gordon, second edition (and
First Supplement, 1984), Greens, 1978 at pp. 1~5-190. Gor~on
considers that Scots law follows the perpetrat10n-preparat1on
test (see p. 190).
67Ev e n if the limitat ion is accepted that some non harm-
causing negligent "act" must have occurred. This might well be
needed to allow detection of the negligence in appropriate cases,
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1S particularly so as, a priori, negligence, as argued by
delict and tort lawyers, is worth deterring. All, then,
that is urged by the present writer is that this be done
more consistently and effectively.
Other areas of law also display regulation of conduct,
sometimes irrespective of harm. Examples include contracts
uberrimae fidei (insurance) and some fiduciary aspects of
other contracts. In insurance contracts, the element of
disclosure is deemed to be of sufficient importance as to
warrant protection. 68 Examples of good faith enshrined in
the law include aspects of the law of agency69 and of
h i 70partners 1p.
These examples demonstrate that the law considers
conduct, and trust, in certa in s i tuat ions to be worth
regulating even where little or no loss or damage has taken
place. Recognition of this in the medical context implies
a more thorough and consistent approach to deterrence. A
further difficulty which stalks deterrence theory is, of
course, that of fault liability insurance. In the general
and also suffices to avoid the precept of the criminal law that
guilty intention on its own cannot be punished.
68Introduction to the Law of Scotland, Gloag and Henderson,
eighth edition, Greens, 1987 at pp. 422-423.
69Introduction to the Law of Scotland, Gloag and Henderson,
supra, at pp. 318-319; Scots Mercantile Law, E. Marshall, Greens,
1983, ch. 1 at pp. 24-27; An Outline of the Law of Agency,
Markesinis and Munday, second edition, Butterworths, 1986, ch.
3 .
70partnership Act 1890, SSe 28-30.
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context of tort law it has been said that,
"[T]he development of liabili ty insurance has
altered administration and financing of the tort
system out of all recognition ...
"For example, since the vast majority of tort
claims are settled out of court, the behaviour of
insurance companies is at least as important as
what lawyers and courts do, to an understanding
of the way the tort system is administered in
practice. Again, reading a book on the law of
torts might well lead one to think that people
who commit torts are constantly being called upon
to pay damages or compensation for what they have
done. Nothing could be further from the truth.
"People who commi t torts very rarely pay
compensation to anyone although the courts
certainly seem largely to ignore this fact. When
tortfeasors did pay damages, lawyers were very
concerned to justify this result. But now that
they do not generally do so, most lawyers seem to
have Li,ttle interest in the question of
f ' ,
,,711nanc1ng.
The posi tion an the law of medical negligence differs
somewhat, inasmuch as damage to a medical man's
professional reputation is likely to be perceived very
seriously by him. Two other factors should be mentioned.
This state of
The first 1S that the defence unions and health board or
authority are likely to settle (in particular) indefensible
cases rather than add the expenses of trial to an otherwise
inevitable judicial award of damages.
affairs is most likely to obtain in the most culpable cases
of negligence arguably those in which the deterrent
effect of the trial is most needed, but in which it is
71Atiyah's Accidents Compensation and the Law, Peter Cane,
fourth edition, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987, at p. 6.
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largely or wholly absent. 72 Thus the worst cases may well
be those which are never sUbject to forensic scrutiny. The
absence of risk-related or claims-related lnsurance ln
medical practice only adds to this unfortunate resul t.
This a s , in effect, perpetuated by the introduction of
Crown indemnity, perhaps to a greater extent if the health
board or authority is inclined to settle cases rather than
risk additional expense in defending them itself. This is
also likely to be the case where N. H. S. hospi tals have
opted-out of health board financial control. Professional
indemnity insurance has shielded the doctor to a
substantial degree from the financial consequences73 of his
negligent actions,74 as does Crown indemnity. Secondly, in
cases where vicarious liability is involved, criticisms may
also be made. The deterrent effect must be weakened by
being exerted partly or wholly against a single, monolithic
defender, such as a heal th board, which has varying or
little direct input into many professional tasks carried
out by employees. Where the negligent episode was not
72 0n the basis of personal contacts, the writer is aware of
out-of-court settlements in which a condi tion precludes the
discussion or publicising of the level of award. This robs the
current process of an important potential deterrent/educative
effect.
73Especially in the absence of risk-related premlums.
74 Th i s lS, on balance, to be welcomed, because with
settlements now reaching £1 million pounds, few if any doctors
would be likely to be able to fund settlement; those involved
would be driven from professional practice, probably to the long
term detriment of the population as a whole. Defensive medicine
might well become a significant problem in this case as well.
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attributable to want of care in a system of work or similar
matter for which the employing health body was responsible
directly, the attribution of liabili ty in respect of a
single lapse of concentration by the doctor, perhaps
through extended hours on duty, may well exert Ii ttle
preventive or deterrent effect in future. Nor is the de
facto superv1sory responsibility of the consultant 1n
charge reflected 1n the law of vicarious heal th-
professional liability, unless in the relatively unusual
case (for example) of negligent over-delegation or a
ser10us failure to supervise. Whereas the criticism in the
passage quoted supra may not apply directly to this area,
it 1S submitted that there are very fundamental
difficulties 1n applying the conventional concepts of
deterrence to it.
In conclusion, the present writer argues that .Slnce
the fundamental purpose of deterrence is negligent-mishap
prevention, it 1S therefore wi s e to retain it: the
desirability of this, as such, 1S difficult to contest.
This would appear to be so even if only a few episodes of
medical negligence are . d d 75avo1 e . Further, it seems
relatively unimportant whether this 1S achieved, as 1S
suggested, by means other than the present action for
medical negligence. Indeed, 1n the writer's submission,
the use of alternative means 1S ultimately likely to
75Although if highly expensive, ultimately a cost-benefit
analysis might exclude this.
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1ncrease the effectiveness of deterrence. It would in turn
lead to a reduction of treatment rectification costs and in
compensation payable.
It 1S also argued that the concept of retributive
justice plays a very small role in deterrence. One reason
for this 1S that the professional medical activity
concerned involves the doctor actively helping the patient.
The intentional delict or tort is extremely unusual in
medical cases; a negligent episode may be catalysed or
caused by overwork or inexperience. In such a context a
retributive justice element is thought to be inappropriate
and should, as a matter of public policy, be minimised as
far as possible. Indeed, a preventive approach would be
likely to reduce compensation costs and lmprove the
standard of care. 76 It has already been suggested that some
patients contemplating litigation may wish an explanation
for a mishap, or unsuccessful outcome, which may be
contrary to expectations or difficult to understand. 77
76 Se e Theories of Compensation, R.E. Goodin, 1989 9 Oxford
J. Leg. Studies at p. 70 et seg.
77supra. Increased professional ~c,?ountabi~ity has been
stressed by various commentators: Med1c1ne, Pat1ents and.the
Law M. Brazier Penguin, 1987, esp. chs. 7-9; Med1cal
Negligence: compe~sation and Accountability (Briefing Paper No.
6), C. Ham et al., King's Fund Institute/Centre for So~io~L7gal
Studies, Oxford, 1988; Medical Negligence and No-Fault L1ab1l1ty,
C. Clothier, 1989 The Lancet 603.
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Options for Reform
Many suggestions have been made for reform to the law of
medical negligence. They may be grouped roughly according
to the extent of the reform proposed, and thus range from
the relatively minor, such as altering the burden of proof,
to major reforms such as no-fault compensation schemes and
beyond. The compensation aspect of the litigation process
has been the most strongly debated, and it is therefore
proposed to devote the main thrust of this discussion to
the non-compensatory aspects of the process. However, it
is worth remarking that the compensation lssue must be seen
in perspective. Not all nations are sufficiently
prosperous as to be able to contemplate awarding
compensation for medical negligence, or indeed many other
heads of compensation generally. Those countries which can
do so are relatively prosperous and fortunate. However,
even in these nations, the principle of scarce resources is
inescapable: unlimited funds are not available for
compensation for medical negligence or indeed other needs,
and limited resources require to be restricted in various
ways if politico-economic strife is to be avoided.
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Restricted Reforms
Although the approach of the Pearson Commission78 and its
recommendations have been powerfully and systematically
criticised,79 its Report did consider reform of the law of
medical negligence, in respect of which it said, "[O]ur
evidence showed that there was considerable dissatisfaction
with the present position and some unease about the
future".80
One possibility discussed was a reversal of the onus
of proof
'
81 . n d t d h t d1 or er 0 re uce w a was accepte as a
disadvantage to medical negligence plaintiffs. 82 The burden
78pearson Report, cit. supra, ch. 24, vol. I, deals with
medical accident/injury.
7ge. g. Disease and the Compensation Debate, J. Stapleton,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
80Report, vol. 1, Ope cit., at p. 285.
81Report, vol. 1, ch. 24, p. 285, para. 1336 et seq. These
were discussed in addition to substantive reforms, such as strict
liabili ty and no-faul t compensation, in respect of which the
Commission concluded that they were unwarranted. It must be
added that at the time the Commission took evidence, the medical
profession opposed the introduction of a no-fault scheme.
82 "We were impressed by the difficul ties facing a patient
who wishes to establish a case, but we doubt if the
confidentiali ty of medical records adds significantly to the
plaintiff's difficulties in view of the court's powers to order
disclosure", Pearson Report, Ope cit., vol. I, at p. 287. "The
proportion of successful claims for damages in tort is much lower
for medical negligence than for all negligence cases. Some
payment is made in 30-40 per cent of claims compared with 86 per
cent of all personal injury claims", Pearson Report, 1978, ~
cit., vol. I, ch. 24, at p. 284.
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on such parties is still acknowledged today:
"[T]he difficulties of plaintiffs in medical
negligence cases are increased by the
understandable reluctance of the courts on the
ground of their lack of competence to d~ so, to
condemn as careless methods of treatment which
the defendant may be able, with the assistance of
expert witnesses, to show were not unusual.,,83
The reforms canvassed by Pearson were directed at easing
plaintiffs' paths to compensation; other issues were barely
mentioned. In summarising the evidence, the Commission
noted that "[I]f tortious liability were abolished, there
could be some attempt to control doctors' clinical practice
to prevent mistakes for which compensation would have to be
paid by some central agency". 84 The only non-substantive
reform upon which evidence was taken was that of a reversed
burden of proof. The Report does not state whether this
would apply only to proof of negligence85 86 or of causation
83 Th i s indictment of the standard of care and its proof is
to be found in The Modern Law of Negligence, R. A. Buckley,
Butterworths, London, 1988, at p. 285.
84Report, Ope cit., vol. I, p. 287, para. 1342.
85contributory negligence is a rara avis in such climes.
Res ipsa loquitur might, of course, apply. However, the low
observed incidence of success of the latter in the case-law may
be because "barn door" cases are settled out of court as
indefensible. Thus, marginal cases may be those litigated most
often, in which the non-compensation aims of the law are needed
less than in the former cases. By definition, if the issue of
negligence is not extreme, res ipsa loquitur is less likely to
be relevant.
86 Se e Saunders v. Leeds Western Health Authority, (1985) 129
Sol. Jo. 225 (child's prolonged cardiac arrest during operation
and brain damage; the defendants' explanation of air embolism to
defeat the maxim was rejected); Clarke v. Worboys, The Times, 18
March 1952 (burn caused during treatment with electrical
appliance; res ipsa loquitur); cf. Brazier v: Ministry. of
Defence, [1965] 1 Lloyd's Reports 26 (res lpsa loqultur
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or both. In its favour, it was argued that such a change
would all but remove the plaintiff's difficulties 1n
"obtaining and presenting his evidence". 87 88 This was
said to be partly because doctors were in a better position
to determine these issues than the plaintiff. The
Commission, however, accepted that the arguments against
were stronger, citing a potential increase in claims and
defensive medicine as likely consequences. 89
No doubt these concerns were valid. But it 1S
where a needle broke) and Levenkind v. Churchi11-
[1983] 1 Lancet 1452 (res ipsa loguitur rebutted in
See the King's
necessary to consider them in the present context. The
medical profession has perceived an increase in litigation
and in the cost of settlement of claims. 9o Whether this
accurately reflects the underlying trend is not clear, but




87pearson Report, Ope cit., vol. I, p. 285.
88 I n Cassidy v. Ministry of Health [1951] 2 K.B. 343, the
court of Appeal accepted that a "prima facie case", in the words
of Denning L.J. (as he then was) had been made out following the
patient's leaving hospi tal wi th four fingers disabled rather than
two ([1951] 2 K.B. at p. 366, per Denning L.J.).
89pearson Report, Ope cit., vol. I at p. 285.
90 Th i s latter is certainly substantiated.
Fund study, Ope cit., especially chapter two.
91 Th e large increases in professional indemnity fees for the
profession, precipitating the introduction of C~own indemnity in
January 1990 have played a large I?art in t.h i s , . Se~ Med1cal
Negligence and No-Fault Compensat1on, A. F. Ph1ll1pS, 1989
J.L.S.S. 239.
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profession's espousal of the principle of no-fault
compensation. 92 Thus, the Pearson Commission's defensive
medicine argument may well already apply. Al though the
Commission's views on the burden of proof might change if
it were now to re-consider the matter, it seems clear that
the courts will construe the burden traditionally and
therefore strictly. Despi te the decision in Clark v.
93 94McLennan and Another, the House of Lords, in Wilsher v.
Essex Area Health Authority95 and in Kay's Tutor v. Ayrshire
and Arran Health Board96 has emphasized that the requirement
of proof of causation by the plaintiff (or pursuer) on the
balance of probabilities still applies. 97 Nevertheless, to
92 Se e No-fault compensation - the B.M.A. proposals, by David
Bolt: ch. 6 in, No Fault Compensation in Medicine, ed. R. D. Mann
and J. Havard, Royal Society of Medicine Services Ltd., 1989.
93[1983] 1 All E. R. 416. "Where there is a situation in
which a general duty of care arises and there is a failure to
take a precaution, and that very damage occurs against which the
precaution is designed to be a protection, then the burden lies
on the defendant to show that he was not in breach of duty as
well as to show the damage did not result from his breach of
duty. I shall therefore apply this approach to the evidence ln
this case" per Pain J., [1983] 1 All E. R., at p. 427 g - h.
94 Se e Medical Negligence - the Burden of Proof, M. A. Jones,
New Law Journal, 6 January 1984, p.7.
95[1987] 2 All E. R. 909
96 1 98 7 S.L.T. 577
97Lo r d Wilberforce's speech, in McGhee v. National Coal
Board 1973 1 W.L.R. 1 was disapproved by Lord Bridge in Wilsher,
supra, as a minority view. See Further Reflections on M~dical
Causation, A. F. Phillips, 1988 S.L.T. (News) 325, and Harrlngton
v. Essex Area Health Authority, The Times, 14 November 1984,
holding that proof of two possible causes of the harm without
being able to distinguish between them did not discharge the
burden of proof on the plaintiff.
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require a defender r n general to refute a claim brought
against him, in all but the most crass cases is to take a
dangerous step, in effect toward allowing recovery of
damages based substantially upon the pursuer's assertion.
This conflicts wi th the difficul ty, acknowledged in the
Pearson Report,98 that a plaintiff faces in establishing a
case ln an unknown and uncertain scientific discipline -
whilst he may have been unconscious. This suggests that
the cost of this amelioration lS outweighed by the
potential for abuse; however, Dugdale and stanton comment
that,
" ... al though a departure from common professional
practice does not shift the formal burden of
proof, it will, in many cases, constitute the
best available evidence that the defendant was
negligent. It will therefore help to satisfy the
burden of proof which rests on the plaintiff". 99
It might also be possible to ease the plaintiff's task by
readier disclosure of case-notes100; indeed, there seems to
have been a trend towards this a.n recent years,
t i 1 1 r n England. 101par lCU ar y To institute what would amount
98Discussed supra.
99professional Negligence, A. M. Dugdale and K. M. stanton,
second edition, Butterworths, London, 1989, at p. 245.
100Ending "forensic blind man's buff", C. Dyer, 1987 B.M.J.
1407; Medicine and the Law: pre-trial exchange of expert evidence
to become normal practice in medical negligence actions, D.
Brahams, (23 May) 1987 The Lancet 1215.
101From personal contact with the author, the defence
unions' normal policy is to recommend the release of notes at
least to a "third doctor". Health authorities generally are co-
operative too, although on anecdotal evidence it appear~ that
problems more readily arise in that case. At the t i.me of
writing, it remains to be seen how the introduction of Crown
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to a de facto presumption of negligence following a
(possibly) superficially meritorious claim .1S risky;
interests.
whether such a reversal would allow adequate safeguards
against unfounded litigation is doubtful. A larger scale
reform might answer the patient's difficulties, and retain
a more satisfactory balance for the doctor's legi timate
These reforms, the next larger in scale, are
exemplified by the no-fault compensation schemes which have
been established in New Zealand and in Sweden.
these that we now turn our attention. 1 02
It is to
indemnity in early 1990 will affect matters. To an extent this
will bring litigation against N.H.S. hospitals under the control
of the health boards and authorities, although this will not
apply to those hospi tals which have opted out. N. H. S. (and
private) general practitioners will require to continue to fund
successful claims for negligence from their defence unions'
indemnity policies.
l02 Se e the discussions inter alia in, Principle and
Pragmatism in the Compensation Debate, K. S. Abraham, 1987 7
Oxford J. Legal Studies 302; New Zealand's Accident Compensation
Scheme: A Tort Lawyer's Perspective, L. N. Klar, [1983] Univ.
Toronto L. J. 80; The Advantages of Fault, W. W. McBryde, ~
cit.; Medical Negligence and No-Fault Liability, C. Clothier,
1989 The Lancet 603.
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No-Fault Compensation Schemes: Introduction
As the name implies, the essence of a no-fault compensation
scheme is that the requirement to prove fault is removed.
Causation and, of course, loss or damage must still be
established by the claimant. A no-faul t scheme differs
from strict liability in that there is no direct one-to-one
relationship between the source of payment of damages (more
accurately, compensation) and the person who has caused the
injury. A central fund 1S established which disburses
compensation, although those who engage in the activities
producing the need for compensation may be required to
contribute to it, perhaps r.n some relationship to the
degree of risk which their activity produces if this can be
calculated.
The no-fault schemes l 03 introduced in New Zealand and
Swedenl 04 are of differing types. 105 The former demonstrated
103Se e, inter alia, Medical Negligence and No-Fault
Compensation: Background to the Current Debate, A.F. Phillips,
1989 J.L.S.S. 239.
104Se e Compensation for Injury in Sweden and Other
Countries, C. Oldertz and E. Tidefelt, Juristforlaget, Stockholm,
1988: (unnumbered) chapter enti t.led , "The Swedish System",
(pages 17-90).
105Discussed infra. They are not the only such schemes, but
are the most prominent and extensive examples. For example,
Finland has introduced a scheme covering medical mishaps, largely
modelled on the Swedish antecedent, in addi tion to its well-
established traffic- and employment-accident no-fault insurance
schemes. See No Fault Compensation Finnish Style, D. Brahams,
1988 The Lancet 733.
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schemes.
a very broad approach r n which all "personal injury by
accident" (including medical "accidents") is compensated, 106
and the latter a narrower scheme aimed only at medical
mishaps, although Sweden also boasts in addition discrete
road traffic accident, and employment injury, no-fault
Both schemes constitute relatively inexpensive
methods of providing compensation, recent figures showing
that the New Zealand scheme cost 7% r.n administration
charges and its Swedish counterpart 16%.107 This 1S
substantially less expensive and more efficient than the
tort and delict system operating in the United Kingdom. In
the light of the present U.K. approach to medical
negligence, we may find the following general analysis of
compensation in the tort system also applicable to medical
negligence:
"[F] inally, it is worth noting that a major
advantage called in aid to justify the change
from tort liability to no-fault compensation is
that the administrative costs of a no-fault
system are usually much less than those of a tort
system. For example, the Pearson Commission
found that under the tort system the
administrative cost of delivering £1 of
compensation was 87 pence, while the cost of
delivering £1 of social security benefits was
only 11 pence. In the year to March 1979 the
106Se e Accident Compensation in New Zealand, A. P. Blair,
Butterworths (Wellington), second edi tion, 1983. Blair discusses
the term "personal injury by accident" inter alia in chapter
four. The term, he says at p. 27, was originally introduced by
the Accident Compensation Act 1972, and is more recently defined
by s. 2 of the Accident Compensation Act 1982 to include, inter
alia, "(t)he physical and mental consequences of any such in~ury
or of the accident: (ii) (m)edical, surgical, dental or f1rst
i d ' d t "al m1sa ven ure ....
107Ki n g , S Fund study, op. cit., at p. 21 and p. 23.
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cost of handling claims in the New Zealand
Accident Scheme amounted to about 8% of the
benefits paid. It does not follow from this that
the tort system is too expensive, because it may
be argued that the tort system serves goals and
values which by their nature are expensive to
secure - for example the highly individualised
nature of the damages assessment process in the
tort system is inherently expensive. But since
so many people receive no compensation under the
tort system, and given that the administrative
cost is so substantial, it is necessary to ask
very seriously whether the tort system is worth
what it costs. It is difficul t to answer this
question other than negatively. ,,108
108Atiyah's Accidents, compensation and the Law, by Peter
Cane, op. cit., at p. 565.
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New Zealand
The New Zealand Accident Compensation Acts 1972 and 1974,
as amended, brought the Accident Compensation Corporation
and with it the ambitious New Zealand no-fault scheme into
existence, originally in Spring 1974. 109
h . d 111 0Tel ea was to compensate all personal injury by
accident, classified principally by circumstances of
occurrence, i.e. whether in the course of employment, in
road traffic accidents or within a miscellaneous category
mainly comprising accidents to those outwith the other two
f d i t . 111un lng ca egorles. By far the largest single source of
funding for the scheme has been a levy upon employers, the
next largest being that upon users of motor vehicles, and
then by contributions from taxation. 112 However, the
overall aim of the scheme was that all accidents, being
both unexpected and not deliberately sustained by the
victim, were to be compensated. This, however, was
109 Se e Medical Negligence and No-Fault Compensation: The
Background to the Current Debate, A.F. Phillips, supra.
110Fo r a discussion of the background to the genesis of the
Woodhouse Report, the engine for reform, and the scheme itself,
see Compensation for Personal Injury: A Requiem for the Common
Law in New Zealand, G. Palmer, 1973 21 American Journal of
Comparative Law 1.
111 Se e infra.
112 Se e infra and the King's Fund study, Ope cit. at p. 21
and Medical Negligence; also No-Fault Compensation: Background
to the Current Debate, A.F. Phillips, Ope cit.
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qualified, particularly ln the case of medical accidents,
which include medical, surgical, dental or first aid
misadventure. Excluded from compensation are the
occurrence and normal progress ion of the processes of
disease, ageing and infection. Thus, its coverage r n
respect of medical matters was significantly wider than
negligent treatment only. It therefore includes non-
negligent errors of judgment by the doctor and
unforeseeable seguelae, 113 but not to those untoward
happenings which are referable to the normal hazards of
living.
These three maln sections of the scheme (employment-,
road traffic- and domestic- related funds) are financed by
levies from employers, including the self-employed, motor
. . d . t . 114 1vehlcle owners, taxatlon an lnves ment lncome, emp oyers
being subject to substantial increases in charges,115
al though the administration costs amount to only 7% of
116turnover. Accident prevention and rehabilitation are
also aims of the scheme, although subsidiary to these main
113 I n addition, sometimes foreseeable ones. See infra.
114Se e, Medical Negligence and No-Fault Compensation, A.F.
Phillips, 1989 J.L.S.S. at p. 240 et seg.
115Ki n g , S Fund study, supra, table 6, at p. 21: the
proportional contribution from emplo~ers to the Corporation
increased from 50.6% in 1986 to 71.2% ln 1988.
116Ki n g , S Fund study, supra, at p. 21.
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goals. All "personal injury by accident,,117 attracts
compensation from the appropriate fund. 118 As disease as
such has not been included, the scheme is clearly not a
needs-based one.
The scope of the threshold defini tionl 19 for
compensation has occasioned debate 120, particularly In
t f " d i I'd ,,121respec 0 me lca mlsa venture and, for example, heart
attacks which, if work-related, have attracted compensation
under the scheme.
122
Known adverse consequences of surgery
have been held to constitute "medical misadventure" 123,
though risks pertaining to the individual patient's
117Section 2, (New Zealand) Accident Compensation Act 1974,
as amended. See inter alia ch . 4, "Personal Injury by Accident",
in Accident Compensation in New Zealand, A.P. Blair, second
edition, Butterworths (New Zealand), 1983.
118Se e Medical Negligence: Compensation and Accountabili ty,
King's Fund Institute, C. Ham et al., 1988, at p. 21 et seg.
119Wh a t an "accident" IS has also been considered, for
example whether unlawful arrest or detention can constitute it:
The Accident Compensation Act and damages claims (I), J. Miller,
1987 N.Z.L.J. 159.
120personal Injury by Accident, K.L. Sandford, 1980 N.Z.L.J.
29.
121At p. 76, Accident Compensation in New Zealand, cit. sup.
122At p. 69 et seq., Accident Compensation in New Zealand,
cit. sup.
123MacDonald v. Accident Compensation Corporation 1985 5
N.Z.A.R. 276 (bowel fistula following repair of ureter; known
complication held to be "medical misadventure"); Accident
Compensation Corporation v. Auckland Hospi tal Board 1980 2
N.Z.L.R. 748 (pregnancy following sterilisation operation).
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(possibly idiosyncratic) physiology have been excluded. 124
Once entitlement to compensation was established, an
accident victim received up to 80%, index-linked, of his
prlor earnings, plus medical expenses and the possibility
of a fixed sum including an element for pain and
ff . 125su erlng.
It is immediately evident that, although the scheme
ln practice includes all negligence, it is by no means free
f ... 126 h i h h bo c r i. t.Lc i sm , one w lC as een advanced being that,
"[T]here is a belief that even now many people think that
accident compensation is a form of "welfare" and not an
earned right". 127 The qualifications surrounding the scope
of "medical misadventure" require at least some degree of
aetiological enquiry: arguably an uncertain scientific
endeavour, experis i.ve an skilled professional resources.
Such enquiry also bears an uncomfortable similarity to the
causal enquiry required in the present law, which we have
124viggars v. Accident Compensation Corporation 1986 6
N.Z.A.R. 235, in which a patient who had previously suffered
strokes presented a risk outwith that normally expected during
arteriography and accordingly was refused compensation.
125Se e Medical Negligence and No-Fault Compensation, A.F.
Phillips, 1989 J.L.S.S. 239, at p. 240 et seq. and the King's
Fund study (ibid.). Permanent impairment now attracts an
inflation-eroded maximum of NZ$ 27,000 (Accident Compensation in
New Zealand, E. Solender, 1992 J.L.S.S. 23, at p. 24).
126Fo r example where prisoners injured themselves escaping
from gaol: Accident Compensation in New Zealand, The Current
Status, J. Cumming, 1992 J.L.S.S. at p. 24. See also, Damages
for Personal Injury, N.J. MacKinnon, 1992 J.L.S.S. 21.
127Accident Compensation in New Zealand, E. Solender, supra,
at p. 24.
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already considered as presenting one of the most formidable
barriers to an efficient and realistic system. Such
schemes may also entail some enquiry as to the conduct of
the doctor, in order to elucidate whether his professional
intervention was likely to have caused the adverse
consequence under consideration. This may mean an
effective application of a standard of care, or reasonable
foreseeability test, again strongly reminiscent of the
present method of analysis in delict or tort. There has
also been some consideration of whether a narrow
interpretation of "medical misadventure" was sufficient to
exclude the possibility of a tort action by the patient. 128
It may be observed generally that fundamentally the
only way to avoid all causal (and also medical conduct-
related) enquiry is to compensate all according solely to
their need, without regard for the aetiology of disease or
disability. To do so, however, poses essentially political
questions129 of the level of resources which are committed
to compensation as compared wi th competing priori ties.
Indeed, it must be noted that the Accident
Compensation Scheme has experienced some difficulties in
130funding its existing programme. Thus for the three years
between 1985 and 1987, expenditure exceeded income and
128Medical Practitioners' Liability for Personal Injury
Caused by Negligence, C.R. Cripps, 1978 N.Z.L.J. 83.
129Which are outwith the scope of this thesis.
130s e e the King's Fund study, Ope cit., at p. 22 et seq ..
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required to be met from reserves. 131 Over a thirteen year
period (1975 1988) lncreases in expendi ture exceeded
those in lncome almost threefold. 132 Although at one stage
the levy upon employers (including the self-employed) was
reduced, it was subsequently increased enormously, by a
factor of 300%, in order to allow annual income to exceed
annual expendi ture. 133 Until the recent proposed changes
considered below, these financial difficul ties were not
thought sufficient to justify radical change to an
apparently otherwise popular and successful scheme. 134
Many other criticisms of the scheme have been made.
These include the possibility of abuse,135 i.e. of unfounded
claims, distortions ln compensation coverage where an
accident victim will obtain compensation for a condition
which, if it occurred naturally, would remain
uncompensated. Cri ticism of reduced incentives amongst
doctors to maintain or enhance their standard of practice
has also been made. 136 However, against this it may be
argued that compensation levels have hitherto been
relatively generous: as has been seen, up to eighty per
131Ki ng,s Fund study, op. cit. , at p. 22, Table 7 .
132Ki n g , S Fund study, op. ci t. , at p. 22.
133Ki n g , S Fund study, op. ci t. , at p. 22.
134Ki n g , S Fund study, op. ci t. , at p. 22 et seg.
135Se e supra.
136s e e the King's Fund study, op. ci t. , at p. 22 et seq.
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cent of pre-accident earnings have been payable, plus
medical expenses and separate lump-sum payments for
permanent disability (and in respect of the equivalent of
I . 137)so atlum . As already adverted to, some resources
enhancing rehabilitation, and a body concerned to reduce
the levels of accidents,138 are non-pecuniary forms of the
broader view of compensation which a non-tort scheme such
as this is able to provide. For the victim of a negligent
medical accident, the scheme is much more likely to provide
compensation than hi therto, but even wi th such a broad-
reaching ethos this is not necessarily automatic or free
from aetiological enqulry.
At the time of wri ting, it seems that far-reaching
changes will engulf the health service in New Zealand and
also the accident compensation scheme. It is expected that
those who suffer medical accident will no longer be
provided with free medical treatment, but will,
surprisingly, be deal t wi th as if ill by chance and de
novo, for which payment in respect of treatment costs will
. d 139now be requlre :
"[M] ajor changes were also announced in New
Zealand's widely admired "no-fault" compensation
scheme .... Gone too are the lump-sum payments for
permanent injury, without any restitution of the
right to sue. The administrative costs of the
137See Medical Negligence and No-Faul t Compensation:
Background to the Current Debate, A.F. Phillips, Ope cit.
138Although this does not include medical accidents.
139"New Zealand: Health System Reforms", Sandra Coney, 1991
The Lancet, at pp. 374 - 375.
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new system are predicted to be immense, and the
Government agrees that these may offset any
revenue gains. In fact, the charges seem to be
more ideological than revenue-earning. The
Minister of Health, Simon Upton, and other MPs
believe that having to pay will make people more
aware of the cost of services and therefore less
likely to malinger ....
"The most radical feature of the changes is a
provision enabling people to take their share of
health funding and leave the public health
system. They can then buy into private health-
care plans that will be required to provide for
all their heal th-care needs. ,,140
It 1S anticipated that four very large regional heal th
authorities will be the only health-care funders, although
not providers of serVlces, and charges will be made for
health-care if an individual's income exceeds NZ$ 332 per
week - approximately equivalent to £10,000 per annum at the
. f . t' 141t i.me 0 wr i r nq . It has also been reported that New
Zealand doctors will in future have to pay a levy (£150 per
annum) to fund statutory compensation for medical
misadventure, although only for those patients experiencing
serious, and relatively rare, iatrogenic complications. 142
These changes call into question the philosophy of the
accident compensation scheme, and it remalns to seen
whether its funding is sustained, or if it will fall into
decay.
140"New Zealand: Health System Reforms", by Sandra Coney,
Ope cit. at p. 374.
141"New Zealand: Health System Reforms", Sandra Coney, ~
cit., at pp. 374 - 375.
142New Zealand doctors must pay for medical misadventure, R.
Paterson, 1992 B.M.J. 1203, at p. 1203.
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Sweden
The Patient Insurance Scheme in Sweden is restricted only
to medical accidents, although a separate scheme for
pharmaceutically-caused harm was introduced three years
subsequently in 1978. 1 43 Finland has recently introduced a
similar scheme in respect of medically-caused injuries.
Although there are discrete schemes in Sweden for
employment-related and road-traffic injuries, these are, in
total and individually, of much lesser scope than the New
Zealand approach. 1 44
The Swedish system 1S essentially mixed, and it must
be borne in mind that a more generous social securi ty
system exists in that country compared wi th Britain. A
relatively high threshold level of social security benefits
means that the cost of providing additional compensation by
the no-fault scheme, up to a reasonable level, is
relatively low. An option exists for patients to sue under
the Swedish tort system if they do not wish to avail
themselves of the automatic but lower compensation
available under the no-fault scheme. Although this might
be criticised as entailing all the expense of running two
systems where one would suffice (unlike the New Zealand
143Se e generally, The Swedish "No-Fault" Compensation System
for Medical Injuries - Part I, M. Brahams, 1988 N.L.J. 14.
144 Se e the King's Fund study, supra, at p. 23 et seq.
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scheme, which involved far more extensive effective
reduction in the availability of tort remedies) the Swedish
Patient Insurance Scheme is limited 1n scope, and patients
appear to have little incentive to have recourse to
litigation as the benefits approximate to those in tort. 145
It 1S relatively inexpensive to offer the tort option,
compared with what this would otherwise entail in a wider
scheme of accident compensation. It 1S also notable that
the Swedish approach has not been subject to the same
financial strictures as has been the case in New Zealand.
The Patient Insurance Scheme 1S run by a consortium of
insurance corporations, but largely funded by the county
councils. These pay a small sum (70 pence146) by way of
levy in respect of each individual resident within their
jurisdiction. The same heads of compensation are covered
as in New Zealand, comprising loss of income, permanent
disability or impairment, the cost of medical treatment and
. La t i 147a sum r apr-esen t.Lnq so a t i.um. The average cost of an
"accepted claim,,148 in 1987 was £3,200; approximately half
of claims submi tted are settled. 149 Relatively minor, self-
145Ki ng,S Fund study, Ope cit., at p. 24.
1461 98 7 figures: see the King's Fund study, Ope cit., at p.
23.
147Se e Medical Negligence and No-Fault Compensation, A.F.
Phillips, 1989 J.L.S.S. 239, at p. 241.
148Se e the King's Fund study, Ope cit., at p. 23.
149Se e the King's Fund study, Ope cit., at p. 23.
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inflicted and naturally-occurring diseases or injuries are
excluded from the scope of the scheme. Once again, so far
as medical matters are concerned, the scheme compensates
more than simply medical negligence; its Medical
Responsibility Boards also assess and improve the standard
of care. 150 In addi tion to purely accidental, .1. e. non-
negligent, medical injuries, separate categories cover all
stages of the patient's contact with the doctor. 15l These
in effect include negligent delicts both of omission and
commission. Thus, diagnostic injuries are included, which
may resul t from invasive diagnostic procedures. As one
would logically expect, mis-diagnosis is also included as
a separate, if related, category. Treatment injuries which
are avoidable (which suggests some form of test for the
standard of care not dissimilar from the present one) are
compensated under a discrete category, as are infection and
so-called accidental, commonly physical or mechanical,
injuries. A major exclusion from the scheme is any
condition arising from the provision of emergency
treatment. Again, generally speaking, if any infection or
complication is a normal or unavoidable hazard of the
underlying condition, it will not be compensable.
l50Dealing with Medical Malpractice:
Swedish Experience, M.M. Rosenthal, Tavistock,
seq.
The British and
1987, at p.184 et
l5l s e e, Compensation for personal injuries - the Swedish
patient and pharmaceutical insur~nce., c. ~l~ertz, at p . 20 et
seg.; ch. 2 in No Fault Compensatlon ln Medlclne, ed. R.D. Mann,
J. Havard, Royal Society of Medicine, 1989.
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We may see from these that there are elements
reminiscent of the test for medical negligence in these
categories, in addition to a need for causal enquiry as to
the provenance of the condi tion. The Swedish Medical
Responsibility Boards and those hospital boards concerned
with the administration of the scheme also have a positive
role in deterring and educating the profession away from
repetition of avoidable untoward consequences, whether
negligent or not, and toward a higher standard of
professional care. It is submitted that it is difficult to
view such an approach as other than an eminently sensible
balance between coercive and educative preventive measures,
and one that should be incorporated within United Kingdom
medical . 152practlce. It may also be commented that,
It also concentrates
paradoxically because of the scheme's relatively limited
scope, some aetiological difficul ties will be elided in
view of the fact that some medical involvement by the
patient with his own doctor or a hospital is a precondition
of eligibility. This at least presents the decision-maker
with the essential information of the patient's prevlous
condition and provides details of the treatment or approach
employed which led to the claim.
decision-making ln the hands of those arguably best
qualified to assess such matters: the medical profession
itself. However, the option to sue in tort is likely to
152 Th i s will be considered further ln the writer's proposals
for reform.
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set a limit upon any desire of the profession to be unduly
lenient in the matter of self-criticism.
The United Kingdom
It 1S interesting to note that, despite the unwillingness
of the Government of the United Kingdom to countenance a
medical no-fault compensation scheme, the British Medical
Association has recently supported the introduction of a
no-fault scheme, establishing a working party to consider
the a s aue and to make recommendations. 153 It has been
commented that this 1S not solely because of the well-
documented recent 1ncreases 1n the cost of claims
settlement,154 but also because of delays and the inherent
nature of the adversarial system of medical negligence
Li. tigation. 155
153Compensating for Medical Mishaps - A Model "No-Fault"
Scheme, D. Bolt, 1989 N.L.J. 109.
154Reliable figures on the underlying incidence of claims
are, in effect, non-existent. However, the well-documented
increase in the expense of damages awards in cases of medical
negligence may perhaps be ascribed partly to more invasive neo-
natal procedures, and general inflationary trends in the economy.
Substantiating this directly is difficult; see, however,
Escalation of Damages for Medical Negligence, L. Anderson, 1988
(Winter) Journal of the Medical Defence Union 56, and Damages for
Personal Injuries and Death, J. Munkman, eighth edition,
Butterworths, 1989, p. 196 et seg.
155Se e No fault compensation - the B.M.A. proposals, D.
Bolt, chapter 6 in No Fault Compensation in Medicine, ed. R.D.
Mann and J. Havard, Royal Society of Medicine Services Ltd.,
1989. David Bolt chaired the working party which considerd and
recommended the no-fault scheme proposed by the B.M.A.
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The insurance-based proposals are essentially similar
to the Swedish scheme.
suggested, as follows:
Seven guidelines have been
(1) physical injury only 1S compensable;








(5) post-operative infection is compensable;
(6) pharmaceutical complications are excluded,
and
(7) "extraneous" accidental injuries would be
156compensated.
As this summary implies, the authors of this proposal
considered that, "[S]adly, it is evident that all medical
mishaps cannot be compensated. The cost would be
prohibitive,
a v a i I ab Le . ,,157
even if Government finance was freely
156NO fault compensation - the B.M.A. proposals, D. Bolt,
Ope cit., at p. 95.
157No fault compensation - the B.M.A. proposals, D. Bolt,
Ope cit., at p. 94.
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Some expansion of these seven principles lS
valuable. 1 5 8 The B. M.A. 's working party reluctantly decided
that if non-physical injury, l.e. including psychological
trauma consequent upon negligence, were compensable then
any such scheme would be swamped with substantial claims.
This would imperil its financial viabili ty. Instead,
compensation would be limited to the reimbursement of
identifiable financial loss following injury, subject to
restrictions similar to the Swedish scheme in respect of
the first thirty days' illness. 159 Other limitations,
comprising both deductions of benefi ts paid from other
sources and an upper limit on compensation of, say, twice
the national average wage, would also be required. 160
The exclusion of losses caused by the natural
progresslon of disease or infection, by unavoidable
complications and in respect of "reasonable" diagnostic
error clearly require the application r.n effect of a
standard of reasonable care and some aetiological enquiry.
Such requirements are thus open to some of the criticisms
which we have made of the present law, although they are
likely to represent a substantial amelioration of it
158NO fault compensation - the B.M.A. proposals, D. Bolt,
Ope cit., at p. 95.
159Th i s is to exclude minor injury and hence reduce expense
and administration. See No fault compensation - the B.M.A.
proposals, D. Bolt, Ope cit., at p. 95.
160Se e No fault compensation - the B.M.A. proposals, D.
Bolt, Ope cit., at p. 96.
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nevertheless. The working party accepted that exclusion
of pharmaceutical injuries was necessary to render the
scheme practicable, but that a parallel scheme in respect
of these was highly desirable and therefore recommended.
This aspect has now been somewhat overtaken by events,
inasmuch as new E.C. strict product-liability laws have
been introduced. The proposed B.M.A. scheme places much
emphasis upon the rapid evaluation and settlement of
claims, in contrast to the prevailing litigation system.
More generally, these proposals emphasized other
germane issues. Procedural (in the sense of non-
substantive) aspects of the present action for damages for
medical negligence did not escape criticism.
commented, from a medical perspective, that
It was
"[I]t is inevitable that, as compensation depends
upon the proof of negligence on the part of those
responsible for patient care, any attempt by the
victim to secure recompense will be strenuously
resisted, as no professional person is happy to
be found guilty of negligence in relation to the
care given to the person for whom he is
responsible. Consequently, at the first
suggestion that litigation is being considered,
the normal relationship between doctor and
patient is destroyed and replaced by an
adversarial situation, totally foreign to
everything for which the profession stands. ,,161
This .V1ew 1S presumably based both upon the doctor's
professional ethic and that trust which must exist between
doctor and patient. This trust may well be to a deeper and
greater degree than 1S the case, for example, between
161NO fault compensation - the B.M.A. proposals, D. Bolt,
Ope cit. at p. 93.
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solici tor and client, s i.rice the medical relationship 1S
peculiarly and intensely personal. It may require the
disclosure of highly personal and worrisome or embarrassing
information. Given the ethos of the healing profession, it
seems inappropriate that a further and deeper souring of
that professional relationship 1S occasioned by the
adversarial nature of the claims process; it has been said
that often the injured patient in fact seeks an explanation
of, and perhaps apology for, his or her mishap.162
Certainly this seems plausible, at the least in the case of
relatively minor accidental or negligent medical injury.
If this is so, it is difficult to conceive of a better
mechanism for preventing explanations than the adversarial
pre-litigation manoeuvres. On balance, the writer
therefore entertains serious doubts about the
appropriateness of adversarial-type litigation in the
context of medical negligence.
The funding of the B.M.A. proposals was suggested to
be substantially by means of savings from the anticipated
reduction in use of the tort or delict action, although the
option for a patient to sue would aqa i n be retained.
However, the extreme difficulties of, and lack of
appropriate data in considering, the estimates of funding
162 Se e, for example, p. 10, No faul t compensation a
discussion paper, R.D. Mann, chapter 1 in No Fault Compensation
in Medicine, Ope cit.
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were acknowledged. 163 Nevertheless, it has been pointed out
that, prior to the recent change in the funding of claims
of Crown indemni ty, 164
" : . t~e profession puts. of ~he order of ninety
mllllon pounds a year lnto lndemnity insurance
of which less than 50% actually reaches damaged
patients. Evidently, there is a substantial
margin for improvement in the application of the
profession's money, if the element of litigation
could be reduced in favour of providing help in
a non-adversarial manner for those wi th real
need. ,,165
It might, however, be argued that the introduction of the
Crown indemnity scheme has changed matters. This scheme
covers National Health Service hospital and directly-
contracted communi ty doctors and dentists, and provides
indemnity by health boards or authorities for liability for
negligence within the scope of the doctor's or dentist's
contract of employment within the health service. 1 6 6
General practitioners, who are independent contractors to
the health service, do not come within the scheme, and all
163No fault compensation - the B.M.A. proposals, D. Bolt,
op. ci t. at pp. 96-97. A pilot study and a full actuarial
evaluation on behalf of defence organisations and health boards
and authorities was urged.
164 s e e , inter alia, Medical Negligence and No-Fault
Compensation: Background to the Current Debate, A. Phillips,
supra, and Scottish Home and Health Department N.H.S. Circular
1989 (PCS) 32: Medical Negligence: New Arrangements for N.H.S.
hospital and community health service doctors and dentists, and
Circular (December 1989) to all District and Regional Health
Authorities advising of the introduction of Crown indemnity for
N.H.S. hospital doctors and dentists.
165No fault compensation - the B.M.A. proposals, D. Bolt,
Ope cit., at p. 97.
166 N December 1989, "N. H. S. Indemni ty" .See M.D.D.ll.S. ews,
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private or "good samaritan" treatment is, of course, also
excluded. 167 The reason for the introduction of Crown
indemnity was acute Governmental and professional concern
over the rapidly-increasing cost of medical indemnity
insurance, despite the considerable contributions made to
doctor's premlum payments by health boards and
h .. 168aut orltles. This particular problem only was solved,
.
In
because instead of requiring insurance in order to practise
in health serVlce hospitals, the employer effectively
provided insurance at no cost to the individual doctor. As
Crown bodies, however, health boards and authorities do not
insure and thus carry the burden of payment of damages
themselves, to the potential detriment of patient-care
budgets in these cost-conscious times. 169 N.H.S. hospitals
which have opted out of health board or authority financial
control are liable for the costs of negligence claims made
. t th 170agalns em.
However, the adoption of Crown indemni ty does not
necessarily imply any reduction in the total amount of
compensation paid to patients, although any new trends
the response by heal th boards and authori ties to claims
remain to be seen. Furthermore, two fundamental potential
167Se e M.D.D.U.S. News, supra.
168Se e Medical Negligence and No-Faul t Compensation:
Background to the Current Debate, A. Phillips, cit. sup.
169Supra
170Se e ch . 2, supra.
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difficulties .rema1n. Even though the concern at
substantial increases 1n the cost of indemnity insurance
has now been allayed, this .1S arguably treating the
symptoms rather than the underlying cause. Thus, the
sUbstantive law remains unchanged, and there is no reason
to suppose that the trend of increasing costs of settlement
or defence, leaving aside the elusive increase or decrease
of negligence per unit head of patient population, will
diminish. The second factor 1S the more obvious one that
health boards and authorities henceforth will require to
meet a potentially very much larger proportion of the costs
of negligence from their own budgets, without sharing these
with the medical defence organisations. It is therefore
arguable that an acute increase in costs associated with
medical negligence may recur 1n the future. The
introduction of Crown indemni ty r n the National Heal th
Service represents more a re-allocation of existing costs
rather than their reduction; the broad issue of no-fault
compensation is thus still a relevant one.
323
No-Fault Compensation: Conclusions
No-fault compensation schemes have many attractive
features, but they are not a panacea. Quite apart from the
politico-economic doubts now attaching to the New Zealand
system, unless a compensation scheme is wholly
comprehensive it 1S impossible to eliminate the
difficulties inherent in aetiological enquiry and forensic
examination of the standard of care even though these may
be attenuated.
It 1S thought that if a no-fault scheme can be
justified, it would in ideal circumstances be viewed as a
first step towards a comprehensive needs-based compensation
scheme. This would compensate all those with a q i.ven
condition equally, irrespective of how it arose, and would
therefore wholly eliminate troublesome causal171 and
conduct-based enquiries. Such an approach would by no
means be beyond possible criticism: the effects of lower
deterrence on actual standards of care or on the perception
of individual responsibility would requ1re to be
considered, although it might be felt that the other
benefits such a system would bring were worth the sacrifice
of these. Greater aid in rehabilitation and accident or
negligence prevention might be a wider part of a broadly-
171compensating victims of Disease, J. Stapleton, 1985 5
Oxford J. Legal Studies 248, at pp. 250-252.
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based system, as in New Zealand, reflecting the then
prevalent aims. This will be further considered infra in
the context of the writer's proposals for reform.
Needs-Based Reform
The broadest and most extreme potential reform r.n the
spectrum which we are considering is so-called needs-based
reform. As its name implies, reform of this type 1S
preoccupied with the 1ssue of compensation. For our
purposes, it therefore contributes Li. ttle to the non-
compensatory objectives: it compensates victims of medical
negligence simply and solely as individuals evincing need.
Furthermore, as it refers to the far wider questions of the
scope and levels of compensation in society, which it 1S
suggested are ul timately for elected representatives to
determine, discussion will only be to the limited extent
that they are relevant to reform of the law of medical
negligence. Essentially, needs-based compensation refers
to a conceptual category of very broad application rather
than to specific theories and precepts of compensation.
The work of 172Stapleton is a major support of the
d . I . t 17 3 f h h I th hprinciples an rat10na 1 y 0 suc an approac ,a oug
172 Se e Disease and the Compensation Debate, J. Stapleton,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
173Cf . Principle and Pragmatism in the Compensation Debate,
K. S. Abraham, 1987 7 Oxford J. Legal studies 302 at pp. 306-308.
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a recent empirical study has provided evidence of
distortions in the tort and social security systems which
found the recommendation that " .. the future policy-maker
should plan to phase out all existing compensation systems
which favour accident victims (or any category of them)
over illness victims. ,,174
The driving force behind the arguments ln favour of
needs-based compensation is that the tort (and also social
security) system provides varying degrees of support for
accident, disease and other victims, for which no rational
justification may ultimately be advanced. These variations
and distortions are therefore not acceptable, and equality
of treatment should be instituted.
said that
However, it has been
"[V] ictims of accidents and illness in England
and Wales receive compensation and support from
a multitude of poorly co-ordinated sources, with
widely varying cri teria of enti tlement. The
supposed goals and effectiveness of these various
systems have been extensively debated amongst
lawyers, economists, and those concerned wi th
social policy. In particular, the tort (damages)
system, whereby accident victims may sue for
damages on grounds of fault, has come under
widespread criticism as costly, inefficient, and
inequitable in practice. The total abolition of
the tort action in personal injury cases has been
. I d ,,175serlous y propose .
174Compensation and support for I llness and Injury, D.
Harris et al., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, at p. 327.
175preface to Compensation and support for I llness and
Injury, D. Harris et al., Oxford Socio-Legal studies, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1984. See also Disease and the Compensation
Debate, J. Stapleton, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
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Clearly, this is a fundamental cri ticism which must be
taken seriously by all concerned in the quest for a more
rational and just system of delict or tort, as well as
those whose interests extend even further afield. The
provenance of the present system may be largely explained,
even though not justified, by the operation of the
poli tical system and the principle of scarce resources,
which all those an favour of widely-based compensation
schemes must ultimately consider. 176
Thus, the needs-based reform movement aims to
substitute these arguably arbi trary preferences of the
present system in favour of a uniform scheme embodying
equali ty to the greatest extent possible. This in turn
involves a change in ethos of substantial degree, to the
effect that the non-compensation aims of delict and tort
(and of the current social security system) are altered or
reduced, in favour of general community responsibility for
h d . . t i 177azar ous actlvl leSe For example, little allowance lS
usually made in respect of the deterrence, and policing of
individual responsibility, claimed for tort and delict.
176Wr i ting by the so-called "tort lawyers", an favour of
retaining tort and delict, includes, for example, New Zealand's
Accident Compensation Scheme: A Tort Lawyer's Perspective, L.
N. Klar [1983] 33 University of Toronto Law Journal 80; The
Advanta~es of Fault, W. W. McBryde, 1975 J. R. 32, and Principle
and Pragmatism in the Compensation Debate, K. S. Abraham, 1987
7 Oxford J. Legal Studies 302.
177Medical Negligence and No-Fault Liability, C. Clothier,
cit. sup.
327
However, one important criticism of needs-based
trivial ones?
compensation is not merely the likely expense involved in
compensating all who demonstrate need, probably from one
central fund, but where the boundaries are to be set. In
other words, if all illness and disability is to be
compensated, how are these to be def ined and de 1 imi ted?
Would illness extend to all medical conditions, including
Would self-inflicted condi tions, perhaps
related to alcohol or tobacco consumption be included?
Would a genetic predisposition to excess alcohol or tobacco
consumption be compensable? How would stress-related work
illnesses, which have caused difficulties 1n the New
Zealand scheme, be treated? Would "disability" extend
generally to hereditary conditions or diseases? Would it
apply to psychological condi tions or diseases, or to a
person's cosmetic appearance, intelligence and abilities?
Although these are perhaps extreme examples, it 1S
submitted that there would be a real risk of difficulties
of scope arising.
The arguments against preference appear to arise as a
converse of the absence of justification of existing
preferences and discrimination. Thus, Stapleton's category
of man-made disease victims are discriminated against in
favour of conventional, acute-accident and trauma
. t' 178V1C 1ms. Man-made disease victims are argued to be
178Th i s is to oversimplify grossly; unfortunately, dictates
of space and scope prevent a full consideration of the theory.
See Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., and per contra
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effectively disenfranchised both as to proof of fault,
because of long-latency and lack of aetiological knowledge,
and because of even greater diff iculties of proof of
causation.
179
Even if we accept that the argument against
preference is valid in principle and that exceptions may
not be made, three points arise in the context of medical
negligence.
Firstly, the accident preference criticised by
stapleton
18o
and others181 probably does not extend to those
who suffer loss by medical negligence. As we have seen,
there 1S evidence suggesting that such claimants are
disadvantaged compared wi th their peers. 182 Secondly and
relatedly, if medical negligence victims are indeed
discriminated against under the present law, then to
Principle and Pragmatism in the Compensation Debate, K.S.
Abraham, 1987 7 Oxford J. Legal Studies 302, which criticises
Stapleton's thesis inter alia that man-made disease victims are
not shown to be a numerically significant category, that
scientific knowledge is ever-advancing and thus decreasing the
aetiological "knowledge gap" and that Stapleton's advocation of
needs-based compensation is not made out, in competition with the
non-compensation aims of tort.
179partly as a resul t of the operation of the balance of
probabilities test. See Disease and the Compensation Debate, ~
cit., chapters 3 and 4.
180Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., especially
chapters 1 and 2.
181Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Ope cit.,
at p. 552 et seq.; Compensation and Support for Illness and
Injury, D. Harris et al., Ope cit., at p. 2 et seq. and p. 317
et seq.
182pearson Report,
vol.2, Table 11, p. 19
ibid.
op . cit., vo 1 . 2 ,
(discussed supra);
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p. 67, para. 242;
King's Fund study,
implement measures designed to restore this to the level of
benefits
183
enjoyed by other categories of tort or delict
damages claimants is neither to institute nor to approve a
preference, but rather to rectify a pre-existing "balance
of injustice" which delict and tort do not yet formally
acknowledge. This need not infringe an injunction against
preferential treatment, even within negligence litigation.
This may be considered in the context that different
jurisdictions and perhaps also intra-jurisdictional areas
may display markedly varying claims incidences:
"[C] anadian physicians are only one fifth as
likely to be sued for malpractice as their
American counterparts. We believe that this
remarkable difference is attributable to a number
of legal and institutional factors in Canada,
including the presence of universal health
insurance, more generous programs of social
welfare, limited use of contingency fees, the
practice of having the losing party bear the
costs of litigation, limited awards for pain and
suffering, infrequent use of juries, the
effective defense work of the C.M.P.A. [Canadian
Medical Protective Association], and a less
Li tigious culture. ,,184
Thirdly, the pragmatic argument applies that, perhaps ln
order to rectify a previously inequitable system, a limited
no-fault scheme, say, might be instituted. This might also
be seen as a first step toward a fully comprehensive
compensation reform, or as a long-term restoration of
equality in itself.
183rncluding non-compensatory ones.
184Medical Malpractice The Canadian Experience, P. C.
Coyte, D.N. Dewees, M.J. Trebilcock, 1991 The New England Journal
of Medicine 89 at p. 93.
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Furthermore, the arguments of those who advocate
needs-based reform are based mainly upon the needs of the
pursuer or plaintiff. An argument may equally be advanced
that the needs of a medical defender also require
consideration: that an episode of negligence in which harm
happens to have resul ted should perhaps not be accorded
such prominence, as this may minimise or disregard its
perpetrator's previously good practice and successful
treatment results. However, it is suggested that there may
also be a risk that the medical profession has allowed or
encouraged public expectations of medical treatment to
become too high, and that this has contributed to the
increasing costs of claims an respect of medical
negligence.
One method of e as i.nq the pursuer's path to
compensation for medical negligence would be to reverse the
onus of proof, or to introduce strict liabili ty. The
advantage of both of these possibili ties is that they
entail relatively little change to the present law. Such
reforms would carry risks, however; the doctor would in
effect be guil ty until proven otherwise. This might
encourage a flood of unsubstantiated claims, and if the
tactical burden were placed during litigation upon the
pursuer, as would be likely, he or she might not be
significantly better off than at present. Such a reform
would run the risk of replacing injustice to the pursuer
with injustice to the defender. In the view of the writer,
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the demerits associated with these possible changes
outweigh their benefits. Furthermore, the existing
difficul ties of delay and the use of procedural
technicalities would be unchanged. This suggests that a
reform tailored to the specific characteristics of medical
negligence is required.
Despite its attractions, the broadly-based New Zealand
system of accident compensation represents an
unsatisfactory compromise. It has been the widest scheme
for non-fault compensation available anywhere, but even so
has been subject to financial difficulties and now appears
to be at risk of being substantially changed or even
dismantled. Furthermore, its treatment of medical
accidents has not removed restrictions and difficulties in
its scope. Some examination of causation 1S still
required, as is some assessment of the reasonableness of
the standard of patient-care. Certain conditions, such as
employment-related heart disease, have occasioned especial
difficul ty. As far as medical negligence is concerned,
significant reservations attach to the Accident
Compensation Scheme so far as sufferers from iatrogenic
injury are concerned. It would clearly require an even
wider and more expensive scheme to provide compensation
equally to all, wi th troublesome forensic enqu i ry
eliminated. Similar doubts apply in the case of the
otherwise successful Swedish scheme. It bears the twin
disadvantages that, arguably, it perpetuates idiosyncracies
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It must
and distortions in the sphere of compensation - whilst
aga1n needing de facto evaluation of the standard of
medical care and the aetiology of the condition.
therefore be viewed as a pragmatic solution to the problems
of medical negligence litigation, rather than one which 1S
entirely satisfactory ln principle. It is interesting to
recall that the B.M.A. 's proposed scheme is closely based
upon the Swedish model. The converse of this argument on
pragmatism 1S that the judgment of medical and scientific
issues 1S r n the hands of medical personnel, wi thout
requiring the full panoply of the law - which itself would
then require the detailed education and guidance of judges
and lawyers as to technical medical matters. Arguably, the
medical profession is where such decision-making should be
located, and its use minimises the expense of judicial
assessment of negligence and its incidents.
However, anything less than a wholly needs-based
compensation system, of necessarily massive expense, must
ultimately confront the inescapable point made in Atiyah's
seminal analysis of tort reform, that
"[T]he only way of eliminating causal issues
entirely is to base entitlement solely and
entirely on the need of the plaintiff for
compensation. At present., not ev~n the mo~t
extensive no-fault scheme ln operat10n (that 1n
New Zealand) compensates entirely regardless of
cause. ,,185
185Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Ope cit.,
at p. 548.
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This, of course, applies equally to the question of
establishing fault.
aims of the law,
Leaving aside the non-compensation
it IS clear that any less-extensive
approach than this would be unlikely to avoid retaining
some inequalities and pragmatism; 186 this IS likely In
practice to be unavoidable. It might, however, partly be
justified on the grounds of rectifying a historical
inequity,
reform. 187
or as a first step towards comprehensive
Unfortunately, irrespective of the principles
supporting the broader forms of compensation, it must also
be recognised that,
"[N]evertheless the argument based upon cost is
a potent political weapon available against the
introduction of comprehensive compensation
schemes covering illness and disease as well as
accidents. Opposition to the abolition of tort
rights tends to be bought off by providing
generous benefits, but when applied to the sphere
of disease as well as accidents, the high
benef i ts generate new oppos i tion because they
make the scheme very expensive. Thus it can be
seen that the shape of reform can be influenced
as much by poli tical pressures as by rational
f . . I I . ,,188arguments 0 prlnclp e or po lCY.
with these conflicting pressures In mind, it may be that
the best which may realistically be attained is to accept
186Se e inter alia, Dealing with Medical Malpractice: The
British and Swedish Experience, M.M. Rosenthal, Tavistock, 1987,
especially chapters 9-16.
187" I f partial abolition of t~rt can ac~i7ve
. t can be confident that 1 ts total aboLi t LonImprovemen s .... one
improves matters even more." Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation
and the Law, Ope cit., at pp. 568-569.
188Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Ope cit.,
at p. 554 (footnote omitted).
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that, mutatis mutandis,
"[E]ven if all we can realistically hope for is
that the funds currently tied up in the tort
system as it now operates will be better used,
this is enough to justify a limited reform, even
at the cost of creating or perpetuating anomalies
between road accident victims and other social
welfare recipients. ,,189
This chapter has attempted to consider the various options
for reform, some of which have been adopted in certain
jurisdictions. The wri ter' s submission is that none of
these main schemes in itself is able to provide a suitable
mechanism for combining the goals of compensation,
deterrence and accountability. It is accordingly necessary
to consider the wider restrictions upon potential reform,
which is done in the next chapter by considering the
arguments raised in Disease and the Compensation Debate.
In the light of this, the writer's proposals for reform are
then further developed.




Reform: Restrictions and Proposals; Conclusion
In this chapter, the writer considers some of the wider
implications of, and restrictions upon,l reform of the law
of medical negligence which arise from the compensation
2debate. This involves primarily the issues which have been
raised by Stapleton 1n her book, "Disease and the
Compensation Debate" ,3 and provides a necessary counterpoint
to further consideration of the present writer's
suggestions for reform. As has been mentioned, these seek
to embody what are thought to be the (desirable) aims of
the existing law, but wi th the disadvantages of their
current incarnations reduced so far as possible. 4 It is
submi tted that the deterrent function 1S often under-
emphasized; this is unfortunate partly because, if it is
defined broadly as a concern to raise the standard of care
lSee generally, Controlling the Costs of Medical
Malpractice: An Argument for Strict Hospi tal Liabili ty, B.
Chapman, 1990 Osgoode Hall L. J. 523, drawing attention to a
North American upward spiral in negligence costs and proposing
a strict-liability approach to limit the trend.
2Se e also Medical Negligence and No-Fault Compensation, A.F.
Phillips, supra.
3J . Stapleton, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986. See also
Accident Compensation for New South Wales, A.M. Angelo, 1983
N.Z.L.J. 335.
4"But in its role of regulating conduct and deterring
carelessness, tort law, while a useful instrument against
intentional wrongdoing, is a weak one against ot~er forms of
anti-social behaviour." Can the Law of Torts Fulf11 its Aims?
D. Harris, 1990 14 N.Z.U.L.Rev. 113, at p. 113.
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within the practice of medicine, its achievement may in the
longer term reap the benefi ts of a lower incidence of
claims. Such considerations have led the writer away from
argu1ng in favour of the relatively popular option of a no-
fault compensation system, 5 and instead towards a
"composite" approach which seeks to satisfy the disparate
aims of the law but not by the present combined vehicle of
the delict/tort action. It has been cogently argued that
the law of professional liabili ty in tort is undergoing
something of a r-e t.renchmen t ," perhaps suggesting that actual
reform of the law of medical negligence, unless prompted by
financial cons Ldere t.Lons" (as with Crown indemnity), 1S
relatively unlikely.8 However, there 1S some continuing
interest in general 1n no-fault schemes an other
jurisdictions. 9
D.No Fau1 t Compensation,Law:5 d i d thSee, Me r c i.ne an e
Brahams, 1989 The Lancet 170.
6Th e Decline of Tort Liability for Professional Negligence,
K.M. Stanton, 1991 Current Legal Problems 83. However, Stanton
argues that this shift is primarily focussed upon the contractual
remedy which is of course inappropriate in most cases of medical
negligence. See also, Professional Negligence: Some Further
Limiting Factors, R. O'Dair, 1992 55 M.L.R. 405.
7As has been argued in the case of the Uni ted States:
Controlling Health Costs by Controlling Technology: A Private





developments discussed in, Liability in Tort for
of A. I . D. S. : Some Lessons from Afar and the
the Future, R. O'Dair, 1990 Current Legal Problems
9Th e Scope and Meaning of No-faul t Liabili ty in French
Administrative Law, R. Errera, 1986 Current Legal Problems 157.
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all.
which cause them concern.
Logically, it is thought that the actual detection of
non-harm causing negligence is the first requirement. This
is associated wi th raising the standard of care. It is
submitted that it 1S practicable to detect a large
proportion of the incidence of negligence, al though not
One step towards achieving this a i m would be by
insti tuting a reporting system by patients of episodes
This might cover genuine (i.e.
non-fault) accidents, negligence, and also unexpected
outcomes and patient disappointment. IO There 1S some
evidence that about a quarter of adverse outcomes result
from medical negligence;ll this may suggest that there are
many undetected negligent and non-negligent adverse
outcomes. However, r n addi tion to this, other systems
would be needed. If this deterrence mechanism was
supportive and educative, rather than being perceived as
retributive or threatening, doctors might be encouraged to
admit and discuss their mishaps - especially those where no
harm was actually caused. If necessary, this quality audit
would be conducted under conditions of informality and in
circumstances in which no voluntary disclosure or self-
IOIt is difficult to determine whether the apparent increase
In the incidence of medical negligence claims is attributable to
an underlying increase in negligent care, a proportionate
increase because of increased consultations at the same level of
negligence, greater detection, etc. See, A Health Authority's
experience, R. Bowles, P. Jones, 1989 N.L.J. 119.
lIsee, The Epidemiology of Malpractice, R. Smi th, 1990
B.M.J. 621.
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censure could be used for disciplinary purposes or
litigation. It lS submitted that such non-harm episodes
are as important as those which do cause harm, from the
point of view of this hortatory function of the law, even
if not, of course, in terms of compensation. This proposal
would, it lS thought, lmprove the coverage and
effectiveness of the alms of the law. A further
development would be the increased use of medical audit and
quality control. These already exist ln some areas of the
National Heal th Service, and consist of peer review and
audi t of the exerc i se of clinical judgment. 12 A main
objective in their proposed application would be to improve
the qual i ty of care. Currently, these are composed of
groups of doctors, practising in the same discipline or
sub-discipline, inter alia analysing the case records of
patients and considering their findings:
"[O]n the Medical Unit at the Queen Elizabeth
Hospi tal we have held a regular audi t for the
past 18 months and have found it to be an
enjoyable and worthwhile procedure. Audits are
held weekly at lunchtime and involve five
consul tant physicians and their junior staff.
Once a month all deaths occurring in the previous
month are reviewed; in the other weeks a random
selection of recently discharged patients is
looked at. The reviewer audits notes of patients
who have not been under his care. Obviously the
number of cases reviewed at the "death" audi t
varies ... but is usually about two for each
consultant. At the other audit each consultant
reviews three sets of notes, which means that
each month the notes of approximately a quarter
12 s e e , inter alia, Medical Negligence: Compensation and
Accountability (Briefing Paper 6), C. Ham ~e~t~a_l_., King's Fund
Institute, at p. 16.
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of all discharged patients are reviewed. The
meetings last one hour ... ,,13
This relatively informal and expeditious procedure could,
it 1S thought, be expanded relatively easily and
inexpensively. It appears to be a potentially useful tool
for raising the standard of care:
"[M]edical audit apparently resulted 1n
appreciable improvements in aspects of care such
as clerking and record keeping. Analysis of the
scores of the general audi ts has led to the
introduction of agreed standards that can be
objectively measured and are being used in a
futher audit, and from the results of the audits
of clinical management have been developed
explicit guidelines, which are bein~ further
developed for criterion based audit."l
Medical audi t is already used, and being aggressively
developed,15 an the litigious United States: 16 "[it] is now
an accepted part of American hospital life ... [I]t demands
a rigorous quali ty asurance by the hospi tal ... ,,17 It is
submitted that medical audit procedures could readily and
13Medical Audits, D.A. Heath, M.J. Kendall, R. Hoffenberg,
O.L. Wade, J.M. Bishop, 1980 14 J. Royal College of Physicians
of London 200.
14 Fr om Abstract, in:
preliminary evaluation of
McNicol, J. Spilby, S.C.
at p. 526.
What did audit achieve? Lessons from
a year's medical audi t, J. Gabbay, M. C.
Davies, A.J. Layton, 1990 B.M.J. 526,
15Law-Medicine Notes: Medical Peer Review of Physician
Competence and Performance: Legal Immunity and the Antitrust
Laws, W.J. Curran, 1987 316 New England Journal of Medicine 597.
16s e e, Litigation-Mania in England, .G~rmany and the U.S:A.:
Are We So Very Different? B.S. Markes1n1s, 1990 49 Cambr1dge
L.J. 233, especially at p. 260 et seg.
17Audit Reviewed: Medical Audit in North America, W. Van't
Hoff, 1985 19 J. Royal College of Physicians of London 53, at p.
53.
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appropriately be incorporated in the proposed new scheme,
both at the level of patient treatment and forming the
basis for the suggested Medical Audit Board. It 1S
envisaged that these could incorporate the present audits,
in order to conserve resources even though this appears to
be a resource-efficient approach. There is some evidence
that audit has resulted in the detection and investigation
of potentially delictual inconsistencies 1n clinical
decision-making in obstetrics. 18
Analysis of all patient-doctor transactions, however,
is thought to be wholly impracticable and probably
unnecessary;19 it 1S submitted that if necessary a suitable
statistical sampling method could be designed with
sufficiently high confidence levels. Further, areas of
high-risk practice could be identified and perhaps
concentrated upon, as has to an extent already occurred
with the disproportionate escalation 1n the cost of
indemnity insurance for obstetric practitioners. All these
possibilities echo an emphasis on accident prevention which
I8Inconsistencies in clinical decisions in obstetrics,
J.F.R. Barrett, G.J. Jarvis, H.N. MacDonald, P.C. Buchan, S.N.
Tyrrell, R.J. Lilford, 1990 The Lancet 549, at p. 550 et seg.
I9Existing medical audi t schemes seem to utilise random
selection, although a random sample ~o~ld, it .is thought, be
easily arranged. Audit Reviewed: Cl1n1cal Rev1ew; ~ ~orm of
Audit? W. Van't Hoff, 1981 15 J. Royal College of Phys1c1ans of
London 63.
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has been present in the New Zealand approach,2o rather than
the largely reactive present legal approach to regulation.
In addition, it is thought that the establishment of a pro-
active and re-active body, analogous to the Mental Welfare
. . 21 hCommlsslon, or per aps the Swedish Medical Responsibility
Board,22 would be indicated. Such a body would respond to
and investigate a proportion of patient notifications, both
in harm and non-harm cases. Additionally, it would have
its own jurisdiction to investigate individual cases and
procedures ex proprio motu, and to make appropriate
recommendations for the improvement of future practice,
non-specific to individual practi tioners. Failure by a
Welfare State: The
Gaskins, [1980] 18
doctor to implement such a recommendation might ln
appropriate cases be a matter for disciplinary censure.
The composition of such a body would include members
of the medical and legal professions, wi th a regular
secondment of new members drawn from the practising and
academic branches of the professions. It is conceded that
many difficulties would require to be overcome in order to
render such a system practicable. Although it is difficult
20 s e e, for example, Tort Reform in the
New Zealand Accident Compensation Act, R.
Osgoode Hall L. J. 238.
21 Se e Mental Heal th: A Guide to the Law in Scotland, J.
Blackie, H. Patrick, A. Paterson, Butterworths/Scottish Legal
Education Trust, 1990, chapter 6.
22 Se e Dealing wi th Medical Malpractice: The British and
Swedish Approach, M. Rosenthal, Tavistoc~, ~9~7, chs. 9-15;.see
also, Medical Negligence and No-Fault Llablllty, C. Clothler,
1989 The Lancet 603.
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to make projections of cost which are other than
speculative,
insuperable.
it 1S not thought that these would be
The proposed Board 1S discussed further
infra. Generally, however,it may be commented that quality
control "circles" exist already r n the National Health
. 23 d . .
se rv i ce , an represent a Li.m i ted re-deployment of existing
resources. Sufficient supporting and administrative staff
would be required; with modern computerised data processing
facili ties, it 1S thought that this need not be unduly
24costly. Similar arguments apply in the case of a Medical
Audit Board, perhaps to a lesser degree. However, such a
body would be unlikely to be able to cover all specialties
in all locations. A solution to this would be delegation
to a local or specialist committee, whose primary response
would be educative. However, r n the case of a doctor
persistently or repeatedly breaching acceptable standards,
remedial and ultimately perhaps disciplinary, steps would
be requ ired. This would be consistent with the present
trend towards maintenance of qualifications by refresher
course and examination. Where necessary, professional
sanctions through the General Medical Council, or even the
23Medical Audit in General Medicine, D.A. Heath, 1981 15 J.
Royal College of Physicians 197.
24 Th e current financial climate in the National Heal th
Service would appear to suggest otherwise. On the other hand,
heal th boards and authori ties have recently undertaken full
responsibility for N.H.S. damages for hospital-based n~g~igence,
the overall effect of which remains to be seen. Add1t10nally,
the proposal might produce long-term benefi ts in terms of
accident prevention.
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criminal law, would of course continue to be available as
at present. It would be necessary for a standard to be
applied across all specialties and those para-medical
activities included within the scheme. It is submitted
that the content of this standard would vary according to
the special ty, circumstances and level of training and
qualification of doctor concerned, subject to a minimum
standard applying to all. The standard actually applied
would be entirely a matter for assessing doctors an the
special ty concerned, whom it 1S submi tted would be the
correct judges of such a matter. Inasmuch as a general
form of words to express an idea of such enormously wide
application is required, it is suggested that the standard
be expressed, not as a minimum requirement (although there
would no doubt be a tendency to regress to this) but
instead be stated to be at least "acceptable practice".
This would raise the question, "acceptable to whom?", the
acceptabili ty being largely of the external, assessing
peer. Although tempered by subjectivity, as indicated
above, the test would essentially be an objective one. It
is thought that this would not only maintain but ultimately
improve the general standard of care.
The response of the medical profession itself to such
a proposal would be an important factor. Whereas it might
meet with hostility initially, if its primary aim were seen
to be as the positive one of negligence or mishap
avoidance, by educative and supportive measures, this would
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resolve itself. Great care would require to be taken to
ensure that any disagreements between medical colleagues
would not be fuelled or amplified. Several possibilities
exist to ameliorate such a possibility. On a broad brief,
consideration would have to be given to preventing the
patient from pursuing an action where matters were dealt
with under the proposal. 25 Any election by the patient not
to Li tigate would, of course, have to be made at the
initial stage of reporting, or perhaps after a preliminary
finding by the proposed Board. 2 6 It is thought that, freed
of the threat of Li,tigation, both explanations to the
patient, and participation 1n the proposed system by
doctors, would be greatly encouraged. As regards medical
staff themselves, an alternative might be available if an
individual doctor did not wish to participate directly. It
1S envisaged that this would involve reporting to the
proposed Medical Review Board on all patient-notified
episodes or mishaps, and a summary based on a small random
sample of all other cases dealt with by that doctor. This
could then be discussed with a more senior colleague, with
a view to improving the standard of care; the identity of
25 Th e proposal emphasizes the quality of the medical
treatment, but compensation will also be considered infra.
26 Th e practical significance of this would, of course,
primarily be in cases involving harm. I~ the p~oposed ~chem~
were to co-exist wi th a delict/tort act.ron opt.ron , pat i ent.s
wishes as to explanation or suing woul~ be amply cat~red for.
Any election would require to be final, 1n order to avo1d double
jeopardy. This is a problem with existing complaints procedures.
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this colleague could be decided, wi thin limi ts, by the
disclosing doctor. Again, this would involve re-deploying
existing resources, the cost implications of which should,
it is submitted, be containable.
Though the proposed system depends to some extent
upon good faith, such reliance is ultimately unavoidable in
any professional context in which there is, axiomatically,
an ethic to put the interests of patient or client first.
In any event, it 1S thought that most episodes of
negligence would, whether they caused harm or not, be
included in the reporting by the patient. 27 Even if full
detection of negligent episodes were not achieved, a
significant improvement would resul t. In addition, the
attitude of the profession to negligence would be likely to
alter. Rather than polarising doctors and patients into
potential litigants, the proposed scheme would treat
negligence as a problem largely capable of a solution,
without the present incentives for hostility.
27 Th e disclosure scheme, and peer review, would of course be
of much greater importance where laboratory proce~ures. and tests
were concerned. If, however, a mishap resulted 1n e1ther harm
or other deviation from the expected or likely patient outcome,
it is likely that such latent or concealed mi shaps would ~e
brought to light in the course of the attend1ng doctor s
participation in the proposed scheme.
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Compensatory Aspects
Earlier this century, the common law of delict and tort
developed relatively slowly, in response to developments ln
society. In more recent years, however, that pace of
change has accelerated rapidly.28 It is more recently still
that the laws of delict and tort have come under systematic
criticism.
29
This is partly fuelled by some extensive and
(relatively) recent damages claims, such as those ln
respect of asbestos and thalidomide. 3o It is probably fair
to state that the concern following these, and similar
large-scale disasters, has provided an important impetus
28 Th e reasons for this trend are beyond the scope of this
work. It may be speculated that the increasing complexity of
modern life has made a significant contribution. A further trend
is the tendency to produce specialist sub-areas, such as the law
of medical negligence. This is demonstrated by the books
recently published in these area. A recent example is Medical
Negligence, M. Powers and N. Harris, Butterworths, 1990.
29 I n certain areas, it has been supplanted by statutory
schemes. These may be conceived as a response to public opinion,
or reflect policy goals. See, for example, the Workmen's
Compensation Acts 1897 and 1906, and the Vaccine Damage Payments
Act 1979. Cf. In praise of tort, R. Smith, 1991 N.L.J. 308.
30 Se e Disease and the Compensation Debate, J. Stapleton,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, at p. 1. Many of these claims are
of course in respect of what would now be termed product
liability, a subject which is outwith the scope of the present
work. The basis of the law in this area is in the Consumer
Protection Act 1987: see Product Liability, A. Clark, Modern
Legal Studies, Sweet and Maxwell, 1989.
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for the compensation debate. 31 This debate has raised
The work of
several fundamental issues in relation to compensation, the
main elements of which are summarized below before the
present wri ter' s proposals are set out.
stapleton and of the Harris study represent probably the
strongest and most systematic cri ticisms of the present
compensatory regime. For this reason, and the breadth of
their discussions, theoretical in the case of Stapleton and
empirical ln the case of the Harris study, reference will
primarily be made to these works.
The inception of the New Zealand accident compensation
scheme, together with the concerns which had been voiced,
elici ted a response from the British government: the
establishment of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability
and Compensation for Personal Injury, chaired by Lord
Pearson. 32 Its remit was to consider compensation for death
and personal injury in respect of injuries sustained in the
course of employment, use of motor vehicles, supply or use
of goods and services, use of premises and generally where
a remedy would come within the common law of negligence, or
. , I' b i I' t 33posslbly strlct la 1 1 y. Al though its remi t seems
broad, in fact the Commission concentrated on accidents at
310 n e result of this concern was that New Zealand introduced
its Accident Compensation Scheme, following the Woodhouse Report
In 1967.
32 Th e Pearson Report, in three volumes (Cmnd. 7054-1, II and
III), was presented to Parliament in 1978.
33pearson Report, op. cit., vol. I, at p. 3.
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work and road traffic related claims. Acknowledging some
concern over tort, the Report's comment is:
"[T]he existence of a substantial no-fault scheme
for industrial accidents, and the significant
body of opinion which has drawn attention to the
adverse effects of the tort system in the field
of accident prevention, prompt serious
consideration of the abolition of the tort action
as a means of providing compensation for work
accidents. ,,34
The Report, however, concluded firmly against a general
policy of tort abolition. 35 Stapleton comments that,
tI [T] he espoused phi losophy of Pearson was a shift
from tort towards no-faul t but because of its
limited reading of its terms of reference it felt
it could not consider a comprehensive
scheme ..... [I]n other words, despite espousing a
needs basis and the goal of removing compensation
anomalies between the disabled, the whole thrust
of the report was to increase the anomalies and
complexi ties by this ad hoc approach which at
best delays reform and at worst entrenches
preferences which wi 11 further impede reform." 36
In relation to medical negligence, tort abolition was
seriously argued by some of those whom the Pearson
Commission consulted. Despite its findings and emphasis
110.
upon the difficulty of proving fault and causation, the
Report concluded, however, that
tI ••• we did not find these arguments strong enough
to justify making medical injuries a special. case
where tort liability would not apply, especlally
as we received much evidence from medical and
34pearson Report, vol. I, p. 193.
35pearson Report, vol. I, pp. 72-73, 193-195.
36Disease and the Compensation Debate, ci t. supra, at p .
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other witnesses which favoured the retention of
tort. ,,37
Some of the Commission's members, however, recorded that,





the arguments were finely balanced.
appreciate that circumstances may
that our conclusions may have to be
future. ,,38
However, some limited reforms were suggested, one of which
led to the passing of the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979,
a scheme which has since been described as "half-hearted". 39
40
If the interest in the compensation debate waned with
the non-implementation of many of Pearson's specific
recommendations, concern was soon to be revived. Although
the primarily American economic theorists had long
criticised tort,41 others, such as Atiyah,42 stapleton43 and
See Pearson Report, vol.
the question of medical
73.
of
37pearson Report, vol. I, p.
I, ch. 24, for consideration
negligence.
38pearson Report, vol. I, p. 291.
39Medicine, Patients and the Law, M. Brazier, Penguin, 1987,
at p. 145.
40 Fo r a discussion of the Pearson Report's findings in the
context of the modern law of medical negligence, see Medicine,

















42 Se e Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Peter
Cane, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, fourth edition, 1987.
43Disease and the Compensation Debate, J. stapleton,




have more recently mounted ba arrage of
criticism of tort 45 t d, a ren acknowledged by textbook
writers.46 47 48
In its modern form, the attack on delict and tort lS
mounted both on principle and on practical grounds. One of
the strongest exponents of the latter is represented ln the
study by Harris et al., 49 and a leading example of the
former is the work of Stapleton. 50 Against the reformers
44 t.i dCompensa lon an Support for Illness and Injury, D. Harris
et al., Oxford Socio-Legal Studies, Clarendon Press, Oxford
1984. This wide-ranging survey re-opens many of the pearso~
Report issues. Its authors conclude in favour of the abolition
of the current damages action in tort (and presumably delict)·. . ,
see lnter alla ch. 12.
45 Fo r a recent survey of out-of-court settlements in actions
for damages for personal injury, see Hard Bargaining, H. Genn,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
46An interesting comment is made in Clerk and Lindsell on
Torts, sixteenth edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1989, ch . 10,
"Negligence" (R. Dias and A. Tettenborn): "Much of the trouble
has stemmed from conceptualising "duty", "breach" and
"remoteness" and the superimposition of needless terminological
confusion through the indiscriminate use of technical jargon in
different senses. As the law of negligence stands, there is an
irreducible minimum of requirements of liability; and it was in
order to avoid conceptualising that these were set out in non-
technical language .... If these are to be abolished, then
negligence as a form of liability will have to be abolished too,
and some other basis, perhaps automatic insurance, substituted
in its place."
47See The Modern Law of




48 Se e also generally on tort Salmond and Heuston on the Law





are ranged the so-called "tort lawyers": for example,
Klar
5 1
and Abraham. 52 These commentators represent the core
of the debate.
stapleton's argument commences by identifying a
category of negligently-caused damage, for which she
demonstrates serious barriers to recovery of tort damages.
In turn, the fault principle, strict liability, no-fault
systems and causation are analysed. The implications for
the system of compensation, on a much broader canvas than
the law of tort, are worked out. These arguments are
considered because of their implications for the law of
medical negligence.
The starting point of Stapleton's thesis 1S to be
found in analysis of the categories of misfortune which
befall people. Broadly, the taxonomy employed by her is in
effect that of causation. One class, for which tort
damages are not exigible,
Another 1S that of accidents.
and proof coincide, these
1S that of natural disease.
Where legal fault, causation
of course will permit the
recovery of damages. The principal class which Stapleton
identifies and emphasizes 1S that of man-made disease.
This inhabits a partly overlapping zone between these other
two categories. As its name implies, man-made disease does




rise to an accidental injury, be it negligently or
otherwise. Nor, by definition, 1S it "natural" in origin.
They are " ... injuries traceable to a non-traumatic but man-
made source which might, therefore, 1n principle give rise
to a claim tort"·, the class of natural or innate
disablement and disease includes ft •• many cases where there
1S in fact a man-made cause not yet proven or suspected."s3
The next step in Stapleton's argument 1S the
observation that whereas traumatic accidents usually occur
at isolated and identifiable times and places, man-made
disease differs.
latency periods,
By contrast, it may demonstrate long-
uncertain or, more likely, unknown
aetiology or very gradual onset: the causing conditions
are not readily identifiable as occurring at a defini te
time and place. As they are man-made, some or all may
therefore be . . I "S4thought "in pr i.nc rp e to be tortiously
caused and therefore appropriate for the award of damages.
This, argues Stapleton, combined with the inherent
difficul ties of detection and proof for a tort action,
means that there is a major defect, both in principle and
in practice, a n the coverage of the present law. "No
figures exist on the number of tort claims made in relation
to non-traumatic injury, but from reported cases and the
S3Disease and the Compensation Debate, op. cit., at p. 4.
S4Disease and the Compensation Debate, op. cit., at p. 4.
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literature it appears clear that very few such claims are
made and for these the success rate is low.,,55
stapleton goes on to show how these characteristics of
man-made disease effectively constitute barriers to
recovery an a tort action. These include difficul ties
relating to time. With long-latency or gradual onset, such
conditions (some types of cancer are cited as an example)
may manifest themselves long after the carcinogenic
exposure has ceased. This, apart from (prescription and)
limitation lssues, may prevent a plaintiff even from
tracing a tortfeasor, far less for the law to exert a
deterrent effect. 56 It may also lead to difficulties in
meeting the burden of proof of fault. This lS because the
standard of care may not be well-established or articulated
at the time of exposure. More specifically, the court's
analysis of the defendant's conduct, an terms both of
57"knowledge" and "response", is hindered. As she comments,
this lS because the risk may well be insidious and
concealed, rather than obvious, and its "appreciation
depends on knowledge acquired through means other than
. ,,58common experlence. In addition, the fault issue requires
55Disease and the compensation debate, Ope cit., at p. 13.
56 Se e Neoclassical Difficulties: Tort Deterrence for Lat~nt
Injuries, W.L.F. Felstiner, P. Siegelman, 1989 Law and POI1Cy
309.
57Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at pp. 60-
87.
58Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p. 61.
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to be dealt with over a period of time, rather than at a
. 1 . 59 F b' 1 . 60s i nq e po i.n t . oreseea 1 1ty and response are discussed
in detail,61 and it is shown that for the court to engage 1n
the necessary evaluations is extremely difficult. This 1S
partly because of policy questions, and partly because of
the inherent nature of man-made disease,62 and the lack of
reliable data. 63 Procedural difficulties, and the self-
perpetuating pauci ty of case law in this area are also
d i d 641scusse . It is the present writer's view that these
arguments are made out sufficiently. An even greater
difficulty confronts the plaintiff, in Stapleton's view,
than establishing proof of fault: 65 establishing
forensically the necessary causal link.
The argument on causation 1S, once aqa i n , closely
related to the nature of the harm in question. As a result
59Disease and the Compensation Debate, op. cit., at p. 61-
62.
60Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p. 65 et
seg.
61Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p. 68 et
seq.
62supra
63An argument on breach of statutory duty may not be
available for a plaintiff in a man-made disease claim, either.
Once again, this is because of the intrinsic nature of such
disease. Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p.
78-79.
64Disease and the Compensation Debate, op. ci t., for example
at p. 86-87, and ch. 4 generally.
65Disease and the Compensation Debate, op. cit., especially
ch. 4, "Causation in Fact".
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of its ins idious nature, damage may occur In indirect,
subtle but nevertheless serious ways. Examples which are
quoted include genetic damage which may only be evident In
later generations, 66 impairment of growth, reduction In
intelligence and disease resistance. 67 The intrinsic
complexity of such issues is further complicated, medusa-
like, by the malign influence of multiple causation68 and
vary i.nq individual susceptibili ty. 69
that,
Stapleton comments
"[PJroof of medical causation is also extremely
diffi~ul~ ~her~ the disease was not due to, say,
the VIctIm s dIrect use of a product or direct
exposure to hazardous work conditions, but where
the source was more generally or indirectly
dispersed in the environment. For these and
other reasons the aetiology of man-made disease
presents the most complex conceptual and
practical challenges to both the tort system and
66 The recent debate over radioactive contamination at the
Sellafield nuclear reprocessing facility, and the controversial
advice to men working there, is a topical example of such a
possibility. In this case, the apparently clear demonstration
of a scientific link between the radioactive exposure and
specific harm to the babies/children of the workforce, is not
usually characteristic of such issues.
67 . d h t i D b t . t t 33 tDIsease an t e Compensa Ion e a e, Ope Cl ., a p. e
seq.
68Lawyers familiar with decisions such as Wilsher v. Essex
Area Health Authority [1988J 1 All E. R. 871 (H.L.), McGhee v.
National Coal Board 1973 1 W.L.R. 1 (H.L.) and Hotson v. East
Berkshire Health Authority [1987J A.C. 750 (H.L.) will need
little prompting to view causal issue as posing potentially huge
difficulties to legal analyses. Of these three cases, only the
facts of Wilsher genuinely disclose a multiple causation issue.
The other two are included to show that apparently more
straightforward cases may still create substantial problems.
69Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p. 33.
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" f auLt;" t.ino compensa lon schemes which are limited
on the basis of cause of disabili ty. ,,70
Several points of difficulty accruing to the plaintiff in
a man-made disease claim are articulated. 71 Amongst these
are the fact that it must be shown that the (potentially
tortious) hazard in question is in fact capable of causing
the disease.
72
She argues that this will not be possible in
many cases, and that the advances ln aetiological
understanding are slow and unsystematic. It is also stated
that the low incidence and prominence of some claims is
unlikely to provide an incentive for scientific
investigation;73 the scientific proof of these is doubtful,
70Disease and the Compensation Debate Ope cit., at p. 33.
As regards Stapleton's comment on limited no-fault schemes, the
writer will argue elsewhere that for medical negligence (and also
mishap), a limited "needs-based" treatment/hospital compensation
scheme is required. Although it is readily acknowledged that
such a proposal is ultimately conceptually unsatisfactory, it
will be argued that it is preferable to the existing system, and
that it is an acceptable compromise between that and Stapleton's
full "needs-based" compensation.
71Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at pp. 33
et seg.
72Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p. 34.
73 Th e "evergreen" advance of scientific knowledge has been
cited as a reason for doubting Stapleton's comment on this. The
wri ter shares Stapleton's pessimism on this issue: even if
present-day hazard-producing activi ties are more fully understood
in future, it seems likely that the rate of progress will produce
in parallel a stream of new hazards in future. In other words,
technological advancement is likely to continue to outstrip full
understanding of its long-term consequences. This will be so if
only because of the (currently) unavoidably small time-gap
between discovering and utilising new technologies: , It is
further submitted that this reflects the present posltlon, and
is likely to continue for as long as notional "soci~ty" cont~nues
to think that the benefits of such advances outwelgh the rlsks.
See Principle and Pragmatism in the Compensation Debate, K. S.
Abraham, supra, at pp. 306-307. Abraham's criticisms are dealt
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qui te apart from their legal proof. 74 The associated
d t 'I 76 77e al .
difficulties of distinguishing "gul'lty" .cause t.ive agents
from "innocent" ones are also discussed. 75 The potential to
work injustice ln some cases arising from the application
of the balance of probabilities test is also examined in
One fundamental difficulty which is identified
by Stapleton is that a tort claim may be based on omission
to provide safety precautions in appropriate cases: 78
" [I] n such cases the burden which under
traditional rules falls on the plaintiff involves
much greater difficulty: to show that, on the
balance of probabili ties, the victim's disease
was due to the omission. To do so, it must be
shown that: (i) the victim would probably have
used the omitted device or followed the product
advice; and (ii) the omission of the device had
more than doubled the likelihood of the disease
(or exacerbation) which is the subject of the
with generally infra.
74 So me of Stapleton's examples would now have been overtaken
by the strict liability regime in the Consumer Protection Act
1987, although the existence of the "development risks" defence
perhaps suggests "reasonable care".
75 ' d h t.i D b t i t, t 42 tDlsease an t e Compensa aon e a e, Ope Cl ., a p. e
seq.
76An analysis and cri ticism of the case of McGhee v.
National Coal Board, [1972J 3 All E. R.1008, is made by
Stapleton, Ope cit., at pp. 46-49. She argues inter alia that
the court in McGhee abandoned the one-to-one relationship between
damage accruing to the defender, and causal responsibility by the
tortfeasor. It now seems that any possible ambiguity in McGhee
which might be construed in favour of a defender is at least
reduced: see inter alia Proof of Causation in Medical Negligence
Cases, J. G. Logie, 1988 S.L.T. 25, and Further Reflections on
Medical Causation, A. F. Phillips, 1988 S.L.T. 325.
77Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at pp. 39-
42.
78Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p. 44
et seq.
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complaint ..... [A] gain, the fundamental problem is
that . t?e. plaintiff. can only deal in
probab1l1t1es, but w1th omissions these are
clearly muc~ mo~e ~iff~cu~t to assess. Firstly,
there lS an 1ntr1ns1c d1ff1culty in hypothesizing
what .a per~on' ~ p.robabls behaviour might have
been an an arnaq i.nery Sl tuation ... ,,79
A related difficulty to which attention is drawn is that of
assesslng 1n vacuo what the efficacy of the omitted
precaution might have been. It may therefore be seen that,
. h 80 h f hln suc cases, muc 0 t e establishment of a successful
claim rests upon a highly abstract and speculative basis.
Some attention lS also devoted in the argument to
related 1ssues, such as procedural and practical
difficulties. However, the main emphasis of her argument
is on the questions of proof of fault and of causation. We
now consider how these factors lead to her conclusion that
a compensation system based upon harm lS required. 81
Stapleton's primary concern in discussing reform is the
compensation goal, although deterrence and corrective
. t.i d i d 82JUs lce are 1scusse. Her rationale for the adoption of
79Disease and the Compensation Debate, op. cit., at p. 44.
80Again, some of Stapleton's examples have been overtaken by
the advent of the strict liability regime, under the Consumer
Protection Act 1987. However, it is thought that her arguments
are not unduly affected by this - if anything, they may be
strengthened. Examples quoted by her include silicosis and
byssinosis.
81Deterrence is discussed by Stapleton, supra, an chapter 6,
primarily in terms of economic theories.
82"[B]ut the principal debate in Engl.and arises ~rom ~he
widespread acknowledgment that in substantlal measure lt falls
to achieve its "corrective justice" goal, particularly its
compensatory aspect."; Stapleton, op. cit., at p. 104. The
comment is also made that, "[T]he contemporary focus on the
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a needs-based compensation scheme 1S based on two main
factors. One is that, by elimination, once the present
structure of fault and causation 1S shown to be
unsatisfactory, then the remaining cri terion is that of
harm or damage. Alternatively, Stapleton considers the
extent to which preferential treatment 1S justified under
a compensation scheme. 83 Once faul t 1S rejected as a
determinative criterion,84 as she has already argued, it
then becomes impossible to defend preferential treatment
where based only upon causal criteria. 85 Arguments are also
advanced from principle, requiring compensation based upon
86need. This synthesis87 is said to lead to harm as the
touchstone of compensation; limited schemes88 are also
compensation goal together with a rejection of the tort system
as its vehicle has led to a number of non-tort no-fault systems
for compensating particular groups of victims."; Stapleton, ~
cit., at p. 105.
83Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p. 108
et seq.
84supra
85Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p. 108-
109.
86 Se e, for example, Compensating Victims of Diseases, J.
Stapleton, 1985 5 Oxford J. Legal Studies 248 at p. 253 et seq.,
and Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., especially
ch. 7.
87"The conclusion is that once the tort system is abandoned
as an appropriate compensation mechanism there is no.rationa~
justification for preferential treatment. of the d1sabled.
Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope C1t., at p. 115.
88 r . e. pockets of strict liabili~y and limi ted no-faul t
systems: see Disease and the Compensat1on Debate, Ope cit., at
pp . 108-118.
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criticised as entailing problems of definition and scope,
whilst retaining the aetiological difficulty 1n
establishing causation. 89 90
Having set out her case for a needs-based system,
stapleton analyses several reform policy options. 91 These
include the Australian and New Zealand no-fault schemes,
earnings-related compensation systems, and other criteria
both in principle and in practice. 92 Ultimately, it is
argued that the expectations engendered by the tort system
must be re-assessed. This is because they could never, on
grounds of cost, be extended to satisfy the principle of
comprehensiveness. In practical terms, Stapleton also
89 Fo r a summary of this argument, see Disease and the
Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p. 142. Stapleton points out
that, by ignoring man-made disease, tort critics deprive
themselves of the most potent argument against tort. This 1S
stated to be on grounds both of compensation and deterrence. It
is also shown that deterrence is of minimal efficacy in cases of
man made disease, because of their insidious and long latency
characteristics.
90 I t may be thought that Stapleton concentrates too much
upon man-made disease, and that therefore her conclusions for the
tort system as a whole do not follow. However, in reply, it
must be pointed out that a large part of her argument is based
on distortions in compensation. If this is accepted, then it is
hard to justify retention of such a system. Despi te this,
however, Stapleton's criticism of the operat~on of deterrence in
respect of man-made disease does not establ1sh that deterrence
is ei ther undesirable in principle, or unworkable, in other areas
of the law of negligence.
91Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at pp. 142-
169.
92Disease and the Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at pp. 143-
169.
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acknowledges that establishing a comprehensive needs based
compensation system cannot be done quickly.93
Thus the first step in Stapleton's reform proposals is
to introduce a scheme which covers disease rather than
. d t 94accl en s. Several possible separate funds are canvassed ,
including the alleviation of income disruption, incapacity,
or flat-rate or earnings related state benefits made over
ln return for an assignation of the rights in tort of the
victim.
95
The choice of scheme would reflect the values and
priorities of the policy-maker.
It may thus be seen that, although Stapleton argues in
favour of the comprehensive, needs based compensation goal,
and discusses deterrence (in the context of man made
disease), her conclusions reflect a flexibility: this, it
is submitted, is desirable. I t need not undermine the
arguments advanced, but recognises the practical
difficulties of constructing a fully comprehensive system.
In acknowledging these factors, Stapleton argues for either
an alleviation of the shortcomings in tort visited upon man
made disease victims, or a systematic reform designed to
93Indeed, stapleton comments that, ".(T)he: idea of
comprehensive cover may itself be rejected outrlght ln the light
of practical and/or policy considerations. II Disease and the
Compensation Debate, Ope cit., at p. 169.
94Alongside the comprehensive goal. This step would an
practice remedy many of the distortions evident at present.
95 Se e Disease and the compensation Debate, Ope cit., at pp.
158-183, and Compensating Victims of Disease, Ope cit., at pp.
266-268.
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eliminate indefensible distortions r n principle and
practice. We may now turn to a systematic cri tique of
these arguments.
Abraham's counter-arguments
Although Abraham states that he is "largely sympathetic,,96
to Stapleton's views, if the implications of his critique
are accepted, then little remains of the original thesis.
Abraham's first point 1S that it is not established
that man-made disease 1S a numerically significant
97
problem. He concludes from this that if so, the fact that
such victims are unable to obtain compensation is not of
"great moment". 98 Doubting the validity of the examples of
adverse drug . 99react10ns and asbestosis and others, he
argues that the size of the class is not established. He
describes man-made disease as a "possibili ty" . 100 There 1S
nothing, he adds, to prove that in future, circumstances
will arise which will give rise to man-made disease.
96principle and Pragmatism in the Compensation Debate, K. S.
Abraham, 1987 7 Oxford J. Legal Studies 302-308.
97Abraham, op. cit., at p. 303.
98Abraham, op. cit., at p. 303.
99These of course would now fall wi thin the ambi t of the
Consumer Protection Act 1987, and its strict liabili ty and
development risks defence.
lOoAbraham, op. ci t., at pp. 303-304.
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The second criticism is that Stapleton has not
adequately made out her argument that there are major
conceptual and procedural barriers to recovery of damages
by man-made disease victims. Abraham founds on the fact
that, whilst ostensibly considering the British aspects of
this debate, Stapleton makes copious reference to American
101cases. Thus, Abraham argues that the wider Amer ican
exper1ence 1S germane to her conclusions. The
transatlantic exper aence , it 1S argued, shows that the
admittedly high barriers to recovery in man-made disease
and similar cases are being relaxed to a degree. This,
plus several other alleged advantages of American
practice,102 is put forward as "closing the gap,,103 between
defendant and plaintiff. However, other commentators, such
as Atiyah, would disagree fundamentally with this. 104
However, a further argument advanced against
stapleton's views is Abraham's third and final one. He
disputes the proposition advanced by Stapleton that man-
made disease is not susceptible of deterrence by the tort
mechanism. His position 1S that where deterrence 1S
achieved by tort, then this excuses - and indeed justifies
101Abraham, Ope cit., at pp , 304-305.
102Su c h as contingency fees, class actions and "market
share" liability: Abraham, Ope cit., at pp. 304-305.
103Abraham, Ope cit., at p. 305.
104No-Faul t Compensation: A Question That will Not Go Away,
P.S. Atiyah, 1980 Insurance L.J. 625, at p. 628 et seg.
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- non-uniform compensation. 105 Whilst acknowledging the
difficulty of deterring (and proving) the non-traumatic
harm accruing from human activities, it is argued that the
future may well bring a greater understanding of the
hazards and aetiology of such human activities. Were this
the case, it would be possible eventually to construct a
third-party insurance scheme so arranged as to penalize, by
cost of premiums, the authors of the highest risks. This,
of course, would render the existing system far more
efficacious ln providing compensation than it lS at
106present. Vennell has commented that "[U] nfortunately
there is very little information available as to whether or
not the possibility of a civil claim, or the law of torts
itself, acts as a deterrent. ,,107 More seriously, Abraham
goes on to consider the wider question of needs-based
t · 108compensa lone This is based on the view that the tort
system has engendered a high expectation of compensation ln
the public, and that to reduce significantly the level of
recompense under a new system would at the least be
10SAbraham, Ope cit., at p. 305 et seg.
106This indirect admission appears to underly various of
Abraham's comments.
107Th e Scope of National No-Fault Accident Compensat~on ln
Australia and New Zealand, M.A. Vennell, 1975 49 Australlan L.
J. 22, at p. 23.
108Th i s is described as loss-based by Abraham, Ope cit., at
p. 307.
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undesirable. 109 Ultimately, Abraham admits that the tort
system has raised feelings of entitlement to compensation
that 1n some cases it 1S unable to satisfy. Then,
accepting that a disease- or loss-based system would not,
at least initially, be able to compensate all according to
need, he asks whether by comparison the present accident
preference in tort is unjustifiable. He concludes that "a
needs principle may ... be the proper touchstone for
evaluating the justice of modern compensation schemes. But
there 1S a difference between an argument from such a
principle, and an argument for it .... [T]he practical
success of her proposals ... probably will depend a good deal
more on the abili ty of reformers to explain why that
principle should be adopted. ,,110
It may be seen from this debate that departure from
uniform, needs-based compensation may be unavoidable. This
may be on grounds of principle or practicalities or both.
Ul timately, it may be conceded that such a response is
unsatisfactory. So far as cri ticism by Abraham on the
argument to needs-based compensation is concerned, it is
submitted that it is implied, although perhaps not express,
within the greater premise of Stapleton's argument. This
argument would presumably run along the lines that as
similar injuries or disabilities cause equal suffering to
109Cf . New Zealand's no-fault answer, M. Whincup, 1988
N.L.J. 474 at p. 475.
110Abraham, Ope cit., at p. 308.
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their subjects, then prima facie no class of subjects
should be denied such financial relief as is available on
grounds of cause. The cause, by the time the injury had
occurred, would be irrelevant to the degree of sUffering.
In cases of equal suffering, there would be equal need for
financial amelioration. An extension of this argument, and
one which it 1S thought 1S not necessary to establish
Stapleton's point in favour of needs-based compensation, is
that all individuals suffer equally from equivalent
condi tions, and that because of this, they should be
compensated equally, if compensated at all, for misfortune.
However attractive this argument may be, it must be
balanced against the counter-proposition which this
suggests. The counter-argument is that there must be some
limit to what is the subject of compensation, otherwise a
notional norm (or ideal) would be needed against which all
deficiencies or deviations would attract compensation.
This would entail, if pursued, compensation for everything
imaginable which would import the familiar judicial
"floodgates" argument about uncontrolled compensation and
in turn expendi ture . An interesting issue has been the
(now successful) pressure upon the U. K. Government for
compensation for haemophiliacs who acquired the H. I. V.
f
. III
virus through blood trans US1on.
111Haemophilia, AIDS, and no fault compensation, P. Jones,
1987 B.M.J. 944.
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In this context, it 1S interesting that delict/tort
compensation perpetuates inequalities in various ways. Not
only does the aetiology of the injury or disease impose
these, but once the legal requirements are satisfied, the
way 1n which damages are calculated also does so,
especially where they are calculated on loss of earnings,
which accepts ab initio that individuals vary in earning
capacity. However, it is thought that in general anomalies
and inequalities should be avoided by a legal system unless
strong reasons may be adduced in justification.
So far as compensation for medical negligence 1S
concerned, as soon as the ambit of this is attempted to be
defined, difficulties of causation (and of scope l 12 )
immediately arise. In turn, this pre-supposes that the
victims of medical negligence are treated differently from
other accident, delict and disease victims. But in the
light of these arguments, it 1S thought that an ideal
mechanism for compensating those who suffer injury from
medical negligence would be to include them in an expanded
social security system which would compensate according to
need and not cause, r n resource terms to whatever the
extent that society generally would be willing to fund.
Such a decision, and the level of resources devoted to it,
112 Th e New Zealand scheme did not actually abolish the tort
remedy of damages; it merely rendered it unavailable. It has
been argued that even this may permit some residu~l to:t
deterrent effect to linger, al though the present wr i ter 1S
sceptical of this. See, Some Kiwi Kite-Flying, M.A. Vennell,
1975 N.Z.L.R. 254 at pp. 255 - 257.
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would require to be considered In the appropriate
democratic fora. In order to mi tigate the "floodgates"
risk, a (problematic) set of criteria would need to be
developed to restrict compensation to more tangible,
deficiencies.
substantial injuries and to exclude all minor or cosmetic
It must be conceded that, apart from the
issues of principle involved, this would be at some risk of
being impracticable and expensive. Such an approach,
though, might be amenable to risk analysis and
management. 113
In the light of the "principle of scarce resources",
the approach proposed IS a compromise, al though it lS
conceded that this re-introduces causal criteria. This lS
fel t to be unavoidable short of full-scale compensation
according to need. Thus, those who suffered injury from
medical negligence would have in common that the medical
quality control groups, and/or Medical Audit Boards, would
have considered their case ln the context of the standard
of care. Such a category of claimant would already have
been identified, and his or her medical condition assessed.
It is submitted that (ideally) an appropriate independent
doctor, if resources should permit, failing which the
proposed body, should also make a determination as to
113Th e Institutionalization of Risk, A.J. Reiss, 1989 Law
and Policy 392. Risk management and analysis has been.exam~ned
within the nuclear power industry for some years: Managlng R~sk:
Managing Uncertainty in the British Nuc~ear Installatlons
Inspectorate, P.K. Manning, 1989 Law and POI1Cy 350.
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whether a patient was entitled to compensation. This would
not involve any consideration of whether the doctor or
other medical personnel had been negligent but would simply
reflect that individual's need. Criteria similar to those
utilised in the Swedish system (as to aetiology) would be
needed to exclude non-iatrogenic harm from compensation,
unless a full needs-based system were adopted, and
resources so permitted. 114 If this determination were made
by the bodies responsible for monitoring the standard of
care, this would be justified on the grounds of
practicali ty and economy, a.n the light of the arguments
advanced above regarding the separation of assessment of
the standard of care and the provision of compensation. 115
The compensation thus allowed would be administered and
paid through the relatively efficient and
. .lnexpenslve
conduit of the social security system; it would be up to
the claimant to forward his certificate to the social
security authorities to claim his entitlement. It is also
suggested that in order to simplify the payment of
compensation, a "banding" system be devised whereby r n
several tiers, levels of compensation suitable for varying
114Arguably avoiding issues of scope which have bedevilled
the New Zealand scheme, for example wh?ther preqnancy and
childbirth following a failed sterilisat:on .came Wlt.h i.n the




J. 19, at p.
Incentive Issues in the Design of No-Fault
h M J Tre b i l c o c k , 1989 39 Univ. Toronto L.sc emes, ..
45 et seq.
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levels of disability, injury or pain be provided. Of
necessity, criteria would require to be devised in order to
prevent the system being overwhelmed with a mass of trivial
I . . 116app 1cat1ons. It 1S proposed that criteria such as
whether pain is suffered and its nature and degree, whether
an individual's normal life and activities are curtailed
and to what extent, whether time absent from work 1n excess
of a certain number of days (ten 1S suggested), and
similar, be applied. 117 Such a scheme, grafted on to the
existing social security arrangements, would, it 1S
submitted, be relatively inexpensive and efficient and
would avoid the complication, delay and expense of
litigation. Furthermore, it 1S arguable that the
arrangements for Crown indemni ty, which allow a certain
"pooling" of claims payments to be made between authorities
(slightly analogous to an 1nsurance scheme for Crown
bodies, not normally able to insure), represents a step
towards such a reform. 118
116 I n Holland, anyone who loses over 15~ of their ~arn~ng
capaci ty because of disease receives com~ensat1on. Causat~on 1S,
other than this minimal threshold requ1rement, not cons1dered.
However concern is mounting at the recent 13% proportion of the
workfor~e claiming under this scheme, payments amounting to a 5%
bUdget of the Dutch national net income: "13% of Dutch workers
"disabled" ", J. Verbeek, 1991 B.M.J. 1495 at pp. 1495-1496.
117 Th e details of such an approach would be subject to
review and research.
118 Se e Who pays for clinical negligence? J. Tingle, 1991
N.L.J. 630, at p. 631.
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This
The amounts of compensation payable would in turn be
determined by the resources devoted to the scheme.
would ultimately be determined democratically in the light
of ambient economic condi tions. It .1S envisaged that
Parliament would determine the matter. If the affordable
initial level of resources was too low to provide
meaningful compensation, despite the suggested limitations
above, it is acknowledged that a choice as to whether to
adopt the new scheme 1n preference to the existing
arrangements would then have to be made. Nevertheless,
readers are referred to Chapter VI and to the submission
reported therein, that the £50 million currently spent on
compensation for medical negligence could be re-deployed to
provide sufficient funding for a no-fault scheme. It is
submitted that savings in the cost of litigation would also
result from an alternative compensation mechanism; ln
Sweden, 14% of the Patient Compensation Scheme's budget is
d . . t t' 119spent on a m1nlS ra lon and few take up the tort
litigation option. 120 The average delay before compensation
. h t . two months .121 Inis paid under the Swed1s sys em 1S
support of some reform of compensation may be cited
119Dealing with Medical Malpract~ce: The British and
Swedish Experience, M.M. Rosenthal, Tav1stock, 1987, at p. 176.
120Ki ng,S Fund study, supra, at p. 23.
121Rosenthal, Ope cit., table 19, at p. 180.
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pressure towards regular payments of damages wi thin so-
called "structured settlements" .122
This proposal has been made on the premise that this
might be a first step towards a needs-based scheme which
in its entirety might be too expensive, or alternatively
that the existing arrangements for medical negligence
claimants require reform. However, it is submitted that it
is possible to advance arguments in favour of a seemingly
preferential system for such individuals. The most obvious
approach is that the existing arrangements purport to treat
this category of claimant equally with other sufferers of
delictual injury. If this is correct, it is submitted that
it fails adequately to achieve this goal. It has already
been seen that medical negligence claims are more difficult
and time-consuming to sustain than other comparable
1
. 123calms. Thus the argument r.n favour of preference
reverts merely to that of restoring this class to the
status quo ante. Alternatively, it might be argued that
the state, in providing the National Health Service, has a
moral obligation which should be reflected in potential
legal liability to those of whose injuries it has been the
author. The counter-argument is that it lS enough to
provide such a service for the general good, and that
episodes of harm-causing negligence are an unavoidable
122E . g. Structured settlements - an unexploi ted opportuni ty,
H. Witcomb, 1990 N.L.J. 88.
123 Se e chapter I and chapter VI.
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pr i ce to pay for its general benefi ts. This approach
involves a similar risk/reward analysis but with different
starting values.
However, if compensation were provided to everyone
wi th a disabili ty, measured upon an abstract scale of
ae r i ouaries s , then the mere fact that the route to that
compensation by one individual happened to be via a medical
audi t board or similar, which society had decided to
incorporate within the broad outlines of its social
security system, would not infringe arguments against
preferences. Inasmuch as presently disadvantaged, the
Practical
victim of medical negligence may be seen as analogous to
stapleton's victim of man-made disease. If he has suffered
through exposure to a mechanism which society has provided,
and perhaps which a patient has no choice but to utilise,124
then ensuring compensation may become a rational preference
or goal supported from a desire not to engender unnecessary
suffering in consequence of state provision.
difficulties, such as those of the patient's understanding
of the way in which his injury arose, 125 may also justify
preferential compensation, if the present proposal indeed
is such. It is also envisaged that generally for a patient
(and a doctor, mutatis mutandis) there would be a right of




not arise in many other categories of injury
delict/tort system, such as road traffic
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appeal to a higher medical tribunal, and thence one further
appeal to a court of law of equal or greater rank to the
Court of Session. For the doctor, this would be if he had
been censured as to his professional conduct; for the
patient only if a procedural mistake or equivalent abuse of
discretion had taken place. The election which the patient
would have made originally to avail himself of compensation
under the proposed scheme would not be invalidated by such
an appeal; he would not be permitted to make a claim in
delict or tort at this stage in the proceedings but merely
to obtain a judicial reV1ew of the exercise of the
procedures. The .ma1n assessment of compensation for
care,
medical negligence under the proposed scheme would, it is
suggested, be undertaken by general practi tioners; some
payment, preferably small, would clearly require to be made
to such doctors for this. It is suggested that a system of
tiers of compensation would reduce the resources required
1n this context to the minimum, at some cost in accuracy.
It 1S also suggested, with hesitation, that unless rn
receipt of social security benefits, claimants be required
to pay this themselves simply to reduce the financial
burden upon the proposed scheme.
So far as the provisions dealing with the standard of
accountability and deterrence are concerned, these
have already been adverted to. Although evidence and data
regarding negligent practices are virtually non-existent,
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there is a certain amount of evidence that some of the
symptoms are
" ... deficient data from case-notes .... inadequate
provision of emergenc'y, services, low necropsy
rates, poor supervlslon of junior staff
(particularly senior house officers ln
h t · ) 126anaest e lCS, and surgeons operating outside
their special ty ... ,,127
It lS worth recapitulating that the proposed reform
envisages the equal importance of compensation and (broad)
deterrence, and that two methods would primarily be used to
detect cases in which an audit of clinical jUdgment would
be carried out. The first of these is the patient-driven
reporting system. Any adverse outcomes, especially if
unexpected, causing disappointment, could be included
within this. As the clinical audit system would only be
linked to a simple assessment of compensation, inasmuch as
economy of resources required the same bodies to
adjudicate, and not as a mechanism for actually providing
it, it would be likely to detect and resolve cases in which
previously there would have been a desire for a simple
explanation and apology. This might reduce the number of
claims and the potential bitterness of some patients
126 r n relation to this, the writer has already argued
(supra, ch. 2) that the law does not allot sU~ficient liabili~y
and responsibility to those who supervise junlor doctors. ThlS
is included within the proposed scheme.
127Th i s refers only to deaths s,urroun~ing surg~cal
op t ' NeE POD· Revisiting perloperatlve mortallty,era lons. . .
N.W. Morrell, W.A. Seed, 1992 B.M.J. 1128, at p. 1128.
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arguably fostered by the present adversarial system. 128
Against this it could be argued that there is a risk of a
flood of complaints. This possibility is acknowledged by
order to contain it.
the writer, and the system might have to be restricted ln
Equally, it is arguable that claims
would be better deal t wi th under this scheme than to
proceed to a long, expensive and more stressful litigation.
Furthermore, it is submitted that such a scheme would meet
Brown's objection, to both fault and no-fault schemes, that
deterrence is only available by a risk-rated premium or
contribution system. 129
If a patient wished to make a report under the
proposed system, he would be barred from exercising a
remedy ln litigation on the grounds of negligence, and thus
would be obliged, if compensation was desired and
appropriate, to apply under the compensation mechanism. It
is anticipated that few would opt to exercise a remedy ln
d 1 , . d 130e lct, as ln Swe en. Inasmuch as the proposed approach
overlaps with existing complaints procedures, it lS
128There is some evidence from a large Danish study that
those most likely to be dissatisfied with treatment are the
elderly and those who have rec.eived ,or a.re rec~iving higher
education. See, Patients' n i s sa t i.s f ac t Lon wi t.h Medlcal Treatment
and Their Reaction, E. Segest, 1988 Medicine and Law 205.
129Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, C. Brown,
Univ. of Western Ontario L. Rev. 111, at p. 154.
130supra. Finland opera.tes broadly sim.ilar no-fault
- d S ter alia "Nocompensation schemes to those r n Swe en. ,ee ,=l.=..;;n:.....::....:: -::-
Fault" in Finland: paying patients and drug v i.c t.Lms , M. Brahams,
1988 N.L.J. 678.
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submitted that these should be subsumed within the proposed
system, as its scope would be wider. For clari ty, the
self-reporting by doctors would be wholly confidential
(i.e. could not give rise to disciplinary consequences) in
order to encourage their participation in the suggested
scheme; however, matters raised by patients (and others)
could, whether or not already self-reported by the doctor,
be referred by the proposed bodies to the G.M.C. if
necessary. I t is submi t ted that this would l.mprove the
efficiency and efficacy of the proposed scheme and medical
practice; thus, complaints would be included within it and
automatically dealt with at the most appropriate level, as
discussed elsewhere.
Apart from this, the ma i n mechanism by which the
medical audit or quality control system would operate would
be by the suggested Medical Audi t Board. As has been
mentioned above, this body would undertake several
functions. If a patient were dissatisfied by the
consideration q i.veri to his report by the medical audit
group of local doctors at first instance, he would be able
to appeal to the Medical Audit Board. Its personnel would
comprise doctors, perhaps academic doctors, qualified in
the same medical discipline as those being considered, and
a lawyer. The approach of the Board, and also of the
quality control circles and peer review audits presently
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being introduced into the N. H. S. ,131 would not be
adversarial but inquisitorial, and would not be
disciplinary or judgmental, although (as mentioned) clearly
a power to report doctors to the General Medical Council
would be needed to cope in sUitably serious cases. It is
not thought that the proposed scheme would sUbstantially
affect the operation of the disciplinary machinery of the
latter, or the operation of Fatal Accident Inquiries where
appropriate to the present discussion. In addition, the
proposed Boards, like the Mental Welfare Commission, would
be required to undertake a study of samples across varying
specialties as a random investigation of the standard of
care. The composition and qualification of Board members
would clearly require to be varied as appropriate for such
exerclses. This partly pro-active jurisdiction could not
cover all medical treatment, and indeed could not be
expected to, but would nevertheless consti tute an
addi tional check and balance. It is suggested that it
should seek to audit a certain proportion, perhaps between
two and four per centum, of consultations across the range
of hospital and general practice. Private medicine, it is
thought, would not initially be included within this
mechanism, but could be included subsequently if
appropriate, and in the light of experience. The Board's
131Se e generally, The approp~i~te use ,of diagnostic
Medl' c a l audl't l'n cllnlcal practlce and medicalservices: (xiii)
education, D.A. Heath, 1986 18 Health Trends 74.
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prlmary function would be the lmprovernent of the standard
of care, and its findings, in order to safeguard its
independence and non-disciplinary character, would be
inadmissible in (any legal and) G.M.C. proceedings against
doctors and health boards, authorities or opted-out N.H.S.
hospitals. The G.M.C., if a matter were referred to it,
would thus require to conduct its own independent
investigation. The standard of care which such a Board
would operate would be that of "acceptable practice": 132
"[N]o matter whether the doctor is held liable
for negligence or whether there is insurance
coverage for medical misadventure, decisive is
whether or not the treatment measures up to the
standard of medical science at the time of the
treatment. ,,133
This would combine a substantially objective approach
tempered with subjective elements: some allowance could
therefore be made for a junior doctor who had been on duty
for extended hours, 134 or who had not been sufficiently
supervised. The difficulties in interpretation of medical
evidence, exemplified in Hughes v. Waltham Forest Health
132supra
133Medical Malpractice and Medical Misadventure in New
Zealand: Public Insurance in Lieu of Private Liability as
Administered by the Courts a~d. the Accident Compensation
Commission, E. Deutsch, 1982 Medlclne and Law 345, at p. 353.
134A junior doctor has been held in Engl~nd to have a right
of action against his employi~g health a~thorlty where damage to
his health arose through worklng exceSSlve hours: Johnstone v.
Bloomsbury Health Authority 1991 2 W.L.R. 1362.
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Authori tv, 135 would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, the
basic separation of assessment of the standard of care and
compensation would reduce the impact and complexi ty of
causal enquiry; this could only be removed entirely by the
adoption of a needs-based compensation system with wholly
separate accountability provisions. It is suggested that,
as with the courts, the proposed Board's meetings would be
open for patients, doctors and their relatives to attend.
This would not be compulsory, unless they were required to
be interviewed or examined by the Board, and the emphasis
would be upon openness, explanation and the avoidance of
future mishaps. Although as it is conceived this would
apply to adverse outcomes and patient disappointment, the
primary, de facto focus of the scheme would be upon cases
of medical negligence. However, if resources and
experience wi th the scheme were to suggest it, such a
system could be widened to incorporate all "medical
accidents" or even be adapted to assess compensation in the
event that a needs-based compensation scheme were ever
adopted. These suggestions seek to enhance accountability,
reduce antagonism and the adversarial characteristics of
the present system,136 and improve the standard of care.
135 I n the court of Appeal. Reported in Medicine and the
Law: Conflicts of Medical Evidence, D. Brahams, 19?1 The La~cet
841-842. See also generally, Complaints aga1nst Med1cal
Practitioners, M.C. Meston, 1989 S.L.T. (News) 69.
136Se e, Alternatives to Litigation: Factors in Choosing, J.
Effron, 1989 52 M.L.R. 480.
381
Conclusions
This thesis has attempted the ambitious task of trying to
identify, diagnose and suggest treatment for the ills of
the legal mechanisms for dealing with medical negligence,
ln addition to setting out the main substantive principles
of the relevant Scots law. It has also sought to explain
the working of the main driving principles behind the
appropriate body of law, and to examine and criticise the
deficiencies an the present approach. However, it 1S
thought that there should be a balance in such assessments,
and it is submitted that the plight of a doctor accused of
negligent practice should be considered just as that of the
patient. Similarly, criticism should ultimately be
constructive rather than merely destructive. Accordingly,
the writer has sought to identify the aims of the present
system, and to avoid discarding these with aspects of their
incarnation into the current legal regime. These aims
appear to be worthwhi Le ones, and they have therefore
formed the underpinning principles for the writer's
proposals for reform. Whilst acknowledging that
reservations must inevitably accompany them, the foregoing
suggestions are put forward not as a complete solution, but
rather as a starting point for consideration of reform of
the present system for dealing with medical negligence. It
is accepted that they are unlikely to provide a panacea.
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However, the writer is concerned that the present system
perpetuates unnecessary difficul ties1 3 7 and stresses for
both sides
1 3 8
of litigation in medical negligence - about
which a system of justice must be vigilant and strive to
minimise. If the analysis ln this thesis, and these
suggestions for improvements, assist in this process or its
consideration in any way, the aims of the writer will have
been amply fulfilled.
137 Se e A Review of the Civil Justice Review: Economic, . t Litigation, T.M. Swanson, 1990Theories Behind the Delays ln Tor
43 Current Legal Problems 185.
138As regards the defender who is a fPro~essilonma;n s~~~ ~~~
. ff t see The pro ess ronanegligence and 1 ts e ec s, 1043.
spurious claim, o. Catchpole, 1990 N.L.J.
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